CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION AT THE MARGINS OF THE WELFARE STATE

Edited by
Marianne Takle, Janikke Solstad Vedeler, Mi Ah Schoyen, Kjetil Klette-Bøhler and Asgeir Falch-Eriksen
This book presents a critical account of how citizenship unfolds among socially marginalised groups in democratic welfare states. Legal, political and sociological perspectives are applied to offer an assessment of the extent and depth of citizenship for marginalised groups in countries which are expected to offer their members a highly inclusive form of citizenship.

The book studies the legal and political status of members of a nation-state, and analyses how this is followed up in practice, by examining the subjective feelings of membership, belonging or identity, as well as opportunities to participate actively and be included in different areas of society.

Showing how the welfare state and society treat citizens at risk of social exclusion and offering new insights into the conceptual interconnection between citizenship, social exclusion, and the democratic welfare state, the book will be of interest to all scholars, students and academics of social policy, social work and public policy.

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The editors are grateful to the Norwegian Social Research (NOVA), Oslo Metropolitan University, for financial support and the priority to develop this volume. Without such support the project would not have come about.
Citizenship among socially marginalised groups

This book grapples with the question of how socially marginalised groups experience social exclusion in democratic welfare states. In order to answer this question, it draws on resources both from legal-political and sociological perspectives. From a legal-political perspective, we study the legal and political status individuals hold as politically recognised members of a nation-state and analyse how this is followed up in practice. From a sociological perspective, we examine individuals’ and group members’ subjective perceptions of membership, belonging and identity, as well as their opportunities to participate and potential barriers to participating and being included in society. These two perspectives offer lenses through which we can assess the extent and depth of citizenship for marginalised groups in countries that should be situated to provide an inclusive form of citizenship to most of their members (Kourachanis, 2020; Taylor-Gooby, 2019).

A special focus on the Norwegian welfare state allows us to examine what we can learn from how a generous welfare state provides for its citizens. One conclusion derived from this book is that even highly ambitious and resource-rich welfare states categorise individuals into “in- and out-groups” (Tajfel, 1979). These patterns emerge due to unequal or stratified access to national welfare institutions (Stokke, 2017). More importantly, our findings pose new questions regarding how to re-organise social welfare and design policies that reduce or minimise social stratification in all types of welfare states.

The book has been written against a rather gloomy backdrop, in which even fully socially and economically integrated households have had their quality of life tested. This turns our attention to the different social groups that struggle and are likely to be disproportionately affected when multiple crises erupt around the world. Nation-states, labour markets and local communities, which are all key arenas for exercising and expressing citizenship, have experienced turbulent times since the turn of the century. Across Europe and beyond, millions of people have experienced a drawn-out period of economic hardship since the 2007–2009 Great Recession. Since 2020, the global COVID-19 pandemic has represented another extended shock, but this time, it has affected not only the global economy. The pandemic has also led to illness, death and severe social and economic disruptions for millions.

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of people. On top of this, Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, and war broke out on the European continent. In the following months, Europe had to cope with almost unprecedented inflationary pressures, along with an energy crisis. Furthermore, the summer of 2022 was characterised by several heatwaves, periods of drought and record-high temperatures in many European countries.

The main objective of the book is twofold. First, we show how the welfare state and society at large treat citizens at risk of social exclusion. Second, we provide new insights into the conceptual interconnections between citizenship, social exclusion and the democratic welfare state. To achieve these objectives, the chapters demonstrate how the welfare state offers legal, social and economic protection to some groups, while others face significant marginalisation and the risk of social exclusion at different life-course stages. The core of the welfare state is that the state has collective responsibility for the well-being of its citizens. The types of welfare arrangements a state chooses are the result of decisions made through democratic bodies. Democratic decisions establish the framework for whether and how the welfare state includes and excludes its citizens. While a further conceptual clarification of the welfare state can be found in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 offers theoretical discussions of citizenship and how to understand social exclusion.

The book builds on the scholarly literature on citizenship. With his seminal book *Citizenship and Social Class*, T. H. Marshall (1950) kicked off modern citizenship studies, aiming to foster theoretical and empirical insights into citizenship in democratic welfare states. This literature has generally concentrated on expanding civic, political and social rights, thereby emphasising the process of ensuring social integration through political means (Banting & Kymlicka, 2017; Preuss, 2016). However, Marshall developed his concept of citizenship in the context of modernisation through industrialisation, the political regulation of capitalism, the expansion of democratic rights and nation-states that developed welfare systems. This book discusses whether contemporary models of citizenship are compatible with new and complex challenges to the democratic welfare state.

Altogether, the chapters explore further the processes described by Bloemraad et al. (2019), through which a broadening of the civic and political dimensions of citizenship in the Global North seems to be accompanied by a reduction of the social rights of citizenship. The authors’ point of departure is Marshall’s argument that modern societies are characterised by a progressive extension of civil, political and social rights to a larger number of individuals, recognising, in principle, the right of citizens to a minimum standard of living. Contrary to this expectation, Bloemraad et al. do not see a corresponding expansion of the allocation of welfare entitlements. They have explored the processes via which the broadening of legal, social and cultural membership in Western societies has not been followed by a parallel extension of social rights to members belonging to these newly included groups, such as racial, sexual and religious minorities and immigrants.

In this book, we build further on their documentation of increased tensions around social citizenship. We thereby contribute to the scholarly debate on citizenship by identifying forms of national “membership without social citizenship”
(Bloemraad et al., 2019). This refers to those who possess national citizenship – or are residents of a specific welfare state – but still fail to obtain their social rights in practice. We elaborate on whether and how citizens may not have formal access to certain social rights or struggle to exercise these rights in practice, which are crucial for economic security, a sense of social inclusion and the individual opportunity to live a decent life.

As opposed to political rights, such as the right to vote or stand as a candidate in general elections, many social rights and obligations are detached from formal national citizenship in most European welfare states. For instance, the right to healthcare tends to be granted to foreign nationals when they obtain the status of legal residents. Similarly, the replacement rate of cash benefits, including sick pay and disability benefits, unemployment benefits, old age pensions and paid parental leave, is generally closely linked to formal employment and previous payments of statutory social insurance contributions (Taylor-Gooby, 2019).

Across multiple chapters, the book provides empirical analyses that shed light on what citizenship entails in highly advanced post-industrial democratic societies. This particularly applies to questions of incorporation in or coverage by national welfare systems, which typically consist of social rights and regulations and a range of cash and in-kind social benefit programmes or schemes. By including legal-political and sociological perspectives on citizenship in this volume, we attempt to increase our analytical leverage and thus identify the achievements and weaknesses of existing welfare programmes and institutions. However, the aim of this book is not to assess the merits or shortcomings of the welfare state per se but, rather, to use empirical cases to shed light on the challenges relevant across nation-states.

The book is divided into two parts:

- **Part I:** These chapters examine the laws and public policies determining membership in terms of legal rights or bureaucratic rules governing citizens’ access to social protection. This entails exploring how institutions establish rules, procedures and norms that generate and communicate membership. Furthermore, some of the chapters examine how practices are institutionalised by the organisations that mediate the relationship between individuals and the state.
- **Part II:** We examine the on-the-ground experiences of social exclusion based on interpersonal interactions and understandings of meaning. This includes how individuals and groups experience and perceive the implementation of social rights in practice.

Each chapter places an empirical case in a context that illuminates the dynamics affecting processes of social exclusion. In this way, the chapters contribute to current debates about how today’s political and social order is under pressure. Many of the challenges expressed and addressed nationally stem from societal and environmental changes that do not respect national borders. These global challenges imply that the nation-state model of citizenship has been challenged. This has led to new discussions about denationalised, transnational, post-national and cosmopolitan
citizenship (Glick Schiller, 2018; Sassen, 2002; Soysal, 1994). Moreover, it has led to discussions about how citizenship continues to be unfinished and is in the process of being reconstructed (Clarke, 2022).

Some of the consequences of global challenges regarding national citizenship are addressed in the various chapters of this book. These challenges include how environmental damage puts welfare states under pressure to find new sustainable solutions for future welfare. The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly spread to all corners of the world, putting even more pressure on citizens’ social lives and financial positions. States are deregulating markets within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism, and there is increasing economic insecurity and limited labour market opportunities for marginalised groups. Borders are open for some people who are increasingly living transnational lives. Still, there are challenges related to the new forms of belonging and membership in political entities. Through a direct focus on the processes of social exclusion, we illuminate how, where and why the boundaries of a democratic welfare state are drawn. Accordingly, the book analyses how various concepts of citizenship may lead to varying forms of social inclusion or exclusion.

Most chapters draw upon Norwegian data, but each chapter will provide empirically rich insights into the dynamics of social exclusion that will be far from unique to the Norwegian case. Instead, we are addressing challenges recurrent in most post-industrial and emerging welfare states, as evidenced by the three chapters exploring other country cases. Compared to the chapters addressing the “Nordic or Universal” welfare state model, these additional cases illustrate some significant challenges that are currently faced by societies in “liberal” and “truncated” welfare states, the United States and Latin America, respectively. In addition, one chapter compares Norway and Romania. In this way, these chapters provide relevant insights into the opposing forces involved in the relationships between social exclusion, the exercise of citizenship and welfare state policies across national contexts. The chapter on the United States analyses how employers’ attitudes and perspectives on disability hinder the employment rights and opportunities of individuals with disabilities, as well as how these translate into exclusionary practices, even in the presence of clear legislation on the topic. The chapter on Latin America shows how the exercise of political citizenship, in recent years, has revolved around the demand for social inclusion and access to social policies in these societies. Overall, the inclusion of these three cases provides a broader overview of the relationships between the central topics of the book, enriching the perspectives used and furthering the comparative analysis of citizenship, social exclusion and the welfare state.

Studies of citizenship and exclusion

The book offers new ways of studying citizenship and social exclusion from the welfare state. The chapters are interconnected and relate coherently to the central topic. As laid out earlier, the book is divided into two parts. In Part I, we examine citizenship from the perspective of laws and public policies, while in Part II we examine citizenship from the perspective of on-the-ground experiences of membership.
Citizenship: laws and public policies

It is essential to the book’s first part that laws and public policies determine membership in terms of the legal rights and bureaucratic rules governing citizens’ access to social protection. The seven chapters in Part I explore how institutions establish rules, procedures and norms that generate and communicate membership, as well as how organisations institutionalise practices that mediate the relationship between individuals and the state.

In Chapter 1, Are Vegard Haug asks whether the Norwegian welfare state is at a crossroads. First, the chapter identifies and elaborates on the key components of a welfare state, as well as its types and preconditions. Second, the status of the “Nordic model” is examined, considering the conceptual framework of individual rights and elements of citizenship. The challenges, directly or indirectly elaborated in the subsequent chapters of this book, include maintaining political and union support for the welfare state, handling a more heterogeneous society and increased inequalities and social exclusion. An important argument that is highlighted in the chapter is that the realisation of citizenship (civil, political and social) requires solid, well-functioning, stable public and political institutions. This cannot be taken for granted. Gradual and incremental changes can cause greater challenges for the welfare state and our political community in the long term.

In Chapter 2, Asgeir Falch-Eriksen explores the constant threat of social exclusion for citizens. Social exclusion is discussed against the background of modern stressors of the social order itself, which make social exclusion all the more challenging: value pluralism, interconnectedness and work-differentiation. It is argued that, if the nation-state does not confront the threat of social exclusion and reintegrate citizens who are on the verge of exclusion or have become excluded, these stressors will exacerbate the problem of social exclusion. Given the need to overcome the challenge of social exclusion, the chapter delineates different types of social exclusion in line with ideal types of citizenships: instrumental, communitarian, civic-republican and cosmopolitan citizenships. In other words, the chapter reveals what social exclusion implies from the perspective of different ideal types of citizenship and, correspondingly, the ways in which different types of welfare states can carry the same ideal types and deal with the social exclusion of citizens given value pluralism, interconnectedness and work-differentiation.

In Chapter 3, Kristian Heggebø and Axel West Pedersen describe the temporary adaptations made to the Norwegian unemployment benefit regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic and explore the ramifications for citizenship and social inclusion among a disadvantaged group, namely those who are unemployed and without access to unemployment benefits. If a citizen is unable to earn a living by participating in the labour market due to, for example, serious health impairment, the Constitution requires the Norwegian welfare state to provide some type of income maintenance. However, many people who are out of work, roughly half, are not entitled to unemployment benefits due to strict eligibility criteria linked to previous income from work. In March 2020, the unemployment rate in Norway hit a record level of 10.6%. When confronted with such a deep macroeconomic crisis,
policymakers have three alternative responses: (1) maintaining the status quo, (2) increasing coverage and generosity (i.e., more inclusion) and (3) reducing coverage and generosity (i.e., more exclusion). The chapter outlines how the Norwegian welfare state responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by moving the unemployment benefit system in a more inclusive direction. This was done by relaxing the eligibility criteria, increasing replacement rates and extending the maximum period for benefit receipt. Although the policy changes were all temporary, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted gaps in the current unemployment protection system, such as the precarious position of the self-employed and freelancers. According to punctuated equilibrium theory, policymaking is typically stable over prolonged periods, followed by a sudden leap triggered by an exogenous shock that takes the policy area in a new direction. The COVID-19 pandemic could represent such a leap, as it led to substantial (temporary) improvements in the Norwegian unemployment protection system.

In Chapter 4, Kaja Larsen Østerud, Janikke Solstad Vedeler and Nora Framstad focus on the labour market as a central arena in which to promote citizenship, in line with the subsequent Chapter 5. The authors investigate a specific policy called the Inclusion Dugnad, which was introduced in Norway between 2018 and 2022 and included a soft quota obliging Norwegian state employers to make sure that 5% of new hires were disabled or had a CV gap. The policy also entailed renewed effort in a state trainee programme for disabled people. By highlighting how employers should contribute to the societal economy by hiring disabled people, it was a policy introduced with a welfare state sustainability narrative. Reviews show that state employers struggled to meet the quota. The chapter investigates potential reasons for the failure of the policy by using interview data with employers and observational data derived from job interviews within the trainee programme. Two main findings are emphasised: hiring disabled people is portrayed as a charitable act, and employers have trouble addressing disability as an asset. The authors argue that, by attempting to incentivise employers to hire disabled people by highlighting the importance of employment for the sake of the welfare state, this, in effect, concedes that disabled people fail to live up to employers’ notions of an ideal worker, rendering them second-class workers.

In Chapter 5, Jaskirat Kohli and Janikke Solstad Vedeler explore how anti-discrimination employment laws may play out in practice. The right to meaningful employment is important in discussions of citizenship. In the United States, the employment rate of people with disabilities is significantly lower than that for those without disabilities. While the American welfare state has mandated laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to ameliorate employment outcomes for people with disabilities, in practice, this approach falls short of its intentions in terms of recruiting and hiring workers with disabilities. Unlike universal human rights, citizenship rights are based on membership. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate the underemployment of individuals with disabilities through the lens of social identity theory and the dynamics of ingroup/outgroup membership. Drawing on qualitative interviews with employer representatives from various sectors, the findings reveal that employers’
“othering” of people with disabilities may lead to their underemployment. The findings further highlight how anti-discrimination employment policies may merely reflect symbolic gestures of inclusion if employers prioritise the outgroup differences of people with disabilities and, consequently, perpetuate their social exclusion from meaningful employment and, ultimately, the ideals of citizenship.

In Chapter 6, Simen Mørstad Johansen argues that, through human rights obligations, liberal democratic welfare states claim to be committed to protecting and enforcing the rights of their citizens. This chapter tests such a claim and focuses on the fundamental right to respect for family life. The chapter examines whether Norwegian and Romanian general welfare state policies, as well as child protection policies, are aligned with the right to respect for family life. The chapter develops a rights-informed family-interests triangle to analyse and evaluate how the interests of children, parents and the public are balanced across the two countries, as well as what it means for such interests to be balanced according to a human rights standard. The analysis shows that neither Norwegian nor Romanian preventive policies are in line with the right to respect for family life. The Norwegian policies are, to some degree, instrumentalising parents, while the Romanian policies do not sufficiently protect the dignity of children. In conclusion, the chapter proposes that mandatory in-home measures and targeted prevention could be coupled with a universal social right to parenting support and thus better protect the right to respect for family life.

In Chapter 7, Marianne Takle addresses how the concern for future generations has increasingly been included in legislative and policy measures since the early 1970s. The chapter asks whether it is meaningful to include future generations in the contemporary concept of citizenship and, if so, what this would imply. This policy turn that began almost 50 years ago was motivated by questions about the potential consequences for future citizens’ welfare if present generations were to transfer irreversible environmental damage to them. The theoretical point of departure combines two strands of academic research: scholarship on citizenship and concern for future generations. The chapter develops and applies analytical tools that bring future challenges closer to our lives, allowing us to understand better what intergenerational solidarity means and what it requires of us today if we are to include future generations in our concept of citizenship. Empirically, the relevance of these concepts is evaluated by examining Norway as an example of how around 30 countries have included ecological protection clauses for future generations in their constitutions.

Citizenship: on-the-ground experiences of membership

The second part of the book addresses a variety of on-the-ground practices of social exclusion by exploring how individuals and groups experience the consequences of the implementation of laws and public policies. It consists of six chapters.

In Chapter 8, Sigurd Eid Jacobsen and Kjetil Klette-Bøhler analyse qualitative interviews that explore how Norwegian families with disabled children experienced societal participation and access to social welfare services during the pandemic.
Conceptually, the authors take inspiration from recent work on affective citizenship as they draw attention to the affective ramifications of being entitled to or excluded from social services, education and healthcare. The findings show that the pandemic hampered these families’ sense of well-being and participation, as a number of welfare services were shut down due to infection control measures. More importantly, social exclusion had deep affective consequences, as the families reported that they felt underprioritised and abandoned by the state. One informant argued that emotional self-management was crucial in order to receive vital services, and he argued, “You can cry, but you can’t get angry. The welfare administration accepts tears, but not anger. You can’t get mad. Then, you don’t get anything.” Taken together, the findings derived from the chapter invite us to further research how affect and citizenship are intertwined on multiple levels, as social exclusion may generate tears, frustration and anger. These must be communicated and handled in particular ways when citizens dialogue with government officials to obtain the citizenship they are entitled to by law.

In Chapter 9, Helle C. Hansen and Erika Gubrium take a close look at activation policy to explore the extent to which it supports or limits social citizenship for service users far from the labour market. In Norway, as in other European countries, employment is considered a means of self-sufficiency, economic freedom, self-realisation and societal recognition for individuals and groups. In many respects, labour market participation and employment form the basis for social inclusion and citizenship. Nevertheless, regardless of a strongly developed rights-based welfare state, the only right that the Norwegian welfare state does not guarantee its citizens is the right to work, and service users who do not obtain paid employment often circulate in the welfare system over time. The authors explore how Norwegian activation policies aimed at preventing social exclusion affect such long-term service users in terms of social citizenship. Drawing on qualitative interviews with service users in the Norwegian labour and welfare services (NAV), this chapter studies activation policy from the perspective of the service users’ experiences. Applying Jenson’s notion of social citizenship and Fraser’s theory of social justice, the authors analyse how the programme promotes or hampers participation and inclusion, as well as what this means in terms of social citizenship. The findings demonstrate how activation may mean enhanced inclusion and participation for some service users but also loss of status and further exclusion for others.

In Chapter 10, Jon Ivar Elstad and Kristian Heggebø build on the Marshallian notion that citizenship entails not only civic and political rights but also economic welfare. Accordingly, economic incorporation may be a prerequisite for immigrants’ full citizenship. The chapter examines this topic among African and Asian refugees in Norway since the turn of the century. With longer stays, refugees may acquire better language skills and more work experience, potentially leading to steadily diminishing differences between refugees’ and natives’ average incomes. Analyses of 20 years of trajectories showed, however, that, although refugees’ incomes rapidly approached the native level during the first years, this gap began to widen again after some eight to ten years of residence. Supplementary analyses indicated that
Introduction

Precarious, unstable labour market attachment was a major reason for this. Furthermore, due to favourable macroeconomic conditions and inclusionary policies, the authors expected that economic incorporation would proceed better for more recent refugee cohorts than for earlier ones. The findings contradicted this expectation because income trajectories among those who came around 2000 proved to be more favourable, not worse, than the trajectories of the later 2010 cohort. In sum, the analyses in this chapter indicate that the economic incorporation of African and Asian refugees in Norway has not improved over time, which is worrying with respect to the future prospects for social inclusion and full citizenship for this immigrant category.

In Chapter 11, Justyna Bell, Anne Balke Staver and Ida Tolegensbak discuss the interplay between residency, citizenship and a sense of belonging across borders using data obtained during the COVID-19 pandemic. One of the most immediate consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic was travel restrictions, which had unprecedented effects on non-citizens of various legal statuses, as well as Norwegian citizens with family ties crossing national borders in complex ways. Residency and citizenship statuses that had earlier been relatively easy to navigate became very difficult to handle, intangible borders became tangible and previously mobile lives suddenly became immobile. The chapter problematises the issue of citizenship through the eyes of those who live on the border between multiple legal statuses. The chapter uses policy analysis of the series of changes to border rules in Norway, as well as online ethnography, and employs a bottom-up approach to citizenship. During the pandemic, some individuals with Norwegian citizenship found their citizenship status inadequate to secure family life. Others found that their ties to Norway were not strong enough in the eyes of the state. The chapter shows how people, individually and as a group, argued for their rights as citizens to maintain family life, as well as how they expressed opposition to travel restrictions. They were mostly unsuccessful in their protests. The intervention of the national authorities in transnational mobilities has direct consequences for people’s relationship with the state. The pandemic revealed a disjuncture between the lived experience of citizenship and its legal complexities. It exposed the incoherence between how people define, belong to, live and experience citizenship and the legislative definitions of citizenship.

In Chapter 12, Barbara A. Zarate-Tenorio focuses on citizenship and the quest for social inclusion in Latin American countries, which represent so-called truncated welfare states that engage in the under-provision of public services and have longstanding inequalities. Discontent over the access to and quality of social policies is widespread in many Latin American democracies and has often led to expressions of general dissatisfaction with the performance of the democracies in the region. This chapter explores how dissatisfaction with the provision of social policies and demands for redistributive policies shape the democratic deficit – the gap between support for and satisfaction with democracy – as well as driving citizens’ engagement in diverse forms of political participation. Using data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for a sample of 18 countries, the
analysis shows that the democratic deficit widens as citizens’ dissatisfaction with education and health services increases and as citizens’ perception that the government should implement policies to reduce inequality increases. The results also show that both discontent over public social services and support for redistribution are positively associated with several forms of citizen political participation. These findings illustrate how political citizenship is exercised and advanced in connection with the struggle for social citizenship in democracies with truncated welfare states, in which inequalities in access to social services persist.

Finally, in Chapter 13, the conclusion chapter, Marianne Takle and Asgeir Falch-Eriksen draw lessons from the various empirical studies in this volume. While the volume is organised around a distinction between legal-political and sociological perspectives on citizenship, this chapter shows how these forms of relationships are connected. The analyses are organised in relation to different categories of people with common traits who live at the margins of the welfare state. The chapter shows how a concept of citizenship can create new insights into how we collectively coordinate and resolve social challenges through the democratic welfare state. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first part discusses the role of citizenship in democratic welfare states and various mechanisms of social exclusion. The second part analyses how various categories of people live at the margins of the welfare state. This is based on the findings derived from the empirical studies in the chapters of this book. The third part suggests a typology for social exclusion based on how four ideal types of citizenship respond to social exclusion within democratic welfare states. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing how any form of social exclusion is a cause for concern and, in most cases, the very purpose of the welfare state to focus on solving.

References


Part I

Citizenship

Laws and public policies
Introduction

In the international literature on welfare states, the Nordic model has typically been emphasised as a success. Both the European Commission (2020) and World Economic Forum (2020) have recently cited Nordic countries as policy examples worth mirroring. The Nordic countries also stand out when considering more objective indicators. In the 2021 Human Developmental Index (2021) ranking comprising 191 countries, Norway is second on the list, with Iceland (3), Denmark (6), Sweden (7) and Finland (11) close behind. The Nordic countries also fare well on the Global Competitiveness Index (Schwab, 2019), with positions varying from eighth (Sweden) to 26th (Iceland) of 141 countries, which clearly shows that a large public sector and strong state are not necessarily a negative for businesses. We find the corresponding top score for the Global Liberal Democracy Index (2019), which combines information on suffrage, the freedom and fairness of elections, freedoms of association and expression, individual and minority rights, equality before the law and executive constraints. Moreover, on the Social Mobility Index (2020), which measures the ease with which people can climb the socio-economic ladder from one generation to another, the Nordic countries exclusively comprise the top five out of 82 countries. As Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin recently noted, “I feel that the American dream can be achieved best in the Nordic countries” (CNBC, 2020).

However, in recent decades, several social and political challenges have emerged that have called into question the success of Nordic welfare states. Increasing poverty rates and social exclusion, as discussed in this book, are illustrative examples. Political criticism has also increased from both the populist left (as a response to societal differentiation) and the populist right (restricting majoritarian rule). Although these challenges have gained a foothold in the Nordic countries to varying degrees, today, they are given momentum that is caused by a series of crises: financial crises, refugee crises, climate challenges, terrorism, pandemics, energy crises and the war in Ukraine. Each event is flanked by a twin challenge: handling the various crises while securing welfare. To what extent and in what ways do the Nordic welfare states respond to such developments? Do we today see indications of the erosion of the democratic, social and economic values that constitute the cornerstones of

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the Nordic model? What challenges do the Nordic welfare state face in the twenty-first century?

Focusing primarily on the Norwegian welfare state, the ambition of this chapter is twofold. First, it identifies and elaborates on the key components of a welfare state, as well as its types and preconditions (Barr, 2001; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Knutsen, 2017). Second, the status of what the Economist (2013) referred to as the Nordic “supermodel” is examined by considering the conceptual framework of the individual rights and elements of citizenship (Marshall, 1950). A total of three overall challenges are highlighted. The selection criterion for “choosing” the challenges is that they are addressed, either directly or indirectly, in the subsequent chapters of this book.

The welfare state: origin, perspectives and types

A widely used source of welfare state origins is the so-called Beveridge Report (1942), in which Sir William Beveridge first identified the “five evils” haunting Britain at the time: want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness. The report was prepared on behalf of the UK government to combat a series of social challenges (e.g., public old-age benefits, sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, accident benefits and child benefits). The report and subsequent implementation were a significant source of inspiration for the British sociologist T.H. Marshall and his classic 1950 essay “Citizenship and Social Class.” Marshall’s basic observation was that welfare was unevenly distributed by class affiliation. In a lecture series at Cambridge University, he introduced and defined new elements of citizenship as both a contrast to and continuation of traditional citizenship.

Since the emergence of modern nation-states in the nineteenth century, citizenship has been conceived of as a relationship between an individual and the state to which the individual owes loyalty and from which the individual is entitled protection. As such, citizenship is the most privileged form of nationhood. It implies the status of freedom with associated responsibilities; certain rights, rules of law, obligations and responsibilities are denied or only partially extended to foreigners and other non-citizens residing in a country. The usual responsibilities for citizenship are taxation and military service, and citizenship obligations also include complying with the laws and regulations established by the nation-state, including international obligations such as human rights. Liberal democratic rights have also facilitated and ensured participation and involvement across sectors and interests. Thus, the welfare state represents both a vertical and horizontal dimension; in sum, it is a political community regulated by the state.

Marshall distinguished between three understandings of the concept of citizenship (1950, p. 148), which can be perceived as the steps in a historical developmental process of citizenship. The first element is the establishment of civil citizenship through a constitution of individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, the rights to justice, the right to own property and the right to conclude valid contracts. The next element, which presupposed and was built upon civil citizenship, is the development of political citizenship: the right to
participate, democratisation and the introduction of universal suffrage for men and women who are citizens of the state. Alongside these developments, political labour movements, parties and institutions grew (e.g., the Labour Party went to the UK Parliament). Finally, according to Marshall, the third element is the development of social citizenship, which is a citizenship that includes more individuals than those who benefit from traditional civil and political citizenship. Regardless of whether the person in question is a citizen of the country in which they live, Marshall (1950) argued that they should be entitled access to universal welfare benefits and welfare services, such as education, social services, and healthcare.

These three elements of citizenship are intended for an improved social norming of society. The main strategy for realising the ideas of universal welfare has been various regulations, that is, an extension of citizenship through a comprehensive system of rights: civil rights, which includes the rule of law, citizenship legislation, passport laws, freedom of speech, property rights and so forth; political rights, which includes the establishment of a political community with voting rights, freedom of association and so forth; and social rights, which includes poor laws, social security legislation, decent working conditions, housing, education and national insurance. The latter is constitutive of de facto welfare: the right to protection and compensation from the nation-state in the case of illness, work incapacity, old age, unemployment, homelessness or need for care. Although certain social policy measures were introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century, not until after the Second World War did the development of the welfare states gain momentum in the Nordic countries. Unemployment benefits, child benefits, sickness benefits and general old-age benefits were introduced in succession. For instance, in Norway, these rights were incorporated into the National Insurance Scheme in the mid-1960s (Knutsen, 2017).

To be elaborated in Chapter 2 by Falch-Eriksen, as well as in the final chapter of this book by Takle and Falch-Eriksen, a vital point is that all three elements of citizenship (civil, political and social) are essentially intertwined. As such, they constitute a political community within the framework of the liberal democratic nation-state. Membership through citizenship, for example, triggers equality before the law. Therefore, citizens should be able to decide who makes the laws (i.e., the principle of popular sovereignty). This, in turn, assumes that the citizens have sufficient prerequisites to realise their political rights and duties, which, in turn, requires both educational capacity and the absence of exclusion. The interdependence of the elements of citizenship also gradually forms the foundations of what we refer to as welfare states: a political community where civil, political and social rights are secured and further developed through institutional regulations and liberal democracy. Thus, an essential component of this is Montesquieu’s “separation of powers.” Motivated by a historically well-founded idea about the need to limit power within a state, the aim is to prevent the concentration of power, political absolutism (autocracy) and potential abuse (corruption) and to balance and exercise control among the “elites” (the legislative, executive and judicial power).
A contested framework: the three worlds of welfare capitalism

It has been more than 70 years since the Beveridge Report and Marshall’s work paved the way for the welfare state. Yet we are still plagued by the problems they aimed to eradicate. Establishing legal rights is not equivalent to implementing these rights. We have also added new “evils” to fight (elaborated later). Furthermore, developing welfare states does not happen without political battles; some are smaller and incremental, while others are larger, lasting and ideological.

The first and perhaps most important is the difficult relationship between welfare and the economy. Already, although Marshall’s ideas about the welfare state began to gain a foothold in the UK, the rights-based focus on the welfare state was simultaneously challenged, especially from liberal economists. The concern was partly the welfare state’s costs, that is, high taxes and alleged weakened competitiveness, and partly the view of the division of labour between the market and the state, that is, market liberalism. Generous welfare benefits were not only resource-intensive, but they also – according to critics – weakened the motivation to work and led to social security dependence, abuse and bureaucratic growth. Several economists have also claimed – and continue to claim – that high taxes have hampered economic competitiveness and growth. According to this rationale, the proposal for a better welfare state lies in the free market.

Key contributors, including Asa Briggs, have illustrated this “market thinking” in welfare research. In his work *The Welfare State in Historical Perspective* (1961), Briggs explained the welfare state as a system of state intervention into the play of market forces. To provide a guaranteed income for all, reduce insecurities and provide services to those who need them, the welfare state is a cost component for private businesses, that is, restrictions on the use of labour, taxes and insurance premiums. This criticism continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, especially from the political right. However, countercriticism of the mainly US-inspired economic market liberal thinking came from several authors (see, e.g., Olsen & O’Connor, 1998), especially in political science and administrative research. The most important critics include Simon (1957), Dahl (1962), Cyert and March (1963) and Almond and Verba (1965). This research field represents a critique of economics and the belief in rationality and market mechanisms. This criticism was particularly directed at economic competition theory, which, at the time, was defended by Milton Friedman, especially in *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962).

However, Friedman’s thoughts and values about economic liberalism are still evident in several more recent studies. In Nicholas Barr’s work *The Welfare State as Piggy Bank* (2001), he argued that the welfare state is the state running of an insurance company. Developed in the context of the 1980s, the point of departure is that a great trade-off exists between social equality and economic efficiency: equality comes at the expense of efficiency. The welfare state is in crisis, and a new neoliberal agenda is required. Welfare policies must be rearranged to produce better incentives for market-driven economic modernisation and restructuring. Barr’s position is that a justification of the welfare state and of comprehensive state intervention is also possible in terms of conventional economic efficiency. The argument
is that needs are risks. What is considered a need in a social paradigm should be seen as a risk in an economic paradigm: the welfare state exists not only to relieve poverty (the “Robin Hood function”) but also to provide insurance and consumption smoothing over the life cycle (the “piggy-bank function”). Thus, risks are considered probabilities. If they are predictable for a specific group of individuals, risks can be traded in a competitive market (e.g., insurance). In a market of risks, the consumer will have to pay a price (i.e., a premium) in accordance with their risk group. Market-based insurance is actuarially fair. Each covered person will – on average – receive compensation in proportion to their risk (i.e., class) – minus the cost of running the insurance institution. Insurance institutions redistribute resources horizontally from those not affected by the event to those who are. The welfare loss that individuals suffer is compensated by the premiums paid.

However, insurance markets will fail if the probability of events is unpredictable (e.g., unemployment, longevity, medical costs). Profits can be maximized if individuals with high risks are systematically excluded from the pool of insured, yet “bad risks” are often those with severe and legitimate social needs. In short, moral hazards (e.g., opportunistic behaviour, rent seeking) and event probabilities increase when the individual is insured. Consequently, the compulsory and complete pooling of resources, as financed through taxes, and universalistic welfare rights become a solution to market failure for the goods people demand.

Given these debates, different countries – under diverse political regimes – have weighed these two considerations (market and state) differently. The controversy arises because the allocation of rights has consequences for human lives – sometimes literally – and because they represent scarce goods. The state does not have unlimited finances, and a too liberal or economically generous practice of rights will trigger conflict about who is going to pay. Over time, therefore, various welfare regimes have emerged. Esping-Andersen, in his often-cited volume *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990), has argued that a single European social model does not exist, but rather, a family of different welfare regimes can be seen:

- **Nordic model (i.e., “Universalism”):** The whole population has individualised rights financed by a relatively high income and consumption taxes, as well as workers’ and employers’ social insurance contributions and high levels of public services, with an emphasis on the principle of equality and generous and universal services and benefits. The models emerged through a blend of liberalism and socialism (mixed economy), in which political support for redistribution was secured by including the needs and interests of the middle class. A large part of care work and education is considered a public task, which also requires high occupational activity among women. Key examples include Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Finland.

- **Continental model (i.e., “Bismarckian model”):** Benefits are linked to rights earned through professional participation, and subsidiarity is based on welfare being provided at the lowest possible level; the family policy was originally based on men providing for their families and mothers staying at home, with modest
public childcare services, that is, a “breadwinner” model. Comprehensive insurances are linked to the work contract, financed by payroll taxes, family-based services and transfer biased. A key example is Germany.

- **Liberal model (i.e., “Residualist model”):** Emphasis is on the market’s role in ensuring welfare; social benefits are limited by means of testing or providing modest benefits. The liberal model is a dual model: needs-tested benefits to the poor and private insurance for the rest. There are tax-financed low benefits and expenditure levels. A key example is the United States.

Taken together, the welfare state is defined as a state that provides (i) social security through redistribution, (ii) protection against social risks and (iii) access to the satisfaction of basic needs for all citizens. In more general terms, a welfare state is a state that, to a considerable extent, guarantees the inhabitants of the country help if they should suffer from health failure, social distress or a loss of income (e.g., in the event of unemployment or old age) and ensures the individual right to education. However, welfare states vary in this respect. In a Nordic context, this includes a large number of publicly provided or regulated schemes: health and care services (e.g., hospitals and nursing homes); social protection schemes (e.g., old-age, disability pensions and unemployment benefits); social assistance benefits; free educational institutions (e.g., schools and universities); and family policy schemes (e.g., child benefits, parental leave and kindergartens).

**Current challenges facing the welfare state model**

The typology presented earlier is clearly a simplification. Several studies have argued that there are, in fact, five Nordic models (e.g., Knutsen, 2017). The key point is that different political ideological views on the role of the state (or the market) have been constitutive of the scope of the welfare states and of the role of the state and financing models for the redistribution of capital. In recent decades, however, the welfare state has come under pressure from a more multifaceted set of challenges. Although the economy is central, welfare states are being challenged in new ways that sometimes go beyond the control of the nation-state. Other challenges can be attributed to gradual changes in people’s support for the welfare models.

As an illustration, according to one of the latest Norwegian “Perspektivmeldingen” (Meld. St. 14 [2020–2021]) – a white paper presented to the Norwegian Parliament submitted by the Ministry of Finance every four years – if Norway does not implement changes to the welfare state in the next decades, they will have a budget deficit corresponding to 6% of the gross national product (GDP), with the Government Pension Fund Global (the oil fund) included (Nbim, 2021). The key words that explain the challenges are population ageing, immigration, globalisation, private service providers, increase in health expenditure, more inequality, more and new groups with low occupational participation, technological development and changes in the labour market, climate and environment.

In the subsequent sections, several such challenges are identified and elaborated upon. As mentioned in the Introduction, a common denominator for the
challenges selected is that they are addressed either directly or indirectly in the subsequent chapters of this book. Furthermore, a challenge is characterised by the fact that it is complex and lacks clear solutions. A theoretical approach to understanding the challenges lies in recognising these as so-called wicked problems (see, e.g., Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, pp. 12–13), which are problems characterised by exceeding institutional boundaries, unclear actor constellations and unclear lines of responsibility. This creates three types of uncertainty: cognitive uncertainty (i.e., related to the content of the problem and access to and interpretation of information); strategic uncertainty (i.e., how to proceed to solve the problem); and institutional uncertainty (i.e., how to bring together the process and interactions with other actors). The presentation of these challenges is neither prioritised nor exhaustive and concentrates on the past two to three decades. They might also be considered “dilemmas” because they include moral or ethical issues, situations where the values and norms that are valid and relevant in the context in which an actor operates conflict with each other and where the different stakeholders cannot immediately agree on the “right” decision or action (Heres, 2014, p. 37). As such, the challenges require assessments and democratic decision-making where (principles of) proportionality and balancing between different considerations are essential.

**Challenge I: maintain political and union support**

The first – and perhaps most fundamental – challenge is political support for the welfare state. This is particularly related to political citizenship, yet both presuppose and build on civil citizenship. Through democratisation and the introduction of universal suffrage for men and women who were civilians of the country, this has gradually developed into a series of democratic rights (see previous discussion) and political community. Robert Dahl’s (1989) five classical ideals or criteria for democratic procedures are illustrative of this. The first ideal – enlightened understanding – states that “each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering and validating the choice on the matter to be decided that would best serve the citizen’s interest” (Dahl, 1989, p. 112). The second ideal provided by Dahl is effective participation, which means

through the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the final outcome. They must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing the questions on the agenda and or expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.

(1989, p. 112)

The third ideal is equal voting rights. The rules for determining the results at the decisive stage must take into account the expressed wishes of every citizen in an equal and fair manner. Thus, votes must be distributed equally among citizens. Fourth, the people’s final control over the agenda refers to the people’s right to make decisions on which cases are to be decided by means of those processes that
are in accordance with the first three criteria (i.e., equal voting rights, informed understanding and effective participation) and which are not. Finally, there is inclusion, in which the people must include all adult members, except passers-by and persons who are demonstrably mentally unfit.

All of Dahl’s criteria are important; however, the focus here is on two related institutional channels: numerical democracy and corporatism (Rokkan, 1966 [1987]). The numerical democratic channel is based on territorial representation, where the distribution of votes at elections (at different levels) determines who will represent the constituency. The corporatist channel, in which various sectors or functions are represented by organised interests (Rommetvedt, 2017, p. 171), has been defined as “the institutionalized and privileged integration of organised interests in the preparation and/or implementation of public policies” (Christiansen et al., 2010, p. 27). Both concepts are disputed. As Christiansen et al. (2010, p. 26ff) argued, political economy studies have focused on “varieties of capitalism,” while interest group studies have been concerned with “varieties of democracy” (Rommetvedt, 2017, p. 172). Nonetheless, Rokkan’s work highlighted that there are several channels for political influence. Dahl’s book Pluralist Democracy (1982) elaborated on this, paying respect to organisational pluralism as “the existence of a plurality of relatively autonomous (independent) organisations (subsystems) within the domain of a state” (Dahl, 1982, p. 5; see Dahl & Tufte, 1973). The numerical and corporate channels have undoubtedly been important for the development of the Nordic welfare model. However, this has created two new challenges for the further development of the welfare state.

The first challenge is the numerical democratic challenge, that is, finding a sustainable balance between the consideration of continuity in the support for egalitarian social values and changes in voters’ behaviour and value choices. The welfare state is not only a compromise between the labour movement and capitalism, but it is also a result of underprivileged groups, especially the working class, mobilising their political resources to improve their living and working conditions. It is a political mobilisation and organisation with the aim of ensuring social and economic standards for all citizens. Although variants of the welfare state have existed under regimes with different ideological orientations, several studies have highlighted the emergence of social democratic parties as essential for the development of Nordic welfare states (Knutsen, 2017, p. 48). Here, it must be added that social democratic values also have found a foothold in several political parties; for example, there was a centre-right parliamentary majority when the Storting passed the reform that set up the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme in 1966. Through comprehensive Keynesian reform programmes – a mix between a planned and market economy – the social democratic parties were important in fighting unemployment and establishing decent conditions for workers, social security, gender equality and so on.

The social democratic parties had their golden age from the mid-1930s to the first two decades after the Second World War. However, support for social democratic parties has been in sharp decline (see Figure 1.1). For example, support for the Norwegian Labour Party has fallen dramatically in recent years, that is, in terms
of both party members and electoral support. In general, class identity – a mainstay of the “class struggle” – is changing rapidly (Knutsen, 2017). An important observation is that the party-political landscape appears more fragmented, with new political parties in Norway and other Nordic countries (e.g., progress parties and green parties).

Various explanations for this development have been presented in the literature. However, in a comprehensive review of the decline of Swedish Social Democrats (Lidstöm, 2018), a key finding is that, despite having long held a dominant position in Swedish politics, the party has lost almost a third of its voter support over the past 40 years. Five structural changes explain 75% of the variation in this decline: reduced industrial employment, rising education levels, rising economic prosperity, urbanisation and a reduction in social pressure that previously benefitted the party in its strongholds. Although other political parties support the main tenets of the welfare model (i.e., at least in a Nordic context), the social democratic parties, one of the cornerstones of the welfare state is severely weakened.

This has paved the way for new perspectives on welfare and the state’s monopoly on the production of basic welfare services (e.g., schools, health centres, kindergartens, child welfare). A concrete expression of this is the significant flourishing of private welfare providers (NOU, 2020, p. 13). However, the numerical democratic challenge is far from simple to address. The Norwegian Labour Party, like its corresponding political parties, must follow one strategy to gather voters and support from labour unions in the old industries (i.e., oil and gas, power-intensive productions). Another strategy is required to address new voters who prioritise,
for example, climate and environmental issues. This can be formulated as a shift from the idea of class solidarity towards generational solidarity, that is, demanding strategic choices for any political party.

Thus, the second key challenge is related to the corporate democratic channel. This challenge consists of finding an appropriate form of working life organisation that supports a continuation of decent working conditions and cooperation while simultaneously capturing new values and other forms of working life affiliation across party lines. As with political channels, support for labour unions has also been a mainstay of social democracy and universal welfare. The period referred to as the golden age of Nordic social democracy (1930–1970) was characterised by extensive incorporation of various interests in political decision-making processes, especially in worker and employer organisations (i.e., corporatism; Rokkan, 1966, Rommetvedt, 2017). The cooperation itself has sometimes been referred to as “tripartite cooperation” (Dølvik et al., 2014; Fløtten & Jordfald, 2019), which, in practice, is a compromise between labour and capital (Knutsen, 2017, p. 48). Strong support from the labour union movement has been essential to achieve comprehensive social and economic tasks and the ability to appeal to voters in both the centre and the periphery (Knutsen, 2017, p. 48). The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions’ (LO) close ties to the Labour Party made it possible to improve wages and working conditions. The 1977 Working Environment Act was an important milestone, yet also the Holiday Act of 1964, the principle of sick pay, equal pay and contractual pensions, set the foundation for important rights.

However, the corporate channel has seen a similar challenge as the numerical channel – a weakening, especially since its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s. This can be measured based on interest groups’ participation in policy preparation and implementation committees for parliament (Christiansen et al., 2010, Rommetvedt, 2017, pp. 176–177). There has also been a reduction in union membership. LO reduced its share of the organised workforce from 83% in 1958, to 65% in 1982, to 50% in 2014 (the lowest in the Nordic countries). In addition, LO has been challenged by new unions that organise white-collar workers and academics to a greater extent. This can be explained by a reduction in the working class and a parallel increase in the middle class (Rommetvedt, 2017, p. 181). Nonetheless, the proportion of active members has fallen in both trade unions and political parties. Figure 1.2 displays the percentages of active members in both political parties and labour unions between 1997 and 2017 in Norway. The data are based on the Living Conditions Survey EU-SILC 2017 (SSB, 2017).

However, the proportion of employees who are members of an employee organisation is still relatively high in Norway (over 50%). In addition, the number of members in the Nordic countries, especially compared with other OECD countries, is high (e.g., the proportion of organised workers was 10.8% in France in 2016 and 9.9% in the United States in 2020; OECD, 2021). There have also been tendencies for a decrease in support to flatten. Nevertheless, the corporate channel that has been important for the development of social democracy and support for “ordinary working people” in the Nordic model appears to be weakened. In addition, political
citizenship is exposed to new and perhaps lesser-known challenges. This is the subject of several chapters in this book. In Chapter 7 by Takle, analytical tools are presented and discussed that can be used to grasp what it would mean to include future generations in the contemporary concept of citizenship. This chapter particularly challenges an oil and gas nation like Norway. Correspondingly, the political ideals of international solidarity might imply a positive attitude towards immigration, yet this requires that one succeeds in the integration work. This is a key topic in Chapter 10 by Elstad and Heggebø. Finally, the dynamic interaction between political power, democracy and a country’s social conditions is perhaps best communicated when the Nordic model is put into a comparative perspective. In Chapter 12 by Zarate-Tenorio, we obtain insights into the situation in Latin America; the chapter reflects on the relationships between dissatisfaction with public social services and support for redistribution, along with various forms of political participation.

**Challenge II: handling a more heterogeneous society**

The second and related challenge is for the welfare state to handle a more heterogeneous society. A fundamental test, at least considering public debates, is migration. This is twofold and illustrates the interrelation between the various elements of citizenship. The first is immigration, that is, finding a sustainable balance between considering people in need of protection and the resilience of society. In recent years, immigration has received extensive attention (most controversially, labour immigrants, family immigrants and refugees). There are several significant challenges for the welfare state in this respect. First, there is a strong ideological tension with increasing scepticism towards immigrants, especially regarding Islamophobia (see...
Hoffmann & Moe, 2020), flanked by increased support for immigration-sceptical political parties (Knutsen, 2017; see Figure 1.1). Several research projects have also documented how political power matters to immigration. The results vary (Akkerman & De Lange, 2012), yet most have identified a stricter immigration policy when immigration-sceptical parties have gained power. For example, in the latest Swedish parliamentary election in 2022, the Sweden Democrats (SD), who are opposed to multiculturalism, want a more restrictive refugee and immigration policy and have communicated a clear EU scepticism, received over 20% of the electoral support. We find similar debates in several countries. In some cases, blatant exclusion and discrimination occur (Prop. 81 L [201/2017]). This also occurs for people whose application for citizenship is rejected but who cannot be sent out of the country for various reasons (e.g., because Norway does not have exchange agreements with the recipient country, i.e., “stateless” immigrants). Many fundamental rights have been violated because stateless persons are persecuted and arrested for being stateless, denied access to education and basic health services or blocked from the labour market.

The second related challenge is integration. This challenge consists of finding a sustainable balance between consideration for the people in paid work and society’s ability and willingness to support people who, for various reasons, do not participate in working life. This discussion primarily focuses on the reception (i.e., settlement) of migrants and refugees. Yet integration affects many of the aspects of a multicultural society, including social, religious and cultural coexistence. Comprehensive reviews of immigration to Norway appear in the white paper “Integration and Trust. Long-Term Consequences of High Immigration” (NOU, 2017, p. 2). A main conclusion of this white paper (the so-called Brochmann II committee) is the consequences of integration policy failure. The committee’s analyses have indicated the potential for improvement in the existing integration policy, outlining alternative adaptation strategies if the results are not forthcoming or the economic framework conditions are significantly worsened. The committee gave a strong warning:

If Norwegian society does not succeed better with the integration of immigrants and refugees from countries outside Europe, we risk that increasing economic inequality may play a role in cultural differences and this may weaken the basis for cohesion, trust and the model of society’s legitimacy.

(NOU, 2017, pp. 2–11, author’s own translation)

Thus, an increasing number of studies (and political forces) today have focused on how migrants manage after arrival, particularly in the labour market. This is, among other things, connected to the economic sustainability of the egalitarian welfare state (see Chapter 10 by Elstad and Heggebø of this volume). As in other European governments, a key goal of Norway’s government is to transition immigrants with refugee backgrounds into paid work. Beyond the extensive economic and political debates presented earlier, integration has also triggered new – and perhaps less discussed – conditions related (directly or indirectly) to citizenship and the welfare state. As discussed in Chapter 6 by Johansen about child protection,
state–parent–child relations can be interpreted and balanced in different ways in national laws and policies. As an illustration, Chapter 6 discusses different political cultures and practices in Romania and Norway. These transnational challenges became even more pressing during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Chapter 11 by Bell, Balke Staver and Tølgensbakk, the topic is the extent to which the national travel restrictions implemented during the pandemic affected non-citizens with ties to Norway and Norwegian citizens with family ties crossing national borders.

Challenge III: increased inequalities and social exclusion

The third key type of challenge, also related to the previous sections, is that welfare states must handle the growing inequalities and social exclusion of certain groups in society. This is central to this book. The status and rights the inhabitants of a country with collective or universal welfare services are the rights that the individual enjoys, regardless of whether they are citizens of the country where they reside (exceptions do exist). For instance, persons who live, work, study and pay taxes in Norway or other countries with universal welfare benefits or services have the right to access these services.

The most important social rights include poverty legislation, social security legislation, working environment, social housing and the National Insurance Scheme (Folketrygden). The latter, established in 1967, is a compulsory social security scheme for everyone who lives in Norway and provides financial benefits in the event of illness, pregnancy and birth, unemployment, age, disability, death and loss of a breadwinner, among others. The National Insurance Scheme also covers the expenses for medical treatment and rehabilitation, as well as for work-oriented measures. The scheme is administered by the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV). In 2018, Norway’s expenditure was NOK 470 billion, corresponding to 35% of the state budget. Of this, members and employers paid 67%, while the state and others paid 33%. Clearly, the use of these schemes is extensive. In 2017, more than 2 million people received pensions or temporary benefits to secure income from the National Insurance Scheme. More than every third Norwegian over the age of 25 has social security as their most important source of income. The largest expenditure by far is the old-age pension, followed by disability benefits (i.e., permanent reduced ability to work) and sickness benefits (NAV, 2019).

Again, it becomes clear how the interaction between the various elements of citizenship is important. A distinction between civil and political citizenship, on the one hand, and social citizenship, on the other hand, is that the rights attached to social citizenship depend on ongoing decision-making by the National Assembly and local governing bodies. Financial resources – the size and structure of public budgets – set the limits on welfare benefits. Social rights – and, thus, social citizenship – face economic constraints. The resource constraints will not have corresponding significance for the practice of civil and political rights, but it is through the exercise of political rights (e.g., use of the right to vote, political demand and support) that the scope of social rights is determined and changed. Recognising this
is important because it provides a key input and factual basis for party politics (e.g., programmes, campaigns) and voter preferences.

Going into detail on this is outside the scope of this chapter. However, two significant demographic challenges should be highlighted as illustrations. The first challenge is the so-called “elderly wave,” the large birth cohorts after the Second World War that are now or in the near future becoming old-age pensioners and, thus, users of health services. Although the elderly over 80 today make up about 4.5% of the population, the proportion is expected to increase to almost 12% in 2060 (Meld. St. 14 [2020/2021], p. 31). This development will require significant growth in resource investment in health and care services in the future.

The second and related challenge is social exclusion. Despite extensive and universal welfare schemes, poverty rates in the Norwegian welfare state are increasing. Having citizenship provides a number of legal and formal rights. Nevertheless, in practice, individuals exercise these rights to varying degrees. A person may, for example, be a Norwegian citizen and hold all the formal rights that come with Norwegian citizenship but still have difficulty actually functioning as a full member or citizen of Norwegian society. The most common reasons for this include poverty, serious or chronic illness and disability and language problems. These forms of exclusion can be specified in different ways (e.g., various forms of exclusion in working life).

Thus, the composition of the low-income group is changing. This is also related to the fact that the share of the elderly is decreasing, whereas the share of immigrants is increasing (Meld. St 14 [2020/2021]). The fact that certain immigrant groups work to a lesser extent is partly because of their lack of the necessary qualifications, such as language and education. According to the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs (Bufdir, 2022a), five groups of children in particular are exposed to poverty: children in households with weak labour market attachment, children in households where the main income earner has a low education, children with single parents, children in households that receive over half of their total income through public transfers and children with an immigrant background. The latter make up an increasing proportion of children in low-income households and are overrepresented in low-income statistics. Today, more than half of the children in low-income families in Norway have an immigrant background (Bufdri, 2022b).

Figure 1.3 illustrates Norwegian children in households with a persistently low income, that is, children with and without an immigrant background (SSB, 2021). Based on Statistics Norway’s calculations, the proportion of children with persistently low household incomes has increased steadily since 2011 and was 11.7% in 2019. Children with an immigrant background are increasingly overrepresented and make up 60% of low household incomes.

According to Marshall, poverty and disability were the main reasons why certain people were not considered full members of society; thus, he spoke in favour of expanding the concept of citizen to include social citizenship. The idea was that a more inclusive welfare state could better facilitate the conditions for groups of citizens that, for various reasons, had difficulty achieving a satisfactory quality of life. Figure 1.3 illustrates that modern Norway is in the process of (again) creating social dividing lines in society. Thus, measures for better integration into society can be perceived as a way of making the marginalised inhabitants of a society full-fledged social citizens. Furthermore, child
poverty is used as an indicator, but other forms of social and economic exclusion are also evident. In the subsequent chapters of this book, we elaborate on these topics. In Chapter 5, Kohli and Vedeler focus on labour market participation as a social right yet questions the practice of these rights for citizens with disabilities in the intersection between employees, interest organisations and the employers’ involvement. Chapter 4 by Østerud, Vedeler and Framstad, also on disabilities, questions the role of employers in more detail and examines expectations and other barriers to employing people with various disabilities. Both contributions provide important inputs – evaluations – as to the status of social citizenship in Norway. Chapter 8 by Jacobsen and Klette-Bøhler follow up on this but directs attention to how Norwegian families with disabled children experienced the COVID-19 pandemic. In Chapter 3, Heggebo and West Pedersen focus on the gap in the unemployment benefit regulation for freelancers and self-employed, also a vulnerable group during the pandemic. New and more inclusive measures were rolled out to this group, and the chapter questions whether these changes could lead to a longer-lasting change. Finally, in Chapter 9, Hansen and Gubrium direct attention to Norwegian activation policies to preventing social exclusion through labour market participation. They ask to what extent and how such activation programmes work whether they result in successful integration or whether reinforce the subordinated status and social exclusion of citizens in the labour market.

Discussion: the link between the three elements of citizenship

Three overall challenges have been identified for the welfare state: maintaining political support, the handling of a more heterogeneous society and, finally, several tasks related to increased inequalities and social exclusion. The list is far from exhaustive. It is only intended to point to key challenges where nuances and further evaluations are addressed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The examples are also mainly
taken from Norway and the Nordic countries. At the time of writing this, European welfare states (and other continents) are characterised by several other significant challenges. Key “crises” include Russia's brutal invasion and aggressive warfare in Ukraine, which has affected the financial markets, creating an energy crisis and new membership in the defence alliance NATO, and the climate crisis, which has triggered migration and natural disasters at an increasing rate, to mention a few. We have also (hopefully) mainly put behind us a dramatic pandemic, which, in many ways, and, to a significant extent, has challenged the welfare states’ capacity for action, but also citizens’ trust in the institutions that form the backbone of the welfare states.

Given these lines of development, there is little doubt that the Norwegian (and Nordic) welfare model today and in the future is under considerable pressure. Moreover, evident from the earlier discussions, social rights cannot be isolated from the economic and political preconditions for the model. Historically, the Nordic model has included a political culture where certain common goals and values have been central, including small differences between people, high employment, efficiency, codetermination, social security, trust and a balance between duty and rights. In addition, a high degree of membership in various institutions, unions and NGOs has been vital. This includes a series of organised interests related to work, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion and so forth. In the Nordic political party systems, all these interests and considerations (albeit with different outcomes) have been addressed, that is, translated and balanced into policies and changes. As such, the political representatives are part of a “conflict community” with strong institutions, agreements, respect for the rule of law and a political culture helping promote set goals. In sum, this is an essential requirement for both the numerical and corporate channels. The former requires well-functioning political institutions, while the latter must recognise and actively practice transparent consultation processes in which organised interests are listened to.

Thus, the elements of citizenship are linked. As mentioned previously, an important distinction between civil and political citizenship, on the one hand, and social citizenship, on the other hand, is that the rights attached to social citizenship will always be conditioned by ongoing decision-making by the Norwegian National Assembly and by local governing bodies; often, the availability of financial resources and, thus, the size of public budgets set limits on how comprehensive welfare benefits can be secured for the population through individuals’ status as social citizens. Such resource constraints will have no bearing on the practice of political rights, but it is through the exercise of political rights that the scope of social civil rights is determined and changed. As such, can it perhaps be collective resources, rather than individual rights, that are the synthesising mechanisms in the Nordic model?

Conclusion and the way forward

Do we today see indications of the erosion of the democratic, social and economic values that constitute the cornerstones of the Nordic model?

The answer is yes. As the title of this chapter suggests, the Norwegian and other Nordic welfare states today are at a crossroads. The universal welfare scheme is
being challenged. Several internal and external factors – some familiar and others more unexpected – put continuous pressure on the welfare state and its political leadership. If anything is to be highlighted, it is perhaps the concern for the Nordic welfare state’s popular support – changes in the political community – that has triggered the greatest concern. Therefore, the handling of the various crises we now face will be essential, if not decisive, for trust in the welfare state and its legitimacy.

**Under what conditions does the welfare state change?**

The simple answer is that the welfare state will be altered when support for the model changes in the population. This is, in its simplest form, a value question about continuing and strengthening the inclusion of people in a collective community. If universalism, on which the Nordic welfare states are founded, is to continue, we must continuously fight all types of exclusion. This requires continued support for the redistribution of capital and equity. The more complicated answer is that the welfare state changes incrementally. Sometimes, this is almost invisible, while other times, it occurs through open political power struggles and compromise. Such small adjustments to the coordinates by which the welfare state is navigated might be perceived as insignificant. However, even small changes in navigating are important because small adjustments over a longer time perspective can change the course quite fundamentally. Several such small (and some major) adjustments have been identified in this chapter – for example, changes in political support for the welfare state.

A crucial general point is revealed here. The realisation of the three elements of citizenship that this volume addresses (civil, political and social citizenship) requires solid, well-functioning and stable public and political institutions. To quote Rothstein and Varraich: “We have no doubt in stating that a major part of human misery in today’s world is caused by the fact that a majority of the world’s population is forced to live under dysfunctional (low-quality) government institutions” (2017, p. 147).

In the following chapters, these and other related challenges are addressed in more detail. Each chapter represents current and interesting debates – path choices – that the welfare states must handle. Sometimes, the challenges are considered welfare gaps to be filled, typically by strengthening the legal regulations and securing social rights. However, evident from several of the chapters, the solution may not lie so much in rights, although both rights and duties can always be improved. Rather, attention can just as successfully be directed at the practice of these rights (realisation). Perhaps, the main contribution in the subsequent chapters of this book lies precisely in such an evaluation of the welfare state.

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2 Social exclusion of citizens of democratic welfare states

Asgeir Falch-Eriksen

Introduction

In 2021 Eurostat, the European Union’s (EU) statistical office released statistics claiming that 21.7% of the EU population were at risk of poverty and social exclusion. In 2020, 24.2% of the child population was at risk of poverty and social exclusion (Eurostat, 2022). Provided the statistics are accurate, it amounts to more than 95 million citizens across the EU. Also, across the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which crosses all continents, almost 40% of households are financially insecure, and 12% live in relative income poverty. The number is almost double concerning those who struggle to cope financially, at 21%. In many respects, the numbers are dire. It is not merely about poverty but is about various symptoms of social exclusion such as loneliness, social capabilities, lack of opportunities, lack of predictability of access to basic goods and services, the experience of disenfranchisement across multiple civic roles (for instance, democratic participation, receiving constitutional protections, access to relevant public officials) and lack of hope for a better future. The threat of social exclusion is not merely a challenge that affects the fabric of society, the normative character of solidarity among peers and how we can trust one another, nor does it only speak to the fact that current welfare arrangements do not work. A more significant threat becomes unravelled by these statistics: the disregard for the dignity of those who become socially excluded, which can be argued amounts to every fifth person. Across Europe, each citizen is formally owed constitutional protections of personal dignity through human rights. Each citizen is owed provision, financial support and services following needs to safeguard their dignity. When more than every fifth citizen is measured by Eurostat to be socially excluded, the argument that arises that nation-states do not do their formal duty writes itself.

In this chapter, I will explore the social exclusion of citizens as a key challenge facing modern liberal welfare democracies and suggest some solutions. Initially, I will understand social exclusion as a symptom of societal disintegration, where particularistic needs and preferences of individuals and groups gradually detach from the symmetrical and inclusive relationships among the citizens within the social order they belong to. In such a process, each excluded citizen becomes desocialised because the solidarity within the social order no longer encompasses each
citizen as an equal. Implied is that each excluded citizen, with its particularistic needs and preferences, is no longer considered part of what binds society together and the normative composition of solidarity. By having citizens who become excluded, a welfare state has effectively abandoned the societal idea of each person being equal compared to all others within the social order and instead treats the excluded citizen, one way or the other, as unequal to those encompassed by the social order, and leaves those excluded to their own individualistic capabilities.

This approach to social exclusion will be discussed with the background of challenges that any modern social order faces: the fact of value pluralism (Rawls, 1993), interconnectedness (Luhmann, 1979), and the increased functional coordination of a division of labour (Giddens, 1990). The two last challenges both allude to the increase of complexity within modern social orders. If the nation-state does not confront the threat of social exclusion and reintegrate citizens on the verge of exclusion or have become excluded, this chapter will lean into the insights of trust and solidarity as a binding force of society and argue that these challenges will exacerbate the problem of social exclusion within the social order and threaten the solidarity and trust the social order depends on to prevail (Brunkhorst, 2005; Elster, 2007; Locke, 1823; Luhmann, 1988). If the argument holds, not resolving the challenge of social exclusion can be equivalent to an admission of failure on the part of the welfare state ethos itself and the purpose of having it, namely to establish and enforce a concept of social justice that is equally distributed to each citizen. Provided the need to solve the challenge of social exclusion, the chapter will delineate different types of social exclusion from what it means to different ideal types of citizenships, namely the instrumental, communitarian, civic republican and cosmopolitan citizenships. In other words, I will explore what social exclusion implies from the perspective of different ideal types of citizenship. How can different types of welfare states deal with the social exclusion of citizens provided value pluralism, interconnectedness and division of labour?

In the first section of this chapter, I will elaborate on four ideal citizenship types and explain their corresponding concept of social exclusion. Second, I will elaborate on the three challenges facing welfare democracies mentioned above. Third, I will argue for combining two of the four ideal types to understand better how to combat social exclusion. Fourth, I will explain crudely the dynamics of rights-based citizenship and how it lays down certain premises for how to deal with social exclusion in modern welfare democracies.

Social exclusion across four ideal types of citizenship

To the citizen of liberal constitutional democracy or democratic welfare state, as I will refer to it, irrespective of any welfare state type, social exclusion alludes to the failure to redeem the promise that citizenship carries, namely access to membership of a political order, a polity, for each individual (Cohen, 1999; Gosewinkel, 2017; Marshall, 1950). The memberships are granted to each individual from a specific and delineated social order where the political order reflects the binding force of solidarity of the social order. In most practical circumstances, the crude delineation
of the social order is territorial nation-state boundaries. In line with this argument, solidarity is the denomination of the age-old lesson of vinculum societies, referring to those norms and expectations that constitute a binding force of society (Brunkhorst, 2005; Preuss, 1999; Rehg, 1994). The political order provides for the reassurance of an orderly coexistence with members holding equal citizenship. This order entails the specific distribution of constitutional liberties equally to each member of the political order. Also, a due sense of solidarity among the members of the social order reproduces itself through their collective engagement within the political order (Habermas, 1998; Rehg, 1994).

When citizens stand on the brink of becoming socially excluded, they are excluded from the social order and retain their formal membership with the political order, that is, they are not politically excluded (that can happen, but it is not the focus of this chapter). Their social exclusion is thereby connected to how the social order governs the political order through popular sovereignty and also how the political order reflexively responds to the social order by governing collective decision-making and coordination within the social order. Therefore, the solution to social exclusion from the social order is very often located within the political order and how it reflexively solves the problems within and coordinates how the social order works. Those who are excluded, therefore, do not get their problems solved through how the political order currently is designed to govern the social order, nor are they listened to or take part in the communication to inform and design a political order that benefits them through how popular sovereignty works. To illustrate, legislation can be developed that governs in a manner that leaves lonely people lonely, that settles on election practices that hinder certain citizens from participating properly, that removes disability benefits that were proven to finally provide opportunity sets for certain citizen groups and that certain illnesses have cures no longer financed. In these examples, the citizen becomes left to their capabilities, and the needs of these citizens are no longer encompassed by the normative width of the welfare state in the political order and arguably also what can be deemed as the depth of solidarity within the social order.

To understand how social exclusion works concerning the promise citizenship holds, and from the viewpoint of a political order, taking ideal types of citizenships as a point of departure is fruitful. We can begin by resorting to the classic origin story of modern citizenships, namely the French Revolution and the motto “liberté, égalité, fraternité”, which can be translated into liberty, equality, and solidarity (see Brunkhorst, 2005). Within a modern and ideal type of citizenship, social exclusion plays a distinct role depending on certain key traits of liberty, equality and solidarity (Table 2.1). To liberty, acting on liberty is imperative within the scope of modern citizenships. We can argue with Benjamin Constant’s classic twofold approach to liberty, the liberty of the modern and the ancient (Constant, 2003/1815). The former speaks to the constitutional protection of individual liberty and that each citizen is bestowed as much liberty as can be compatible with all others having the same amount of liberty, which is a strong modern influence from Immanuel Kant. The latter speaks to the liberty to participate in democratic decision-making through the use of their public liberty (Habermas, 1996a). The
Social exclusion will mean different things for each of these two approaches to liberty. To equality, citizeionships imply equal memberships distributed equally. How citizenships are distributed equally can imply at least two different things. Firstly, we can speak of an equal distribution of memberships among those who share territorial or contextual boundaries. Secondly, we can speak of universal citizenship, irrespective of sharing contextual backgrounds. To solidarity, as the third element of the modern ideal citizenship, we refer to those versions of solidarity reflected in the composition between equality and liberty, where the combination produces four different ideal types of citizenships: instrumental, communitarian, republican and cosmopolitan.

The first ideal type, instrumental citizenship, is a membership type decoupled from any collective societal identity but refers to an individual membership within a particular territory and the individual citizens participation in the collective enforcement of power (Joppke, 2019). Hence, citizenship is meant to be a member of a “thin” political order, where especially efficiency is a legitimizing force for political action, and implementing and enforcing individual rights are perceived purely as a problem-solving device for which it is an aim to optimise problem-solving, that is, being both cost-efficient and fast and also strictly by the letter of the law.

The second ideal type is the communitarian citizenship. In contrast to the instrumental one, it is built on the Aristotelian notion of a social order based on a common good as a monolithic ethical community and that citizenships are meant to shape each person into belonging as part of a the common good (Pocock, 1995). Citizenship is sought rigged for collective action, and where collective problem-solving and coordination become optimal when its actions align with a collective “we.” Citizenship rights are thereby the result of individuals internalising norms that integrate them into a collective identity anchored in an ethical community (Habermas, 1996b).

The third ideal type is civic republican citizenship. This type of citizenship is also rigged for a collective identity, but where it is not a matter of one ethical common good but rather a democratically forged general public good, which also is ethical but where it varies according to the composition of a current social order (Habermas, 1996b; Honohan, 2002). To such a citizenship type, the notion of participating in collective problem-solving and coordination is imperative, and where the citizen is, in what Jean Jaques Rousseau would argue, immersed in society and a relation of interdependence to other citizens (Rousseau, 1968). Within the civic republican model, citizenship membership is a strictly formal relationship that grants each member formal access to public participation through democratic
means. Citizenship itself does not prescribe any allegiance to any ethical conviction and is thereby a thinner concept than the communitarian.

The fourth and last ideal type is cosmopolitan citizenship. This type is bent on protecting individual dignity through rights (Habermas, 2012; Waldron, 2013). It does not, for instance, depend on memberships that originate from the residence within a nation-state’s territory with loyalty to a legal and political community such as both communitarianism and civic-republicanism do. It is equally valid from one nation-state to the next. In this regard, cosmopolitan citizenships will be built on constitutional rights equally distributed across boundaries and irrespective of governments, as also discussed in Chapter 7 by Takle.

To each of these ideal types, we can argue the case of a corresponding type of social exclusion (Table 2.2), which reflects the concept of legitimacy that belongs to the citizenship type. As citizenships are memberships of a political community of a political order, this membership is in our current focus not under threat (it can be, but that is outside the scope of this chapter). At the same time, the citizen can become socially excluded within the social order. Hence, to avoid social exclusion, the political order and its design, and how it is set to deal with citizens at the brink of exclusion, about the societal corrosion that comes along with it and the risk of disintegration become all the more important to focus on.

To the instrumental citizenship type, the political order is merely seen as a decision-making device set to solve collective tasks. An amount of socially excluded citizens would be connected to a low-performance level of the political order provided the political order was set to solve their problems, and where the political order lacks legitimacy on the merits that it is not solving problems it is set to solve. Hence, social exclusion becomes an inherent challenge to the design of the political order, but not for any other reason than to redefine what constitutes a problem or increase the performance of how the political order functions. Those who become socially excluded are citizens the political order is incapable of identifying as being a “problem.” To the instrumental citizenship, politics is about identifying problems and keeping to each citizen “strictly purposive-rational calculation of their own interests” (Habermas, 1996a). Those excluded have yet to manage to push for their interests efficiently. Their exclusion is only dealt with once others’ rational self-interest becomes sufficiently negatively affected to deal with the problem.

To the communitarian citizenship type, those socially excluded are relatively straightforwardly those citizens within the social order who drift away from adhering

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Central legitimizing norm</th>
<th>Socially excluded</th>
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<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Efficient problem-solving</td>
<td>Non-identified problem</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communitarian</td>
<td>Ethical compliance</td>
<td>Non-belonging</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civic Republican</td>
<td>Democratic participation</td>
<td>Inconsequential participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitan</td>
<td>Safeguard individual dignity</td>
<td>Individual dignity threatened</td>
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to a collective conception of an ethical way of life and that each member of the social order thereby is rigged to accommodate. Citizenship is, first and foremost, ethical to a communitarian type, and the political order aims to channel a concept of good, a way of life, that emanates from the social order. On the other side, we can argue that one of the lead motivations of communitarianism is to avoid social exclusion through strict admission criteria by ascribing membership and corresponding exclusion criteria: “Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination” (Waltzer, 1983). Following this argumentation, the political order and the social order collapse onto one another, and where shared identities include meanings, values and the intersubjectively shared form of ethical life. Those at risk of social exclusion and where the communitarian approach is set to accommodate each person deemed to belong to the community at large and who carries the ethical approach to life that the concept of solidarity espouse. Those who will not be included are those that disagree or have chosen a different ethical doctrine to base their life on and who thereby do not belong.

To the civic-republican citizenship type, a socially excluded citizen is opposite to the communitarian. Civic-republicanism does not demand allegiances to any ethical conception of the common good. Instead, you are responsible for participating in public discourse and self-government through collective decision-making and coordination to develop a political order that adheres to your interests. In the end, the political order is the product of collective engagement, where each citizen is given equal weight through participation. The political order thereby reflects a temporally delimited public good constructed through civic engagement. Hence, those who experience social exclusion are those who cannot participate effectively or choose not to participate through democratic engagement and who, thereby, fall outside of the scope of what the political order is set to do. By not participating in self-government, they will run the risk of having a political order that will likely not identify social exclusion as a problem.

The last type is the cosmopolitan citizenship, where those excluded are individual citizens with threatened dignity. This type prioritizes the constitutional protection of each individual through the political order and in a reflexive manner to the social order. Hence, certain restrictions on individual interaction also restrain interaction within the social order itself. Once individual liberty is bestowed onto all members of a social order, nobody can act in such a way that it violates liberty. Furthermore, each individual is granted equal liberty to realize their dignity. Those who cannot manage the independence of life granted by personal liberty are those who run the risk of becoming socially excluded. To the cosmopolitan type, the welfare state becomes justified, primarily through the need to make sure that opportunity sets are distributed equitably so that each citizen can act on liberty equally.

The ideal types of citizenship refer to different alignment configurations between the social order and the political order, and where the solidarity espoused by the social order is reflected differently by the different political orderers. What is implied is that each of the citizenship types has different approaches to what constitutes the
normative underpinnings of solidarity and, thereby, what is the motivational force of societal integration and the interest in actively working to include those who are socially excluded. Hence, whenever the social order pushes on through modernisation processes, norms and expectations develop, how people engage one another changes, the capabilities for interaction alter and so on. The normative composition of solidarity within the social order will run the risk of change, and a discrepancy between the social order and the political order can arise. Such a discrepancy will always be present when it is empirically investigated, and empirically the ideal types of solidarity can only be expected to be partially prevalent. Empirically, we expect all the different ideal types to be prevalent, albeit to different degrees.

Three challenges of modernity to the socially excluded

In the following, I will draw on three interchanging challenges that affect a modern social order and make social exclusion a distinct challenge in that discrepancy in the alignment between the social and political order is established. As mentioned in the Introduction, these challenges are value pluralism, interconnectedness and division of labour. Although not an exclusive list, the three are significant challenges to a social order’s ability to reproduce and remain integrated across time. Each of them causes the social order to fluctuate in its response to the challenge and, consequently, pushes for demands for collective coordination and problem-solving within the political order. Challenges force the political order to change and to “keep up.”

The threat of social exclusion has been recognised since the earlier studies of poverty in the cradle of modern sociology. The term was nevertheless coined in the 1970s by Rene Lenoir, who described those who were “excluded” in a rather crude fashion, from, for example, “handicapped” to “misfits.” Today, the research literature abounds and approaches the concept of social exclusion differently, especially from a sociological viewpoint in the empirical investigation of how different groups of individuals are pushed to the brink of society in one way or the other. This empirical focus, although fruitful, often does two disservices. First, it seldom incorporates observable empirical variations into the larger picture of societal integration and disintegration. By not doing so, the threat of social exclusion can become downplayed. Second, it often becomes implicitly moralistic by unveiling what is perceived as an unjust exclusion from a social entity held to be good for everyone to be a part of. The conceptual approach taken in this chapter might be criticised for being overly conceptually oriented. However, without discussing social exclusion in a larger theoretical framework, lessons drawn from empirical investigations are disconnected from the greater picture of why social exclusion is one of the most significant threats any democratic welfare state faces. Recall from the introduction that every fifth EU citizen is at risk of social exclusion.

Social exclusion as a concept has become increasingly relevant as the social order of modern welfare democracies becomes increasingly detached from a traditionalistic societal consciousness and types of solidarity based purely on social engagement through familiarity are an “unavoidable fact of life” (Luhmann, 1988). The gradual detachment that the modern nation-state brings is pushed forth by
processes of modernisation characterized by functional differentiation of society, increased societal complexity and the fact that within a social order, each member now relies on others they have never met (Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1979; Simmel, 2008). In line with this gradual detachment, where modern interaction within a social order cannot rely solely on traditional norms for interaction and coordination, modern social orders rely on trust that is distinct from traditionalist societies' proximity- and context dependency. Solidarity within a modern social order, and what binds modern social orders together, has transcended the ever-present contextually rooted ties where individuals were familiar to their kin, their family and the local community (Giddens, 1990). A modern social order calls for solidarity with strangers, accepting dependencies and risk (Brunkhorst, 2005; Luhmann, 1979). The role of the political order of a democratic welfare state is to be designed in such a manner that different challenges facing individuals with the threat of exclusion are answered in a manner that ensures their continuous inclusion.

The flux that causes the social order to dealign with the political order does so by challenging established norms and expectations of interaction and questions whether or not the political order is set to solve the problems that come with major societal challenges. To illustrate the effect of flux on a political order designed to a specific social order and which remain unchanged, the social order fluctuates away from what the political order once regulated, and a political order that remains unchanged regulate a social order that no longer exist. The reason is that what was once stabilized into a political order has been pushed further by the flux generated by these challenges, and the social and political order is no longer aligned. The challenges represent facts that make the tension between the political order and the social order more critical as a focal point as the risk of social disintegration can occur, leaving citizens socially excluded. Hence, a democratic welfare state, in order to remain aligned with the currents that push the social order into flux, must be re-designed, laws must be amended or new codes developed, budgets need to accommodate changes, policies must answer current needs and so on.

The first challenge is the magnitude of reasonable choices on how to live your life, that is, value pluralism or the fact of reasonable pluralism (Rawls, 1993). Value pluralism must be seen in combination with the incremental introduction of the constitutional right to choose how to live your life in a modern society – to act on personal liberty (Rawls, 1993), and that on an aggregated level, a social order consists of a diverse set of reasonable choices on how to live life. Through constitutionalism, a principle of formal equality is enforced on a fundamental level to secure the right to choose how to live life for everyone as long as that choice is reasonable. Thus, the fact of value pluralism can be deemed as a basic feature of democracy and “is the normal result of its culture of free institutions” (Rawls, 1987). The establishment of constitutional protection of individual liberty thus becomes a hallmark of free institutions.

Securing the right to freely choose how to live life involves instituting constraints upon government and others from interfering in the everyday lives of citizens, and thus have two obvious flip-sides regarding social exclusion. First, pluralism is a “permanent feature of the public culture of modern democracies” (Rawls, 1987), leaving individual citizens to their faculties. If you are incapable of acting on your
liberty, there will be a heightened risk of social exclusion, inability to cope with your situation, how your choices are lined up and so on. The second is that each citizen can be said to be free to choose how to live life, which leaves the configuration of how different possible choices in life will vary continuously according to what individuals want out of life. It will lend pressure on those action norms that have previously been agreed to. Certain action norms will diminish, contested and reconsidered, while new norms can begin to take shape that one day could receive general recognition. In such a manner, value pluralism will constantly challenge the existing action norms and possibly push others towards exclusion.

The second and third challenges are interconnectedness and division of labour into a division of labour. Although these are two different challenges, they share the same backdrop in the complexity of modern welfare democracies. The difference, however, is that interconnectedness alludes to ties of dependencies, whereas division of labour is an organisational feature of modern societies coordinating what is deemed as necessary work. In modern welfare democracies, each citizen seeks to establish a life of their choosing, that is, to act on liberty, but cannot do so alone. For instance, a teacher must teach and cannot grow crops, enforce justice, care for the ill, drive the bus and so on. Each citizen thereby becomes interconnected to others through mutually shared dependencies – the interconnectedness among and which is a type of interconnectedness that produces and reproduces the division of labour. Due to personal liberty, collective problem-solving and coordination have become the choir of elected representatives.

The increased interconnectedness and division of labour have become truisms, but both establish interdependence that each citizen must rely on to get by. A modern democratic welfare state establishes increasing contingencies and risks (Luhmann, 1979). A modern society even presents hidden contingency through interconnectedness, in that there are many aspects of an agent’s life that the agent is unaware that it depends on. The potential of success or failures of others, known as unknown, whom we interact with and that affect us are crucial for many outcomes in our daily lives. Getting by in a complex environment would become even harder if we could not act on mutually recognized action norms and corresponding expectations – that is, to belong in a social order bound together by solidarity. In modern society, being unable to be included within a social order, to trust others and to be trusted by those we interact with, knowingly or not, would make our lives hard or even impossible (Baier, 1986; Barber, 1983; Luhmann, 1979). Hence, social exclusion can become complicated to overcome provided, for instance, that an individual citizen can no longer partake within the social order.

Identifying these three modern challenges to those who are socially excluded, we also must underline that each of these challenges not only can push individual citizens to the margin of society but can also cause a wider dealignment between the social order and the political order itself. As the social order is in constant flux, the political order is not, but needs to be actively changed through self-legislation, bureaucratic decision-making or other means. Through means of democratic self-rule, what is enacted and how government works are meant to be in constant dialogue with the social order, and as popular sovereignty is anchored in the social order and feeds into the democratic welfare state, the priorities and manner in
which the political order is driven forth are based on choices through democratic will-formation. Those who are socially excluded or at the margin of becoming excluded either receive a priority or do not as part of how the political order alleviates certain individuals or groups at risk of social exclusion (while others perhaps are not alleviated).

The call for reconciling cosmopolitanism and civic-republicanism

That being said, the political order belonging to a welfare democracy is located between the cosmopolitanism of, for instance, Immanuel Kant and the civic-republicanism of, for instance, Jean Jacques Rousseau. This version of democracy can come in various forms, where Europe might be the obvious example, as each nation-state must uphold constitutional rights and simultaneously be a democracy. The following social exclusion will be explored by combining these two ideal citizenship types.

Suppose we return to the promise built into citizenship, which alludes to the solidarity of a social order aligned with a political order. In that case, we can elaborate on the combination of the concept of liberty and equality built into the cosmopolitan and civic-republican types of citizenship. In this combination, the political order can be perceived as reflecting the solidarity of the social order whenever, first, each citizen can act on a maximum number of personal liberties compatible with all others having the same number of liberties, and according to each own rational self-interest, as a matter of individual right. Second, reasonable individuals can always rationally agree to the constraints on liberty because disagreements would be resolved through civic deliberation and would not breach the cosmopolitan claim to liberty. Combining these two, it can be argued that political order is a product of constitutionally restrained civic engagement in democratic discourse. Only by combining these two types of liberty, the cosmopolitan and the civic-republican can legitimate aims be pursued within a political order through democratic rational self-legislation.

The combination of the two ideal types of civic-republicanism and cosmopolitanism establishes a political order that is only in need of external obedience rather than the call for internalisation of ethical norms as called for by communitarianism. External obedience means that citizens are motivated to engage in the political order because it applies to everyone equally, but simultaneously do not demand that peers conform to any conception of good they would not want to participate in. It means that the political order does not demand that individual agents must ethically comply with it, nor that value pluralism can be subdued through paternalistic demands towards how you would like to live life. A demand for the internalisation of societal norms, as communitarianism does, would narrow the scope of value pluralism. It would imply that many would potentially have to ethically reorient themselves against their will, violating their rights to personal liberty and demanding some pledge of allegiance to an ethical doctrine they perhaps would not want to be a part of. Theoretical shortcomings of communitarianism aside, it is pretty evident to the observer of current politics that the claim of a need for internalisation has again reached a momentum across Europe, whether it is religious beliefs or nationalistic sentiments (Fitzi et al., 2018; Mudde, 2016).
The instrumental citizenship is also ill-equipped to explain how welfare democracies deal with social exclusion. Only when exclusion is a perceived problem by enough citizens will a potential solution be sought out. Through the instrumental approach, the political order is purely a problem-solving mechanism for the social order to use when needed. In this respect, there is no motivation to secure collective problem-solving and coordination and enforce citizens’ right to liberty and safeguard their dignity.

A modern contribution that elaborates on a fruitful combination of these two principles of liberty is provided by Jürgen Habermas (Habermas, 1996a). In his approach to a legal form, he argues for the two conceptions of liberty: the constitutionalism that cosmopolitanism calls for and the democratic self-rule of civic-republicanism. Habermas argues that a precondition for the right to work is liberties granting personal liberty prior to any liberty to engage in collective problem-solving and coordination through democratic self-rule. Constitutionalism, thereby, aims to establish basic institutions that can secure the liberty of each citizen through basic civic rights.

To the political order, civic-republicanism becomes a constitutionally restrained self-government. The goal is to establish a public good through the “expression of ethical self-realization,” which is separate from communitarianism in that it aligns with the variations across publics across time espoused through democratic self-rule (Habermas, 1996a). Constitutionalism opposes democratic self-rule mainly because of the restrictions a personal right to liberty imposes on reaching collective self-realisation through self-legislation.

Constitutionalism, according to the cosmopolitan ideal type, establishes a formal and politically thin egalitarian universalism shaping the normative character of solidarity that restrains how the social order, on the other hand, can design the political order. Constitutionalism thereby forces on the social order a reflexive relation to the political order and demand towards ensuring that each member of the social order is included in the fold of solidarity. Combining these two ideal types, each citizen is bound by the rule of law and the constitutional guarantee of protecting each person’s dignity. If any citizen or a group of citizens becomes excluded, the constitutional duty to safeguard their dignity has not been observed. Those excluded are a part of the social order, and violations of their dignity imply that the promise built into the citizenship itself has not been kept. Hence, by reconciling the civic republican view with the cosmopolitan view, it is not purely up to each person to cure their risks of exclusion, but also a thin conception of justice that dictates the duty of any social order to design a political order to hinder any violation of any individual citizen’s dignity.

**Enforcing social inclusion**

In order to establish a political order with a mechanism built into it to combat social exclusion, the protection of each person’s dignity needs a priority. Hence, a rights system must be incorporated into the political order that guarantees the constitutionality of individual protection before establishing democracy. According to Habermas, whom I will align with here, such a system of rights consists of five broad
categories. The first three are basic negative rights, membership rights and the right to legal remedies. These, and how they are interdependent and interconnected, are a constitutional guarantee of personal liberty, and “in a word, there is no legitimate law without these three” (Habermas, 1996a). These three types of rights are a necessary condition for embedding the fact of value pluralism into a legal form on an individual level by securing the right of each to choose for themselves how to live life. The fourth category, which can only claim to be legitimate provided that the former three rights have already been secured, consists of political rights to participate in democratic discourse – it guarantees public liberty (Habermas, 1996a). The democratic component incorporates the principle of popular sovereignty, that is, the liberty to engage in collective self-government, which can only become legitimately enforced if the personal right to liberty is introduced first, protecting each person from majority rule and arbitrary use of coercion.

The last type of right is social-welfare rights. They are necessary insofar as the effective exercise of civil and political rights depends on specific social and material conditions that can only be achieved through redistribution and establishing some level of justice (Habermas, 2012). These rights can secure the level of welfare necessary for providing a fair opportunity for individuals to use their personal liberty (Habermas, 1996a).

The rights system is necessary for establishing a legal form capable of safeguarding each person’s dignity from social exclusion. The “system of rights” is something that each modern democratic welfare state must appropriately elaborate and specify as constitutional to enable a lawmaking procedure that aims to counter any violations of individual dignity. Accordingly, it can be argued that such a system “states precisely the conditions under which the forms of communication necessary for the genesis of legitimate law can be legally institutionalized” (Habermas, 1996a). A system of rights, constitutionally embedded within the political order, provides the necessary ingredients and backdrop for designing decision-making bodies reflecting the social order.

Conclusion: the call for social sustainability

Modern welfare democracies in Europe are young, and the idea of rights-based welfare state systems is even younger. If the threat of social exclusion is not met, provided we know that modern challenges to any social order will not pause but cause flux, there will always be a threat of citizens becoming increasingly excluded. An active effort must be undertaken to solidify solidarity and make the risk of trust worth taking, or else the prevalence of order is on the line. Traditional approaches to inclusion and maintaining order through social integration do not answer the real-world challenges within a modern nation-state. Therefore, although you will most certainly find the prevalence of each of the ideal types of citizenships across any democratic welfare state, the communitarian solution to social exclusion is no longer feasible. Also, the purposive-rational calculation of interests within the instrumental approach must deliver on the promise of citizenship to safeguard order.
A key challenge across Europe can be read as a consequence of social exclusion. We can see the rising support for authoritarianism, which is antithetical to the political order that a democratic welfare state espouses and arguably threatens its ability to secure the promise of citizenship. Currently, and through democratic means, citizens have willingly leaned into and begun supporting the politics of democratic and human rights backsliding and become bent to walk the path of re-negotiating the social contract (Bermeo, 2016; Donno, 2013). Today, and across Europe, disruptive and corroding currents that constitute a direct threat to the cosmopolitan and civic-republican political order abound. The social contracts that shape the basis of citizens' peaceful and productive coexistence become questioned. Today, it has become pertinent to question how to safeguard liberal democracy from corrosion, distrust, lack of solidarity and instability. A more explicit focus on those threatened by social exclusion, whose dignity is correspondingly threatened, could force policy development and lawmaking to re-design the political order of welfare democracies that brought everyone along, albeit slowing the wheels down.

Modernisation processes ensure the differentiation of functional spheres that consist of necessary components to secure social reproduction but simultaneously push the social order into flux that sets social integration on trial (Luhmann, 1979). What binds society together has thereby become increasingly complex. It also illuminates the social order's need to align itself with a political order that can coordinate social reproduction and ensure that a social order remains integrated. With such a coordinating force, a complex social order would prevail. Hence, the interconnection between a social and political order is intrinsic to modern democratic welfare states.

In this dynamic, the formal establishment of a political order, with a constitution and the rule of law established as a product of self-rule, can be viewed as a system that stabilizes norms and expectations of the social order into the political order. Each citizen can participate in re-designing the political order through democratic self-legislation but is restrained through a duty to secure the dignity of each citizen by either leaving the citizen alone or providing necessary welfare assistance for the citizen to make use of their liberty. Across Europe, with every fifth citizen being defined as socially excluded, we can argue that their dignity is either violated or threatened of becoming violated, and as each citizen of the EU carry human rights, the argument that stipulates the democratic welfare states across Europe do not do its job according to the promise built into the citizenships of each individual is merited.

References


3 The Norwegian welfare state adjusting to crisis

Temporary changes in unemployment benefit regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic and their long-term implications

Kristian Heggebø and Axel West Pedersen

Introduction

According to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway, article 110, “Those who cannot themselves provide for their own subsistence have the right to support from the state.” Thus, if a Norwegian citizen is unable to earn a living by participating in the labour market, because of, for example, serious health impairments, the constitution requires the state to provide financial support. The Norwegian welfare state is also obliged to provide financial support to people who are temporarily out of work (cyclical unemployment), those who do not have the qualifications demanded by employers (structural unemployment) and, in principle, all individuals who are in need for whatever reason (e.g., substance abuse). Obviously, the need for income support from the welfare state is likely to increase noticeably during economic crises, when some firms go bankrupt and others need to downsize, and there are few labour market opportunities because job openings typically dwindle.

The COVID-19 pandemic is primarily a health crisis, but the impact on the labour market has also been massive, including in Norway, where, however, the sickness and death toll have been relatively low. In March 2020, shortly following the announcement of the infection control measures by Prime Minister Erna Solberg and the Minister of Health and Care Services Bent Høie, the unemployment rate hit a record-high level of 10.6%. The number of applications for unemployment benefits skyrocketed as well – the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration received more unemployment benefit applications in four days’ time (16–19 March) than over the entire previous calendar year.

We ask the following overarching research question: What was the policy response from the Norwegian welfare state to the extraordinary labour market situation triggered by the global spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus? Examining this question may shed some light on the processes of social exclusion/inclusion (UN, 2016) for a disadvantaged group in Norway: the unemployed. The current chapter is an example of what Haug discusses in Chapter 1, and it shows that policymakers have decided to implement several temporary amendments to unemployment benefit regulations. These changes were all in a more inclusive direction. The DOI: 10.4324/9781003347279-5
coverage/eligibility criteria, replacement rates and maximum period were altered so that coverage and generosity markedly increased.

This chapter is structured as follows: First, we present an overview of the income maintenance schemes available for Norwegian citizens of working age. Subsequently, we provide a brief description of the COVID-19 pandemic in Norway, with an emphasis on the labour market crisis that emerged because of the pandemic and imposed infection control measures. We proceed with a sketch of the political leeway for a potential restructuring of income maintenance schemes during an economic downturn/crisis. Thereafter, we provide an overview of the temporary changes to Norwegian unemployment benefit regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic. The observational time period is restricted to the year 2020, before the large-scale vaccination rollout. In the final section, we discuss whether the temporary policy changes implemented may have any permanent, long-term implications for the unemployment insurance system in Norway.

Income maintenance schemes in Norway

For people who cannot provide for their own subsistence, welfare states may offer either income maintenance schemes, social transfers in-kind or a combination of both. Financial support from the Norwegian welfare state for people in need most often comes in the form of income maintenance schemes, such as unemployment benefits and sick pay. Social transfers in-kind, that is, providing specific goods and/or services for free or at low cost (e.g., meals or food stamps), are rare, though many services, including healthcare and education, are universally available for free or heavily subsidised for all Norwegian residents.

The five most important income maintenance schemes in the Norwegian welfare state for people of working age are as follows: (i) disability benefits, (ii) work assessment allowance, (iii) sick pay, (iv) unemployment benefits and (v) social assistance. Income maintenance schemes in Norway are mostly universal – that is, the benefit is provided without means-testing. Social assistance, a meagre and means-tested scheme, is the only major exception.

A particular feature of the Norwegian system of income maintenance is that the health-related benefits – sick pay, work assessment allowance and disability benefits – are consistently more generous and accessible than the income protection offered to people who are out of work. Therefore, we will briefly describe the health-related schemes before moving on to describing the existing income protection offered to the unemployed prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Income support for people with health problems

Disability benefits, work assessment allowance and sick pay are all health-related; that is, a key eligibility criterion is that work incapacity is caused by a diagnosed medical condition.

The sick pay scheme offers full compensation (100%) for previous earnings up to a ceiling of six times the base amount (BA). BA is a technical calculation quantity
used in the Norwegian welfare system. One BA was equal to 101,351 Norwegian kroner (NOK) in 2020, approximately €10,000. Hence, 6 BA would correspond to roughly 120% of average full-time wage. Thus, the sick pay scheme is very generous compared with most, if not all, other countries. Sick pay is only available for people who currently hold employment (i.e., labour market insiders).

For both work assessment allowance and disability benefit, the compensation level is 66% for earnings up to the social security ceiling of 6 BA. For these two health-related schemes, coverage is truly universal in the sense that benefits are also available for people outside – or on the fringes of – the labour market. The minimum benefit offered to individuals without previous earnings can be considered reasonably generous, especially compared with social assistance: 2 BA for work assessment allowance (1.33 BA for recipients below 25 years old) and 2.28–2.48 BA for disability benefits per year.

The maximum period of receipt is one year for sick pay. For the work assessment allowance, the maximum period is three years (four years until reform 1 January 2018). Disability benefits are granted indefinitely but may be reconsidered if the recipients’ work capacity increases, for example, because of improved health or educational attainment/training that opens up new job opportunities.

**Income support for people out of work**

For a person who is active in the labour market but temporarily out of work, there are two main alternatives if they need income support. First, for those with previous labour market attachments, unemployment benefits may be available. Coverage is restricted to wage earners with a prior attachment to the labour market. To be covered by unemployment benefits, one must have earned at least 1.5 BA during the preceding 12 months or 3 BA over the preceding 36 months. The threshold of 1.5 BA corresponds to roughly half the average wage of a full-time unskilled worker in the lowest income bracket in Norway. Thus, the earnings threshold is low for people who are employed full-time for all (or large parts) of the year but may be too high for part-time employees and for people who only have earned income a few months each year. Second, for people with a rather loose labour market attachment, that is, those who have earned less than 1.5 BA in work income during the preceding 12 months (or less than 3 BA over the last 36 months), means-tested social assistance is the only option.

The maximum period of unemployment benefit receipt is two years. However, the maximum period is one year for unemployed individuals who have earned less than 2 BA during the preceding 12 months (or below 2 BA on average the last three years). If the person is still out of work and in need of financial support from the welfare state after 24/12 months, they must apply for social assistance. Moving from unemployment benefits to social assistance will normally lead to a marked income drop and often poverty, depending on the number of dependent children and expenditures on housing. Another key difference is the discretionary nature of social assistance and possibility of being subject to different forms of means-testing (e.g., requiring the claimant to sell assets like a car or the family house). Furthermore,
social assistance is not tailored to be a permanent income source for people out of work but is instead intended to be a short-term economic relief for people struggling to make ends meet. Despite these intentions, a non-negligible number of people receive social assistance for prolonged periods. In 2019, a total of 129,894 people received social assistance in Norway, and 42.76% (N = 55,541) were recipients for six months or more (SSB, 2022a). The economic situation is still characterised by uncertainty because of the low generosity with roughly 1 BA yearly on average (SSB, 2022b) and the ever-present risk of losing income support altogether (e.g., because of caseworker’s changed evaluation). These two out-of-work benefits are not health-related, but there is still an overrepresentation of individuals with health problems, both among the unemployed (Heggebø & Buffel, 2019) and among long-term social assistance recipients (Heggebø et al., 2019).

The replacement rate for unemployment benefits in Norway is 62.4% for earnings below the above-mentioned social security ceiling of 6 BA. Data from the OECD (2021) paint a varied picture of how generous unemployment benefits are in Norway. Only five (Luxembourg, Portugal, Switzerland, the Netherlands and France) out of 34 OECD countries had higher net replacement rates in 2019 for a single childless person with an average wage after 12 months of unemployment (i.e., long-term). However, Norway is ranked considerably lower on short-term receipt, especially for low-income brackets: sixteen OECD countries ranked higher for a single childless person with 67% of the average wage in previous earnings after two months of unemployment. Norway’s ranking also varies for the Social Policy Indicators (SPIN) Out-of-Work Benefits dataset, where social assistance, housing benefits and child and family benefits are included (Nelson et al., 2020). Depending on the income level, unemployment benefits in Norway is ranked as number eight or nine out of 38 countries for a lone parent with two dependent children in 2011 (most recent year with available data). Unemployment benefits are considerably less generous, however, for two-parent families with two dependent children. For this family type, Norway is ranked as number 18 or 19 out of 38 countries.

Thus, the generosity of the Norwegian unemployment insurance system is not outstanding from a cross-national comparative perspective. Furthermore, the scheme has far from universal coverage and has low take-up among the unemployed. People with low total work incomes are not entitled to unemployment benefits. Self-employed and categories of freelancers are not entitled either, and the same applies to full-time students and students who work part time (but earn less than 1.5 BA). Unlike work assessment allowance and disability benefits (see previous discussion), there is no minimum unemployment benefit available for people with low or no previous work income. Official statistics confirm that many unemployed people are not entitled to benefits (NLWA, 2021d). During 2012–2014, an average of 52% of all registered unemployed received unemployment benefits. During 2015–2017, the corresponding share increased to 57%. The coverage share decreased to 51% and 46% in 2018 and 2019, respectively. These numbers clearly show that a large proportion of people out of work in Norway – approximately half – were not covered by existing unemployment benefit regulations.
In fact, Norway’s unemployment insurance system is somewhat of an outlier among the Nordic welfare states when it comes to coverage. Coverage is restricted both because of the income threshold of 1.5 BA and that only income from work counts. Business income, which self-employed and freelancers tend to earn, is disregarded. Contrary to Sweden and Finland, there is no “lower level” unemployment benefit in place for, for example, newly graduated students or people with no or minimal earnings from work during the preceding year. Norway also differs from neighbouring countries by not basing unemployment protection on the Ghent system, that is, requiring that individuals join a voluntary unemployment fund (typically run by a union). Thus, the Norwegian unemployment insurance system is all-encompassing in the sense that everyone is entitled to benefits as long as they exceed the work income threshold. However, there are some noticeable gaps in the system because the following groups are not covered:

- People with no or minimal previous work experience (e.g., newly graduated students)
- People with a low income level (i.e., earn less than roughly €15,000 yearly)
- People with non-standard employment contracts (e.g., self-employed and freelancers)

The Norwegian welfare state adjusting to crisis – options and obstacles

Unemployment rates typically soar during economic downturns, so more people are in need of financial support from the welfare state. While confronted with a deep and long-lasting economic crisis, there might be a need to adjust income maintenance schemes, either temporarily or permanently.

Policymakers can respond to an economic crisis in three main ways. The first and perhaps most obvious option is stability – to do nothing. In other words, the regulations governing the income maintenance scheme should be kept unchanged. This will normally lead to increased public expenditures for as long as the crisis lasts. The second option is to change the regulations in a more exclusive direction. To balance budgets, it might be considered necessary to, for example, lower the replacement rates, at least during the peak of the crisis. The third and final option is to change the regulations in a more inclusive direction. Policymakers could be motivated to relax the eligibility criteria to mitigate the negative social consequences of the crisis by ensuring that those who are affected have access to financial support. The latter option, that is, increasing the coverage and generosity of income maintenance schemes, might also be motivated by concerns about upholding and stimulating aggregate demand to avoid a further deepening of the crisis.

It is also possible to use a mixture of these three approaches, for example, to keep the eligibility criteria unchanged but to lower the replacement rate and reduce the maximum period of receipt. Of course, concerns for state finances are important when deciding between these three main options. If a country is nearing insolvency,
it may simply be financially infeasible to keep the regulations unchanged – not to mention changing it in a more inclusive direction.

Policymakers also take public opinion into account when deciding what to do. Previous research has shown that the unemployed are viewed more favourably when unemployment is widespread (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Fraile & Ferrer, 2005), which may be explained by several mechanisms. First, more people may think that the unemployed are not to blame for their joblessness in an economic crisis, whereas there will be more negative connotations associated with unemployment in a booming economy when job opportunities abound. Second, more people may know someone they like and respect who has recently lost their job during a crisis. Third, more people may worry that they will lose their jobs themselves, thus sparking empathy for those who are currently unemployed (Buss, 2019). Policymakers will probably consider these and similar public sentiments when deciding how to respond (Burstein & Freudenburg, 1978; Page & Shapiro, 1983). The size of the unemployed population could also matter. Taking steps to improve the unemployed people’s situation might make sense if a large fraction of the electorate is out of work, especially if there is an election coming up.

Another potential factor is the extent to which policymakers are responsible for the crisis. Infection control measures are, for instance, partly to blame for job losses during the COVID-19 pandemic. Of course, many businesses would have gone bust without any infection control measures at all, caused, for example, by lower economic activity because of SARS-CoV-2 contagion fear. Still, the mandatory closing of all pubs, restaurants, hairdressers, gyms, music concerts and so forth did most likely deepen the labour market crisis. Therefore, policymakers could be more inclined to change regulations in a more inclusive direction.

The COVID-19 pandemic in Norway

Health crisis

The COVID-19 pandemic is a severe health crisis estimated to have resulted in roughly 14.9 million excess deaths during 2020 and 2021 (WHO, 2022). The first confirmed COVID-19 case was registered in Norway on 26 February 2020, and the first COVID-19-related death occurred on 12 March 2020, that is, on the same day as the country’s first infection control measures were announced.

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has been comparatively mild in Norway, as measured by case rates, hospitalisations and COVID-19-associated mortality. Figure 3.1 shows the daily new COVID-19 cases, alongside the cumulative number, during 2020. In the figure, the first (March–April) and second (November–December) waves are clearly visible. In total, 50,155 COVID-19 cases were registered during 2020. Note that the observed case rates in March–April 2020 are biased towards zero because of limited test capacity at the start of the pandemic. Thus, the real case rates were probably much higher in the spring wave than in the autumn wave, as evident by the considerably higher hospitalisation rates during the spring wave (cf. Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.1 New daily and cumulative number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in Norway, 21 February 2020–31 December 2020

Source: NIPH (2021)

Figure 3.2 New daily and cumulative number of hospital admissions associated with COVID-19 in Norway, 21 February 2020–31 December 2020

Source: NIPH (2021)
New daily hospital admissions associated with COVID-19, alongside the cumulative number, are shown in Figure 3.2. The bulk of new hospitalisations were registered from mid-March to the start of April, and the number of hospitalisations increased slowly but steadily during the autumn wave as well. In total, 2,185 people were hospitalised in Norway during 2020 with COVID-19 as a registered (main or contributing) reason.

The mortality toll has also been rather small in Norway. Only five out of 37 OECD countries had fewer COVID-19-related deaths – when adjusted for population size – during 2020 than Norway with 8.4 per 100,000 inhabitants: Iceland (8.1 per 100,000 inhabitants), Australia (3.6), Japan (2.8), South Korea (1.9) and New Zealand (0.5) (NOU, 2021, 6, pp. 45–47).

Labour market crisis

The health crisis caused by the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was comparatively mild in Norway during 2020, but the labour market impact was still massive. After the announcement of the infection control measures on 12 March 2020, the unemployment rate increased rapidly, reaching a record-high level of 10.6% in March (see Figure 3.3). Similar unemployment levels have most likely not been observed in Norway since the Great Depression in the 1930s. Unemployment statistics have been compiled and published since 1948, and the highest recorded yearly unemployment rate was in 1993, when 5.5% of the workforce was unemployed (NLWA, 2021c).

![Figure 3.3 Registered monthly unemployment rate in Norway, January–December 2020, in percentage](source: NLWA (2021a))
As a result, the number of applications for unemployment benefits exploded. In a timespan of merely four days, between 16 March and 19 March, the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration received more applications for unemployment benefits ($N = 162,286$) than during the entire previous calendar year ($N = 160,500$). During 2020, a grand total of 663,903 unemployment benefit applications were sent, 43% of which occurred during the first two weeks after the implementation of the infection control measures. Compared with 2019, the number of unemployment benefit applications more than quadrupled (314% increase). The bulk of the unemployment benefit applications were because of redundancies (“permittering” in Norwegian), that is, a temporary type of unemployment where firms are expecting to rehire the employees made redundant as soon as the economic conditions improve again and the firm needs their services (indicated with striped pattern in Figure 3.4). In essence, the employment relationship is paused rather than being completely terminated. A smaller fraction of the unemployment benefit applications were “real” unemployment, that is, people dismissed from their previous positions (indicated without pattern in Figure 3.4).

Temporary changes in unemployment benefit regulations

While confronted with such a deep and potentially lasting economic crisis, policymakers need to decide how to respond. Essentially, there is a choice between stability (i.e., no alterations), more inclusion (i.e., generosity), more exclusion (i.e., cutbacks) and a mixture of these approaches. Three different domains can be subject to amendment:

![Figure 3.4: Number of applications for unemployment benefits, 01 March 2020–30 April 2020](Source: NLWA (2021b))
Norwegian policymakers implemented numerous temporary changes to the unemployment benefit regulations, and most amendments were introduced on 20 March 2020, that is, roughly a week after the announcement of the infection control measures. First, the coverage criteria were relaxed by lowering the income threshold to a minimum of 0.75 BA in work income during the previous 12 months (or a minimum of 2.25 BA during the previous three years), that is, the previous income threshold of 1.5 BA was cut in half (MLSA, 2020a). This change should ensure that more people with a low total income and employees with part-time work would be covered by the scheme. Also, the eligibility criteria were modified. The requirement that the reduction in working hours should be at least 50% was lowered temporarily to a minimum reduction of 40% during the COVID-19 pandemic (MLSA, 2020a).

Second, the replacement rate was also changed temporarily to a noticeably higher level: 80% for work income between 0 and 3 BA (MLSA, 2020a). For income between 3 and 6 BA, the replacement rate was still 62.4%. Thus, the benefit increase was more noticeable for people with low earnings. A person who earned, for example, approximately €25,000 during the last year would receive 18% higher benefits after the temporary changes to the unemployment benefit regulations (NOU, 2021, 6, p. 364). A person who earned roughly €50,000, on the other hand, would receive 11% more in benefits compared with the situation before the COVID-19 pandemic.

Third, the maximum period also changed. On 27 March 2020, it was decided that people who were approaching the maximum period for benefit receipt (24/12 months) should get an extension (MLSA, 2020b). Initially, the extension was supposed to last until the end of June, but a new extension was later implemented until the end of October 2020 (MLSA, 2020c). These extensions meant that long-term unemployed individuals did not have to apply for social assistance – a meagre and means-tested income maintenance scheme – after 24/12 months. As noted above, the bulk of unemployment episodes in Norway during 2020 were redundancies, that is, a temporary kind of unemployment. Normally, the maximum length of such “paused” employment relations would be 26 weeks, but this was changed to maximum 52 weeks during the COVID-19-pandemic (MTIF, 2020).

In summary, the Norwegian unemployment insurance system was changed temporarily in a more inclusive direction during the COVID-19 pandemic, both in terms of coverage/eligibility criteria, replacement rates and maximum period.

Other changes were also introduced to fill the gaps in the existing unemployment insurance system. A new economic compensation scheme was rolled out for freelancers and the self-employed, where people could apply, on a monthly basis, for lost income because of the pandemic and infection control measures (MLSA, 2020d). The complete closing of businesses for shorter (e.g., hairdressers) or longer (e.g., music concerts) periods is a typical example where economic compensation could be granted. Yet another new scheme, salary compensation, entitled people who became unemployed between 20 March and 31 August 2020, to a benefit that
compensated for income losses during the first 20 days after redundancy/lay-off (MLSA, 2020e). Importantly, students – a group with limited options for income support – could apply for salary compensation. The scheme was far from a permanent source of income given the short time window (compensating roughly three weeks of lost income), but it would nevertheless help students in precarious economic positions. An additional student grant and loan (with favourable interest) of roughly 0.25 times the BA (i.e., 26,000 NOK, roughly €2,600) was also announced for students who lost earnings because of the pandemic (Lånekassen, 2022). Moreover, a temporary legislative change was introduced that made it easier to enrol in education or attend training courses while receiving unemployment benefits (Prop 27L, 2020/2021).

Discussion

The preceding review of the changes in unemployment benefit regulations has shown that the Norwegian welfare state responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by altering the system in a more inclusive direction. Coverage and eligibility criteria were relaxed, the maximum period of receipt was extended and replacement rates were increased. Other adjustments were also introduced to fill the gaps in the unemployment insurance system, such as the lack of income support for students, self-employed and freelancers. All changes were announced as temporary amendments ceasing to exist when the economic conditions improved again. Still, these temporary policy changes could prove to have permanent, long-term implications for the Norwegian unemployment insurance system. According to Jones and Baumgartner’s (2012) punctuated equilibrium theory, policymaking is typically stable over prolonged periods, followed by a sudden leap that potentially leads the policy area in a new direction:

> Change occurs only when the informational signals from the external world are either extraordinarily strong, on the one hand, or when the signals accumulate over time to overcome the friction. . . . As a consequence, policy-making systems remain stable until the signals from outside exceed a threshold, and then they lurch forward – that is, policy punctuation occurs; afterward, they resume “equilibrium.”

(2012, p. 8)

The signals were “extraordinarily strong” in March 2020, so the COVID-19 pandemic could represent such a “lurch forward” that might lead policymakers down a new road, breaking the current path where relatively generous out-of-work benefits are available only for labour market insiders with a standard employment contract.

Temporarily changing unemployment benefit regulations in a more inclusive direction is definitely a leap compared with recent policy reforms. Since the turn of the century, there have been several unemployment benefit reforms in Nordic welfare states that have led to different types of cutbacks. In Norway in 2003, the maximum length of benefit receipt was reduced from three to two years, and the
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income threshold was increased from 1.25 to 1.5 BA. Sweden introduced a series of reforms in 2007, when replacement rates were lowered and the maximum period was decreased. In 2010, Denmark reduced the maximum length of benefit receipt from four (during the past six) to two (during the past four) years. Thus, the temporary adjustments to the Norwegian unemployment benefit regulations in 2020 do not align with the Nordic “policy trend.”

The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed gaps in unemployment benefit regulation in Norway. The following three groups were not covered by the Norwegian unemployment insurance system in its pre-COVID-19 form:

1. Newly graduated students and others with no or minimal work experience.
2. People with low total income level.
3. Self-employed, freelancers and other people with non-standard employment contracts.

First, students with low or no income from work had no other income support option than social assistance – a meagre and means-tested, short-term economic relief – during an unemployment spell. An already vulnerable economic situation for students was worsened considerably during the COVID-19 pandemic when access to part-time jobs (e.g., restaurants, shops and bars) was restricted. Some policy measures, such as additional student loans and 20 days of salary compensation, did ameliorate the situation somewhat, but the lack of a more permanent income source for unemployed students is still a noticeable gap. The economic situation was particularly frail for newly graduated students, who were no longer entitled to student loan/grants.

Second, people with low earnings were not covered. Many part-time and seasonal employees do not exceed the income threshold of 1.5 BA and, thus, are not eligible for unemployment benefits. Social assistance is yet again the only income support option. The economic situation is better yet still fragile for those who barely exceed the income threshold because the unemployment benefit is proportional to previous earnings without a benefit floor. However, there was a slight improvement during the COVID-19 pandemic when replacement rates increased for all unemployment benefit recipients, but the increase was largest for those with low total income. People in low-income brackets face a double disadvantage because they are, first, more likely to become unemployed because many low-income jobs are located in labour market segments sensitive to economic fluctuations. Second, when they experience job loss, an already precarious economic situation worsens considerably because 62.4% of previous income often implies a life in poverty. Of course, an unemployed person who used to earn high salaries (e.g., more than €100,000) will experience a considerably larger income drop post-unemployment because of the social security ceiling of 6 BA. However, they will not be at risk of poverty. Shielding citizens from the harmful effects of poverty is one of the main tasks of the welfare state. If the replacement rates were to be stratified permanently by previous income levels (i.e., higher replacement rates for low-income groups), the Norwegian unemployment insurance system could prevent poverty to a larger extent.
Third and finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the vulnerable position of freelancers and the self-employed. Because only income from work qualifies for unemployment benefits and business income is disregarded, people with non-standard employment contracts are often not covered by the Norwegian unemployment insurance system. The \textit{ad hoc creation} of a new economic compensation scheme was a temporary aid for self-employed and freelancers during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, this gap in unemployment benefit regulation will continue to pose problems for Norwegian policymakers in future labour market crises, unless a permanent solution is launched.

According to the United Nations, social exclusion can be defined as “a state in which individuals are unable to participate fully in economic, social, political and cultural life, as well as the process leading to and sustaining such a state” (UN, 2016, p. 18). Approximately half of people registered as out of work at local employment offices in Norway do not have access to income support, apart from short-term, meagre and means-tested social assistance. Thus, the unemployment insurance system, at least in its pre-COVID-19 form, contributed to upholding a state where numerous unemployed were unable to participate fully in Norwegian society. Social inclusion, on the other hand, is defined as “the process of improving the terms of participation in society for people who are disadvantaged . . . through enhanced opportunities, access to resources, voice and respect for rights” (UN, 2016, p. 20). The temporary changes in unemployment benefit regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic provided more unemployed people with the (economic) resources to deal with a difficult and uncertain labour market situation. Thus, in line with the UN’s definition, the various adaptations made to the unemployment insurance system led to more social inclusion for a disadvantaged group – unemployed without access to unemployment benefits.

\textbf{Summary and conclusion}

The COVID-19 pandemic and implemented infection control measures created an exceptional situation on the Norwegian labour market – unemployment rates soared and hit historic high levels in March 2020. The Norwegian government, backed by the parliament, decided to respond to the economic crisis with numerous temporary changes in the unemployment benefit regulations. The regulations were changed in a more inclusive direction. First, the \textit{coverage and eligibility criteria} were relaxed so that more unemployed people became eligible for unemployment benefits. Second, the \textit{replacement rate} increased so that all unemployed – especially people with low earnings – received higher benefits than they would before the crisis. Third, unemployed people who were approaching the \textit{maximum period} of benefit receipt received an extension. Other amendments were introduced to fill existing gaps in the Norwegian unemployment insurance system, such as the lack of income support for students, self-employed and freelancers. All policy changes were temporary and would cease as soon as the economic conditions improved and job openings reappeared. Nonetheless, these temporary changes in unemployment benefit regulations may have long-term implications. Punctuated equilibrium
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theory stipulates that policymaking tends to be stable over prolonged periods, followed by a sudden leap that potentially leads the policy area in a new direction. The COVID-19 pandemic could represent such a leap that breaks the current policy path in Norway, where relatively generous out-of-work benefits are available only for labour market insiders with a standard employment contract.

Epilogue

At the time of writing this chapter, the Norwegian labour market is booming again, with a registered unemployment rate of 1.6–1.7% in May–July 2022. All temporary changes to unemployment benefit regulations have been withdrawn, and there are few indications that policymakers will take any steps to fill the aforementioned gaps. The reluctance to alter the unemployment insurance system has to be viewed in light of the so-called “work line” approach – a set of policy principles stipulating that Norwegian citizens should be rewarded in the welfare system for stable employment and tax contributions. These principles imply that labour market insiders – with a seamless employment history and positive income development over time – can make full use of the generous benefits available in the Norwegian welfare state. In contrast, for someone outside or on the fringes of the labour market, two out of five income maintenance schemes (i.e., sick pay and unemployment benefits) are normally not available. Furthermore, the benefits that are available will often imply a life in poverty, for instance, roughly 1 BA on average in social assistance or 2/1.33 BA in work assessment allowance yearly. Filling the identified gaps – by, for example, creating a “lower level” unemployment system for people with low or no previous earnings – would necessarily mean taking a few steps away from the “work line” approach.

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References


4 The exclusionary potential of work inclusion policies

Employers addressing their responsibilities towards disabled people

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Introduction

There is a large and enduring disability employment gap between disabled people and the general population (Geiger et al., 2017; van der Zwan & de Beer, 2021). This marginalisation in the labour market has been a key marker of social exclusion for disabled people, underpinning their status as a vulnerable group in society (Barnes & Mercer, 2005). Therefore, challenging exclusion in employment is pivotal for fostering social inclusion for disabled citizens. The increased influence of a rights-based narrative concerning employment and considerable legislative efforts of supranational bodies has put the right to participate in work on the agenda (Chhabra, 2021; Waldschmidt, 2009). For example, the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) has recognised “the right of persons with disabilities to work, on an equal basis with others; this includes the right to the opportunity to gain a living by work freely chosen or accepted in a labour market and work environment that is open, inclusive and accessible to persons with disabilities” (Article 27). The key actors in realising such rights are employers. This creates a need for effective policy targeting the employer side.

In this chapter, we investigate a Norwegian work inclusion initiative – the Inclusion Dugnad (implemented in the period of 2018–2022) – and an accompanying trainee programme. With the Inclusion Dugnad, the Norwegian government attempted to facilitate the hiring of disabled people, primarily among state employers. However, an evaluation of the Inclusion Dugnad has shown little impact on the hiring rates (The Norwegian Agency for Public and Financial Management, 2021). This is in line with the general finding that work inclusion policies generally have little impact on the employment rate among disabled people (Geiger et al., 2017; Holland et al., 2011). Thus, this chapter contributes to the literature on why disability employment policies often fail to improve labour market integration and foster social inclusion, a topic also discussed in Chapter 5 by Kohli and Vedeler.

We ask the following: How did state employers targeted by the Inclusion Dugnad understand disability and address their responsibilities towards disabled people? To approach this question, we examine the Inclusion Dugnad initiative and...
utilise key findings from two studies concerning state employers’ inclusive practices. We use data from an interview-based study with state employers (Østerud, 2020) and observation data from a study on state employers’ implementation of a trainee programme targeting disabled job applicants (Framstad et al., 2022). We argue that the Inclusion Dugnad, in how it was communicated and practiced, ended up reproducing the idea that disabled people do not live up to the images of the ideal worker (Foster & Wass, 2013) and that they, because of this, are second-rate workers who we should hire primarily to protect the financial sustainability of the welfare state.

The Inclusion Dugnad – taking one for the team?

There is a hegemonic idea that paid work is central to social citizenship in the Nordic countries (Tarvainen & Hänninen, 2022). Employment is understood as a central way of taking part in society, both socially and economically. In Norway, there has long been an emphasis on the importance of labour market participation of all who are capable, see also Chapter 3 by Heggebø and West Pedersen. In part, this is because Norway, like most advanced economies, is an ageing society expecting a future labour supply shortage and strain on the financial sustainability of the future welfare state. Concerns about sustainability have also been raised in relation to an increase in the number of disability benefits recipients (Terum & Hatland, 2014). The work exclusion of disabled people has been depicted as costly, in terms of both lost tax revenue and social expenditure. This type of discourse is what Hvinden (2003) calls the discourse of societal costs of disability, which he contrasts with a discourse of equal rights and opportunities that has been recognised in the UN-CRPD. Thus, the enduring disability employment gap becomes a cause for concern for the welfare state. In Norway, 78% of the general population is employed, while the same is true for only 37% of the disabled population (Statistics Norway, 2022). In response to worries about societal costs, labour market initiatives have been based on the strong ideal of active participation of all capable citizens found in the Nordic welfare state model (Frøyland et al., 2018). With this ideal in mind, disabled people are considered an underused labour market resource because of the persistent employment gap between disabled and non-disabled people (Geiger et al., 2017). The idea that increased participation in paid work is central to the future of the welfare state, especially when it comes to underrepresented groups like disabled people, was a crucial backdrop for the implementation of the Inclusion Dugnad.

When the Inclusion Dugnad was launched in 2018, the government published a circular explaining its rationale and the obligations for state employers. The Inclusion Dugnad highlighted how labour market participation is a priority for the government and that the government was concerned about the share of people not participating in working life. The circular claimed that “work inclusion and high rates of work participation are important for our creation of wealth” and that a high employment rate is “a prerequisite for ensuring our welfare state and upholding our pension obligations” (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2018b, p. 2). Although the Inclusion Dugnad was launched as a national motivational campaign targeting all employers, state employers were especially targeted with a
soft hiring quota. The quota demanded that at least 5% of all hires had to be disabled or have a two-year CV gap. The circular also stated that another important intention was to signal the value that disabled workers represent. However, the societal cost of disability was the dominating discourse. A speech from 2018 in which the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs sought to engage Norwegian employers in the Inclusion Dugnad exemplifies this. The Minister asked Norwegian employers to “take one for the team” and give back to the community by hiring someone who struggles to enter the labour market, highlighting the moral duty of employers to contribute to society (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2018). The use of the Norwegian word “dugnad,” which refers to unpaid voluntary community work, further strengthened the impression of doing it for the greater good. The quota obliged state employers to increase their hiring rates and report annually on their hiring numbers. However, there were no sanctions on enterprises unable to reach the quota target.

As the Inclusion Dugnad was launched, a renewed effort was put into the state trainee programme for disabled people. The programme was first launched in 2006 as a part of the tripartite inclusive working-life agreement. Starting in 2018, the programme was highlighted as one of the key tools state employers could employ to meet their quota target. The participants in the trainee programme were hired as ordinary employees in temporary positions. The trainee was then considered a junior member of the regular staff, filling a position that would otherwise be advertised in an ordinary manner. When applying for a trainee position, disabled candidates must declare that they have an impairment and that they are in need of a workplace accommodation. Employers are legally forbidden to ask directly about the nature of the impairment (according to the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act), but they can ask about accommodation needs and questions relating to the capacity to perform central work tasks.

State employers struggled to meet the quota targets from the start (Østerud, 2020). The efforts introduced with the Inclusion Dugnad have only been able to show a small increase of hires in the targeted group (The Norwegian Agency for Public and Financial Management, 2021). In 2020, only two out of 16 departmental areas could report that they reached the 5% target goal. When the Inclusion Dugnad was quietly put to rest in 2022, the intended results had not materialised.

Notions of the ideal worker and ableism

In this chapter, we argue that part of the answer to why the Inclusion Dugnad was ineffective in bolstering inclusion is that, by strongly promoting a discourse of societal costs of disability, it effectively suggests that disabled people are a less desirable group from which to hire. A theoretical concept that sheds light on working-life norms that impede labour market integration for disabled people is the ideal worker. The notion of the ideal worker originates from feminist sociology and is used to describe practices that create structural and enduring gender inequalities (Acker, 1990). The ideal worker refers to an abstract person who bears the social characteristics of a man (Acker, 1992). This individual is a devoted and committed
employee, “always ready, willing and able to work” (Cooper, 2000, p. 395). In disability research, the notion of the ideal worker has been applied to describe how it is not just a gendered norm but also a non-disabled norm, showing how jobs are created around an able-bodied ideal that marginalises disabled workers (Foster & Wass, 2013; Jammaers & Zanoni, 2020; Jammaers et al., 2016; Østerud, 2022).

Ableism is a related theoretical concept that refers to the conscious or unconscious assumptions and actions that support the notion of ableness as the human standard and disability as a diminished and substandard way of being (Campbell, 2001). Employment policy that fails to challenge ableist perceptions of disabled people may create a “double bind of ableism” (Campbell, 2009), that is, ableist discursive practices that run counter to the mission of inclusion. The double bind of ableism, Campbell (2009) claims, is created when inclusion initiatives are implemented at the same time as ableist discourses prevail, proclaiming disability as “inherently negative, ontologically intolerable,” which makes a positive significance of disability unspeakable.

The literature has demonstrated how ableism and ideal worker notions contribute to images of disabled people as falling short of prevailing working-life standards. Scholz and Ingold (2020) demonstrate how the notion of the ideal worker is even embedded in active labour market programmes, favouring skills like being adaptive, stable and having few outside responsibilities. Lundberg (2022) shows how ableist norms of normality are found in the public employment service frontline workers’ own narratives of work inclusion success stories, pointing out how disabled people are often presented in a paradoxical way: weak yet strong, deficient yet resilient. In the effort to “redress disabled people’s subordinated position,” frontline workers still reinforce the idea that disabled people fall short of what an ideal worker should look like (Lundberg, 2022, p. 1). Similarly, Tarvainen and Hänninen (2022) point out how the ideals surrounding work participation become yardsticks against which disabled people measure themselves to become either heroes who overcome obstacles or tragedies who fail and remain excluded from full participation in society.

Methods

To investigate how the Inclusion Dugnad was implemented in practice towards disabled people, we draw on two qualitative data sets. Both sets investigate the accounts and hiring practices of Norwegian state employers subjected to the 5% quota. In addition, the second data set allows for an investigation of the interaction between employers and jobseekers. Both data sets were part of studies that were reviewed by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data to ensure compliance with research ethics guidelines.

The first data set was ten semistructured qualitative employer interviews with eight middle managers and four HR representatives (two of the interviews had two participants). The aim of the study was to uncover employer accounts of hiring practices and attitudes regarding the Inclusion Dugnad and disabled people. The interviewees were recruited based on recent job advertisements, ensuring that they had recently carried out a recruitment process. The interviewees were from
different levels in the state sector, from ministries to underlying agencies and enterprises. They were either managers or HR representatives and were all involved in the recruitment processes. The interviews were conducted between January and March 2019, approximately six to nine months after the Inclusion Dugnad was launched in June 2018.

The second data set is a series of observations in a recruitment process to a trainee programme for disabled candidates. The data consist of observations of six job interviews with four women and two men in an adviser position in a state agency. All of the candidates had impairments that they disclosed in a letter before the interview took place. The job interviews were carried out by a section manager and HR adviser. A union representative was also present. A follow-up research interview with the section manager was done after the hire was made, as well as with four of the candidates, to tap into their experiences of taking part in this kind of job interview. Through the observation, we aimed to investigate how disability is addressed in job interviews between a non-disabled employer and disabled job candidates. Observations and interviews were conducted in the fall of 2019.

The data were thoroughly read in light of the research question, searching for overarching themes that could help describe how employers responded to the Inclusion Dugnad in their hiring practice and explain why employers struggle to increase hiring rates of disabled people. The themes were discussed and refined through an iterative process of reading, discussion and writing. In the following findings section, we first consider a central theme found in the first data set and then another theme in the second.

Findings

Inclusion as a charitable act

The interviews yielded rich accounts of how the employers related to the initiative and how they evaluated the feasibility of reaching the 5% goal. When talking about their recruitment practices, the overwhelming majority could not point to much experience with hiring disabled people. Even though the Inclusion Dugnad had not been in effect for a long time, the intended purpose of the quota was for state employers to “lead the way” (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2018a). This did not turn out to be the case. The recruitment processes conducted in this time period should have been regarded as important opportunities in trying to reach the 5% goal. Only one of the interviewees could refer to a recent hire of a disabled person. Generally, experience with disabled candidates was minimal. This finding was also reflected in a document analysis investigating 161 annual state employer reports, showing that only 3.1% of the state employers reported that they fulfilled the quota in the first year (Østerud, 2020).

The notions of an ideal worker influencing recruitment were evident in the employer accounts because the interviewees talked about how the pressure to be productive led them to want to make the most out of each position for which they hired. They referred to the high standards demanded of their employees and to how
each employee had to deliver an abstracted notion of 100% productivity if they were to fill a full-time, 100% position. The employers typically described getting assigned vacancies to advertise as a scarce coveted resource. The abstracted candidate they had in mind would have to be able to fill a 100% position, as illustrated by the following statements by the managers of three different enterprises:

We are a government agency where we need highly competent employees. The pressure is high when it comes to expected contributions and deliverables, many work trips, big international and national projects and so on, and then, it’s clear, it takes something special to be admitted.

(Interviewee 2)

I could have a lot of people with impairments, but then, I want to be compensated, right? If 40% of the time or whatever that, they don’t work. Is that kind of reasoning. If I base my consideration on a 100% position, that is not what I get from that person. So that is the challenge from the employer's perspective.

(Interviewee 5)

Potentially to be stuck with an employee that does not function well, that I need to pay a salary and that blocks other resources out, that is a situation I absolutely do not want.

(Interviewee 8)

The employers in these excerpts exemplify how vacancies are abstracted and constructed as made for someone highly productive. Their impressions of disabled people became equated with someone falling short of this ideal, which was irreconcilable with the abstracted candidate they imagined they would need.

Although many referred to this notion of getting the most productivity possible out of each position, several interviewees expressed positive attitudes towards the Inclusion Dugnad. The positive employers seemed more open to negotiating the terms with a suitable disabled candidate and wanted to give disabled applicants a greater chance of demonstrating that they fit into the job. They described themselves as having an “attitude of generosity,” “a veil of positivity” and “giving an extra chance.” The employers mentioned two important reasons why they wanted to express such an attitude. The first was the need to provide help for disabled people who struggled to enter the labour market. In addition, the welfare state sustainability narrative was mentioned as an important reason why inclusion was important:

The calculation for the Norwegian government is easy. It costs so and so much to have someone dependent on welfare benefits for their whole life instead of the person being productive and generating tax revenue that can finance others.

(Interviewee 1)
The narrative of inclusion as something done for the greater good often appeared in the conversation. Although the influence of the notion of an ideal worker was present throughout the interviews, the interviewees varied in how they positioned themselves against it. Some, like interviewees 2 and 8 mentioned earlier, displayed disinterest in disabled job seekers on the basis that they did not see them fitting with their image of an ideal worker. The employers embracing the importance of taking social responsibility and doing it for the greater good, most often the HR representatives, seemed more open to adjusting their expectations slightly:

I think managers are willing to exert extra effort, and many of them are willing. And everyone could expand this, not exactly affirmative action, but under otherwise equal circumstances can be interpreted in many ways. They want someone who can contribute. If you can’t contribute 100% because of something you struggle with, then you can contribute 85% and 80%, and that is enough. I think I don’t know every leader in the state or in the municipalities, but I know quite a lot of them, and I think there are many who are positive and willing and want to contribute.

(Interviewee 6)

The ideal worker notions and inclusion rationales could thus create a certain image of what disability and inclusion are. Disabled people’s marginalised position in the labour market was understood mainly in terms of their shortcomings, here as related to competence and productivity. To hire disabled people, employers seemed to interpret a need to at least slightly disregard qualifications and productivity potential. Inclusion efforts were seen as a way of helping them, despite their shortcomings, to support a sustainable welfare state. Disability becomes something inherently negative, and inclusion becomes something of a generous practice. The act of calling the inclusion effort a “dugnad” further strengthens the charitable image. Hiring disabled people is then an uncompensated task that employers take on to serve the greater good. Thus, inclusion becomes a charitable act, and in competition with productivity ideals, charity was seen as something falling outside of the managers’ core responsibilities.

Difficulties in addressing disability as an asset

The interview observations provided a demonstration of state employers’ hiring practices towards disabled jobseekers and how this impacts job interview conversations between the employer and jobseeker. We found that the employers divided the trainee position job interviews into three parts. In the first part, the employer introduced the trainee programme; in the second, the qualifications and competence of the candidate were addressed; and in the third, the employer and candidate engaged in a conversation about the need for accommodation. Here, we focus on the second phase to show how the employer addressed and answered the phenomenon of disability when introduced in this part of the job interview about qualifications and competence. After the first introductory part, the employer marked
a shift by saying that the actual interview began: “Let’s just start, can you tell us a little bit about yourself, who are you?” In the follow-up research interview with the section manager, the employer said that this phase followed the same procedure as in an ordinary job interview where questions are asked about motivation for the announced position; oral, written and analytical skills; ability to collaborate; and the candidate’s views on interdisciplinary work. The observations reveal that uncertainty about the status of disability permeated this part of the interview – both from the perspective of the candidate when introducing themself and on the part of the employer in the follow-up of the candidate’s presentation. Candidate A, for example, seemed to perceive the question about who she was as vague:

Ehm, well, I do not know if I should explain why I am here or why I am applying for this position. I did write a bit about that [referring to a letter regarding accommodation needs that the applicants were asked to submit], but I got... ehm... a chronic [disease]. It took a while before it became chronic, so I may not have fully understood... uh... the seriousness of it. Ehm... and [I just] kept on... ehm... and then, well, eventually, it did not go very well. So I ended up on sick leave and eventually also had to take a break from my studies, had to take a proper break and began receiving intensive treatment.

The excerpt shows that the candidate started out by first relating how she got the chronic illness. Later in the dialogue, she reflected on the choice of education and her motivation for why she applied for this adviser position. The other candidates also addressed disability when introducing themselves, such as candidate C:

Section Leader: Can you first start by telling a little about yourself, who are you?
Candidate C: Well, yes, my name is [name of candidate], I have a degree [name of profession] from the university in [name of city]. I have a partial disability pension, which I’ve had for two years.

The way the candidates replied to the employer’s questions suggests that they perceived themselves more as job applicants with a disability than as job applicants with suitable qualifications. The same thing happened when we examined the candidates’ motivation for applying for the position, as illustrated in the dialogue between the section leader and job candidate B:

Section leader: You did write a little bit about it, but if you could say a little bit about the motivation for applying for this position?
Candidate B: Yes... when I first read about this [kind of position], I thought it was very good... very good like with the Inclusion Dugnad and that kind of thing... I, I have been to a few earlier interviews that were quite conventional, and I, I dare not write in the application that I use hearing aids, I am afraid that I will be discriminated against, for example. For this position, it is very, in a way,
very reassuring, where you already know that I am applying because I have a disab... well, yes... I think it’s great, and I do need work experience.

Whereas the candidates addressed the issue of disability when responding to interview questions, the employer appeared passive when the subject was raised. The employer just confirmed the information with nods and continued down the list of questions listed in the interview guide. The conversation with candidate A shows the unease the employer displayed. The topic was on progress with work tasks:

**Section leader:** But if you could reflect on... ehm... whether you would have any tips or tricks to make progress also on work tasks that are not yet urgent?

**Candidate A:** I think as a starting point if you set up your calendar with, the first thing you do when you come in the morning, that is... then you set aside maybe 15 minutes to look through your email. Is there anything urgent? No, not right now. And perhaps it is early in the morning that you are more awake. Of course, people may be quite different. But that you separate the day into different parts.

**Section leader:** Mhm... that sounds like good ideas. We need to save those tips (mild laughter).

**HR adviser:** Yes, I thought about it, too, have to write some notes (humming).

**Section leader:** No, I’m thinking that this is something you do in fact have some experience with, based on what you have been thro-, through both studies that are long-term towards an exam, but also with children that have to be taken to nursery.

In this dialogue, A’s advice on how to organise one’s work tasks was acknowledged actively by both the leader and HR adviser (they are taking notes while A talks). Then, we see that, in the last utterance, the section leader was about to comment that this effective way of organising one’s workday can probably be related to A’s experience of living a life with a disability, but she stopped herself in the middle of the sentence (“have some experience with, based on what you have been thro-“). She moved quickly on to relate this effectiveness to A’s status as a mother and her previous student life. The excerpt indicates difficulty and discomfort in addressing the experience of being disabled as an asset. This difficulty was also apparent in another interview in which the candidate tried to talk about their experience with a disability as an asset (candidate F). He said in his interview that he was the first person in Norway with an impairment to complete the university degree he had. Yet this was something the interviewer did not respond to or ask follow-up questions about. Instead, a substantial portion of the interview was directed towards a discussion of accommodation needs.

It is important to note that a stated prerequisite for participating in the trainee programme was that the candidate had accommodation needs. This need was defined generally and not in relation to a specific position. In the observed interviews,
the interviewers also had not decided to which specific department the candidate would belong. Thus, needing accommodation is decontextualised and individualised. This contributed to a view of disability as a personal attribute, detaching disability from its contextual aspects. This prerequisite could contribute to the employers being motivated to uncover the specific accommodation needs early to control whether the candidate fulfilled requirements for participation or not and, thus, be more attuned to needs rather than assets in their evaluation. As one employer stated in the interview with candidate C, “We do have to evaluate whether you are eligible for the trainee programme, basically.”

Concluding discussion

The findings demonstrate how the employers commonly adopt an understanding of disability as an individual attribute that is inherently negative. This understanding is hard for employers to reconcile with their images of the ideal worker. Disability was seen by the participants as a condition that in and of itself triggers a need for accommodation or a lower work capacity, regardless of context. This individualised and deficiency-oriented understanding made it difficult for employers to identify potentially positive assets tied to a disability identity. Many of the employers sympathised with disabled people struggling to gain access to work, but they largely attributed this marginalisation to disabled people’s shortcomings and not to discriminatory mechanisms or inflexible work arrangements, despite the reality of discrimination that has been demonstrated in multiple field experiments (Ameri et al., 2018; Baert et al., 2016; Bellemare et al., 2018; Bjørnshagen, 2021; Bjørnshagen & Ugreninov, 2021). This deficiency-oriented sentiment is an echo of the framing of inclusion as a dugnad, a charitable voluntary act. Labelling the inclusion effort as a “dugnad” and anchoring it in the welfare state sustainability narrative and “taking one for the team” portray inclusive hiring as acts of voluntary and selfless sacrifice needed for upholding the future of the welfare state. The Inclusion Dugnad, thus, rests on an individualised approach to disability inclusion and a vision of citizenship that fails to sufficiently address structural barriers. Thus, by bolstering a discourse of the societal costs of disability, the Inclusion Dugnad can be argued to have contributed to the legitimisation of disabled people’s marginalised position in the labour market rather than challenging and contextualising it.

The fact that disabled people are excluded from the labour market and face significant barriers in exercising the right to work is a significant societal problem. Unemployment creates higher rates of poverty (Grammenos, 2019) and precludes access to an important arena of life that can provide purpose, status, activity and social contact (Jahoda, 1981; Paul & Batinic, 2010). Historically, the notion of citizenship has been associated with the exclusionary potential for disabled people by espousing ideals of productivity, independence and rationality that limit the potential for disabled people to act as autonomous individuals (Altermark, 2017; Snyder & Mitchell, 2010). As a response to such concerns, Waldschmidt and Sépulchre (2019) propose that a nuanced approach to citizenship that combines a human rights approach can
be beneficial for disabled people because of its principles of participation, autonomy and solidarity. What this could mean for work inclusion efforts is the recognition of disabled people as an underrepresented minority facing significant societal barriers in exercising their right to work, in which society has a duty to help diminish. We suggest that in order to have a better potential to muster employer effort, future work inclusion policies need to build on a notion of citizenship that incorporates a rights-based perspective. This means highlighting a discourse of equal rights and opportunities and focusing less on the discourse of societal costs of disability (Hvinden, 2003). This perspective rests on a disability human rights paradigm that acknowledges the nuanced nature of disability (Harpur, 2019). By incorporating imperatives from a rights-based perspective, inclusion efforts could better address the social and structural barriers that stand in the way of labour market participation.

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References


5 Social exclusion and disability
Exploring the role of ingroup/outgroup dynamics in employment

Jaskirat Kohli and Janikke Solstad Vedeler

Introduction
The United States has been recognised as the birthplace of the disability rights movement and disability rights laws (Burke & Barnes, 2018). Despite this laudable status, the United States has struggled to impart full social citizenship rights to individuals with disabilities, especially in the context of employment. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2022), 33.6% of the disabled population (aged 16–64) is employed compared with 76% of non-disabled people. In an effort to address the social exclusion of its citizens with disabilities from the labour market over the past 50 years, the American welfare state has enacted a litany of federal legislation to prohibit discrimination in employment and the job application process against individuals with disabilities:

- Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act (1974)
- Sections 501 and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act (1973)
- Civil Service Reform Act (1978)
- Titles I and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990)
- Section 188 of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (2014)

In fact, “the development of disability policy is so intimately linked to the development of the American welfare state that it is difficult to disentangle the two” (Pettinicchio, 2019, p. 1). Nonetheless, despite a strong motivation towards the pursuit of the ideals of citizenship and equality, along with the provision of economic and social security to individuals with disabilities, there is a lack of consensus on the ameliorative effect of legislation on access to meaningful employment for this population.

Based on their reviews of empirical studies that have attempted to measure the impact of antidiscrimination laws on the employment of people with disabilities, Button et al. (2016) concluded the following:

The empirical evidence of the effects of disability discrimination laws on the labor market outcomes of individuals with disabilities is very mixed. Some studies find that laws have a negative effect (DeLeire, 2000; Acemoglu &
Angrist, 2001; Jolls & Prescott, 2004), others generally argue for no effects (Beegle & Stock, 2003; Houtenville & Burkhauser, 2004; Hotchkiss, 2004), and some show a positive effect (Kruse & Schur, 2003; Button, 2017).

Because of the minimal impact of antidiscrimination legislation on the employment of individuals with disabilities, liberal theories of social citizenship have received criticism, as discussed in Chapter 2 by Falch-Eriksen. Generally, critics have asserted that liberalist approaches to citizenship sacrifice human diversity in pursuit of an abstract notion of citizenship. Young (1989) asserted that liberalism and its ideal of a universal humanity that does not take into account social group differences is oppressive, while Waldschmidt and Sépulchre (2019) went as far as to deem citizenship an ableist ideology “because it operates under the assumption that citizens ought to be healthy and exercise productive social roles” (p. 27). Furthermore, in place of social liberal theories of citizenship, critics have often heralded a human rights approach that “proposes that there are a set of rights that all people have simply on the basis of their humanity” (Carey, 2009, p. 226).

Whether citizenship is theorised using social liberal ideals or human rights ideals, theories function at an abstract level. Although there is an abundance of literature evaluating the pros and cons of various citizenship theories, there is a paucity of research investigating how such theories are operationalised and carried out. As evidenced by the plethora of legislation that has been enacted but has been inadequate in its impact, theories and laws are limited. As Carey (2009, p. 214) poignantly stated, “Rights are human constructions established and negotiated in real-world contexts . . . even when a law substantiates a right, the right does not exist as a neat guarantee . . . [and] is negotiated within the contexts of micro-relationships.” Citizenship rights, like most rights, cannot be actualised by the right bearer without the consent of the right bestower.

In the context of employment rights, it is the employers and specific employees involved with recruitment and hiring who play the role of right bestowers. We would argue that it is the attitudes and perceptions of these individuals that have a greater influence on hiring practices and decisions than legal mandates and policies. Although Chapter 4 by Østerud et al. has explored this phenomenon in its examination of how Norwegian employers’ attitudes towards disability impacted the hiring of the individuals with disabilities as the state employers implemented the Inclusion Dugnad (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2018) – a governmental policy that sought to increase the employment rates of workers with disabilities by establishing a quota – this chapter focuses on the role that social psychology plays in shaping employers’ attitudes and perceptions of workers with disabilities.

Banting and Kymlicka (2017) noted that citizenship rights are tied to group membership and that social rights are specifically tied to ingroup/outgroup affiliations. Given that rights are socially mediated, it is imperative to investigate the relational aspect of the employment and hiring of individuals with disabilities.
Therefore, this chapter seeks to explore the micro-relationship between employers and individuals with disabilities as it attempts to understand how the former’s understanding and interpretation of antidiscrimination laws, coupled with their view of disability, impacts the hiring of the latter. Specifically, the question that undergirds this research is as follows: What is the impact of ingroup/outgroup dynamics on employer’s hiring and recruiting practices towards applicants with disabilities?

The chapter begins with an overview of social identity theory, a description of our research study and methodology, which is followed by the study’s findings and a concluding discussion.

Social identity theory

In the United States, it is under the umbrella of social welfare that laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) have been enacted in an effort to promote equal employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities. Although, in theory, the law should be lauded for fostering ideals of social justice, in practice, the law falls short of actualising justice when it comes to providing equal opportunities for employment to workers with disabilities. Although the breakdown in intent, from theory to practice, may be the result of various factors, a significant factor is the gatekeepers of the law. With the ADA specifically, employers often act as gatekeepers because they are the ones who interpret and administer the law through their recruiting and hiring decisions. Thus, because the law is socially mediated, it is reasonable to investigate how employers interpret the law and its impact on individuals with disabilities through a social psychology lens.

Henri Tajfel (1979) has been credited with developing social identity theory, which postulates that not only do people establish a sense of being and belonging to the social world based on their group memberships, but they also categorise others into groups and divide the world into “us” and “them,” with the former forming the “ingroup” and the latter forming the “outgroup.” In reflecting on Tajfel’s work, McLeod (2019) explained that, through this process of social categorisation, “we tend to exaggerate: 1) the difference between groups and 2) the similarities of things in the same group” (Introduction section, para. 4). These two principles serve as the foundation for the key phenomena associated with social identity theory, which were also prevalent in our findings:

- Ingroup favouritism – the tendency to behave more favourably towards others who belong to our ingroup than those from the outgroup.
- Intergroup threat – experienced when members of one group perceive that another group is in a position to cause them harm.
- Outgroup homogeneity – tendency to assume that the members of the outgroup are very similar to each other.
- Outgroup disadvantage – justifying inequality by associating it with outgroup inferiority.
- Outgroup altruism and tolerance – instances of prosocial interactions with the outgroup.
Social identity theory and the aforementioned concepts are useful for understanding how employers label and interpret the social identities of applicants with disabilities, specifically and alongside the identities of ethnicity and gender. By unpacking ingroup/outgroup dynamics in the context of employers’ hiring and recruiting practices, we can recognize the social dynamics that contribute to the underemployment of individuals with disabilities.

Methods

To understand how employers relate to disability in recruitment processes, we have drawn on employer interviews conducted in the United States in 2020. We interviewed a total of 11 employer representatives from the public, private and not-for-profit sectors (see Table 5.1 for an overview). The employers were recruited based on their use of an “Equal Opportunity Employer” (EEO) statement in job advertisements, displaying a commitment to equal opportunity and diversity. Eight of the employer representatives were located in the northern part of the same state in metropolitan areas and three in major cities in three other states. The interviewees were managers, human resources personnel or others actively involved in hiring processes. To ensure compliance with the research ethics guidelines, the consent form and interview guide were reviewed by the Institutional Review Board at California State University, East Bay.

The employer representatives were asked about recruitment practices and their understanding of what it means to be an Equal Opportunity Employer, as well as their perceptions of the statutory requirements for hiring people with disabilities. All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim.

When analysing the interviews, we examined how the employers described how they related to regulatory policies and disability. In our view, the employer accounts

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Employer</th>
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could offer “a window – although not a perfectly transparent one” (Peacock & Holland, 1993, p. 374) on social practices. We engaged in a circular analysis endeavour, rereading our data in light of our quest to understand employers’ interpretation of antidiscrimination laws and the impact on the hiring of individuals with disabilities, drawing on the ingroup/outgroup concepts of Tajfel’s social identity theory.

Although our research critiques the gap between the employment rights a citizen with a disability should expect and what transpires in practice, our findings are limited in that they only show that bias against outgroup members (i.e., workers with disabilities) can occur in the employment process, not that they do occur.

Findings

Ingrounp favouritism

In the United States, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is a federal agency established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC’s purpose is to prohibit employers from discriminating against individuals who belong to a protected class. Although race, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation or gender identity) and disability are all protected classes, the former two are largely included in meaningful diversity initiatives, while the latter is often left out or is an afterthought.

Two factors that may contribute to the exclusion of disability from equity policies are the affiliation of disability with pathology and different treatments it demands. With respect to the former, Kim and Aquino problematised how “seeing disability as a form of impairment prevents disability from serving as an empowering characteristic of an individual’s identity, and therefore further separates disability and other demographic characteristics that are seen as traditional forms of diversity” (2017, p. xii). With respect to the latter, Fletcher and O’Brien (2008) contended that, unlike antidiscrimination legislation revolving around race and gender, which demands equal treatment, disability legislation demands different treatment through the provision of accommodations.

It is plausible that disability history’s inexorable relationship with medicine and the legal mandate for disparate treatment results in not only relegating people with disabilities into the outgroup but also in separating disability from other social identities such as race and gender. In fact, in the current study, during the conversations with the interviewees regarding diversity and diversity hiring, it was apparent that disability continued to be viewed as an outgroup identity, while preference was given to race and gender, a phenomenon which can be understood as ingroup favouritism. Ingroup favouritism can be defined as the tendency to favour or give preference to one’s own group over another. It is generally accepted that “people act more prosocially towards members of their own group relative to those outside their group” (Everett et al., 2015, p. 1).

In his description of the ways in which the company is increasing diversity, one of the interviewees (Employer 5) stated that to employ more women, the company attends a global conference for women in computing. However, when asked if the
company could employ a similar strategy to increase disability hires, the employer responded with the following:

There is no specific measure to do that, again, I mean it is, it is based on qualification and competency. But we don’t, we don’t say, okay go and hire you know, people on wheelchair. Because I don’t think it is going to be fair to say that, yeah, because you are forcing like a segment of the population versus I want to hire the most qualified one.

It is interesting to note that when it came to hiring people with disabilities, the employer emphasised qualification and competency, but to improve the employment prospects for women, it was acceptable and suitable to utilise a specific and direct recruitment strategy. Moreover, in the context of employing people with disabilities, the employer stated that it was not fair to focus on a specific “segment of the population” rather than the most qualified one. To summarise the employer’s view, there was nothing wrong with implementing purposeful recruiting strategies to increase women in the workforce, but it was problematic to execute similar strategies for people with disabilities because they had to meet competency and qualification standards to be hired.

The exclusion of people with disabilities from the realm of diversity candidates was also evident in a statement from another interviewee (Employer 7) who acknowledged the need to improve the employment rate of individuals with disabilities but who qualified her statement by saying, “You can’t do it at the cost of veterans, women . . . and other minorities . . . .” In another instance, the interviewee stated that hiring people with disabilities “has been put on the backburner, because people are focused on women and minorities.” This comment once again highlights that individuals with disabilities, compared with women and ethnic minorities, are at the bottom of the diversity hierarchy.

Despite their shared identity as a protected class in a legal context, women, ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities do not share a similar fate in a diverse context. As has been identified in the research regarding employers’ perceptions of hiring people with disabilities, there is a “lack of a strong commitment to include disability as a cultural group in . . . companies’ diversity plan” (Chan et al., 2010, p. 418). Moreover, the current study found that there is a tendency in the employers’ accounts to extend ingroup membership to women and ethnic minorities more readily than to individuals with disabilities.

Intergroup threat

In social psychology, an intergroup threat “occurs when one group’s actions, beliefs or characteristics challenge the goal attainment or well-being of another group” (Riek et al., 2006, p. 336). Whether real or perceived, it is this threat that is also associated with influencing intergroup bias. In the context of employment, however, and, more specifically in the context of the present study, the intergroup threat manifested itself as litigation or a financial burden. There were several
instances throughout the interviews where the interviewees’ concern for non-compliance with the laws or the cost of accommodation provision superseded their belief in equity and inclusion pertaining to the employment of individuals with disabilities.

As mentioned earlier, in the United States, the EEOC’s purpose is to prohibit employers from discriminating against individuals based on their age, race, gender, national origin, disability and religion. One of the avenues by which the EEOC tracks employers’ compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws is by reporting data from the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) surveys. Voluntary EEO surveys are typically found at the end of online job applications and ask applicants to identify their race, gender, citizenship status and disability.

When asked about the EEO surveys, one of the interviewees (Employer 1) responded, “I don’t look at [them], there is no reason for me to, it goes into an automatic file . . . ” She elaborated further, “What [the surveys are for] is if we ever have to prove to the government that we’re . . . you know, interviewing all different types of people, we can pull [the report] and say how look here is all the applicants for this job, look at how they vary.” By highlighting the fact that she did not review the EEO surveys and that their primary function was data collection (rather than data analysis), the employer’s response provides an important insight. Although on the surface it appears that the EEO survey is serving its purpose because the employer is not making hiring decisions based on an applicant’s demographic data, a deeper analysis of the employer’s response reveals that the EEO survey plays a stronger role as an item on an antidiscrimination checklist rather than a commitment to provide equitable opportunities for employment. Moreover, the interviewee went on to comment, “Part of our job is to protect our company . . . by following the law.” By emphasising that legal compliance serves as a safeguard for the company, the employer voiced her concern over intergroup threats and the consequence of non-compliance.

There were several interviewees who expounded on the consequences of non-compliance. One interviewee (Employer 1) stated, “The impacts for the employer if you don’t [follow the laws] are very expensive” and that for an employer to deny an accommodation it would have “to be almost financially detrimental to the company.” Here, the interviewee’s emphasis on cost considerations, whether in the form of lawsuits for denying accommodations or in the form of expenses incurred for granting accommodations, exemplifies the expense-related intergroup threat hiring individuals with disabilities poses to employers.

Moreover, another interviewee (Employer 8) asserted that the role of hiring personnel is to “make sure your company . . . you protect the risk, prevent, you mitigate the risk, you reduce the risk . . . [because] they have a responsibility to their shareholders, to their stockholders . . . ” Here, the employer has highlighted sheltering the company from liability as the motivation for following the law. Similarly, in their study of small- and medium-sized companies, Fraser et al. (2010) concluded that financial risk and aversion were significant factors in employers’ decisions regarding the hiring of workers with disabilities. Collectively, these studies reveal an
important truth regarding the employment of individuals with disabilities. The accounts show that cost and risk are the perceived threats that influence a company’s hiring practices rather than a strong belief in the law’s intention to reduce prejudice from employment decisions.

**Outgroup homogenisation**

According to the ADA, a disability is a substantial physical or mental impairment that limits an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity, such as hearing, seeing, speaking, walking, breathing, performing manual tasks, caring for oneself, learning or working. Moreover, common disability categories include learning, mobility, psychiatric, visual, hearing and medical conditions. Thus, not only is a disability broad in its definition and categorisation, but specific disabilities also fall within a continuum (i.e., mild, moderate, severe and profound). Despite such variance in disability, people with disabilities are often thought of and discussed as a monolithic group, which is a phenomenon that has been described as outgroup homogeneity:

Research on the outgroup homogeneity effect has found that when it comes to attitudes, values, personality traits, and other characteristics, people tend to see outgroup members as more alike than ingroup members. As a result, outgroup members are at risk of being seen as interchangeable or expendable, and they are more likely to be stereotyped.

(Plous, 2002, p. 6)

When asked if there were any jobs that individuals with disabilities would be unable to perform within the organisation, in some of the accounts, a narrow-minded belief about people with disabilities emerged. More specifically, one of the interviewees (Employer 1) responded that individuals in a wheelchair would not be able to perform the duties of a patient escort because “the whole idea is that they are escorting people up and down the stairs.” Irrespective of the fact that the employer did not consider whether an individual in a wheelchair could utilise an elevator to accomplish the specific task of escorting patients, the employer expressed the assumption that all people in wheelchairs can never walk up and down stairs. Wheelchairs fulfil various needs because some people might only use a wheelchair when they are experiencing an exacerbation of symptoms related to their disability, some when they need to travel long distances and others when they need to traverse a terrain that is not flat.

Similarly, in another interview during which the discussion was about the travel requirement aspect of various positions within the company, the interviewee (Employer 5) stated, “And that’s where I think they might say, oh I cannot travel as much or as many times.” The use of the word “they” is indicative of the fact that the interviewee viewed all individuals with disabilities as an undifferentiated group and, furthermore, as a group with a uniform inability to travel or to travel regularly. Along the same lines, an interviewee (Employer 8) asserted the following:
Social exclusion and disability

There is a whole range of roles and jobs or functions that could present a difficulty for people with disabilities. .. On one end, I say janitorial service, where you have to lift things and move things around, do some physical tasks. Someone in a wheelchair might not be able to do that, but then that person in a wheelchair might be better suited to a role where they are seated.

The statements reveal the assumptions employers can make about the abilities of people with disabilities, even before interviewing or meeting them. It is assumptions such as these that may result in the stereotypical treatment that people with disabilities are subjected to (Plous, 2002), despite their varied abilities as individuals. Similarly, another interviewee (Employer 6) responded, “If somebody had some physical challenges, yeah, there are some positions that they just would not be able to do.” Once again, the interviewees’ statements were based on generalised assumptions about the ambulatory abilities of people in wheelchairs and the physical abilities of others, respectively.

Collectively, employers’ parochial perceptions of people with disabilities unjustifiably limited the abilities of (all) people with disabilities and could prevent certain individuals from obtaining positions that they may be otherwise qualified for, with or without accommodations. It is evident how such suppositions about the capabilities of workers with disabilities can limit their hiring prospects, as demonstrated in a study of American employers’ responses to fictional job applicants with spinal cord injury, Asperger’s syndrome and those without disabilities, as disclosed in a cover letter (Ameri et al., 2018). The researchers found that there is potential for bias in employers’ hiring decisions because employers were less likely to express interest in applicants with disabilities (irrespective of the type of disability) than those without disabilities.

Outgroup disadvantages

Outgroup disadvantage or inferiority is often used by the ingroup to justify social inequalities. In fact, when considering the marginalisation of people with disabilities, Dirth and Branscombe cited research to assert that mainstream society’s “social representations and ideologies portray disability as an inferior way-of-being” (2018, p. 1302). Furthermore, in their literature review of disability and employment, Vornholt et al. (2013) reported that employers’ negative perceptions of individuals with disabilities often included concern for the quality and quantity of work, attendance, motivation, emotion regulation and follow-through. Such unwarranted inferior characterisation was also present in the current study, as manifested by the interviewees’ perceptions of accommodations and their view of disability in general.

According to the ADA National Network (2018), an accommodation in the workplace is:

any change to the application or hiring process, to the job, to the way the job is done, or the work environment that allows a person with a disability who is qualified for the job to perform the essential functions of that job and enjoy equal employment opportunities.

(Key definitions section, para. 1)
What is significant in this definition is that accommodation is anything that removes the barriers preventing a qualified worker with a disability from successfully completing the duties and responsibilities required of the job. Essentially, the goal of an accommodation is to minimise or reduce the external barriers for individuals with disabilities. In contrast, the interviewees believed that the goal of accommodation is to minimise or reduce internal barriers within individuals with disabilities. For example, one of the interviewees (Employer 1) stated that “if it is an invisible disability, [human resources staff] often don’t have any idea until . . . there is difficulty in performing the job” or “until the employee is failing [and] they need accommodation.” Both statements attribute accommodation provision to inadequacies in the individual’s performance rather than to remedy the manner in which a task is required to be carried out. A more blatant example of affiliating accommodations as “fixes” to an individual’s shortcomings rather than to a barrier-ridden environment was evident in the following narration of how an individual was accommodated:

The one person who was blind who was hired, he said, you know, this place is hard to navigate because he is walking with a cane and, and I think somebody found him walking in the street. Because there wasn’t really any sidewalks at the time. Well, they built sidewalks . . . because he had a limitation that wasn’t safe.

(Employer 7)

This anecdote is insightful because it poignantly captures the crux of the accommodation/barrier issue by juxtaposing the interviewee’s understanding with that of the employee’s. Although the former’s statement points to the belief that erecting a sidewalk (accommodation) was to keep the employee safe because of his visual limitation (barrier), the employee may have identified the building of the sidewalk (accommodation) as a solution to the difficult-to-navigate environment (barrier). These seemingly contrasting views of accommodation and barriers are firmly rooted in the medical and social models of disability, respectively.

Another compelling example of outgroup inferiority was presented in the interviewees’ views of individuals with disabilities, when they were asked for recommendations for improving the hiring rates of this population. One of the interviewees stated the following:

For those people who are disabled or have issues to, to gain back the confidence in their ability and their qualifications and their future. Because that’s, that is most, more important than the company hiring.

(Employer 5)

Here, the interviewee made it clear that the low employment rates of people with disabilities is an issue that the individuals themselves had to improve, rather than a concern for employers. More specifically, the interviewees correlated a
lack of confidence in their skills and abilities, coupled with a lack of hope for their future, as significant factors that impacted the job prospects of individuals with disabilities.

The employers’ (mis)understanding of accommodations as solutions for intrinsic deficiencies and of disabilities as markers of inability and self-doubt illuminated how the interpretation of a law has more far-reaching impacts than a law’s intention. Moreover, as the interpreters of the law, employers’ view of disability as an outgroup disadvantage has the potential to not only limit the employment of people with disabilities but to also justify it. Without access to meaningful and abundant employment opportunities, it is questionable whether people with disabilities can be provided the same citizenship rights as the able-bodied or whether Armer (2004) was justified in his contention that contemporary society “confers full societal membership . . . only [to] the normal” (n.p.).

**Outgroup altruism and tolerance**

Although it goes without saying that the employers’ attitudes and beliefs about individuals with disabilities were not a result of intentional animus or exclusion, it also goes without saying that employers’ seemingly unconscious ingroup bias may have detrimental unintended consequences ranging from the underemployment of individuals with disabilities to the troubling notion that a “disabled citizen is a contradiction in terms” (Meekosha, 1997, p. 50). As a result, the analysis of our data would not be complete if we did not highlight instances where the employers discussed favourable attitudes and experiences with individuals with disabilities.

Within our study, the employers shared positive experiences with individuals with disabilities that contributed to greater practices of social inclusion. Within the context of social identity theory and scholarship, these positive experiences have been categorised as outgroup altruism and outgroup tolerance (e.g., Whitt et al., 2021). Outgroup altruism is often linked to empathy that ingroup members feel towards the outgroup. During our interviews, altruistic practices towards people with disabilities were evident in employers who referenced the creation of employee resource groups specific to individuals with disabilities and their allies, employers who invited a community organisation working with individuals with autism to speak about barriers to employment and employers who were offering unconscious bias training to their staff. Ultimately, outgroup altruism is prompted by members of the ingroup who are conscious of their privilege as the dominant group. On the other hand, outgroup tolerance is often the outcome of positive experiences with individuals with disabilities in work and non-work settings. Other ways employers can promote prosocial attitudes and outgroup tolerance among staff include offering opportunities to volunteer at organisations for people with disabilities, mentor youth with disabilities and invite guest speakers with disabilities.
Concluding discussion

In differentiating between human rights and citizenship rights, Banting and Kymlicka (2017) contended that, although the former are universal, the latter are based on membership. Although the statement may be true theoretically, we would argue that access to both human rights and citizenship rights are subject to the arbiter of those rights. In the context of employment rights, a company’s human resources (HR) staff has the power to determine the level of social inclusion/exclusion experienced by applicants with disabilities. Ultimately, access to employment is based on whether or not employers and HR staff extend group membership to individuals with disabilities. Group membership is characterised by shared solidarity, which “is motivated by attitudes of mutual concern and obligation towards their fellow co-citizens” (Banting & Kymlicka, 2017, p. 4). Unfortunately, the label “co-citizen” is not uniformly made available to all citizens and is instead based on whether one is designated as belonging to the ingroup or outgroup, depending on the context of the situation. Thus, citizenship rights are not automatic but are socially mediated and dependent on acceptance into the ingroup.

Our analysis has illuminated three distinct revelations regarding the dynamics of ingroup/outgroup membership on employment rights, as depicted through the relationship of employers as members of the non-disabled ingroup and job seekers with disabilities as members of the outgroup. First, despite their shared history of inequality in the US labour market, women and ethnic minorities have been experiencing greater acceptance into the ingroup of employable citizens than people with disabilities. As a result, diversity efforts to improve the job prospects of women and ethnic minorities cloak the continued marginalisation experienced by individuals with disabilities. Second, the perceived threat of lawsuits and the costs associated with providing accommodations are prominent in employers’ hiring decisions. The very legislation enacted to prevent employment discrimination simply seems to foster compulsion towards compliance and cost/risk analysis rather than the substantive work needed to eliminate bias and prejudice from hiring practices. Third, irrespective of impairment to employers, disability seems to be synonymous with inability. This association further hinders the employment of individuals with disabilities because their ability is judged to be limited and inferior in quantity and quality to their counterparts without disabilities.

In her multichapter book on citizenship, Beckett (2006) asserted that human rights should be at the centre of citizenship and should be conceptualised based on our universal need for protection from vulnerability. Although we agree with Beckett in principle, appealing to our shared vulnerability remains a nebulous and abstract ideal. The past 50 years of US history have been rife with antidiscrimination laws that, at best, have prevented overt discrimination against individuals with disabilities but have neglected to produce the substantial change necessary for this population to advance from the margins of society and actualise true citizenship through group membership. We argue that laws and policies need to be coupled with targeted training for those responsible for carrying out the mandates. It is imperative that such decision-makers acknowledge their biases and begin the arduous
work of recognising their complicity (albeit unintentional) in the social exclusion of people with disabilities.

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**References**


Introduction

This chapter investigates how primary and secondary preventive parenting policies in Norway and Romania align with the fundamental human and national civil right to respect for family life, ascribing equal dignity as a fundamental human right to both children and parents as citizens.

By ascribing civil rights to individuals, liberal democratic welfare states commit to protecting the fundamental interests of their citizens and their equal right to freely choose how to live their lives. Across Europe, the fundamental right to respect for family life is enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 1950, 2020), but this right usually has corresponding rights norms embedded through national legislation. This specific fundamental right provides a space for, inter alia, parents and children to enjoy each other’s company without any interference from any entity; and in this case, the nation-state is set to protect such a right. Nevertheless, the rights of parents to raise their children without public interference is conditioned not only by the interests and rights of children, but also by public interests that dictate parts of how children are cared for and raised through, for example, education, health, care and family policies. The interconnection between these three distinct interests – the parent, the child and the public – constitutes a triangle that, inspired by David Archard (2019), can be referred to as the family interests triangle. How this triangle is enshrined in national laws and policies configures the citizenship of children and parents and their equal human dignity.

In liberal democratic welfare states, a lead hallmark of citizenship is the equal distribution of rights and the corresponding duty laid on the public to equally enforce rights. That being said, the family institution remains a “crucial source of inequality in modern societies” (Fishkin, 1983, p. 1). To abide by the principle of equality, in his classic contribution to the citizenship literature, Marshall argued that civil rights should be supported by social rights for citizens to “live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society” (Marshall, 1950, p. 11), as elaborated on by Haug in Chapter 1. If we apply this notion to the right to family life, the welfare state should, on the one hand, try to enable parents to use their freedom to provide a family life that is in accordance with the prevailing

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standards of society. On the other hand, how the citizenship of children and parents is formed through the configuration of the family interests triangle generally conditions social inequality and the risk of social exclusion.

A central public organisation involved in the configuration of the family interests triangle is child protection services (CPS); this service is mandated to enforce the right of children to be protected from any form of violence and safeguard their development (Sandberg, 2018). To protect these rights, CPSs can, as an ultimate measure, put forth a case and argue for the removal of a child through a care order and, as a result, severely interfere with children’s and parents’ right to family life. Nevertheless, the CPSs are first and foremost delegated the task of securing the care and development of the child with less severe interference in the child–parent relationship through voluntary in-home measures. Ideally, CPS and parents collaborate to remedy the substandard care provided in the family. A trusting relationship between the two parties is a central ingredient in this regard (cf. Fauske et al., 2017). In-home measures come in various forms; they may entail contact families and support persons for children, respite care, financial and in-kind measures, leisure activities and counselling for parents (Christiansen & Hollekim, 2018, p. 186). Research has suggested that measures such as advice, counselling and courses, which are intended to improve the abilities, skills and competencies of parents, have gained increased importance and that some groups of parents, typically those with less education and income, are targeted with in-home measures more than others CPS (Gilbert et al., 2011).

In-home measures are provided to parents to prevent harm from evolving further or reappearing. Such measures fall into the category of so-called secondary preventive measures. Secondary preventive measures can be distinguished from primary preventive measures that are intended to prevent harm from appearing in the first place (cf. e.g., Caplan, 1964). It is not only CPSs that are concerned with parents’ abilities, but there are also many other welfare state organisations, private organisations and third-sector organisations that promote children’s health, development and education and provide advice, counselling and courses for parents. Whether primary or secondary, these preventive services can be summoned under the umbrella of parenting support policies and measures (cf. Churchill et al., 2021). Although the right to family life protects parents against unlawful interference in the private sphere, these welfare state organisations are often intensively involved in how parents fulfil their responsibilities. Moreover, in differentiating between targeted and universal primary preventive measures, research has shown that some groups of parents are more targeted than others (Abela et al., 2021), which could be problematic from the perspective of equal citizenship. Although there is some research on the relationship between primary and secondary preventive measures related to parenting support (Bråten & Sønsterudbråten, 2016; Wesseltoft-Rao et al., 2017), there is not, to the best of my knowledge, any research that investigates this relationship in association with the right to family life.

For countries across Europe, parenting support policies need to attend to each country’s human rights obligations, which implies that parenting support
policies must align themselves with a human rights standard (HRS) when addressing each citizen included in the family interests triangle. Hence, an important task is, on the one hand, to evaluate whether preventive policies across countries align with the HRS and, on the other hand, to know how preventive measures support or undermine the realisation of the right to family life. In this regard, this chapter will attempt to answer two questions: (1) How is the family interests triangle configured across primary and secondary preventive measures in two different nation-states? (2) How does the configuration of the family interests triangle on primary and secondary preventive measures align with the right to family life?

In answering these questions, this chapter will compare Norway and Romania, two very different European countries that are formally committed to enforcing the same human rights. These two countries, with their very different welfare schemes, also have different models of CPS (Helland & Luhamaa, 2020), different political and institutional trajectories concerning the implementation of children's rights in legislation (Gaba et al., 2018) and cultural differences in family values (Herlofson et al., 2019). These differences provide not only a comparative perspective on the two countries’ national configurations but also a fruitful contrast to inform a better understanding of what it would generally mean for the social citizenship of children and parents to align with the right to family life.

First, I will provide a brief overview of the Norwegian and Romanian welfare states and CPS concerning primary and secondary preventive measures. Second, I construct an analytical framework based on a human rights interpretation of the family interests triangle. After describing the method and data, third, I analyse Norwegian and Romanian primary and secondary prevention policies. Fourth, I then discuss how the configurations of the family interests triangle in primary and secondary preventive policies align with the HRS. Fifth, I discuss how the relationship between primary and secondary preventive measures may affect the equal right to family life. Finally, in conclusion, I argue that the two countries could learn from each other about parenting support policies to better align with their human rights obligations concerning the right to family life.

Background for the Norwegian and Romanian family interests triangle

At around the turn of the twentieth century, both Norway and Romania developed welfare states with a form of CPS (cf. e.g., Anghel et al., 2013; Falch-Eriksen, 2012). After the Second World War, the countries took different paths, which had consequences for the configuration of the family interests triangle of today.

In Norway, the welfare state has massively expanded. Concerning primary preventive measures, Norway incrementally introduced health centres and family welfare services that, among other things, provided advice for parents (cf. e.g., Bråten & Sønsterudbråten, 2016). Concerning secondary prevention, in-home measures were introduced and prioritised to avoid removing children from their
The right to respect for family life

parents (Falch-Eriksen, 2012). The reform established a type of CPS that today can be referred to as a family service model (Gilbert, 1997; Gilbert et al., 2011), indicating a family interests triangle more centred on the interests of the parents. In Romania, the communist regime thought public welfare services could meet all the needs of the family, making preventive social work, including CPS, redundant (Marin & Stanculescu, 2019). Additionally, the communist state was, to some extent, perceived as the primary caretaker responsible for the upbringing of children (Iusmen, 2014), indicating a family interests triangle centred more on the interests of the public or regime.

Subsequent reforms in CPS in Norway have been characterised mainly by continuity with an expansion of the family-service model and incremental introduction of human and children's rights in the legislation (Skivenes, 2011). Research on Norwegian CPS has identified an increased prevalence of parenting advice, counselling and courses among in-home measures (Falch-Eriksen & Skivenes, 2019). Moreover, other welfare organisations supporting parents with information, counselling and courses have emerged and expanded into primary prevention, such as family welfare services, kindergartens, schools and third-sector organisations. Today, the Norwegian CPS is characterised as a type of family service based with a child development orientation (Gilbert et al., 2011), which suggests a family interests triangle centred on the child’s interest. In contrast, Romanian reforms have been characterised by discontinuity. In the wake of communism, massive international attention was directed at the grave problems surrounding Romanian orphanages packed with children and not meeting their basic needs. The problem of parents abandoning their children because of poverty was a central cause behind the high number of children entering state care. This problem with poverty became a key driver for massive reform, gradually reintroducing public services by addressing the needs of families through social work and CPS in the 2000s (Marin & Stanculescu, 2019). The related legislative reform in the field was modelled upon the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations General Assembly, 1989), with significant assistance from international organisations such as the EU and UNICEF (Iusmen, 2014; Marin & Stanculescu, 2019). Today, the legislation is perceived as having many similarities with the Norwegian model and has been converging towards a family service – based model oriented towards child development (Gaba et al., 2018); however, in practice, the provisions are far from being implemented (Marin & Stanculescu, 2019). Although the scope of welfare organisations in Romania for providing primary preventive services to parents is much less extensive than in Norway, parenting advice, counselling and courses are fragmentally provided in some form in the healthcare system, schools, kindergartens and third-sector organisations (Cojocaru & Cojocaru, 2011, p. 36). Despite the legislative reform (Anghel et al., 2013; Marin & Stanculescu, 2019), the Romanian CPS is nevertheless perceived as having a higher threshold both for removing children and providing in-home measures (Helland & Luhamaa, 2020), indicating that the Romanian family interests triangle could be perceived as centred more on the interests of parents.
The family interests triangle according to a HRS

Departing from the concept of dignity, which is considered foundational for human rights, in this section I construct an analytical framework for the empirical analysis of preventive parenting support policies. First, I will elaborate on what dignity means for the relationship between children and parents. Thereafter, I elaborate on what this requires of the preventive measures, which finally end up in a human rights-informed configuration of the family interests triangle that will be applied in the analysis.

Habermas (2010) and many other scholars have argued that the moral source of all human rights conventions is the equal and inherent value and dignity of all human beings. He claimed that “the respect for the dignity of every person forbids the state to dispose of any individual merely as a means to another end” (p. 465). The inherent dignity of all humans requires that both children and parents be treated as ends in themselves. This implies not only that neither the public nor the parents can treat children as mere means to meet their interests but also that the public cannot use parents as mere means to meet the interests of the public or child. To better understand why the family life of both children and parents must be treated as ends in and of themselves and the reasons for protecting this relationship with rights, I will start by elaborating on the nature of parents’ rights to make decisions for their children.

Brighouse and Swift (2006, 2014) argued that parents’ rights are not simply a duty correlated to children’s interests and rights to care and development. Parental rights are also in part about fundamental interests in parenting, here in the sense that its justification is grounded in the benefits it will bring to the parents themselves and not merely the interests of the child or public. They argued that this fundamental interest of parents in the particular parent–child relationship makes the family better fit to serve the needs of children than alternative arrangements, such as public childcare institutions. These institutions cannot meet the fundamental interests of the child in having a lasting relationship characterised by loving attention from an adult with a special duty of care towards the child, a particular quality referred to as familial relationship goods.

Rights are accorded to protect valuable interests, and fundamental rights are accorded to protect fundamental interests, such as the interest in familial relationship goods. The justification for parents’ fundamental rights over “their” children is, therefore, not that children belong to their parents but that it is a fundamental interest of the child to be raised by parents who have a fundamental interest in parenting them. Thus, the right to family life can be perceived as a fundamental right for both children and parents that protects their common fundamental interests in familial relationship goods. Consequently, treating parents only as a means to meet the interests of the child or public would undermine not only the dignity of parents but also their children and possibly even the public interests in familial relationship goods.

Although parents’ rights are fundamental in protecting parents’ own interests, they are nevertheless conditioned and limited upon parents meeting the
fundamental interests of children in care and development, including familial relationship goods. It is with regard to this conditionality of parenting that the welfare state and CPSs enter the picture. Both the Norwegian and Romanian welfare states have a self-imposed duty to protect the interests of children and parents in familial relationship goods as enshrined in the right to family life, but also a public interest in supporting the production of familial relationship goods to safeguard the care and development of children.

To further explore the interest of children and parents in parenting support, I use Brighouse and Swift’s (2006, 2014) distinction between interests and rights that are fundamental and interests and rights that are instrumental. Similar to the relationship between social and civil rights, instrumental rights support enforcing fundamental rights. Moreover, instrumental rights, which in this case can be read as social rights, can support the fundamental rights of the rights-holder, for example, the parent, or the rights of some other than the rights-holder, for example, the child (Brighouse & Swift, 2006, p. 87). In other words, it can be argued that both children and parents have an interest in parenting support policies to support fundamental interests in familial relationship goods. However, such parenting support policies come in many forms, which is not necessarily in line with an HRS protecting the dignity of citizens.

To align with the right to family life, parenting support measures cannot be forced upon parents against their will, except for the protection of the rights of children (Council of Europe, 1950, article 8 (2)). In other words, to align with an HRS, parenting support measures must be voluntary and based upon consent, until the point where the rights of children to protection trumps the parents’ right to family life. As long as preventive measures do not merely consider the parent–child relationship as a means for public interests but as an end in itself, parenting support policies will be in alignment with the HRS. Suppose the empirical analysis shows that Norwegian and Romanian parenting policies are not in alignment with the HRS. In this case, I will discuss whether they are too centred on the interests of the public, too centred on the interests of the parents and, hence, not protecting the child’s dignity against violence from the parents or too centred on the interests of the child, hence treating parents as mere means. Moreover, it must be understood that a too child-centred or too parent-centred triangle impedes familial relationship goods and, therefore, is at odds with the HRS.

Methods and data

The empirical part of the chapter is based on a policy analysis of document data that included primary and secondary preventive policies related to parenting support. The documents included in the analysis were identified through process tracing (Bennett & Checkel, 2015). This method uses intertextual references in law and policy documents to identify relevant data to answer the research question. The most central documents included were (1) laws about child protection and parental responsibility, including law proposals and preparatory works, such as white papers.
and government-commissioned reports, and (2) policies, such as regulations, circulars, strategies and action plans. Importantly, this policy area constantly evolves as policies are proposed and approved. Therefore, some of the main documents included in the analysis are, at the time of writing this, not official laws or policies and are interpreted as such. The supply of documents was much broader and more easily accessible in Norway than in Romania. Moreover, the intertextual references were not as encompassing as in Norwegian, and it was difficult to find documents going much further back than in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, I tried to include documents from approximately the same period and areas in the two countries. The list of documents I ended up using in the final analysis is included in the references. The documents were not necessarily read from start to end but were also explored through keywords identified in the process and search function. Finally, I have lived and worked in both countries and, therefore, have mastered both Norwegian and Romanian. In the case of quotes, if there was no available or official translation to English, I have made the translations myself.

The family interests triangle in Norway and Romania

In this section, I present the results from the document analysis. First, I present the analysis of one primary preventive policy on parenting support in each country: Norway first, then Romania. Next, I present the analysis of secondary preventive parenting policies in the same order. This analysis consists of a mixture of relevant documents. Finally, I provide a brief summary as a bridge to the discussion on the relationship between primary and secondary preventive policies from the perspective of HRS.

Primary preventive policies with universal and targeted measures

In 2018, the Norwegian government launched a strategy for parenting support called “Safe Parents, Safe Childhood 2018–2021” (Barne- og Likestillingsdepartementet, 2018). The strategy holds that public support of the family has considerable public interest, including support in developing parental abilities. The family is perceived as the institution where the groundwork for future societal participation is done (Barne- og Likestillingsdepartementet, 2018, p. 5). Early parenting support is considered economically rational, reducing the need for more costly measures later, here working upon the premise that improved parenting abilities lead to better adapted and secure children, which increases the probability of children completing school and entering the labour market (Barne- og Likestillingsdepartementet, 2018, p. 21).

The strategy also thematises parents' interests in parenting support. Overall, it is emphasised that all parents experience challenges and may need support sometimes. Moreover, it is underlined that there is a strong demand emanating from the Norwegian population for information on parenting but that the quality of information and advice available privately is not assured (Barne- og Likestillingsdepartementet, 2018, p. 24). Addressing this problem, the strategy prioritises developing
and making available quality-assured information for parents through an online platform, as well as providing material for personnel working in public organisations, such as health centres, family welfare services, kindergartens and schools, all of which are regularly in contact with parents (Barne- og Likestillingsdepartementet, 2018, pp. 39–42). Municipalities are encouraged to apply for grants to arrange parenting courses; however, it is not a legal duty for the municipalities, and it is acknowledged that the availability varies across the country (Barne- og Likestillingsdepartementet, 2018, pp. 45–46).

These universal measures are differentiated from measures targeted at particular groups of parents that are perceived as having an additional need for parenting support, such as parents with cognitive challenges, immigrants, prisoners, CPS clients and others. Some of these groups of parents are perceived as harder to reach (Barne- og Likestillingsdepartementet, 2018, pp. 49–53). In general, the strategy aims to encourage parents to approach different branches of the welfare state for parenting support. However, it is acknowledged that, for some groups of parents, asking for help with parenting is associated with stigma and shame (Barne- og Likestillingsdepartementet, 2018, p. 49). Consequently, many measures are targeted at these groups of parents with a higher threshold to ask for help and are perceived as more at risk of abusive and neglectful parenting. In principle, the targeted measures are voluntary, but for example, in the case of parents in prison, participation is a general condition for having children visiting (Kriminalomsorgsdirektoratet, 2017, p. 4), and for refugees with children, parenting courses are mandatory through the introductory programme (cf. Integreringsloven, 2020, §-14). Overall, the protection of children’s interests in protection and growing up with their parents is the core rationale behind the strategy, which the following quote illustrates: “Help to the parents is – most importantly – a helping hand to the children” (Barne- og Likestillingsdepartementet, 2018, p. 5).

In 2022, the Romanian government proposed a parenting support strategy called “Educated Parents, Happy Children” (Ministerul Educatiei, 2022). The highlighted public interest in supporting parents is to improve educational outcomes and provide children with equal opportunities. This objective is proposed on the background of a plethora of social problems, which are also addressed across other policies on child and family welfare (see, e.g., Guvernul Romaniei, 2021, 2022), such as high infant mortality, high rate of school abandonment and risk of poverty and social exclusion for children, a culture of abuse, neglect, exploitation and abandonment of children (Ministerul Educatiei, 2022, pp. 9–10). The parents are perceived as an essential means for the public interest in the child; however, the strategy also acknowledges the parents’ own interest in parenting support. According to the strategy, parents need support because rapid and profound societal changes have created increased pressure on parents, and new and more complex expectations related to children’s rights must be met. For example, children’s right to increased codetermination with age requires that parents should learn a “new family culture,” one valuing dialogue, knowledge and participation; in the strategy, this new culture is contrasted to a “traditional culture” where, for example,
violence towards children is tolerated. Considering the increased complexity of parenting, the strategy emphasises lifelong learning both to modernise Romanian society and improve the life quality of parents. When it comes to particular measures, the proposed strategy is, at the time of writing, less concrete and differentiated than Norwegian. Most importantly, the strategy proposes a national programme for parenting education operationalised, with six modules corresponding with stages in their development (Ministerul Educatiei, 2022, pp. 25–26). These courses are aimed at all parents, prospective parents and teenagers as potential parents and can be provided by both public institutions, such as schools and kindergartens, social and health services and private organisations within a government-approved quality standard. Participation in parenting education is voluntary; nevertheless, the strategy differentiates measures targeted at parents with higher education from those without because more educated parents are expected to have increased access to information themselves and the capacity to make use of it. In contrast, the strategy proposes that less-educated parents should be provided with interactive courses that are situated locally.

Pertaining to primary prevention, there is a strong thrust in Norway and a growing one in Romania towards offering parents support to develop parental abilities. Although the public interest in educational outcomes and cost reduction are important rationales, the Norwegian and Romanian policies are primarily centred on children’s interests in protection from abuse and neglect and development in the family. In this regard, both countries target particular categories of parents, of which children are considered more at risk, but for a few groups in Norway, this is mandatory. Regarding parents’ fundamental interests in parenting, there are some minor differences given that the Romanian policy more explicitly also emphasises parents’ interest in life quality.

**Secondary preventive measures: voluntariness and coerciveness**

Next, I analyse policies on in-home measures provided by CPS for specific families. Although voluntary universal and targeted parenting support provided by the welfare state does not directly interfere with the right to family life, in-home measures provided by CPSs are another matter.

In Norway, it is the child who has the right to in-home measures upon certain conditions (Barnevernloven, 1992, §1–5; §4–4(2)). Parents do not have social rights in the Child Welfare Act, nor in the Children’s Act (Barneloven, 1981) for regulating the parent–child relationship. Nevertheless, CPS still has a duty to facilitate (albeit not necessarily provide) advice and guidance for parents upon request (Barne og familiedepartementet, 2016). All measures provided to the child in CPS are guided by the least intrusive measure principle. This is a proportionality principle dictating that the right to privacy should not be unnecessarily interfered with, implying that CPS is obligated to consider in-home measures before preparing for a care order procedure (Barne og familiedepartementet, 2016, p. 7) In-home measures can be provided through two types of formal decisions. The priority is that the parents voluntarily agree on measures. However, if parents refuse, measures can be
compulsory to parents through a decision of the county welfare board (Barnevernloven, 1992, §4–4). Even though parents’ consent is a central principle, imposing measures are perceived as potentially helping the parents “understand the seriousness of the situation” (Prop. 72 L (2014/2015), p. 7). The possibility for compulsory in-home measures has been in Norwegian legislation since 1953 (Ot. prp. nr. 56. (1952)), but only a type of measure that falls under the notion of compensatory measures (Barne og familiedepartementet, 2016) has been imposed on parents to provide kindergarten, attend school or provide healthcare (cf. Barnevernloven, 1953, § 18). The 2015 reform extended the scope of potential measures to include so-called structuring measures that contribute to lasting positive change in the family through improving parental abilities, developing the interaction between parent and children and activating the network around the child (Barne og familiedepartementet, 2016, p. 4) to “prevent more intrusive measures as care order” (Prop. 72 L (2014/2015)).

In Romania, in-home measures were introduced with the legislative reform in 2004. As rationales, the law proposal explicitly referred to the right of children to know and be raised by their parents and the human right to enjoy family life while raising awareness among parents about their parental responsibility (Guvernul Romaniei, 2003). Although not equally emphasised in the law proposal, the second objective for in-home measures is the prevention of abusive behaviours of the parents and family violence (Parlamentul Romaniei, 2004, §39(1)). As in Norway, children carry a right to in-home measures, but article § 35 (3) stipulates that parents also have a social “right to receive information and specialised assistance that are necessary for upbringing, caring and educating the child.” It is the duty of local CPSs to provide special consultancy regarding the legal possibilities of support upon the request of parents (ANPDC & UNICEF, 2006, pp. 35–36). In contrast to Norway, a care order must be preceded by systematic services and assistance to the parents (Parlamentul Romaniei, 2004, § 39 (2)). It is not sufficient to consider merely providing in-home measures before applying for a care order. In Romania, there are no provisions for imposing in-home measures.

Overall, the analysis of Norwegian and Romanian primary and secondary preventive policies suggests that the fundamental interests of children in care and development in the family are the central concerns and that the public interest in the development of children does not conflict with this. Nevertheless, the fundamental and instrumental interests of children and parents are weighed slightly differently between the countries. Concerning social rights to parenting support, children in Norway have a conditional right to in-home measures that implicate their parents, while in Romania, parents also have an explicit social right, although also conditional, to claim parenting support themselves. Concerning the principle of consent and voluntariness, Norwegian parents can in some situations be ordered to participate in parenting courses, while in Romania, parents can refuse. Next, I discuss some aspects related to the relationship between primary and secondary preventive measures to clarify how the family interests triangles are configured in Norway and Romania’s parenting support policies, along with how they align with the HRS.
Is the family interests triangle aligned with the human rights standard?

The main objective of preventive policies in Norway is to avoid CPSs having to interfere in the family with a care order. In contrast, Romania’s policies are composed of different objectives not only centred on children’s fundamental interest in family life and protection but, among other things, the interests of parents in parenting support to improve their life quality. This aspect could be read as acknowledging the fundamental interests of parents in improving the quality of familial relationship goods for their own sake. In contrast, the inherent value of parenting for parents is somewhat downplayed in Norwegian policies. Explicitly emphasising parent’s interest in parenting support would hardly come at the expense of children’s interests; on the contrary, highlighting also parents’ own interests could build up under the interest of children in familial relationship goods and, therefore, strengthen the children’s fundamental right to family life in line with the HRS, as well as the public’s interest in this. The emphasis on parents’ fundamental interest in familial relationship goods is also different concerning the provision of both primary and secondary preventive measures. While Norwegian children have a conditional right to in-home measures, in Romania, children and parents can claim such a social right. Given the common interests of children and parents in familial relationship goods, it is not certain that providing in-home measures as a social right also to parents would undermine children’s rights. From this perspective, at least formally, the Romanian legislation and policies are more aligned with the HRS because it is also centred on parents’ interests and, therefore, more explicitly on facilitating their dignity.

Evaluating these policies over the voluntariness criteria is less straightforward. While there is a possibility in Norway for imposing in-home measures, as well as primary preventive measures, on some groups of parents, voluntariness comes without exception in Romania. However, the fact that parents can refuse the proposed in-home measures can be against children’s interests in protection and familial relationship goods if the refusal leads to a care order. In the latter case, it can additionally be against the parent’s fundamental interest in familial relationship goods. However, a problem with imposing in-home measures is that they undermine the necessary trust for the collaborative relationship to work as intended (Paulsen et al., 2021). Although it could, at the threshold for a care order, be in the fundamental interest of children and parents to oblige parents, this should be avoided as much as possible according to the proportionality principle. However, seeing secondary preventive measures in the context of primary preventive parenting support could enable a new perspective on this problem. In the Norwegian strategy for parenting support, it is acknowledged that there is a barrier for many groups of parents to ask for help to improve their parenting abilities. Simultaneously, the reason for targeting them is that these parents are perceived as needing guidance. Although there are good reasons for and intentions behind targeting these groups with measures, research indicates that these groups of parents, which are associated with lower education and income, are also those that generally have less trust in CPSs
(Juhasz & Skivenes, 2017). Rothstein (1998) argued that targeted social policies undermine trust and stigmatise the targeted groups, which is at odds with the human rights obligation to secure the dignity of the parents. Adding shame and stigma to the groups of parents that already have a too-high barrier to approach CPSs for help with parenting could end up in a negative feedback loop, making it even more difficult for the parents to cooperate if approached by CPS. This mechanism could undermine the good intentions of the Norwegian parenting support policy to provide all with opportunities for parenting support and, as a consequence, lead to unequal opportunities to enjoy family life between the children and parents of the targeted categories and other families. However, if children and parents were accorded social rights to parenting support, these problems with mistrust, stigma and shame could possibly be alleviated, at least to some extent. Hatland (2011) held that universal social rights, among other positive things, have a symbolic effect on the public perception of the need for support, making the public responsible for providing, in this case, parenting support. Possibly parenting support policies in the form of social rights could contribute to alleviating the negative effect on trust, conditioning the collaboration between parents, CPSs and other welfare organisations while supporting the fundamental interests in dignity and familial relationship goods more in line with the HRS.

Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter suggests that neither the Norwegian nor Romanian citizenship of children and parents aligns with HRS. Although the Norwegian configuration of the family interests triangle is based on the children’s fundamental interests, the parents’ fundamental interests could be more emphasised and supported with a universal social right to parenting support without undermining the interests of children directly. In contrast, the Romanian configuration of the family interests triangle, although based on the fundamental interests of children, leaves too much leeway for parents to refuse in-home measures, possibly undermining both children’s and parents’ fundamental interests in familial relationship goods. On the other hand, Romanian legislation is closer to formally providing parents with a social right to parenting support. In conclusion to the first research question, the Norwegian preventive policies indicate a child-centred configuration, while the Romanian policies indicate a slightly parent-centred configuration; Norway could inspire Romania to introduce compulsory in-home measures, and Romania could also inspire Norway to introduce in-home measures as a social right directly for parents.

For the second research question, on how the two countries’ configurations of the family interests triangle align with the HRS, this chapter argues why it may be necessary for welfare states to provide parenting support as a universal social right. The human right to respect for family life only makes sense if parents can use this freedom to fulfil the child’s and parents’ fundamental interests in familial relationship goods. Welfare states offering primary preventive measures go some way towards acknowledging the instrumental interest in parenting support;
however, the provision of primary preventive parenting support as a universal social right would strengthen the fundamental rights to family life, on the one hand, and could alleviate some of the problems related to the provision of secondary preventive in-home measures, on the other hand. Finally, if parenting support policies of liberal democratic welfare states were better aligned with the HRS, they could possibly play a substantial part in addressing the role of the child–parent relationship for social exclusion without interfering too much with citizens’ right to family life.

References


7 Citizenship for future generations

The inclusion of future generations in welfare state considerations

Marianne Takle

Introduction

Since the early 1970s, concern for future generations has increasingly been included in legislative and policy measures at the national and global levels (Tremmel, 2021; UN Secretary-General, 2013). This policy turn has been motivated by questions about the consequences for social cohesion and individual opportunities if present generations transfer irreversible environmental damage to future citizens. This has happened in the context of a growing concern for persons who are not yet born, in contrast to the intergenerational relations between younger and older people living today. The present generations significantly influence future generations’ welfare, while the people who are not yet born have no voice. In 1987, the UN World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987) wrote the following:

We borrow environmental capital from future generations with no intention or prospect of repaying. They may damn us for our spendthrift ways, but they can never collect on our debt to them. We act as we do because we can get away with it: the future generations do not vote; they have no political or financial power; they cannot challenge our decisions.

(No. 25)

Because of this combination – of the present generation’s capacity to affect the future ecosystem and the future generations’ lack of influence – many scholars have argued that today’s generations have a responsibility to include the welfare of people who are not yet born in political decisions (Gough, 2017; Sen, 2013; Tremmel, 2021). Future generations are socially excluded from contemporary decisions that are important to their welfare. If we should consider people who have not yet been born in national welfare state considerations, how could we do this? Or, more specifically, considering this book’s central theme, could we include future generations in the contemporary concept of citizenship, and if so, what would this mean?

To answer this question, I combine two strands of academic research: scholarship on citizenship and solidarity and on concerns for future generations. Moreover, I discuss the question within the framework of the democratic welfare state. Within this framework, being a citizen implies inclusion as a member of a political
community based on a certain level of solidarity (Banting & Kymlicka, 2017; Preuss, 2016). This means that the regulation of access to citizenship is decisive for how a welfare state defines the boundaries with whom the members should act in solidarity (Bauböck et al., 2006).

In this chapter, my focus is on national constitutions, and I apply a legal–political approach. Constitutions are meant to endure for many generations; they are the most important intergenerational contracts in democratic welfare states (Gosseries, 2008). Moreover, I evaluate the empirical relevance of the tools by examining Norway as an example of how around 30 countries have included ecological protection clauses for future generations in their constitutions (Tremmel, 2006, 2019). Greenpeace Norden Association and Nature and Youth Norway have taken legal action against the Norwegian government for violating this protection clause. I use this climate lawsuit as an intake to study the main arguments related to future generations. The analyses do not cover the whole lawsuit, and I do not evaluate the judicial arguments within a legal framework, but rather I analyse this from a political scientist’s perspective. My case study shows that such protection clauses are not always fulfilled in practice. An indication that they are not is that there have been 1,587 registered climate lawsuits worldwide between 1986 and 2020 (Setzer & Byrnes, 2020). Even though not all of them refer to future generations, many do. Such climate lawsuits are an excellent way to study the arguments concerning the inclusion of future generations in political considerations in constitutions.

In the following second section, I place my main question within the framework of how citizenship has a long history of expansion. In the third section, I review previous studies of future generations. I argue that these are not efficient analytical tools to examine what kind of concrete binding commitments to collective actions a concern for future generations calls for. In the fourth and fifth sections, I aim to contribute to filling this gap by combining the scholarly literature on future generations with those on citizenship and solidarity. In the sixth section, I discuss how constitutions are based on intergenerational solidarity. Although I present the Norwegian case and methodology applied in the empirical study in the seventh section, I analyse one contested issue in the Norwegian climate lawsuit in the eighth section. In the final section, I summarise and conclude.

**Including new citizens**

Citizenship carries a core meaning as the formal membership of a legal and political entity with rights and obligations that distinguish the citizen from non-citizen (Hagedorn, 2001). In terms of a legal–political understanding, citizenship defines an individual’s membership in a political community (Preuss, 2016). As mentioned earlier, the regulation of access to citizenship is how a national state defines the boundaries of whom to include in the political community, and within a democratic welfare state, the community is based on solidarity (Stjernø, 2005).

The scholarship on citizenship often refers to citizenship as the sum of civic, political and social (welfare) rights. This definition is based on the well-known categorisation made by Marshall (1950), as is also discussed by Haug in Chapter 1
in this volume. Marshall saw the expansion of citizenship rights as a process of incorporating new groups (specifically the English working class) into society and the polity. Although civil rights emerged in the eighteenth century, the political right to vote originated in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, citizenship expanded along with social rights as a virtue of membership within the community (Marshall, 1950). Access to all these rights implies inclusion in democratic welfare states based on solidarity (Preuss, 2016).

Historically, but at different speeds and in different ways, citizenship has a long history of expansion within democratic welfare states (Bauböck et al., 2006). In most welfare states, this has usually followed the pattern of including all men, independent of their property, women by abolishing gender qualifications, younger groups by decreasing age requirements and immigrants with permanent residence. Moreover, over the last half-century, the scholarship on citizenship has described a process of less exclusionary definitions of national membership. This has been accompanied by a more pluralistic conception of national solidarity (Banting & Kymlicka, 2017; Bloemraad et al., 2019; Takle, 2018). Against this historical and theoretical background, the question is whether and how this process of including new members as citizens of a political community also applies to the inclusion of future people.

Who are the future generations?

The concern for future generations is increasingly discussed in public debates, but what is meant by future generations? This term often refers to our children and grandchildren, perhaps also great-grandchildren (i.e., to specific descendants we can imagine). Future generations are also more abstract; they will be born but uncertain of who, where and when. They are people we know little about, beyond that they will live in the world we leave behind. We know what future generations will need in some basic terms, but we have limited knowledge of their preferences and technological abilities (Takle, 2020).

Previous studies have generally explained the growing concern for future generations as a pragmatic adaptation to new circumstances, where improved knowledge of the global limits of many natural resources and environmental degradation is central (Caney, 2018; Taylor, 2017). Although climate change is the current headline issue, biodiversity is increasingly important (IPPC, 2022; IPBES, 2019). There is a new awareness that the use of natural resources needs to be assessed in relation to what is left to future generations and that the contemporary way of life in large parts of the world will lead to escalating global environmental damage (Gough, 2017). Attention to future generations is also related to economic and political stability. One consideration is how one generation’s national account budget deficits might inflict considerable disadvantages on subsequent generations (Graeber, 2011). Another is how current generations can transfer stable political institutions to the coming generations (Rawls, 1971).

The concern for future generations has mainly been discussed in the literature in the fields of political philosophy, legal research, welfare and development economics and political science. Political philosophy scholars have developed general
theories of justice between intertemporal generations, that is, people who lived in the past, present and future (Tremmel, 2009, 2021). Three principles are frequently used. Justice as impartiality is based on Rawls’ (1971, pp. 284–310) original position theory: justice as equality and justice as reciprocity. Contributions from political philosophy typically provide abstract principles of justice.

Legal research concentrates on future generations’ rights. At the national level, scholars analyse the legal and political consequences of including intergenerational justice clauses, ecological generational clauses or generational financial clauses (Fauchald & Smith, 2019; Gosseries, 2008; Häberle, 2006; Tremmel, 2006, 2019). These analyses of state practice and court cases based on protection clauses can illuminate the legal and political consequences of constitutional protection for future generations. At the global level, scholars analyse how commitments to future people are incorporated in international agreements and laws, for example, as a guardian, a common heritage of mankind and trusteeship (Aguis & Busuttil, 2013) and human rights extended to future generations (Lawrence, 2014; Taylor, 2017).

Welfare and development economics focuses on the well-being of those born in the future (Büchs & Koch, 2017). Two debates are of particular interest: (i) The discussion about forms of sustainability is crucial for the question of if and what the current generation should save for future generations (Takle, 2020). (ii) There is an ongoing debate about whether we should focus on future generations’ needs or capabilities (Gough, 2017; Sen, 2013).

Political science contributions focus on how democratic procedures can be both obstacles and tools to promote intergenerational justice (Caney, 2018; Jones et al., 2018). Among these obstacles are short-term interests connected to political elections (Taylor, 2017). Democratic procedures can promote intergenerational justice by proxy representations by, for example, giving extra votes to persons representing future generations (Kates, 2018). Although political science long ignored the problem of “presentism,” in recent years, the research on institutions for future generations has gained more attention (MacKenzie, 2021; Smith, 2021; Tremmel, 2021).

Overall, these four strands of the literature generally capture the complexities and tensions underlying concerns for future generations while providing analytical approaches to studying these concerns. However, there is a need for theoretical discussions that can be used to understand the normative basis for including future generations as the citizens and members of a political community.

The extension of boundaries over time
In this chapter, the question of access to citizenship for these unborn individuals is not defined in terms of whether and how they can have rights and duties. We can neither expect anything from them nor know what their preferences will be (Caney, 2018; Tremmel, 2019). Rather, the question is how the current generations, who influence political decisions, include future people in their policy considerations – as if future people were citizens already.

Including future generations as citizens implies an extension of national solidarity boundaries. The concept of solidarity with future generations differs from
solidarity with contemporaries because the boundaries are not only drawn in relation to territorial space and administrative units, but stretching these boundaries also requires an extension into time. We constantly develop our relationships between the past, present and future and combine them with territorial spaces and administrative units (Elías, 1987; Koselleck, 1989). Within the framework of the nation-state, the past is crucial. National solidarity is based on a sense of timeless continuity with past generations transmitted to future generations, who are understood as future citizens of the nation-state (Elías, 1989).

Although national welfare states are based on bounded solidarity, these exclusive boundaries are more problematic in relation to solidarity with future generations. One reason is the increasing knowledge about how actions in one part of the world directly affect people’s lives in other regions. This implies that the ability of the state to function as an adequate shelter for its citizens is reduced, and principled reflections on justice are not only confined to domestic political settings but also require a global approach (Sjursen, 2020).

A global concept of solidarity emphasises how contemporary challenges cross national borders and require global solutions (Stjernø, 2005, 2015). Can we conceive of cosmopolitan solidarity for future generations grounded in the universalism of human rights? This implies that states have the same responsibility for upholding the welfare of all future people, not exclusively their future citizens, thereby eroding the national boundaries of solidarity. Although national boundaries are essential, there are signs of mutual responsibility for future generations that point to solidarity at the global level (Taylor, 2017).

In emphasising solidarity with future generations, one would accentuate the future, rather than the past and historical traditions, to define the boundaries of solidarity. This concept is forward-looking. It emphasises that today’s actions have a significant future dimension because those people who will be born in the future will have become increasingly dependent on current decisions because of ecological limits (Kverndokk, 2020). The cosmopolitan model, as discussed by Falch-Eriksen in Chapter 2, provides a better way of connecting the past, present and future that would help us approach the concern for future generations. Still, its foundation is weak because it lacks the constitutionally defined national welfare state boundaries that determine with whom one should act in solidarity.

The inclusion of future generations in constitutions

Applying a legal–political understanding of solidarity makes self-imposed binding in constitutions evident. According to Habermas (2015, p. 24), solidarity is a political concept based on confidence in the form of reciprocity guaranteed by legally organised relations. Political community members are the coauthors of the laws, and the political order is an expression of their collective will. The praxis of citizens who exercise their civil and political rights forms a legal and politically constructed solidarity (Habermas, 2001, p. 76).

In common with Habermas, Preuss (2016) argued that solidarity is a modern concept not based on prepolitical communities and that the concept of solidarity
unites two seemingly contradictory elements. On the one hand, solidarity includes duties of care nurtured in Gemeinschaft-like communities. On the other hand, these duties are directed towards aliens and implemented in Gesellschaft-like kinds of communities. Thus, solidarity can be understood as institutionalised reciprocity that combines feelings of sympathy in line with Gemeinschaft-like types of communities with modern institutions based on Gesellschaft-like kinds of communities.

This paradoxical combination is enshrined in the institutions of contemporary welfare states. The rights and duties within a national solidaristic community are mediated through state institutions and are inherently linked to the basic principles of constitutionalism (Preuss, 2016). The most important are the principle of legal rights, the connected concept of an independent judiciary, the separation of powers and the principle of equality before the law. These principles are based on the idea that all forms of governmental power, including a majority in parliament, are subject to critical substantive limitations.

The idea of constitutionalism expresses limitations on democratic decisions. The constitution places restrictions on the legislative powers to preserve the fundamental freedoms of individuals. Constitutions are meant to place certain questions beyond the reach of the simple majority. Most written constitutions are difficult to change because they often require legislative supermajorities, concurrent majorities of different legislative houses and/or legislative majorities in two consecutive parliaments.

Therefore, national constitutions are self-imposed political and legal bindings for current and future generations (Häberle, 2006). Moreover, constitutions are meant to endure for many generations and are the most important intergenerational contracts in modern welfare states (Gosseries, 2008); they function as a guarantee of confidence in the form of reciprocity over time.

More specifically, protection clauses in national constitutions intend to set limits for democratic decisions to secure the well-being of future generations. Jörg Tremmel (2006) distinguished between three types of protection clauses: (a) General clauses refer to general considerations of future conditions of prosperity, but not specifically to future generations. (b) Financial clauses mean that one should not transfer debt to future generations. (c) Ecological clauses point directly to the need to ensure ecological conditions for those who come after us. According to Tremmel (2006), around 30 countries have included ecological protection clauses for future generations in their constitutions. A report by the UN Secretary-General (2013) also emphasised the importance of such clauses for future generations and mentioned six examples: Bolivia, Ecuador, Germany, Kenya, Norway and South Africa. A study by Dirth (2018) showed that 120 countries have clauses referring to the environment and sustainability, but only 37 explicitly point to future generations. This variation in numbers shows that there are different ways of counting protection clauses.

Citizenship for future generations

By including the protection of future generations’ access to a healthy natural environment in constitutions, the current generations have committed themselves to considering future people in contemporary welfare state considerations. As such, protection clauses are self-imposed institutional bindings made by the present
generation for the sake of welfare for persons who are not yet born. This implies an extension of the boundaries of solidarity over time. However, solidarity is based on reciprocity over time, and regarding future generations, reciprocity among equals is impossible. Because we cannot expect anything from people who have not yet been born, authors have suggested indirect reciprocity, in which each generation receives from its predecessors and contributes to later generations (Lawrence, 2014; Page, 2006). In this respect, constitutions represent an institutional guarantee of solidarity with future generations.

Including future generations in the contemporary concept of citizenship requires that we have future people in our policy considerations. The current generations can act in solidarity with future generations by extending boundaries in terms of whom we are concerned over as equal members of a political entity in current policy decisions.

Protection clauses in constitutions are within the framework of national states and have a limited scope of application. Although they include future national generations, they do not provide global rights in terms of territorial spaces or administrative units. It follows from international law that each country is responsible for environmental damage from its territory. Although protection clauses have national jurisdiction, ecological damages are global and require global solutions. A crucial question is how boundaries with which one should act in solidarity could be extended to all current and future people of the world and what kind of challenges these conflicting approaches raise.

The Norwegian Constitution

The Norwegian Constitution of 1814 is one of the world’s oldest constitutions still in force. An amendment to the Norwegian Constitution requires a two-thirds majority in the Storting (Norwegian Parliament), and changes can only be adopted after a new election. Many of the provisions of the Norwegian Constitution are relatively short and aim to specify general rules (Fauchald & Smith, 2019). This also applies to the environmental protection clause, Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution:

Every person has the right to an environment that is conducive to health and to a natural environment whose productivity and diversity are maintained. Natural resources shall be managed on the basis of comprehensive long-term considerations which will safeguard this right for future generations as well.

In order to safeguard their right in accordance with the foregoing paragraph, citizens are entitled to information on the state of the natural environment and on the effects of any encroachment on nature that is planned or carried out.

The authorities of the state shall take measures for the implementation of these principles.

(Stortinget, 2018)
Greenpeace Norden Association and Nature and Youth Norway have taken legal actions against the Norwegian government, represented in court by the Office of the Attorney General, for violating the Norwegian Constitution’s Article 112. The central issue is the Norwegian government’s decision on 10 June 2016 to award licences for searching for petroleum in the Barents Sea. Because of climate change and the vulnerability of areas in the High North, environmental organisations argue that the country should not search for more petroleum in these areas and should also phase out petroleum production. The environmental organisations succeeded neither in the first trial in the Oslo District Court in November 2018 nor in the second trial in the Borgarting Appeal Court in November 2020. In December 2020, the Supreme Court concluded that such decisions must be made by politicians in the Storting.

In December 2021, two organisations and six young Norwegians filed the case with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). They argued that the Norwegian state violates its fundamental human rights by issuing new oil drilling licences in the Arctic. The ECtHR has characterised the case as a potential “impact case” and requested that the Norwegian government respond to the application. This is where the case stands in October 2022.

The following empirical analysis is based on primary documents in the climate lawsuit within the Norwegian context. The research includes primary documents from environmental organisations (Greenpeace Norden Association, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2020) and government representation in court by the Office of the Attorney General of Norway (Attorney General of Norway, 2016, 2018). Moreover, it includes the judgements made by the District Court (2018), the Appeal Court (2020) and the Supreme Court (2020). As mentioned in the Introduction, my focus is on future generations, and the analysis does not include assessments of all the aspects of the lawsuits and court decisions.

Future national citizens or all unborn people

The climate lawsuit has revealed contestations over whether, based on Article 112, one should assess only the environmental damage associated with oil and gas production in Norway or if the assessments also include greenhouse gas emissions related to combustion outside Norway. In the following, I concentrate on this contestation in the lawsuit to examine the ideas expressed by experts, politicians and judges and which political and normative assessments they make. The reason for highlighting this issue is because it reflects conflicting views about whether the concern for future generations should include the future citizens of the national political community or whether it should include all persons in the world who have not yet been born.

Environmental organisations require an overall assessment, including the future risk of traditional ecological damage in the Barents Sea and greenhouse gas emissions associated with both production in Norway and combustion outside Norway. One central argument is that, in a situation of catastrophic global warming, Norway has a global responsibility that must be assessed because the country is a significant oil exporter.
In contrast, the government draws national boundaries and argues that emissions from the combustion of Norwegian petroleum outside Norwegian jurisdiction are not covered by Article 112. The government states that the constitution does not provide global rights and has a limited scope of application and jurisdiction in terms of persons and territory. Moreover, the government refers to the fact that international and national climate policies are based on each state being responsible for its national emissions, and Norway has committed itself to reducing its emissions through international agreements. According to the government, it is only relevant to assess the consequences for the climate in Norway.

The District Court concluded in line with the government, while the Appeal Court argued that emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels after export should also be included. However, the arguments were vague:

This involves, in the same way as the principle regarding solidarity across generations, a moral principle that can have major significance in the work on reducing climate changes. However, in contrast to the principle on solidarity with future generations, the principle has not been expressed in the wording of Article 112, nor have any clear references been made to the principle in the preparatory works. The key will therefore have to be the effects arising in Norway.

(Appeal Court, 2020, p. 22)

The Appeal Court concluded that global environmental harm must be considered in line with environmental organisations’ cosmopolitan ideas for future generations. Still, its primary concern corresponded with the government’s drawing of national boundaries.

The Supreme Court concluded in line with the government’s argument that Norwegian climate policy is based on the division of responsibility between states that comply with international agreements. However, in the judgement, the Supreme Court stated that the state has a duty under the constitution to refuse to approve plans for developing and operating petroleum deposits when considerations of climate and the environment otherwise require them. The Supreme Court presupposed that the climate impact of exported combustion emissions would be included in such assessments (Supreme Court, 2020).

The case has been followed up not only by the ECtHR but also by the Norwegian National Human Rights Institution (NIM), which is an independent institution established to strengthen the implementation of human rights in Norway by the Norwegian Constitution, the Human Rights Act and international human rights law. In a report to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, the NIM argued that the state has a duty to assess plans for developing and operating petroleum deposits in relation to climate and the environment (NIM, 2022). These assessments should include both national and exported combustion emissions. It argued that the state has a duty to refuse to approve such plans when approval gives rise to combustion incompatible with limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. According to NIM (2022), the future generations’ right to a liveable climate must be integrated into the ministry’s assessments.
Conclusion

The theme of this chapter is what it would mean to take into account people who have not yet been born in national welfare state considerations. The main question discussed is whether we could and, if so, what it would mean to include future generations in our concept of citizenship. The analysis has been made within the framework of the democratic welfare state and uses a combination of scholarship on citizenship and solidarity that concerns future generations. The point of departure is that future generations will have to deal with the consequences of today’s political actions. Still, they have no influence on contemporary political decisions that are important for their welfare. Hence, they are socially excluded.

The questions of inclusion refer to the current generations’ policy considerations regarding the welfare of future generations as citizens. Because this implies expanding the understanding of solidarity in terms of time, national constitutions are central to the analysis. They represent self-imposed political and legal bindings for current and future generations and are meant to endure many generations. Moreover, national protection clauses are even more binding because they intend to set limits for democratic decisions to secure the well-being of future generations. However, the most critical challenges emphasised regarding the welfare of future generations are environmental damage, which requires global solutions.

The inclusion of Article 112 in the Norwegian constitution is an excellent example of a global issue because it reveals conflicting ideas about whether to impose political and legal bindings on current generations, thereby acting in solidarity with future generations. Moreover, the Norwegian climate lawsuit reveals the tensions these bindings might lead to. I concentrate on one contested issue. Based on Article 112, the contested issue is whether one should assess only the environmental damage associated with oil and gas production in Norway or if the assessments also should include greenhouse gas emissions associated with combustion outside Norway. This issue reflects conflicting ideas about whether the concern for future generations should consist of the future citizens of the national political community or whether it should include all persons in the world who have not yet been born.

The climate lawsuit has revealed how global environmental challenges to the welfare state lead to contestations over national boundaries and cosmopolitan ideas for future generations. Only environmental organisations have applied a cosmopolitan approach to solidarity with future generations. This is, as the government argues, not in line with the constitution’s national jurisdiction and international law and treaties and, therefore, is problematic to apply. Nevertheless, the Appeal Court, the Supreme Court and NIM have considered how Norwegian petroleum production leads to consumption and emissions in other countries. Because environmental damage is global, these emissions will have consequences for the Norwegian environment and, thus, future generations in Norway. This must be considered if one is to act in solidarity with future generations.

I conclude by suggesting that we would be better equipped to understand what a concern for the welfare of people who are not yet born requires of us today by including future generations in our concept of citizenship and analysing what
intergenerational solidarity means in practice. By such inclusion, we may bring future challenges closer to our lives.

References


Part II

Citizenship

On-the-ground experiences of membership
8 Affective citizenship

Social exclusion of families with disabled children during the COVID-19 pandemic

Sigurd Eid Jacobsen and Kjetil Klette-Bøhler

Introduction

What are the affective ramifications of being excluded from social services and healthcare that people have the right to? More specifically, how did families with disabled children in Norway experience social exclusion during the pandemic? These questions constitute the focal point of this chapter as we explore the affective consequences of exclusion among families with disabled children in Norway during the COVID-19 pandemic. Through an analysis of qualitative interviews with parents of children with disabilities, carried out in 2021, we shed light on how families with disabled children experienced social services and healthcare at the height of the pandemic. To do so, we draw on theories on affective citizenship, which invite us to move beyond the rational paradigm of much citizenship research, exploring how citizenship is deeply intertwined with affect (Di Gregorio & Merolli, 2016; Fortier, 2016; Mookherjee, 2005). As such, our analysis adds to a growing field of research on citizenship, affect and emotions (Ho, 2009; Vilas et al., 2016). We study the affective consequences of social exclusion, both personally and socially, along with how particular modes of governing through affect are operative in welfare institutions, which only allow certain emotional articulations. Instead of excluding feelings from the conceptual and methodological apparatus, a turn to affective citizenship, coupled with qualitative interviews where people can elaborate on their emotional experiences, provides a deeper understanding of how citizenship matters and feels for people.

To understand how children with disabilities and their families can partake as full members in Norwegian society, some background knowledge is crucial. In the next sections, we outline the context of our study, the conceptual framework related to theories of citizenship, and describe our use of methods and data. In the end, we summarise our findings and discuss the implications of the presented arguments for future research.

Implementing the UN CRPD and being disabled during the pandemic

Since the mid-1960s, it has been an undisputed ideal in the Nordic countries that disabled children should grow up at home with their families (Tøssebro, 2015). The explicit policy goal is to offer families with disabled children coordinated and
flexible services to accommodate their needs and enable them to live as equal citizens, that is, provide for full participation and inclusion in society (Tøssebro, 2015). Particular notions of citizenship and inclusion are integrated as key components of the Norwegian welfare state and of the Norwegian social democratic society at large. After Norway ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) in 2013, it has become even more pressing to organise Norwegian society and social policies of different kinds in ways that enhance autonomy, influence and participation for persons with disabilities. In short, the UNCRPD reminds us of the importance of developing policies and measures that enable persons with disabilities to exercise active citizenship on equal grounds.

COVID-19 and the subsequent shutdown of welfare services and educational institutions in Norway and elsewhere complicated the nation’s relationship with the UN Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD). According to the Norwegian National Human Rights Institution (NIM, 2020), the shutdown of educational institutions following the outbreak of the pandemic disrupted Norway’s ongoing commitment to these crucial human rights. In April 2020, NIM warned officials about the potential negative consequences of the country’s various infection control measures and its closure of several welfare services (including schools and other established structures within the educational system). Other agencies underscored the related threat to key values of the Norwegian Education Act and the national educational curriculum (Bøhler, 2021). Although the Norwegian Prime Minister at the time and other politicians kept insisting that the measures should not disproportionately impact marginalised or vulnerable people, researchers and disability organisations have drawn attention to the subsequent systematic neglect of children with disabilities (Bossy & Hervie, 2021; Funksjonshemmedes Fellesorganisasjon, 2021). One report (Bøhler & Urgeninov, 2021) has suggested that children with disabilities were marginalised in complex ways during the pandemic because of the prohibition of physical contact with their personal assistants, educators trained in special education and physiotherapists. Overall, the shutdown of educational institutions and welfare services undercut Norway’s commitment to offering “varied forms of assessment, learning resources, learning arenas, and learning activities so that everyone gets the best possible benefit from the education” (The Directorate of Education, 2022). In the interest of unpacking this difficult situation, we next elaborate on how theories on citizenship offer a conceptual frame to examine the extent to which families with disabled children could live a life according to their values and visions during the pandemic.

Citizenship in theory: from rights and duties to affective citizenship

Discussions of citizenship have been at the heart of social and political theory for over two millennia (Aristotle, 1996; Collins, 2006; Heater, 2004). Citizenship has served as a starting point for broader debates on how political participation should be organised (Arendt, 2013) and inspired more specific discussions related to equality, freedom and autonomy (Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Fraser, 2009; Rawls, 1997). After the Second World War, theories of citizenship have inspired different
right claims among various marginalised groups within and across national contexts, often in dialogue with identity politics entangled with race, class, gender and postcolonial matters (Crane, 2002; Fitzgerald, 2017; Sadiq, 2017; Volpp, 2017). Understood along these lines, citizenship is a complex and dynamic concept defined by context and various social factors. However, at a more general level, it may also be understood as a particular relationship between an individual and a state (see also Chapters 1 and 13 in this book), where the former’s responsibility includes allegiance, paying taxes and military service in exchange for protection from the latter (e.g., social security and protection by law; Dwyer, 2010). Along these lines, it is common to distinguish between citizenship in the liberal, republican, and social traditions (Dagger, 2002; Delanty, 1997; Honohan, 2017; Turner, 1993a). In the liberal tradition, citizenship is often understood as a legal status that aims to ensure equal opportunities for all citizens (Johansson & Hvinden, 2007, p. 33), and this is often linked to the emergence of modern nation-states (Turner, 1993b, pp. 7–9). This understanding has been particularly prominent in the United States. Republican understandings of citizenship build on key arguments in Rousseau’s *The Social Contract* (1964) by focusing on people’s sense of political agency through active participation in deliberation and decision-making (Miller, 2000, pp. 84–87). However, in Europe, citizenship is often understood as a more comprehensive and holistic concept associated with Marshall’s social interpretation of the term in the classic essay “Citizenship & Social Class” (1950). Here and in other essays, Marshall theorised citizenship in light of the rise of social rights among working-class people in the UK during the twentieth century (Marshall, 1950; Turner, 1992). Marshall was concerned with citizenship as a right for all citizens and defined it as composed of three different categories, which he called civil rights, political rights and social rights. Civil rights are those rights that are necessary to enhance individual freedom, equality and a sense of justice (Marshall, 1950). Political rights, on the other hand, are defined as rights necessary to exercise political power, such as voting and participation in politics. However, it is the third category, social rights, that has received the most attention from scholars because this interpretation draws attention to people’s sense of social and economic security and their ability to participate in society on equal grounds (Edmiston, 2017; Friendly, 2020; Seemann, 2021; Walker, 2016).

Although citizenship is an indispensable concept when trying to understand how politics and social inclusion work, the aforementioned definitions have been criticised for paying little attention to how social citizenship is also conditioned upon emotional and affective structures (Ayata, 2019; Di Gregorio & Merolli, 2016; Fortier, 2016). In the past decade, scholars have criticised citizenship theory for focusing too much on rational arguments and abstract calculations (Di Gregorio & Merolli, 2016; Fortier, 2016). Instead, they have suggested that feelings, emotions and affective engagements are crucial when citizens claim a voice and the appearance of a new subject (Johnson, 2010; May, 2010). One example is Zembylas, who coined the term “affective citizenship” as a concept to study “which emotional relationships between citizens are recognized and endorsed or rejected, and how citizens are encouraged to feel about themselves and others” (2013, p. 6). In another
study, Keegan argued that affective citizenship forces us to move beyond rational analysis of the distribution of rights and duties and focus on “the very boundaries of citizenship that determine who belong in particular places” (2019, p. 348). Following Mookherjee, a turn to affective citizenship simultaneously demands a focus on the emotional mechanisms that enable recognition and voice, or “action,” through wooing in the Arendtian tradition (Arendt in Behabib, 2012, p. 54). Mookherjee wrote the following:

Yet absolute contrasts between reason and rights, on the one side, and emotion and affectivity, on the other, have been resisted by influential feminist thinkers, who have convincingly established the interdependence between these categories. . . . Affective citizenship follows their lead by insisting that emotional connections and dispositions support citizens’ most important reasons for action . . . ., affective citizenship presumes that citizens’ structural autonomy is formed not through just one set of affective bonds, but rather through commitments to multiple, intersecting communities. (2005, p. 37)

Other scholars have used the term to study how the state “govern through affect” (Ayata, 2019, p. 333), and some scholars have explored how different government agencies have developed affective communication strategies to improve dialogue with citizens when they implement new policies (De Wilde & Duyvendak, 2016; Johnson, 2010).

However, although affective citizenship has been used in multiple ways, our focus is mainly on how it enables an in-depth analysis of how citizenship is experienced as affective in subjective experience within the families of disabled children. This conceptual focus allows us to study how tears, anger, frustration and other affective ramifications may be triggered when people have a sense of citizenship hampered and no longer enjoy autonomy or equal societal participation. More importantly, a turn to affective citizenship suggests that such experiences are entangled in different social structures because it invites an analysis of how the affective ramifications described above may hamper other relationships within the family and between the users and providers of welfare services. In addition, an analysis informed by affective citizenship can illuminate what feelings and emotional articulations are accepted or not by gatekeepers in the welfare administration and how emotional self-regulation constitutes an important part of the everyday life of families with disabled children. Before we explore affective citizenship empirically through qualitative interviews, it is crucial to briefly describe our use of the data and methods.

Data and methods

This chapter draws on semistructured qualitative interviews carried out in January 2021 with eight self-recruited parents with children with disabilities. The interview data were produced as part of a commissioned research project that aimed
to understand the consequences that the closure of welfare services during the pandemic had for families with disabled children (Bøhler & Ugreninov, 2021). The eight informants (three men and five women) included two parents with immigrant backgrounds and six native Norwegians. They covered a diverse socio-economic landscape, including high- and low-income families, and had varied academic experience and training. All eight informants signed informed consent forms before the interviews, which were carried out on Zoom, recorded and later fully transcribed. To ensure compliance with the research ethics guidelines, the consent form and interview guide were reviewed and approved by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data.

To enhance comparisons across the qualitative data, all the interviews followed a semistructured interview guide (Kvale, 2008) organised around key questions that examined the child’s participation and everyday life during the pandemic. Although all interviews followed the same interview guide, they were also shaped by the internal dynamics of the social interaction between the interviewer (Bøhler) and informants and varied in length (some lasted an hour, others almost two hours). Here, we briefly introduce and describe the interviews subject to an in-depth analysis.

In our analysis, we have focused on three interviews subject to in-depth analysis and interpretation that have been informed by our conceptual framework. We decided to focus on these four interviews because they highlight the affective ramifications of the pandemic in multiple ways.

The following is a short description of the three informants using pseudonyms:

- Jens was Thea’s father. Both he and Thea’s mother were home during the pandemic to assist Thea in her education and everyday life. Thea was 15 years old and had multiple disabilities.
- Turid was Therese’s mother and lived with her husband and two other children. Therese was ten years old and had multiple disabilities.
- Stine was the mother of Jonas, who was 14 years old, and Margrete, who was eight years old; both children were disabled. Both Stine and her husband worked. Both Jonas and Margrete had significant disabilities.

Taken together, these informants provided rich data with which to explore how children with disabilities were impacted by the new educational environment of the pandemic. More importantly, an in-depth qualitative analysis of the affective causes and consequences they experienced with regarding citizenship during the pandemic sheds important new light on how social exclusion mattered during the pandemic. Here, we apply the presented theoretical arguments to analysis.

**Affective ramifications: “Moses was better off in the desert”**

One of our informants, Stine, argued that the pandemic had put the whole family in a precarious situation:
Those 40 days, from the 12 March to the 20 April 2020, were like being in hell. Moses was better off in the desert. Everything stopped. Special education for the children disappeared. Health services disappeared. Everything. . . . The digital competence of the main teacher was not present, so digital home-schooling did not work. It was chaos, and we were the ones who had to bear the cost.

Stine’s daughter, Margaret, was ten years old and had multiple disabilities. The pandemic turned her life upside down and put pressure on the family because special education, physiotherapy and other social services were placed on hold because of contamination measures. Stine’s argument that “Moses was better off in the desert” and her description of the first 40 days as a “nightmare” illustrate the affective costs of the pandemic. Feelings of stress and anxiety made Stine insecure about the future, and this added further to the burden. The lack of support during this time led to feelings of resentment towards the state because she felt socially excluded by the Norwegian welfare apparatus. Similar stories were found among the informants. Another example is Turid, who argued the following:

Therese [Turid’s daughter] had a very nice network around her [prior to the pandemic]. She had a speech therapist, physiotherapist, occupational therapist, assistants who helped and various doctors and specialists who contributed. But then, it all fell apart on the 13th of March. . . . It felt a bit like Norway panicked. Life and health were paramount for everyone. . . . We asked if we could get an assistant, but then NAV [the Norwegian Welfare Administration] said, “No, you won’t get that, you are not two parents who are in a critical social function.” When we asked about the assistant again, they said by email, “Do you really want to expose the assistant to this risk of infection?” It was COVID that mattered. Our children were of low priority. It was as if every time we asked about something, we were ruining the goal of “saving lives.” We were not met with understanding. There was constant talk about the critical functions of society. We are not seen or heard. Our needs are secondary. It makes me cry, just talking about this. It is very heavy. [She cries a little, and we take a short break in the interview]. We were very much left to ourselves. If we hadn’t had a good relationship, it would have gone badly. My husband and I argued a lot about where we should sit in the apartment. All four needed to be at home under the same roof, and the apartment is not that big. My husband and I also constantly had discussions about who should drop out of today’s work meeting. Stress, stress, stress and stress. It was too much of a burden.

Turid’s quote elaborates on Stine’s arguments by underscoring the feedback loops between the social and affective costs of the pandemic. According to Turid, the system that provided and coordinated different social services, which used to work well, showed no understanding or empathy for Turid when she asked for additional help. In her own words, “It was all about saving lives, [. . . our] children were not
prioritized.” Those experiences were emotionally difficult to handle and were part of the reason why Turid started crying during the interview as she recalled a very difficult time. In short, the precarious situation Turid was in generated further anxiety about the well-being of the family at large and instigated arguments between Turid and her husband. The repetition of the word “stress” at the end of the quote encapsulates these affective costs. “Stress, stress, stress, stress.” As Turid’s story illustrates, stress was both personal and socially mediated. The stress she felt came from both the wider shutdown of social institutions and the particular emotional situation of their family. As such, this illuminates how her sense of precarious citizenship was part of a broader “political economy of affect” (Fortier, 2016) and the product of multiple “affective bonds” (Mookherjee, 2005, p. 37) that interacted in feedback loops and hampered the well-being of Turid and her family. Turid’s narrative illuminates how perceptions of affective citizenship are socially mediated by multiple factors. These interactions added further to the burden. However, Turid was not alone.

All the informants reported strong emotional costs related to the lack of services and what many regarded as systemic neglect by the welfare apparatus. However, these affective experiences had to be articulated in particular ways; if not, you would not get support, as Jens, one of our informants, argued. According to Jens, you had to be able to manage your sentiments when talking with welfare service providers:

We are very cooperative. We must be. I have an angry friend who has a disabled daughter. He gets angry. But you won’t get anywhere if you’re angry. You can cry, but you can’t get angry. The welfare administration accepts tears but not anger. You can’t get mad. Then, you don’t get anything.

Jens’ observation is thought-provoking. We know that families with disabled children have to work hard to get the support and services they need and are entitled to (e.g., Gundersen, 2012; Riksrevisjonen, 2021; StimuLab, 2021). Strong emotional costs are related to such battles. Along these lines, Jens’ argument is intriguing. The welfare apparatus allows for crying but not anger. This shows how “individuals are affectively governed by others (e.g., the state, fellow citizens, social and political organizations) through the creation of particular emotional relationships” (Zembylas, 2013, p. 7). Jens’ story illuminates how experiences of citizenship, or the lack of it, are always affective in practice because it entails “an economy of feelings where some forms of interaction are given more value than others” (Fortier, 2010, p. 20). Anger is a disqualifier, Jens argued: “If you show anger, you get nothing.” However, “the welfare administration accepts tears,” he argued. Although studies have suggested that tears may generate empathy and a sense of compassion among welfare service providers (Gibson & Martin III, 2019), research has suggested that anger is a less productive communicative strategy (Lareau & Calarco, 2012). In short, people seldom get what they want when they express anger in meetings with bureaucrats and social service providers. Still, feelings of anger are common reactions when people with disabilities and their families are in a constant fight with
the system to get the services they are entitled to by law to exercise full citizenship (Halvorsen et al., 2017).

Concluding remarks

The aim of this chapter was to explore the affective ramifications of being excluded from social services and healthcare during the pandemic through an analysis of interviews with parents of children with disabilities. We analysed the interview data through the lens of “affective citizenship”, which draws attention to the emotional costs of social exclusion and their different social mediations. Three lessons can be learned from the study. First, the pandemic turned the life situation of families with disabled children upside down, as illustrated in Stine's words: “Moses was better off in the desert. . . Those 40 days, from 12th of March to 20th of April 2020, was like being in hell.” Stine’s statement clearly shows the strong affective ramifications of being excluded from social services and education during the pandemic. It made an already difficult situation harder, and this emotional burden put further pressure on family work, logistics and social life, among other things. In a sense, the burden doubled. One aspect of this was not getting a service to which one was entitled. Another factor was the emotional stress, anger and feelings of abandonment that this exclusion generated. According to Stine, it placed families with disabled children in a state of emergency that hampered their sense of citizenship because they could no longer enjoy autonomy or participate in society on equal grounds.

Second, such affective ramifications were socially mediated in complex ways: Stine, Turid and Jens described how it influenced their relationship with their partner, their performance at work and the caring they were able to give to other children. Recalling these experiences less than a year after they happened was so troublesome that Turid started crying during the interview and repeated one word four times: “Stress, stress, stress, stress.” Tears and stress were central in their story because they were situated in multiple “affective bonds” (Mookherjee, 2005, p. 37) during the pandemic (e.g., the aggregated affective causes of working from home, restrictions of public space, closed cafés and fear of the pandemic, among others).

Jens gave us a third lesson when he described the importance of emotional self-regulation when he met with welfare providers. He argued that you had to align your socio-emotional strategies with that of the welfare professionals to increase your chances of being granted services. Jens' argument illustrates how particular forms of affective governance are operative within the welfare apparatus, where crying is allowed, but not anger. However, feelings of anger are common reactions when marginalised individuals do not get the rights and services they are entitled to by law. More importantly, these individuals should be the key target of social welfare benefits and not excluded through tacit forms of affective governance that censor anger but accept crying.

All three lessons support the argument that citizenship should not be viewed exclusively as an allocation of rights and duties. Instead, our analysis reminds us that citizenship is a complex and dynamic concept defined by subjects, contexts and
various social factors, including affective ramifications of different kinds. When people are devoid of social services and healthcare, their experiences of exclusion are always affective. Still, frustration, tears, anger and sadness are usually not the topic of citizenship research, which tends to foreground (non-affective) rational actors, an analysis of legislation and social policy, broader social structures and the allocation of rights and duties, among others.

The presented findings—and the aforementioned concept of affective citizenship—are perhaps better understood in light of the recent “turn to affect” across the humanities and social sciences, which has created a renewed awareness of how affect shapes citizens, citizenship and politics more broadly (Fortier, 2016; Kim & Bianco, 2007). Our study adds to this trend and reminds us that barriers to citizenship are always affective for those who are involved.

References


9 Norwegian labour activation

Building or limiting social citizenship for service users far from the labour market?

Helle C. Hansen and Erika Gubrium

Introduction

In many respects, employment forms the basis for social inclusion, citizenship and participation (Betzelt & Bothfeld, 2011a; Hvinden & Johansson, 2006). Moreover, employment is considered a means of achieving self-sufficiency, economic freedom, self-realisation and societal recognition (Halvorsen, 2012). In Norway, active labour market policies (ALMPs) that offer programmes and measures aimed at bringing the unemployed into employment have played a key role in social policies and welfare state interventions. Such ALMPs are connected to general income maintenance schemes, with out-of-work benefits being based on various eligibility criteria, such as reduced work capacity due to health conditions or other complex issues (see Chapter 3 by Heggebø and West Pedersen). The Norwegian Qualification Program (QP) is an example of an ALMP that, through enabling strategies, tailored measures and the close follow-up by social workers, aims to prevent poverty and social exclusion by bringing people who have reduced work capacity due to complex issues out of “passive support” and into activity and employment.

This movement of social policies from “passive” support systems towards activation has been accompanied by normative changes in the relationship between the state and the individual (Betzelt & Bothfeld, 2011a; Gilbert, 2012). This shift in policy has changed “the principles of welfare provision, the structures of social recognition and social redistribution” (Betzelt & Bothfeld, 2011a, p. 4) and affected the normative foundation for citizenship and rights (Berkel, 2011; Betzelt & Bothfeld, 2011b; Beraud & Eydoux, 2011; Gilbert, 2012; Graziano, 2011; Jenson, 2007; Kildal & Nilssen, 2011; Larsen, 2013). Also, frontline workers’ changing interpretations of their work because of this move towards activation have been pointed out (Hagelund & Kavli, 2009; Hansen & Natland, 2017; Nothdurfter, 2016; Møller, 2012; Raeymaeckers & Dierckx, 2013; Røysum, 2013; Solvang, 2017; Thoren, 2008). According to these scholars, frontline workers tend to approach activation in complex ways, ranging from administrative and standardised bureaucratic approaches, with enforcing practices, to individualised and person-oriented approaches, with more enabling practices, depending on local and organisational contexts. Person-oriented interpretations of the activation policy were mostly
implemented in the form of practices that promoted social citizenship and inclusion. However, individualised understandings of activation could also result in less inclusive practices when frontline workers saw service users as responsible for their own situations (Djuve & Kavli, 2015; Nothdurfter, 2016).

Strengthening the employability of service users is central to labour activation programmes and measures (Berkel & Valkenburg, 2007), which often implies a focus on change, that is, a change in the individual. This means that service users are expected to adapt in terms of resources, capabilities and behaviour, including changing or reworking their identity so as to become employable. Such “change work” focuses on shaping the individual to meet the needs of the labour market and also to become aligned with the norms and values of society. In this respect, both the “adult worker” norm (Betzelt & Bothfeld, 2011a) and the “ideal worker” norm (Scholz & Ingold, 2021; see Chapter 4 by Østerud et al. in this volume) are prominent in activation programmes. The question is how this implicit and explicit focus on changing the individual to meet these societal needs and become aligned with norms influences service users in terms of social position and status, that is, whether the “change-work” of activation improves the social position and status of those who stand outside the labour market.

While scholars have taken up the issue of how activation policy has affected service users’ sense of self (Chase & Walker, 2013; Gubrium, 2014; Ohls, 2017), identity formation (Hansen, 2018a) and experiences of time and movement in activation trajectories (Hansen & Gubrium, 2022), there has been little exploration of the impact on social citizenship in terms of service users’ participation, inclusion and sense of belonging in a larger social unit. Using Nancy Fraser’s (2003) social justice perspective and Jenson’s (2007) notion of citizenship, we add to this literature by asking the following question: How may labour activation policy and practice promote and hamper social citizenship for service users far from the labour market? More specifically, using the Norwegian Qualification Program as a case, we explore the impact of labour activation on service users in terms of social citizenship through their sense of belonging and participation.

In the following section, we present our key concepts and theoretical perspectives on social citizenship and participation. Next, we present the empirical context of the Norwegian Qualification Programme and briefly describe our data and methods. In the findings section, we demonstrate how acquired competencies and the adult worker norm may facilitate a sense of belonging and participation for those who are able to become aligned with the norm, while those who are not able to comply with the norm or are not selected for employment may experience further devaluation and social exclusion. In the final section, we discuss how positive experiences of enhanced participation and inclusion may be short lived and fade over time, resulting in activation policy affirming the marginalised position of subordinated groups.

The notion of social citizenship, a sense of belonging and participation

Traditionally, scholars interested in social citizenship have questioned the ways in which the social rights of social citizenship have been connected to the requirement to participate in the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Gilbert, 2012;
The institutionalisation of welfare support within the welfare state has aimed to de-individualise the responsibility for social inequalities and, in this way, de-commodify the requirements for social participation (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, within the context of welfare activation, scholars have also pointed out that Marshall’s notion of citizenship has included a duty to work (Johansson & Hvinden, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2009).

While Marshall’s goal was to enable working people to live according to prevailing norms (see Chapter 1 by Haug), his focus was less on individuals far outside the workforce, for instance, individuals on the “bottom” of the welfare system hierarchy, those receiving social assistance and those participating in a labour-activation programme. Jenson’s (2007) elaboration of Marshall’s concept of social citizenship includes those norms, rules and regulations that shape a citizen’s life situation. Thus, Jenson’s definition encompasses both formal membership, as well as a citizen’s sense of belonging in or affiliation with society and community as sources for developing individual, social, and political identity (Betzelt & Bothfeld, 2011b).

For individuals receiving social assistance, the experience of living in (relative) poverty, as well as the experience of being unemployed, is complex in its connection to social exclusion and marginalisation. The impact of unemployment and poverty is not just economic but also social and psychological (Walker et al., 2013). Thus, subjective experiences of how social policy provides an opportunity for recognition, a sense of belonging and membership in society should be considered (Honneth, 2014). For example, participants in labour activation may report the subjective experience of being misrecognised and further excluded from and marginalised in the labour market after participating in activation programmes (Gubrium & Lødemel, 2014; Gubrium et al., 2017; Hansen, 2018a). On the other hand, they may also report a sense of increased recognition after programme participation (Hansen, 2018a; Ohls, 2020). Such reports may indicate activation policy failure or success, beyond a purely economic focus on movement into the labour market.

Nancy Fraser (2003), however, emphasises the importance of encompassing both the redistributive and recognition dimensions of social policy programmes. For a society to be just, Fraser maintains, all citizens should have the opportunity to participate on par with one another. “Participatory parity” requires that all individuals have economic and material resources, as well as access to relevant arenas in society, enabling them to be full participants. This requires the recognition of subordinated groups. Fraser connects recognition and misrecognition to how social values and norms structure and shape the status and subordination of certain groups, for instance, as unemployed, as immigrants and as social assistance recipients. In so doing, social policy failures, such as the failure of activation policy to bring the unemployed into employment, are measured according to one’s degraded social position. Thus, in evaluating whether policies and practices are just, Fraser’s focus on the social, the structural and the institutional moves us away from personal, emotional impact and towards institutional and interactional relationships, norms, values and meanings – those things that are socially excluding by mal-distribution or misrecognition.
The Norwegian Qualification Program

The Qualification Program (QP) is a national labour activation programme in the Norwegian labour and welfare services (NAV). The programme was implemented to prevent poverty and social exclusion through the labour market inclusion of individuals who experience difficulties obtaining paid employment (Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Inclusion, 2006/2007). The programme is regulated by the Norwegian Social Services Act (Norwegian Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs, 2009). The target group is social assistance recipients and the long-term unemployed who are not entitled to other income-securing benefits, for instance, health-related benefits (see Chapter 3 by Heggebo and West Pedersen). The programme is rights based and accessible for all service users who are defined by reduced work capability due to complex issues, for instance, a lack of education, a lack of Norwegian language proficiency or other skills, challenging social conditions or family or health issues, and are not recognised as eligible for health-related benefits. Nevertheless, the programme is designed to resemble ordinary work-life, and therefore, participants should comply with a programme of 37.5 hours per week, which is the norm for full-time work in the Norwegian context. All participants receive a fixed, taxable monthly benefit.

The structure of the QP represents a human resource development approach, offering training, courses and upskilling to enhance service users’ labour market prospects (Gubrium & Lødemel, 2014). A fundamental principle is that activation measures and activities should be tailored and adjusted according to each participant’s needs, abilities and limitations (Norwegian Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs, 2011; Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Inclusion, 2006/2007). An individual’s programme could include a variety of activities, such as work placement (e.g., in boutiques, coffee shops, food services, kindergartens, nursery homes, workshops, offices or schools), courses (in CV writing, work-life knowledge, clergy work, computer skills, care work skills or truck driving), motivational training, social and physical training, medical treatment and recreational activities (Norwegian Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs, 2012, §30). Moreover, individual plans should be flexible and adjustable to the participant’s experiences and changing needs during the qualification process (Norwegian Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs, 2011, §1). The focus on change and flexibility that is inherent in the programme also includes a focus on identity formation and change towards a more employable identity for the service user (Hansen, 2018b). The “change-work” is evident, both in the skill-building courses in which service users learn CV writing and self-presentation and in the motivational work in follow-up conversations with service users (Hansen & Natland, 2017).

The QP has been said to represent a holistic and inclusion-oriented perspective on labour activation. Nevertheless, the extent to which participants are offered individually tailored programmes and measures varies (Fossestøl et al., 2016; Hansen, 2020). Nonetheless, the programme, with its goal of preventing poverty and social exclusion through labour market inclusion, may be conceived of as a social policy intervention that strives towards participatory parity for a subordinated
status group through redistributive and recognising measures. The redistributive dimension lies within the programme’s attempt to move people into employment and thus become economically self-sufficient, while the recognising dimension lies within the programme’s focus on acknowledging the service users’ diverse and various challenges in obtaining employment, including the acknowledgement of the fact that, for some service users, paid employment is not a feasible outcome. Even so, programme participation should promote social inclusion and ensure the service users’ enhanced quality of life (Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Inclusion, 2006/2007). The question is to what extent that is achieved; activation for some service users also may result in experiences of being further excluded.

In principle, the QP has a long-term perspective aimed at stable labour market attachment for the service users over time. Therefore, participants can remain in the programme for up to a year, with the possibility of applying for another 12-month extension. Nevertheless, only about 30% of the participants achieve employment, with many of these working part-time jobs on short-term contracts (Lima & Furu-berg, 2018).

Data and methods

In this chapter, we study activation policy from the bottom up, based on the experiences of the service users. We draw on qualitative semistructured interviews with service users from the Norwegian Qualification Program, a labour activation programme in the Norwegian labour and welfare services (NAV). The data were collected in 2013 for a PhD project studying how labour activation policy and practice facilitated labour market inclusion for persons defined as having reduced work ability and employability (Hansen, 2018b). The research project was recommended by the Norwegian Research Committee. In this chapter, we reanalyse the data on how labour activation policy and practice can build or limit social citizenship.

The study’s participants ranged in age from 18 to 58 years old, including 21 women and 13 men, with 22 having an immigrant background. They had varying levels of education, ranging from several years of primary education to a complete tertiary education. They also had varying professional backgrounds, ranging from very limited to extensive work histories, including some in the upper levels of the labour market. Their civil status was recorded as single, married or divorced; with or without children and with current or previous partners living in or outside of Norway.

The interviews were carried out in 2013 and focused broadly on the participants’ activation experiences of being enrolled in QP, including their life situation and background, activities in QP, contact with social workers, and hopes and expectations about the outcomes of participation. Using a thematic analysis strategy (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017), in this chapter, we focus specifically on the service users’ experiences in terms of whether and how QP facilitated a sense of belonging and social participation through experiences of recognition and contribution (being able to contribute socially and economically) and skills and competency enhancement. Furthermore, we analyse the programmes’ redistributive dimension, focusing
on how QP affected the participant’s economic status and citizenship in terms of access to sufficient financial and material resources.

Findings

Our findings demonstrate that activation may mean enhanced inclusion and participation for some service users, especially while in the programme, but also the loss of a sense of belonging and status and further exclusion for others, especially in relation to poor prospects for labour market inclusion. Our findings also demonstrate how a sense of belonging and participation relates to not only the social dimension of what one can obtain from activation but also the economic sphere and possibilities that one may acquire or lose through activation.

Enhanced competence and social participation

Even though the activities in QP seldom lead to any formal qualifications and rarely result in employment, the time spent in QP may nevertheless be experienced as worthwhile for many participants in terms of providing the ingredients necessary to participate in social activities over the longer term. Several participants described learning new skills in courses and work placements. They were proud of being able to complete new tasks at their work placement sites, such as operating a cash register, serving customers, taking orders from customers, answering phone calls and gift-wrapping. Having acquired such competencies gave them self-confidence and made them feel valuable because they participated in and contributed to the economy. These participants, often with an immigrant background, also noted the value of acquiring proficiency in Norwegian, which enabled them to communicate with colleagues and engage in workplace fellowship. Because their competencies were enhanced and they were able to participate in fellowship with colleagues, the service users felt recognised and socially included. Additionally, some noted that improving their Norwegian language skills had enabled them to feel confident in socialising with people in other arenas, for instance, in the neighbourhood or talking with parents in their children’s kindergarten. Being able to understand what was said and speak up in school meetings was important for their self-confidence and self-esteem, especially for female participants (Hansen, 2018a). Possessing these capabilities created a sense of belonging to a community of parents. The ability to communicate in Norwegian enabled them to more easily participate and engage in activities with other parents, which was an indication of belonging to the wider society. Participants also valued being able to understand the material their children learned in school and help their children with homework. This also contributed to the participants’ sense of belonging and participation.

While participation in QP may have enhanced the individual sense of belonging for some participants, not all were comfortable with disclosing that they were enrolled in an activation programme. Several noted that they avoided disclosing that they were enrolled in QP for fear of being stigmatised or looked down on. One described her strategy for not revealing her public affiliation with the NAV and the QP:
This is work for me. My job is to become employed . . . and I do not need to tell the people I meet on the street that I am enrolled in activation . . . because, you now, people have so many meanings about why a person is unemployed.

She added, “Nobody has to know that I’m at NAV . . . because, no matter what, it is very stigmatizing to be a NAV client.” To counter a sense of stigma, she emphasised that she paid taxes on her QP benefit and repeatedly described the QP as “work.” Within this framing, she connected QP activation and the benefit with a sense of belonging, a sense of being a worthy and valuable member of society.

**Adhering to the adult worker norm: civic and economic participation**

When first rolled out throughout Norwegian municipalities (from 2008 to 2010), QP was met with enthusiasm on the part of social workers, who saw the programme as a way to do qualitatively good social work with service users with complex problems and those who experienced difficulties in entering the labour market. They referred to QP as the “generous programme,” both because they were granted resources (time, space and means) to follow-up on the service users and also because of the qualifying measures and the long-term perspective on labour market attachment that QP promoted. These features were intended to provide service users with the opportunity and time to qualify and prepare for labour market entry. Thus, the programme appeared promising, both to service users and social workers (Malmberg-Heimonen et al., 2014).

Service users are eligible for the qualification programme in large part due to reduced work capability because of health issues, a lack of skills (vocational or language) or social issues. Nevertheless, the programme is based on an adult worker norm, with a fulltime activity programme of 37.5 hours a week, which is in accordance with the norm for fulltime working hours in Norway. The adult worker norm is also reflected in other features of the programme. While engaged in the programme, participants receive a monthly benefit that is higher than that for social assistance and remains constant over time. Furthermore, the benefit is paid by the municipality rather than by the labour and welfare service (NAV) and is referred to as a salary by both social workers and QP participants (Hansen, 2018a).

Being able to contribute to the family economy, buying things for one’s children and having one’s own money were important parts of the programme, especially for female participants. Several people described feeling proud of bringing money home to support their families. Furthermore, the payment of the qualification benefit was an element that several participants noted as important in terms of building a sense of civic and economic contribution and participation. The ability to receive the benefit as a salary enhanced self-confidence and self-esteem in many of the participants. The fact that the benefit was called a “salary” by caseworkers created a sense of being a normal citizen for the participants – “working,” receiving a “salary,” and putting “food on the table” symbolized one’s ability to comply with the breadwinner norm. On the other hand, participants also noted that these features were convenient in terms of avoiding having to disclose the “truth” of their situation. As one of
the interviewed participants noted, “When people ask me about what I do or where I work now, I just say I work for the municipality because they are the ones who pay my salary.”

Taxpaying was another important feature for many participants. Female participants especially expressed contentment with a qualification benefit that was counted as taxable income. Paying taxes was a token of contributing and belonging to the broader society. Again, taxpaying was a token of normality: “When you pay taxes, like everybody else, you pay, and you get back... you feel like a ‘normal’ person.” Female participants with immigrant backgrounds were especially proud of contributing to society and proud of participating on equal terms with others and according to the social norm of a responsible taxpaying citizen. Thus, the QP benefit and the tax they paid from it facilitated their experiences of fitting into the norms of the country. This led to enhanced self-esteem and experiences of civic participation.

At the same time, many service users found it difficult to comply with the 37.5-hour-a-week programme, with many noting that this was because of health issues. Some also mentioned difficulties due to vague “symptoms,” for instance, old age and tiredness. Even with the possibility of adjusting individual programmes with time to rest between working hours, the fulltime programme proved difficult for many to complete.

Expectations that service users would (re-)enter the standard labour market on ordinary terms were also difficult for many to fulfil. One 58-year-old male participant explained to his QP caseworker the difficulty involved in finding his way back into the labour market. As he said, “It is too late for me. I am nearly 60 years old. There is nothing for me out there now... at this age, it is hard to learn new things.” He had been working in the cleaning business for 25 years prior to entering QP and felt he had done his part with many years of hard physical work. He was reluctant about the idea of having to adapt to a changing labour market that required both enhanced competencies and fulltime participation. Nevertheless, he was reminded by the caseworker that this was the norm in working life. Another participant, who was in his fifties, had a university college degree and 20 years of work experience in property administration. He described the difficulties his health problems posed as follows:

(I am) unreliable as an employee, to be frank... because I cannot guarantee that I can deliver on time... I need a certain timespan to be sure to finish the tasks because my health situation is unstable... so what I need is help to get introduced to an employer who sees the value of my competencies and is willing to hire me on those terms, but that kind of help seems to be impossible for NAV to provide.

Both participants struggled to comply with the programme’s imagined norm of an adult worker. Both were forced to participate in a standard activation trajectory, even with very poor prospects of labour market inclusion. For both, a more tailored activation goal could have promoted labour market inclusion, but in failing to do
this, the participants both felt a heightened sense of labour market exclusion and a devaluation of their status.

**Broken promises and disillusions about labour market participation**

Additionally, many participants were disappointed because promises of becoming employed were not realized and the qualifying measures available proved to be fewer than anticipated. Work placements in public and private companies – where the municipality, rather than the employer, paid the service user their wages – were a commonly used activation measure. As one QP caseworker noted, “Work placement is the key to employment . . . that’s where you can show the employers that you are competent.” Such placements were a key feature of the programme. Some participants experienced the work placement as valuable time spent, even without obtaining employment, either because they learned things and thereby enhanced their competencies or because they could use the competencies, knowledge and skills that they already possessed. However, many participants reported that their work placements had not led to employment, despite having completed several in a row. Participants described feeling disillusioned because of a lack of work offers, especially after having continuously heard the institutional mantra that placements lead to work. One participant noted the following:

I was several months in X, and later I was six months in Y . . . I did a good job for them. I saved them a lot of money by changing the administrative system . . . this was something they needed and which they obviously lacked the competency to do . . . but then I understood they were not going to hire me on ordinary terms, so I quit.

Others described feeling exploited through the work placements, especially after going through several placements without becoming employed:

I worked so hard, and they were happy with the work I did, but nothing . . . he said I just needed to do another month of work placement and then he would hire me, but after that extra month, he said that they could not afford to hire me . . . then, later, I learned they had hired someone else, a Norwegian guy . . . enough of work placements. Now, I just want a job.

Such experiences of exploitation and feelings of being discriminated against were tokens of the subordinated status and social exclusion of these service users, which certainly enhanced their sense of not belonging.

**Concluding discussion**

In this chapter, we have combined citizenship and social justice perspectives to explore how labour activation policy and practice may promote or hamper social citizenship for service users who are far from the labour market. We found that
well-intended, supply-sided activation interventions may provide, at best, a predominantly short-term sense of belonging and participation. In the longer term, such interventions have the potential, rather, to emphasise service users’ inability to achieve full participation and membership in society.

Our analysis demonstrates that the longevity of feelings of increased civic and economic participation depends on whether work activity continues, and whether one continues to receive a salary and have access to the terms of regular work, including paying taxes and accruing a pension. A recent research report suggests that this is not often the case: while the proportion of participants finishing the QP and entering work has increased over the years, only a small proportion find fulltime work after finishing the QP (Lima & Furuberg, 2018).

Some research participants also reported a sense of social collegiality and enhanced competence while at their work placements. This feeling may be sustained over time by continued friendships and networks. Also, for those who experienced enhanced competencies due to participating in the QP, for example Norwegian language skills, this may promote a sense of inclusion and social participation over time. However, for others, experiences of social inclusion and participation may also be short lived. Many QP participants neared the end of or finished with the programme without salaried work, and those for whom a move back to social assistance was imminent felt a heightened sense of not contributing and being outside the normal (Gubrium & Lødemel, 2014). The research participants in our study, furthermore, reported broken promises and disillusionment connected to experiences of being offered “more” in the QP but nevertheless not obtaining paid employment, an experience also seen in other studies of labour activation (Gubrium & Hansen, 2019; Gubrium et al., 2017; Betzelt & Bothfeld, 2011c). At best, therefore, a sense of increased social participation may be felt in the short term for those still in the programme, as well as in the long term for the few who find work through the programme and, possibly, for those who acquire lasting competencies and skills that they experience as valuable for social participation in other arenas than the labour market. Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates that participants felt stigmatised as “NAV clients” and exploited having taken part in continual work placements without obtaining fixed employment (see Hansen, 2018a; Gubrium et al., 2017). Such experiences do not contribute to labour activation’s goal of social inclusion or to a strengthened sense of belonging and participation. On the contrary, they may lead to a sense of being further excluded. Therefore, in the long term, participants’ sense of social citizenship may be actively undermined.

The finding of short-term effects also has methodological implications: If assessments of changed social citizenship take place while participants are engaged in a programme, we may paint a more optimistic picture of the programme’s impact. Fraser’s (2003) strategy of tracing participants’ changing position in the socio-economic structure over time is thus crucial to gaining a more realistic picture of the outcome of activation. Over time, not many move forward economically, with many returning to social assistance, and many even move back socially, having failed in another opportunity and been stigmatized as NAV work trainees.
Furthermore, the QP’s adult (or ideal) worker norm may be appropriate for those service users with full work capability. The target group for QP is, however, service users with significantly reduced capacity. Our findings suggest that institutional insistence on such a universal norm prevents the possibility of real recognition for groups and individuals with reduced work capability. For many of our research participants, the adult worker norm represented a problem, especially when coupled with the goal of individual change: change in terms of behaviour, competencies and motivation to become employable. Contrary to rhetorical promises of individually tailored programmes to promote inclusion and participation, individualised activation based on universal worker norms resulted in the loss of a sense of belonging and further exclusion. Thus, activation policy may reinforce a general adult worker norm as the foundation for social citizenship and may thus withdraw recognition and social rights from those who are not able to live up to such a norm (Betzelt & Bothfeld, 2011a, 2011b).

Finally, the normative change from the recognition of social rights to “deservingness” under such an activation paradigm seems to have undermined the ability to recognise and include groups whose status is especially subordinated – those groups that reside furthest from the labour market (Betzelt & Bothfeld, 2011a, 2011c). Activation may therefore also result in further subordinated status and social exclusion for citizens who already experience difficulties in complying with the societal norm of participation and becoming a full member of society. In this perspective, rather than representing a transformative policy, QP has become an intervention that naturalises, rationalises, and further affirms the marginalised position of subordinated groups (Fraser, 2003).

Note
1 Figures are for 2016. One year after finishing QP only 25.8% of participants are employed in a percentage that covers more than 40% of a fulltime position.

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10 Economic preconditions for full citizenship

Refugees’ economic incorporation into the Norwegian welfare state

Jon Ivar Elstad and Kristian Heggebø

Introduction

Citizenship in advanced societies, according to T.H. Marshall, means “full membership of a community.” This formula entails not only civil and political rights but also social rights (Marshall & Bottomore, 1992). Whereas the former terms refer primarily to legal status and formal access to political power, the term “social rights” refers to inhabitants’ standing in society in a broader sense. As Haug outlines in Chapter 1, by including social rights, citizenship is linked both to social inclusion in general and to the ethos of modern democratic welfare states: “social rights are precisely those rights made possible by the welfare state that are designed to promote economic and social well-being” (Kivisto, 2018, p. 418). Accordingly, the extended citizenship concept, which also embraces social rights, will push citizenship analyses towards a broader array of topics, and also income, wealth and economic welfare become relevant.

Such topics will therefore loom large when investigating immigrants’ trajectories towards citizenship in their new countries. Many welfare states have seen a large influx of immigrants in recent decades. Their pathways towards citizenship will typically include steps such as legal residency, work permits, entitlement to healthcare, voting rights and obtaining passports. However, even if such steps are accomplished, citizenship in the full Marshallian sense may be unrealised if economic resources are scarce. Marshall himself did not advocate any radical equalisation of incomes and wealth (Kivisto, 2018). His arguments imply, nonetheless, that those who suffer from substandard economic conditions may be effectively barred from “full membership” in the community because a lack of material resources may worsen daily life, create health risks, obstruct social acceptance and constrain participation in social life.

These arguments point to the proposition that immigrants’ full citizenship requires economic incorporation. This term refers to the trajectories in employment, income and other economy-related factors that take place after immigrants have settled in a new country (Gleeson, 2010; van Tubergen et al., 2004). Ideally, these trajectories should lead towards an economic situation similar to the native majority, with relatively small economic differences between the average immigrant and the average native. If this is achieved, one hindrance to full citizenship will
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be weakened. Nevertheless, the relationship between economic incorporation and social inclusion is complex, and economic incorporation is not necessarily accompanied by feelings among the immigrants that they are no longer treated as outsiders (Kislev, 2019).

In the present chapter, we address the topic of immigrants’ economic incorporation by investigating income trajectories among African and Asian refugees in Norway. Studies from many countries, Norway included, indicate that “non-Western” refugees have particularly large difficulties in becoming economically integrated (Brell et al., 2020; Brovold, 2020; Herses et al., 2022). Exploring these difficulties are therefore of vital interest for integration policy and may also illuminate the obstacles that other, more fortunate immigrants meet.

Another reason for focusing on this immigrant category is that African and Asian refugees constitute a sizeable part of the growing immigrant population in Norway. During recent decades, immigration has surged (SSB, 2022a), particularly refugees from conflict-ridden countries and work immigrants from Eastern Europe. At the end of 2020, about 800,000 people in a total population of 5.4 million registered residents were first-generation immigrants, and an additional 200,000 were born in Norway to immigrant parents. Among first-generation immigrants, about 100,000 were born in Africa, nearly 100,000 in the Middle East and about 165,000 in other Asian countries (SSB, 2022b). From 1996 to 2020, on average, about 5,000 refugees from Africa or Asia were granted residential permits in Norway each year. Two-thirds of them were born in Somalia, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan or Syria. Some of these refugees have left the country, but many have stayed, and at the end of 2020, about 125,000 refugees from these two continents lived in Norway.

Definitions, hypotheses and design

Immigrants’ level of economic incorporation can be indicated by assessing how much their average economic conditions deviate from those of the native majority. This definition has guided the way we measure economic incorporation in this chapter. A variety of economic indicators could be used, but we restrict the approach to analysing gross, pre-tax, personal income per year (termed personal income). Personal income indicates the yearly inflow of new economic resources to the individual and his/her family, enabling consumption, priced activities and savings.¹

We examine two hypotheses that both imply that the economic incorporation of African and Asian refugees in Norway has improved over time. The first hypothesis is that the typical gap in personal income between refugees and the native majority has decreased with increasing residential time. This hypothesis assumes that more years of residence will be accompanied by better language skills, more work experience, more knowledge about Norwegian society, better competence in navigating public bureaucracies and wider social networks. Accumulating such resources is likely to lead to better work prospects and improved social inclusion and, subsequently, to a persistent tendency over the years that the refugees’ average personal income approximates the average in the native majority.
The second hypothesis is that newer refugee cohorts will experience more successful economic incorporation than previous refugee cohorts. This hypothesis is grounded in various developments in the Norwegian context that may have facilitated the economic incorporation of new immigrants. Since the mid-1990s, macro-economic growth has been considerable. Setbacks such as the international financial crisis of 2008–2010 have had few lasting effects (OECD, 2014). Low unemployment and strong public finances may enhance refugees’ incomes from both paid labour and social benefits. Also, more positive attitudes in the majority population towards immigrants in recent years (cf. IMDi, 2022, p. 55) could have smoothed economic incorporation. Policies implemented since the turn of the century point in the same direction, for instance, measures intended to alleviate refugees’ risk of poverty and a paid integration programme for new refugees and their family members (e.g., the 2004 Introduction Act, see Hernes et al., 2022).

In order to assess the two hypotheses, we examine personal income trajectories for two refugee cohorts. The first, Cohort 2000, arrived around 2000, while the second, Cohort 2010, came around 2010. The first hypothesis – that economic incorporation has improved with increasing length of stay – is assessed by following Cohort 2000 for 20 years, from 2001 to 2020. The second hypothesis – that newer refugee cohorts have fared better than previous ones – is investigated by analysing the first ten-year income trajectories for the two cohorts; that is, comparing the 2001–2010 trajectory of Cohort 2000 with the 2011–2020 trajectory of Cohort 2010.

As will emerge later, neither hypothesis was supported by the findings. We therefore proceed with supplementary analyses aimed at investigating some potential reasons for the negative result – why has economic incorporation among such refugees not improved over time? The final section summarises the main results and discusses the implications of the findings for refugees’ citizenship prospects.

Data and methods

Linked individual-level information about all registered residents in Norway is used in the following analyses. The data come from public registers administered by Statistics Norway and made available for authorised researchers at https://microdata.no/en/. Data security is ensured by an ingenious, inbuilt defence against extracting information traceable to identifiable individuals (NSD/SSB, 2022, pp. 140–149).

As stated earlier, two refugee cohorts were analysed. Cohort 2000 consists of refugees granted residential permits in 1998–2002 (five immigration years were pooled in order to increase the sample size). Further criteria were being born in an African or Asian country and being aged 18–47 years in the year 2000. Choosing this age category implies that primary education was received in the country of origin and that the cohort will be aged 38–67 years at the end of the observation period in 2020 and still, by and large, of working age.

Cohort 2010 consists, correspondingly, of refugees from Africa or Asia who were granted residence in 2008–2012 and were aged 18–47 in 2010.
In order to gauge income differences between these refugees and the majority population, two native comparison samples were constructed. First, all Norwegian-born residents with Norwegian family backgrounds who were aged 18–47 years in 2000 and 2010, respectively, were located. These initial samples were large (about 1.6 million), making statistical analyses time-consuming, and their age distributions, as compared to those of the refugees, leaned towards higher ages, which might bias findings. Using the available tools in the data portal, we therefore constructed two comparison samples (Controls 2000 and Controls 2010) that had manageable size and age distributions very similar to the age distributions in the refugee cohorts.2

Table 10.1 describes the samples. The earlier refugee cohort (Cohort 2000) numbered around 10,600; the later Cohort 2010 was larger and consisted of some 17,300 individuals. Compared to the former cohort, the later Cohort 2010 had a higher proportion of women but a lower educational level on average. In contrast, educational levels rose clearly from the first to the second native control sample.

The central outcome variable personal income summarises pre-tax work incomes (wages, salaries and income from self-employment), social benefits (such as sick pay, unemployment benefits, disability pensions and social assistance) and more uncommon incomes (e.g., dividends and rents). Because the analyses cover a long time period, the original personal income figures were recalculated into Basic Amounts (BA). The BA is a sum in Norwegian Kroner used for calculating pensions and social benefits. It is determined each year by the Norwegian Parliament, taking changes in prices, wages and salaries into consideration (NMLSI, 2022, p. 6).3
Income figures have been top-coded; personal incomes exceeding ten BA were set to ten BA. A substantial number of the natives but very few refugees had very high personal incomes, and mean and median income values differed therefore very much among the natives but little among the refugees. Because our intention was to compare typical income levels between refugees and natives, we chose to use top-coded income data because their mean and median values are close.

In order to measure how the typical refugee income level deviated from the majority population, we calculated, for each observation year, the average personal income for the refugees as a percentage of the corresponding average in the native comparison samples. An increase in this percentage indicates improved economic incorporation. We use figures to display how economic incorporation has developed over time. In subsequent analyses, in order to assess potential explanations for the findings, we also use data on work income and social transfers, and we employ linear regression models.

**Years since arrival and level of economic incorporation**

Figure 10.1 illustrates the refugees’ economic incorporation trajectories by displaying the average personal income in the two refugee cohorts as a percentage of the corresponding average in the age-comparable samples of natives. The lines in the figure show these percentages according to years since arrival.

![Figure 10.1](Image)

*Figure 10.1 Mean refugee personal income as a percentage of mean personal income among age-comparable natives, two refugee cohorts, men and women pooled*
Figure 10.1 indicates poor support for the first hypothesis, that economic incorporation improves with increasing length of stay, and hardly any support for the second hypothesis, that newer refugee cohorts will fare better than previous ones.

In Cohort 2000, average personal incomes among the refugees moved closer to the native average during the first years, in line with the first hypothesis. However, a peak was reached after nine years, at 70.4% of the native average. Thereafter, the percentage fell slowly, in distinct contradiction to the first hypothesis.

As to the second hypothesis, Figure 10.1 shows that the trajectory during the first ten years in the more recent Cohort 2010, followed during 2011–2020 (the dotted line), was clearly less favourable than the trajectory of the earlier Cohort 2000 during 2001–2010. Between six to ten years after arrival, Cohort 2000 came close to 70% of the native average, while Cohort 2010 remained below 64%.

Of course, Figure 10.1 presents a very crude picture. More details would emerge in a gender-specific analysis or if more refugee cohorts had been included. However, tests (not shown here) indicate that more refined analyses, despite adding details, do not alter the main picture. After some eight to ten years of residence, refugees’ levels of economic incorporation, which had progressed until then, tended to be reversed. Recent refugee cohorts do not have more successful economic incorporation than earlier refugee cohorts. Similar results have also emerged in previous Norwegian research (e.g., Blom, 2014; Bratsberg et al., 2016, 2017; Brovold, 2020).

Why was the first hypothesis not supported? In the following, we present further analyses addressing some potential reasons for the empirical patterns observed in Figure 10.1.

**Why was the first hypothesis not supported?**

One important reason that economic incorporation did not improve after some eight to ten years was clearly that labour market integration came to a halt. This is indicated in Figure 10.2, which shows average (top-coded) work income measured in Basic Amounts (BA) for the refugee Cohort 2000 and the comparison Controls 2000 sample.

During the first years after arrival, average work income among the refugees rose strongly, and the gap compared to the native average was reduced. In 2008, the refugee average work income had reached 53.0% of the native average. Afterwards, however, this percentage dropped to 49.3% in 2013 and further to 46.4% in 2020 (percentages are not shown in Figure 10.2 but calculated from the BA figures).

Language skills, work experience and other relevant resources likely continued to accumulate, year by year, among these refugees. Nonetheless, the discrepancy in work incomes did not decline after 2008 but widened somewhat. Natives’ average work income increased until 2015 (top level 5.19 BA). The refugee peak had already occurred by 2008, at 2.67 BA. In the latest observation years (2019 and 2020), some reduction in average work incomes can be seen, partly due to ageing samples – but this decline was larger among the refugees than the natives (the 2020 figures were also influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic, of course).
Thus, the reversal of economic incorporation among the refugees from Africa and Asia after some eight to ten years of residence was clearly linked to stagnating work incomes at a relatively low level. Moreover, the relative decline in refugees’ work incomes was not compensated for by increasing social transfers. On average, per year, the refugees in Cohort 2000 received 1.33 BA in social transfers during 2010–2014, but in the next five-year period (2015–2019), the average dropped to 1.22 BA. In contrast, average social transfers to the native comparison sample Controls 2000 rose from 0.54 BA during 2010–2014 to 0.71 BA during 2015–2019.

Problematic employment trajectories among refugees and other disadvantaged immigrants, with stagnating and sometimes declining work participation after about ten years of residence, have been noted by previous research in Norway (e.g., Bratsberg et al., 2017; Brovold, 2020; Kornstad et al., 2016) and other Nordic countries (e.g., Schultz-Nielsen, 2017). A prominent explanation is the precarious work typically allotted to disadvantaged immigrants (Gauffin et al., 2021). As recently summarised, “non-Western immigrants are more likely than natives to work in temporary, low-skilled and low-paid jobs . . . that are typically characterized by harsh working conditions” (Qvist & Qvist, 2022).

Refugees’ weak attachment to the labour market is indicated in our data in several ways. We may note, for instance, whether yearly earnings exceeded or were

Figure 10.2 Average work incomes, measured in Basic Amounts, during 2003–2020 for the refugee Cohort 2000 and the native Controls 2000, men and women pooled.
lower than three BA. We use the three BA threshold because this would be a typical yearly work income for a full-time worker at the very bottom of the wage hierarchy.

About three-fourths (73.6%) of the natives, with both genders pooled, earned three BA or more in at least 12 of the 18 years from 2003 to 2020. The corresponding figure among the refugees was only 27.2%. Thus, continuous employment (even in very low-paid jobs) was relatively rare among the refugees. Moreover, being persistently in a very marginal labour market position occurred much more often among the refugees. Among them, 19.2% of the men and 44.4% of the women had less than three BA in work income every year during 2003–2020. In the native majority, the corresponding figures were only 6.0% and 10.0%, respectively.

Findings about work income drops are similarly revealing. Table 10.2 shows the percentages who had experienced that work income fell from above three BA in one year to less than three BA in the next year (this estimation can only be made among those who actually had earned three BA or more in at least one year during 2003–2019). Such work income falls had occurred among as many as 80.6% of the refugee men, as compared to only 37.2% among native men. The corresponding figures for women were 71.7% and 52.1%, respectively.

Thus, refugees’ labour market difficulties are not only due to a lower probability of entering jobs but also due to a higher probability of losing one’s job if one manages to obtain employment (cf., Bratsberg et al., 2018). Quite a few refugees enter paid work each year, but the average employment level for the entire refugee cohort may stand still because the number of entrances are often more-or-less balanced by the number of job losses.

Why was the second hypothesis not supported?

Also, the second hypothesis – that economic incorporation will be better in recent refugee cohorts than in previous ones – failed to be supported, as shown in Figure 10.1.
Of course, the particularities of either Cohort 2000 or Cohort 2010 (or both) could have generated the results. Judgements about trends are insecure when based on only two cohorts. It is nevertheless interesting to try to explain why the later Cohort 2010 had a more disadvantaged trajectory.

Adopting both a micro perspective and a macro perspective could be fruitful (van Tubergen et al., 2004). The micro perspective suggests that, as compared to Cohort 2000, Cohort 2010 was composed of individuals whose background, experience and qualifications were less favourable to economic incorporation. As shown in Table 10.1, there were several compositional differences between Cohort 2000 and Cohort 2010. The later refugee cohort had a higher proportion of women and somewhat younger males, and it had a clearly lower educational level than the former cohort, in contrast to the native control samples in which the later 2010 controls had more education than the earlier 2000 controls.

Accordingly, in line with the micro perspective, we examine the extent to which these differences in gender composition, age and educational level account for the poorer economic incorporation of the refugees in Cohort 2010.

The macro perspective, on the other hand, points to factors at the societal level. An explanation for the more problematic trajectories in Cohort 2010 could be that the members of this cohort, as compared to the earlier Cohort 2000, were confronted with environments that were less conducive for economic incorporation.

Here, we highlight only two contextual aspects, both measured at the regional level, that is, the 11 regions that made up the Norwegian counties in 2020. One possibility is that a high proportion of disadvantaged immigrants in the entire regional population may overburden immigration authorities and limit labour market inclusion. Accordingly, we constructed measures of the proportion of African and Asian immigrants (age 18–47, all immigration reasons included) in the regional populations in 2009, assuming that this could have influenced the chances of Cohort 2000. Regarding Cohort 2010, the same measurement was constructed for 2019.

Another possibility is that higher unemployment in the regional labour market during the early years after arrival would obstruct economic incorporation. We therefore obtained measurements of the average regional level of unemployment during 2003–2006, referring to Cohort 2000, and 2013–2016, referring to Cohort 2010 (NAV, 2022).

Linear regression models were used to examine whether these micro and macro variables were related to the differences between Cohort 2000 and Cohort 2010. In these models, the samples of both refugee cohorts were pooled. The analysed outcome (the dependent variable) is the personal income of each refugee as a per cent of the average in the corresponding comparison sample of natives, measured after 10 years, that is, in 2010 for Cohort 2000 and 2020 for Cohort 2010.

We are particularly interested in the coefficient of the primary explanatory variable termed Cohort. This variable is dichotomous, being coded with a value of 0 for Cohort 2000 and a value of 1 for Cohort 2010. The coefficient for this variable indicates the difference between the two refugee cohorts, that is, how much the average in Cohort 2010 deviated from Cohort 2000, measured in percentage points.
The goal of the analyses is to account for this difference by estimating a series of regression models that include, step by step, the available micro and macro explanatory variables. In other words, the Cohort coefficient is adjusted for the effects of different sets of micro and macro variables.

In Model 1 (Table 10.3), which does not include any other explanatory variable, the Cohort coefficient was −5.37. Thus, after 10 years of residence, the deviation in refugees’ average personal income from the corresponding native average was 5.37 percentage points larger in Cohort 2010 than in Cohort 2000. This result is, of course, similar to the distance between the two cohorts we observed in Figure 10.1.

Model 2 includes gender and age, resulting in a small reduction in the Cohort coefficient (−4.36). When Model 3 includes education, the Cohort coefficient drops substantively, to −2.65. Accordingly, the micro explanatory variables, education in particular, accounted for about half of the difference in economic incorporation between the two refugee cohorts when measured ten years after arrival. Thus, the lower educational level and the higher proportion of female refugees in Cohort 2010, as compared to Cohort 2000, were probably important reasons for the less satisfying economic incorporation experienced by Cohort 2010.

The two final regression models include the macro predictors. The inclusion of the variable indicating the proportion of African and Asian immigrants in the regional population (Model 4) led to a further slight reduction of the Cohort coefficient (−2.13).

Lastly, Model 5 included regional unemployment during the early years after arrival. The negative coefficient (−2.36) for this explanatory variable indicates, as expected, that higher unemployment in the region was associated with larger income differences between the refugees and the native majority. However, in Model 5, the

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Note: All predictor variables are centred around the mean. All coefficients (except the one in parenthesis) are statistically significant, p-value < 0.01. Note that the education variable is measured as the deviation from the corresponding native average educational years.
Cohort coefficient increased to −4.74. Thus, after adjusting for the regional differences in unemployment, that is, when comparing regions with similar labour market conditions, the cohort difference became larger. Apparently, regional unemployment did not account for the unfortunate trajectory of Cohort 2010. Rather, unemployment in the surrounding residential regions was usually lower for the later refugee cohort, and the underlying tendency to a worse trajectory for Cohort 2010 was actually concealed when unemployment in the residential region was not taken into consideration.

Summary of findings

The premise for this chapter has been that immigrants’ attainment of full citizenship will require economic incorporation. Accordingly, we have investigated time trends regarding how average personal income among African and Asian refugees in Norway has deviated from the level among comparable natives. We have assumed that the level of economic incorporation among this immigrant category can be assessed by the size of the average income gap between refugees and natives.

Our first hypothesis was that the typical gap in personal income between the refugees and the native majority will decrease with increasing residential time. Using register data, we followed the income trajectories of refugees and comparable natives over 20 years, from 2001 to 2020. At first, economic incorporation progressed; that is, the gap diminished rapidly. This halted, however, after some eight to ten years of residence. In the following years towards 2020, the difference in typical personal income between refugees and natives gradually widened, suggesting a reversal of economic incorporation after the refugees had stayed for around 10 years.

Additional analyses indicated that difficulties in gaining a stable foothold in the labour market were major reasons for the observed tendencies. Most refugees had experience with paid employment, but often in temporary, low-skilled and low-paid jobs with considerable risks of lay-offs and closures. This led to unsteady careers, frequent job loss and unemployment spells. Moreover, the refugees’ average social benefits, which could have compensated for the lack of work income, had a downward trend from 2010–2014 to 2015–1019.

Our second hypothesis was that recent refugee cohorts would experience faster economic incorporation than previous cohorts due to post-Millennium developments in the Norwegian context that may have improved the likelihood of social integration and labour market entry. This hypothesis was assessed by comparing the gap in average personal incomes between natives and refugees for two different refugee cohorts – the refugees who had entered around 2000 were compared with those who had entered around 2010.

This hypothesis also failed to obtain support because the later 2010 refugee cohort fared worse than the earlier 2000 cohort. Supplementary analyses indicated that differences in the composition of the two refugee cohorts were partial explanations for these findings. Female refugees commonly have less personal income, and the proportion of women was markedly higher in the 2010 refugee cohort than in the earlier 2000 cohort. Moreover, educational qualifications were lower in the later cohort. This suggests emigration selectivity. The forerunners (the earlier refugees
Economic preconditions for full citizenship

from Africa or Asia) were apparently more resourced with respect to educational achievement than the refugees who came later from the same continents.

Also, environmental circumstances may influence economic incorporation. This possibility was addressed by investigating possible effects of the proportion of African and Asian immigrants in the regional population, as well as regional unemployment levels during the early years after settlement. These two circumstances did not account for the less satisfactory economic incorporation of the later 2010 refugee cohort. Actually, the unemployment situation appeared to be more conducive to economic incorporation for the later 2010 refugee cohort than for the earlier 2000 cohort.

Concluding remarks

Given that full citizenship presupposes economic incorporation, this chapter indicates that attaining full citizenship in Norway is a thorny process for refugees from Africa and Asia. The findings suggest that many of these refugees will face disadvantaged economic situations across their life courses, and a worrying finding is that more recent refugee cohorts did not experience better economic incorporation than those who came earlier, in spite of policy efforts aimed at improving immigrants’ integration.

Our study has various limitations. It would have been preferable to compare more than two refugee cohorts. The register data we utilised has limited information on many potentially important determinants, and this hampered the attempts to explain the findings. Nonetheless, the empirical patterns we have described are likely to be trustworthy, as they coincide, by and large, with the findings in previous Norwegian reports (Blom, 2014; Bratsberg et al., 2018; Bratsberg et al., 2016, 2017; Brovold, 2020; Kornstad et al., 2016). In a way, our study is a follow-up of earlier research, but we broaden knowledge by linking economic analyses to the citizenship topic, by focusing on a specific and highly interesting immigrant category, and by utilising newer data and analysing an unusually long observation period.

The findings may point towards what immigration research has termed the segmented assimilation model (Vermeulen, 2010; Zhou, 1997). According to this model, immigrants’ social and economic trajectories vary between immigrant categories. Some of them may remain in or drift towards lower socio-economic strata. They may become a part of what could be described as a permanent underclass, with minimal chances of upward social mobility and persistent poverty risk.

Clearly, this chapter suggests tendencies that resemble the segmented assimilation model. Whether such bleak prospects will characterise the population of African and Asian refugees in Norway in the future is nevertheless debateable. An element of the segmented assimilation model is the absence of inter-generational mobility. Our study has not addressed this topic, but earlier Norwegian research has described significant tendencies that second-generation immigrants, also those belonging to low-status ethnic minority groups, have advanced in the socio-economic hierarchy (Hermansen, 2016). Thus, an inter-generational perspective may nurture more optimistic interpretations than those suggested by our study.
Furthermore, although the premise that full citizenship requires economic incorporation may be fundamentally correct, nuances must be addressed. This chapter has demonstrated that average personal incomes among these refugees are substandard as compared to the native majority. It is nonetheless an open question whether this deviation is so dramatic that it entirely prevents social inclusion on social, political and cultural arenas. This may be a topic for future investigations.

Notes

1 Alternatively, consumption strength could be measured by household-adjusted disposable income, which, in practice, correlates highly with personal income. First, we also intended to analyse refugees’ wealth but decided to drop that topic because test analyses showed that, even after 20 years of residence, the refugee average was only some 20–30% of the native average, depending on how wealth was measured.

2 The weighting of data is difficult with the software available in microdata.no. Therefore, the construction of native control samples with the appropriate size and age structures had to done manually, in an iterative manner, via the stepwise exclusion of random birth months and selected birth years.

3 One BA had some 20–25 percent more buying power in 2020 than in 2000. Nonetheless, research has considered the BA as comparable over time (cf., Brovold, 2020; Blom, 2014), but when incomes are measured in BAs over longer periods, one should note that unchanging incomes will often imply increased buying power.

References


11 “I am torn to pieces”

Transnational citizenship and COVID-19

Justyna Bell, Anne Balke Staver and Ida Tolgensbakk

Introduction

When Fix and Zimmermann coined the term “mixed-status families” in 2001, they were writing about the one in ten US families in which one or both parents were non-citizens and one or more children were citizens (2001, p. 397). This is, however, not a phenomenon unique to the US. Twenty years later, a special issue of *Identities* viewed the phenomenon through European eyes: Bonjour and De Hart opened by pointing to the simple fact that one in twelve marriages in Europe is of mixed nationality (Lanzieri, 2021, in Bonjour & de Hart, 2020). Although many of the marriages we count in the study of mixed-status families are between partners who are both immigrants of various statuses, they are not necessarily so. According to Statistics Norway, between 2005 and 2018, 20–23% new marriages in Norway involved at least one foreign-born partner. In 2020, this number decreased to 17% and, in 2021, to 12%, which is still relatively high, taking the pandemic travel restrictions in force at the time into consideration. As we will explore, Norway only officially allowed dual citizenship beginning in 2020, and many residents previously avoided naturalising in Norway because they would be required to renounce their other citizenship(s).

Furthermore, marriage and immigration are not the only way people live transnationally. Former international students, people living abroad for a period of time, and many others maintain their ties to two or more countries over time, creating complex networks beyond their countries of origin. Even those without a personal experience of migration can be connected to other countries through work, leisure, family or friends. They may have an uncle abroad or a pen pal. However important these bonds are to the individual, they are usually not detected in the available population statistics. If we look beyond marriages and begin counting other family relationships, such as siblings, parents, cousins and in-laws, it is easy to imagine that most families in Europe will at least have some distant members who are not of the same nationality, citizenship or settlement status. Borders and how they are managed have implications for whether and how people can maintain these ties.

As Bonjour and de Hart state, “those who belong to dominant groups of society have a much better chance of performing citizenship successfully, i.e. of formulating political claims and being heard, than marginalised groups” (Bonjour & de

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Regulating access to family life across borders can be a tool used for social exclusion and has been conceptualized as “the moral claims of insiders” (Carens, 2003, p. 96) in the immigration context. As Carens explains, “even if it is assumed that liberal democratic states have very limited obligations toward outsiders, they do have an obligation to take the vital interests of their own members into account,” and “being able to live with their immediate family members” is clearly such a vital interest (ibid, 97). This cosmopolitan aspect of citizenship is not, however, conceded by most states. Scholars of immigration law have exposed that, in actual practice, the claims of insiders are not always taken into account in specific immigration cases (de Hart, 2009), exposing the difference between how we may think, a priori, about rights in this context and how rights may actually be realised.

Similarly, the pandemic exposed the incoherence between how people define, belong to, live and experience their families and the legislative definitions of family. The rights, identities, sense of belonging and status tied to citizenship were experienced not as individuals but as members of the web of meaningful relationships that we call intimate citizenship (Bonjour & de Hart, 2020, p. 9).

The struggle with migration policies and the exclusionary nature of citizenship affecting family life is certainly not a new phenomenon and has been explored in various contexts. The most appropriate approach to our analysis seems to be the concept of “performing intimate citizenship” among mixed-status families, which Bonjour and de Hart (2020) discuss as a lived practice and everyday experience. Intimate citizenship relates not to something that people are or something they have but to the performative aspect of citizenship; in other words, it relates to what people do.

Our chapter will analyse people’s subjective understanding of citizenship in a time of crisis. The pandemic and how states and individuals handled it became a poignant example of exactly how global we have become as a society. Our exploration of these issues was guided by the following question: How did individuals affected by travel restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic argue their case as citizens? We explore how people with different types of belonging to the Norwegian welfare state reacted; how they interpreted their rights and what labels they placed on themselves, their loved ones and others’ loved ones in the context of the closing of borders. After briefly explaining our method in the following paragraphs, our chapter describes how citizenship came into play in the Norwegian welfare state during the pandemic – citizenship as seen from above (cf. Chapter 1 by Haug) – before moving to discuss how citizenship was seen from the point of view of transnational families separated from their loved ones.

Method

For the purposes of discussing transnational citizenship during the pandemic, we consider the development and contents of a particular online community. All three authors were themselves, in different ways, living transnational lives when the pandemic arrived and naturally gravitated towards like-minded individuals online – at home as well as abroad – when the borders closed in spring 2020. When we decided
to perform systematic research on the issue, we chose the largest Norwegian Facebook group created for the purposes of discussing how to deal with the difficulties of being separated from loved ones during the pandemic. For a more detailed discussion of the nature of the group and our involvement with it, see Bell et al. (forthcoming).

The group began as a self-help community and quickly attracted several thousand members. After half a year, 7,000 members were engaged in lively discussions ranging from sharing personal stories of missing loved ones to practical advice on enduring quarantines and more-or-less sound legal guidance. By late summer 2020, the activities of the group had evolved into community activism, using personal individual stories and painful experiences to publicly asking governments to change the rules and regulations during a global crisis. It goes without saying that using these data was fraught with ethical issues and we needed to handle all our interactions with the group with the utmost of care.

The Norwegian Centre for Research Data reviewed and recommended our application for ethical approval in August 2021. We contacted the administrators of the largest and most active group and received their enthusiastic approval. To officially notify the members of the Facebook group that the research was being conducted, the administrators published information about our project in September 2021. An important goal of providing this information was to avoid giving the Facebook group members undue hope that our work would help their activism, as well as to ensure that they understood that they could opt out of participating. The varied, complex, and sometimes-sensitive data in the discussions on the group wall meant we had to be creative in terms of how we handled our data. Beyond avoiding any unnecessary storage, we, for example, paraphrased the personal stories shared on the group when collecting them to prevent the traceability and disclosure of identities. The names and origin countries have been edited or anonymised.

Using a digital ethnography approach (Hine, 2015; Kozinets, 2019), we have analysed the life of the Facebook group as a whole, with a particular focus on the kind of citizens that needed the group, how they spoke about their difficulties, and how the group developed over time. When relevant, we have also included an analysis of the activities of the group that extended beyond the confines of Facebook – the outreach into other platforms and the offline activism members of the group engaged in. We concentrated on the first year of the pandemic, which overlapped with the first year of the life of the group.

For this chapter, we have collected those discussions and arguments that revolved around the concept of citizenship, as well as individual residents of various statuses’ relationships to and rights within the Norwegian democratic welfare state. Following our observations of the developments within the group, first and foremost, we have searched for the terms “rights,” “human rights,” “law” and “citizen” in Norwegian and English, which were the main languages used in the group.

Due to the complexity of the legal context in which the analysed discussions took place, we decided to maintain a chronological overview of the changes in the travel restrictions from that period. Therefore, as a supporting methodological
measure, we accessed the historical versions of the Norwegian immigration rules through the Lovdata Pro database. This database has a function for following versions of individual sections of legislation over time, thus making it possible to track which family members were admitted when.

**Citizenship from above**

One of the very first actions taken by the Norwegian government to protect the population in the face of the global COVID-19 pandemic was to restrict travel across the country’s borders. The welfare state closed its borders to outsiders in order to shelter those within. When this happened, citizenship became important in ways it had not been before. Historically and perhaps stereotypically, we have tended to assume a high degree of correspondence between the state, its territory and its population. Being outside of one’s citizenship can be understood as being “out of place” (Brysk & Shafir, 2004). One’s country of citizenship is also the only country to which one is normally guaranteed a right to enter – to restore the “natural order of things,” as it were. With the border closures, this fact became apparent to people who had not previously thought much about it, as it was the one certain key to admission. However, the reason for this relevance, of course, was that they were among the many people living outside or across the national border. With the partial exception of Australia, where returns were temporarily numerically capped (Boucher et al., 2021), Western states tended to abide by the general rule in international law that a state cannot close its borders to its own citizens. Within Europe, the complexities of EU citizenship added a further layer to national citizenships. Norway is not an EU member, but as member of the European Economic Area (EEA), it falls under its common agreements. People’s legal statuses took on new importance in two specific ways we wish to highlight: dual citizenship and multi-level citizenship statuses.

**Dual citizenship**

Most European states have, over the past few decades, introduced provisions for dual citizenship as part of changing conceptions of individual rights, integration and globalisation (Faist, 2007; Sejersen, 2008). Norway was a holdout in this trend, having decided against allowing dual citizenship during the early 2000s (Midtbøen, 2019), and it required people naturalising in Norway to renounce their other citizenship(s). Conversely, Norwegian emigrants naturalising elsewhere had to renounce their Norwegian citizenship. The obligation to renounce likely affected the propensity to naturalise, and the nationalities for which naturalisation was most likely included refugee-producing countries such as Somalia and Eritrea (Molstad, 2022). Given the differential statuses of various passports, individuals from such countries would have the most to gain in terms of mobility and the least to lose through renunciation. Europeans were, conversely, less likely to naturalise, as this involved giving up EU citizenship.
Dual citizenship was allowed in Norway beginning in January 2020, that is, shortly before the pandemic. This led to high numbers of applications for naturalisation, and 2021 represented a record year in this regard. It is notable that European citizens have naturalised in high numbers now that they can do so while retaining citizenship in their countries of origin and, with it, their EU citizenship. While only 208 Swedes per year, on average, naturalised between 2017 and 2019, more than 4,500 Swedes naturalised in 2021 (Molstad, 2022). When the borders closed, however, few had had time to acquire Norwegian citizenship, and few Norwegian emigrants would have been able to reinstate their Norwegian citizenship. This latter category could be particularly hard hit by border closures, as they had no legal ties to Norway but strong familial and affective ties.

Multilevel citizenship

Norway’s complex position outside of the EU yet within the EEA renders EU citizenship relevant in Norway. A central aspect of EU citizenship is free movement rights, which extend to a relatively wide circle of family members of the person exercising them. Both Norwegians and EU citizens can, in accordance with these rules, travel freely and settle in whichever country they would like within the EEA. Extensive jurisprudence at the Court of Justice of the European Union has extended family reunification rights for persons exercising free movement, to the point that these rights may end in being more generous than they are for nationals living in the same country, for whom national rules apply, in a counterintuitive situation known in EU law as reverse discrimination (Kroeze, 2020; Staver, 2013). Many Europeans have exercised their free movement rights to settle in Norway. When the borders closed, the closures involved a derogation from the open intra-EU borders, which is only allowed in exceptional and temporary circumstances. The restrictions on movement to Norway were therefore eased with regard to EU citizens and their family members relatively quickly in 2020. For a period, EU citizens in Norway could be joined by foreign family members, while Norwegians could not, through a form of reverse discrimination. This was temporary, as Norway reintroduced border closures between January and July of 2021, which arguably went further than EU law allowed and led to sharp criticism by the European Supervisory Authority (ESA). However, this eliminated the privileged position of EU citizens.

Citizenship from below

Within the context of the regulations above, individuals who were suddenly affected had to grasp the nuances of how the new changes affected their lives and their ability to meet with family and friends. How people define family and close relationships is often at odds with the meaning of the family in official regulations. However, these differences are not visible until there is a friction, as with the restrictions following the COVID-19 pandemic. This was not the first time the importance of the affective ties was not reflected in legal adjustments; rather, the fluidity of the changes introduced added an additional level of uncertainty
for the people affected and exposed a vast range of complexities in people's relationship arrangements. The taken-for-granted intangibility of borders for those who previously did not have to give them much consideration suddenly became painfully real. They were excluded from the groups the welfare state prioritised during the crisis. At the same time, there has been a silent acceptance of the hierarchisation of levels of citizenship within Norway, including members of the national community (passport holders), non-resident members of the national community, EEA nationals, guest workers, students, refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. The instant closing of the borders affected all these groups in various and related ways.

The Facebook group that we chose to study, the Oss med familie eller kjæreste i utlandet under COVID-19 2020, was the largest Norwegian-based group formed specifically in reaction to the border control restrictions put in place during the COVID-19 pandemic. The group was joined by people of many nationalities and statuses in Norway. While many were foreign citizens living outside of Norway attempting to find ways to enter, the majority were Norwegian citizens or foreign citizens residing in Norway. These were citizens of countries across the globe.

For many of the group members, their membership in the national community as citizens of Norway, the EEA and/or the EU used to have little impact on their everyday lives and did not affect their mobility within the EEA. It was only when the pandemic measures were implemented that they had to consider the formal citizenship statuses of their family members and the fact that these statuses could affect their formerly more-or-less taken-for-granted mobility plans. One’s citizenship became a constituent of a complex maze of rules and regulations that resulted in either mobility or “stuckness” (Jefferson et al., 2019). The mobility restrictions of the pandemic were justified by the need to stop the spread of the virus. Test results and individual personal precautions and attitudes towards infection prevention did not matter if the mobile individual did not have the right citizenship status, which, of course, added to the confusion and frustration in the Facebook group.

I’m a Norwegian citizen. My girlfriend has an Albanian citizenship but has a visa to live and work in Germany. We have been cohabitants for many years, commuting every month. We are buying a house in Norway now. Is she allowed to enter now? (July 2020, translated, and paraphrased)

I am a Brazilian citizen, and my fiancé is a Swedish citizen living in Norway. We have lived together the last 3 years in Australia. We planned on moving to Norway together now, but the pandemic made it impossible. He moved ahead because of work, and now, I am all alone in Australia (July 2020, shortened and paraphrased).

I am living in Israel with my Czech-Israeli husband. Our children are Israeli-Norwegians. My parents in Norway miss their grandchildren. My children miss their uncles and aunts. If anyone has advice, I would be very grateful (July 2020, translated and paraphrased).
In the three cases quoted above – and the many more like them – these were families that had enjoyed a certain level of privilege in that they were used to traveling freely or with few hindrances between their respective countries. The borders becoming visible, tangible obstacles to daily lives came as a shock. For many adult couples, the choice to live in more than one country was often related to the fact that one or more of the partners had children from earlier relationships. With the introduction of the travel restrictions, the nuances of these family configurations were not taken into account. Thus, it became a problem when stepchildren or adult children did not fall under the travel exemptions or when children’s visa statuses were unclear.

Understanding that perceptions of citizenship can be subjective, it is striking that many of the members of the Facebook group did not have formal citizenship in the country they called home:

My Norwegian grandparents live in the USA. We visit them once a year, and they come for Christmas. They have all their family here, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Now, they cannot come, since they are US citizens! (July 2020, shortened and paraphrased)

I used to love this country so much and imagined my whole life here. Norway could have had a dedicated and hard-working citizen in me, but now, I am just torn to pieces. (Foreign national with Norwegian residency, July 2020, paraphrased)

In these cases, there was a visible incongruity between intimate citizenship and legal citizenship: In the first, there was an expectation that Norwegians who have renounced their citizenship should still have access to their country of origin; in the second, there were hurt feelings when an adopted homeland – where one is not yet a naturalised citizen – does not reciprocate that love.

Some of the families separated by citizenship status were granted exemptions from the travel ban as time went on or found loopholes in travel restrictions to meet outside of Norway. During autumn 2020 and winter 2020/2021, some members posted heartening stories of being able to finally unite. However, for many others, no solutions were found for the entire first year of the pandemic, not even after vaccines began to roll out. For many foreigners, vaccination status had no effect on right to entry. In the first winter during the pandemic, the Facebook group filled with increasingly desperate stories of family members stranded in foreign countries without the possibility of working or moving on. Some members announced that they were leaving the group because their romantic relationships had ended due to the strain of being apart, wishing other members better luck.

Victories and losses

Considering the first year of the Facebook group, the content of posts and comments is varied but follows some consistent paths. First, the members of the group began by finding solace in the fact that they were not alone, sharing frustration
and heartache when they were not able to meet their loved ones across borders. They shared tips about where to find updated information, and the Facebook group served as an important information channel regarding where and how to find relevant information from the Norwegian government. This was particularly important for the many group members with a limited understanding of the Norwegian language. Over the first few months, members gradually began to describe the borders closing not only as heart-breaking but also as unjust and in violation of their rights. One of the first fights they took on as a collective was to protest the fact that non-Norwegian EEA citizens residing in Norway could host their spouses from EEA countries, while Norwegian citizens did not have the same rights:

Not getting your fiancé home to Norway because you have Norwegian citizenship in your own country is absurd. The law must be the same for all!

(June 2020, translated and paraphrased)

The reason for this differential treatment is precisely that two different sets of law applied, so the law was not the same for all. The rules for EEA citizens were derived from the more generous EU legal provisions, which Norway could not tighten without risking a violation of the EEA agreement. The rules for Norwegian citizens, however, were a domestic issue. For those affected, it felt unjust and exclusionary.

The same month, an important topic for the group became the fact that only married couples, not fiancés, boyfriends, girlfriends, partners or individuals involved in other forms of romantic relationships, were able to reunite under the exemptions from the travel ban. This became a pivotal issue not only for couples who were too early in their relationship to have considered marriage but also for those who may have been living as a family unit for many years but had seen no need to confirm their relationship formally in the eyes of the state. Becoming married is not necessarily a common choice for all family formations, perhaps particularly in the Nordic countries, where nearly every couple starts out with unmarried cohabitation and many never marry or marry much later (Syltevik, 2010). These people were all excluded from the humanitarian exceptions the welfare state made from the strict travel restrictions.

Even early in the life of the group, the members not only discussed individual solutions but measures that could be taken to influence the government. One such measure was the widespread use of coordinated social media campaigning. They were not only writing to newspapers and sharing Facebook, Instagram and Twitter posts but also helping one another in the comment sections of online articles relevant to their cause or in the official Facebook pages of relevant politicians:

I also wrote a comment on the Minister’s page. This is my text: Please open the borders for couples! We need real contact. We suffer, and we are lonely. Denying us this basic personal right just because we lack Norwegian papers and marriage papers is completely unacceptable!

(June 2020, shortened and paraphrased)
They spurred one another on in protesting that some individuals and families living within a democratic welfare state’s borders have important ties outside those borders. They wanted the state to acknowledge their need to maintain such connections, perhaps particularly during a crisis.

As the first summer went on, the Facebook group slowly concentrated on specific issues. It is difficult for us to ascertain whether the relative unity of the Facebook group should be ascribed to a collective effort on the part of the many members or hard work on the part of the administrators. Regardless of the reason, the group remained relatively friendly and low conflict. Although various conspiracy theories were launched, for example, the idea of the government using the pandemic as an excuse to stop immigration for good, these did not become dominant themes of the discussion.

Even though it remained acceptable to vent and share individual frustrations and heartbreak, the group managed to combine their resources in productive work. They collaborated on writing to media and authorities. The administrators of the group became more professional in terms of organising the group as time went on, for instance, by posting reminders of the group’s main goals or stressing that answers to some of the recurring questions could be found through links.

First, the consensus of the group was that the pandemic border regulations were unfair in the sense that the group members felt they were treated differently from other groups. Members discussed that excluding them from travel ban exemptions because of their passports or living arrangements was unjust. Particularly after the initial ban was lifted and Norwegian citizens were able to travel to a degree for the summer holiday of 2020, many group members pointed to spoiled “cabin tourists,” “sydenturisters” (those going to warmer countries for holidays) and sport or film celebrities as people granted exemptions when there was no need for such or any real suffering:

I’m so angry now. The minister of culture just allowed Tom Cruise to travel to Norway with his crew, while my daughter has to wait half a year to hand in her Norwegian citizenship application. These people do not even need to quarantine:-(

(July 2020, OP, translated, shortened and paraphrased)

The Facebook group members stressed the illogicality of the pandemic travel measures. Over and over, they wrote about how they failed to see how they – brothers and sisters, unmarried partners and grandchildren – could be more of a sanitary threat than others who were allowed freely into the country. “Why are our loved ones more contagious than others?” was a recurring rhetorical question posed both in the group and in public, for instance, in letters to the media.

In addition to the travel bans and lack of exceptions, other issues related to the ongoing pandemic were also discussed. Perhaps the most noteworthy was the fact that many institutions necessary for the processing of visas and other paperwork were closed or inaccessible (and remained so throughout the pandemic). For families awaiting family reunification, the pandemic brought about unprecedented
holdups and significant extra costs. As the months went on, more and more individuals lost their visa-sanctioned time slot for entry into Norway.

Another recurring topic for the group was related to incompatible rules and practices between different travel agencies and airports, the risk of cancelled tickets and changing schedules, and obtaining insurance if one was travelling against government advice. Even after some restrictions were scaled down in the autumn of 2020, there were many problems and obstacles on the way to reuniting with loved ones. In the confusion, group members with refugee status, as well as trailing spouses, found themselves trapped by the same hostile system.

When writing about “rights,” the group members were not always clear as to which particular legal regulations or specific status granted them those perceived rights. As in some of the cases quoted above, the members would often simply state that it was their “personal right” or “basic right,” without being more specific. However, as individual members turned to the legal basis of what they almost instinctively felt was their rights or group members with backgrounds in law shared their knowledge and opinions on the matter, the claims became more specific and grounded in legal language. Throughout autumn 2020, many posts were from members who had contacted lawyers or read what national and supranational entities had to say about rights of movement.

After the press conference today, I get the feeling that the government is hiding behind the pandemic to limit immigration. What does the law say? The Siracusa principles adopted by the UN in 1984 say that all measures implemented to protect the population that restrict rights and freedoms must be legal, necessary and proportional. States of emergency should be limited in duration, and all restrictions of rights should take into account effects on particular population groups and marginalised groups.

(November 2020, translated, shortened and paraphrased)

The commenter is taking for granted that the right of movement is a human right, as the Siracusa principles relate to the application of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in emergencies. Unless one is seeking asylum, however, the only country international law ensures that you can actually enter is the country of your own legal citizenship. For many members of the group, this was where their lived reality and the law clashed.

The group was political from the start in the sense that it opposed the ongoing border regulations restricting free movement. However, while, for the first weeks and months, the group concentrated on mutual moral support, as the restrictions continued and there was no sign of a solution, the members became more and more directly political. The members also became increasingly aware of the fact that they were many others around the world struggling with the same issues, and there was a growing awareness that there were international and national laws that could be appealed to in their individual cases. The members educated one another, and they encouraged one another in whatever endeavours they attempted to reach their
loved ones, whether that meant travelling to countries with fewer restrictions to be married or sending letters to the Prime Minister.

The activism of the group quickly grew into tangible online and offline results. Using various members’ strengths and resources, they, for example, set up an Internet page and filmed short videos to share on various online platforms, collaborating to make these as visible as possible. The group conducted its own research, for example, taking surveys of members’ mental health so as to be able to argue publicly that the restrictions of movement had detrimental effects on important health parameters. The members coordinated efforts to contact politicians in different levels of government and co-wrote several letters to national and local media (Tjelta, 2021). Importantly, an ongoing activity, in addition to the aforementioned organised pile-ons in the commentary sections of online newspapers every time the media wrote something relevant to their cause, was to contact all kinds of local and national newspapers, agreeing to interviews in an effort to influence public opinion (e.g., Baksaas, 2021).

Considering how social media posts by the group members were interacted with (liked, retweeted and commented on), it seems they mainly preached only to the choir. The overarching public discourse on border controls and travel regulations in Norway in the first year of the pandemic was one of worry that the borders were not sufficiently closed. In the context of the above-mentioned concept of dugnad, the broadcasting of a specific case of family separation did not resonate with the public or gain much sympathy, as all members of the community were expected sacrifice. Considering that part of the goal of the hashtags and other activities was to muster mainstream attention and lobby for political results, the fact that tweets marked with the hashtag #slippossinn were retweeted mainly among a relatively small in-group of community members must have been considered disappointing by the group. It raises the question of what happens to networked activism if the message does not reverberate outside the network, and it raises the question of why this specific message did not resonate with the wider public.

Concluding discussion

Fredrik Nilsson and Lena Marander-Eklund has studied how negative cultural stereotypes of two main groups formed in the early days of the lockdown in Finland. Their analysis will likely apply to many countries affected by the pandemic, especially the Nordic countries. Nilsson and Marander-Eklund (2021) wrote that the Hoarder and the Traveller became the embodiment of immorality during the pandemic lockdown. This fits well with age-old images of the nomad, the traveller – those who do not belong and are forced into or choose mobility. While crossing borders can have an aura of progress, adventure and modernity, during the pandemic, staying put became the only moral choice.

One potential reason for this is the disjuncture between the lived experience of citizenship and its legal complexities. The expectations of what would be allowed – to be joined by close family, to welcome grandparents who had given up their Norwegian citizenship, to be treated better than European non-citizen residents in Norway – did
not match reality. If they could barely believe it themselves, how could they make the wider public understand the situation? By the fall of 2021, most restrictions were lifted, though entry rules remained in place for several months after the initial lifting of domestic COVID-19 restrictions. The Facebook group crowdfunded a lawsuit against the Norwegian state for human rights violations because of the restrictions on family life (Sæther, 2021; Zondag, 2021); however, the case coincided with the lifting of restrictions and was dismissed by the Court as no longer having “legal interest” (Eilertsen, 2021). For many of the Facebook group members, this was a large disappointment. They felt their basic rights as citizens – their rights to family life – had been violated, they felt excluded from the imagined pandemic community and they expressed uncertainty about the future should similar crises reappear. The Facebook group quickly became inactive after the fall of 2021. The disappointment is no longer audible (or readable online). This does not necessarily mean it is not there.

Internet use and social media became especially important during the pandemic because many other means of reaching others were barred. For individuals and families living transnationally, social media also became a means of collective action. It remains to be seen whether the FB group participants and all the others involved in protesting the border closings will continue fighting what they felt was unjust or this will be forgotten as just one of many strange things that happened during the time of the pandemic. As a group, these individuals attempted, by any means and resources they could find, to argue their case as citizens, and they lost. It remains to be seen whether this will have a long-term impact on how they view their connection to the greater community, the Norwegian state and their citizenship.

Notes
1 All authors have contributed equally to this chapter. While Bell worked on the theoretical perspectives of intimate citizenship, Staver had a special responsibility for immigration policy, and Tolgensbakk analysed the ethnographic data.
2 For a discussion of the risk of reinforcing state-instated hierarchies of inclusion or exclusion through terms such as “mixed-status marriages,” see Moret et al. 2021.
3 These states rank at the bottom of the so-called Quality of Nationality index, which measures factors such as ability to travel and settle, while Norway ranks near the top.

References


12 The democratic deficit, political participation and demands for social inclusion in truncated welfare states

Barbara A. Zarate-Tenorio

Introduction

The third wave of transitions to democracy has had a limited impact on income inequality and poverty reduction in many Latin American countries. Latin America still ranks among the most unequal regions worldwide. The welfare states in the region have historically evolved in a “truncated” way, gradually granting social rights and employment benefits to different sectors of society in formal employment while excluding the large segment of the workforce engaged in informal employment (De Ferranti et al., 2004).

Notwithstanding social policy expansions to informal workers, the implementation of strong redistributive policies and improving the quality of and access to social policies remain crucial challenges in Latin America (Cardoso & Magalhaes, 2001; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Holland, 2018; Levy & Schady, 2013; Holland & Schneider, 2017). Unsurprisingly, survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Survey shows that around 40% of the population is “dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied” with the quality of public schools, and this percentage reaches 50% in the case of public health services. Moreover, around 80% of the population believes that the government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality (LAPOP, 2012).

Several governments have met with citizens’ manifestations of discontent over inequality and demands for social policy change (Valls, 2013). For instance, the student protests in Chile demanding major reforms to the education system in 2011 are considered the largest demonstrations since the return to democracy (Long, 2011). Another example is the mass protests in Brazil in 2013, which originated as a result of an increase in the public transportation fare. These protests rapidly evolved to include broader grievances related to corruption and, especially, a lack of adequate access to education and health services (Watts, 2013; Benson & Levine, 2013).

This chapter presents a contrasting case of study to the rest of the chapters in this volume by focusing on the exercise of political citizenship for the quest of social inclusion in contexts of segmented welfare states. In contrast to the “Nordic model” (see Chapter 1 by Haug), Latin American democracies have not attained social citizenship (Marshall, 1950), and a large proportion of the population remain
excluded from social benefits or have access to services of lower quality. This chapter explores how, in Latin America's segmented welfare states, dissatisfaction with the provision of social policies and demands for redistribution shape the democratic deficit – the gap between support for and satisfaction with democracy. It further analyses the extent to which dissatisfaction with the provision of social policies and demands for redistribution constitute drivers of citizens' engagement in diverse forms of political participation (i.e., voting turnout in general elections, signing petitions, participating in community projects and joining a protest).

The analysis contributes to the literature on citizenship and democratic legitimacy (e.g., Norris, 2011; Lühiste, 2014; Anderson & Singer, 2008; Booth & Seligson, 2009) and to studies on the sources of citizens' political participation (e.g., Machado et al., 2011; Moseley, 2015). It extends previous individual-level analyses which are exclusively focused on protest and incorporates other forms of political participation (see, e.g., Machado et al., 2011; Zarate-Tenorio, 2014, 2021; Moseley, 2015; Justino & Martorano, 2019). Using survey data from a sample of 18 Latin American countries, this chapter shows that the democratic deficit widens as citizens' dissatisfaction with the quality of education and health services increases and as citizens' beliefs that the government should implement policies to reduce inequality grow stronger. Moreover, it also shows that discontent with public services and support for social redistribution have differentiated effects on citizens' engagement in the political arena.

Previous research on democratic legitimacy

Studies on the sources of democratic legitimacy underscore several factors that influence citizens' reported levels of satisfaction with democracy, including various measures of the quality of governance, democratic processes and policy performance. For instance, Norris (2011, Ch. 11) finds a positive relationship between an index that combines the Worldwide Governance Indicators (i.e., voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption) and citizens' satisfaction with democracy in 44 countries. Similarly, Dahlberg and Holmberg (2013) find that the quality of bureaucratic institutions, as defined by their effectiveness, professionalism and impartiality, has a positive impact on people's perceptions of democracy. Wagner et al. (2009) find that better rule of law, lower corruption, checks and balances, and good institutions enhance satisfaction with democracy in Europe.

Empirical studies at the individual level show consistent results. Subjective evaluations of the quality of governance and the extent to which people feel represented in the political system have proven to be important predictors of citizens' satisfaction with democracy. For instance, Huang et al. (2008) show that positive perceptions of government performance in areas such as the respect for individual freedoms and human rights, effectiveness in handling the most important issues and the degree of corruption affect the extent to which citizens are satisfied with democracy. The negative consequences of perceived levels of corruption are a consistent finding in the literature, and several studies show that its effect extends to support for democracy. Bratton et al. (2004, Ch. 11) show that corruption has a
strong effect on perceptions of democracy in Africa and that this effect is of a similar size to those of important variables such as trust in institutions and economic performance. Weitz-Shapiro (2008) analyses government performance across Argentinian municipalities and finds that citizens discriminate between different types of information when they evaluate how democracy works and the extent to which they are committed to democracy. While having to wait in long lines does not affect either, the provision of information and the perceived level of corruption affect satisfaction with democracy. The latter also negatively affects citizens’ commitment to democracy (but see Graham & Sukhtankar, 2004).

One important debate in the literature relates to the extent to which economic factors are more important than political and/or cultural factors regarding citizens’ support for democracy (Mishler & Rose, 1996; 2001; 2005; Shin et al., 1989). Chu et al. (2008) show that factors related to the electoral process and trust in democracy are just as important as individuals’ evaluations of the state of the national economy for citizens’ satisfaction with democracy (also see Chang et al., 2006). Economic factors such as economic growth, unemployment and inflation have also been found to affect satisfaction with democracy (Ezrow & Xezonakis, 2011; Wagner et al., 2009; Booth & Seligson, 2009).

Another strand of research analyses the influence of other policy-related issues (i.e., crime victimisation, subjective well-being and human development). Studies focused on Africa and Latin America show that individuals who have been victims of crime or feel unsafe are significantly less likely to be satisfied with democracy (Bratton et al., 2004; Booth & Seligson, 2009; Fernandez & Kuenzi, 2010). Social policy performance has been proxied using aggregate outcome-based measures, such as the human development index and an index of subjective well-being that combines individuals’ self-reported level of happiness, satisfaction with their life, state of health and financial situation (Norris, 2011, Ch.10). Similarly, Anderson and Singer (2008) analyse the effect of inequality, measured at the country level, on citizens’ trust in public institutions and satisfaction with democracy. They find that inequality does have a negative impact on those aspects of system support in European democracies. Likewise, Lühriste (2014) investigates the role that social protection policies play at both the aggregate and individual levels on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in Europe. She finds that social exclusion reduces satisfaction with democracy, while positive assessments of social protection policies have the opposite effect.

The democratic deficit

The concept of the “democratic deficit” links citizens’ demands for democracy with its perceived supply:

[T]he size of the democratic deficit derives from the overwhelming approval of democratic values and principles, which are widely expressed in most societies today, and yet the more skeptical evaluations of the democratic performance of governments, which are also relatively common.

(Norris, 2011, p. 31)
Building on Eckstein (1961), Norris further argues that a high level of congruence between the demand for and supply of democracy can be considered a signal of contentment with the status quo, and thus, the likelihood of regime instability should be low in such circumstances. However, when the size of the democratic deficit is large, there is room for the channelling of demands for change through political mobilisation (Norris, 2011, p. 33). This argument is consistent with leading theories of conflict suggesting that the gap between people’s aspirations and satisfaction can be a source of political instability and violence (e.g., Davies, 1962; Huntington, 1969; Gurr, 1970).

Figure 12.1 illustrates the extent of the democratic deficit in Latin America. Using data from the 2012 survey of the Latin American Public Opinion Project, Support for Democracy measures the extent to which citizens agree with the following statement: “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.” On the other hand, Satisfaction with Democracy measures the extent of citizens’ satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country.

Figure 12.1  The democratic deficit in Latin America
To estimate the Democratic Deficit, which is the difference between support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy, both variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Democracy enjoys high support in most countries. Whereas average support is well above 0.6 in all countries except for Honduras, average satisfaction with the way democracy works only reaches 0.6 in Uruguay. Ecuador, El Salvador and Honduras have relatively small democratic deficits due to their low levels of support for democracy and relatively high levels of democratic satisfaction. On the other hand, in Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Brazil, both support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy are above the regional average levels. Finally, Paraguay, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Guatemala and Bolivia have below regional average levels in terms of both support for and satisfaction with democracy.

After decades of sustained democracy in Latin America, fears of authoritarian reversals have dissipated, and scholarly attention has shifted towards the question of how to improve the quality of democracy (see Munck, 2004). As a political system democracy enjoys high levels of support in the region, as in most democracies around the world (Booth & Seligson, 2009; Norris, 2011). Moreover, protest participation has been normalized, and electoral politics are widely established. That is, electoral and protest mobilisation, along with other forms of participation (i.e., signing petitions, formulating local initiatives and contacting officials), are the most common channels used by citizens to voice their demands and express their discontent (Booth & Seligson, 2009, Ch. 5). It is thus plausible that the perceived democratic deficit in Latin America shares common sources with political participation.

This chapter examines the following hypotheses:

H1. Citizens’ dissatisfaction with the quality of education and health services increases the democratic deficit.
H2. Citizens’ demands for redistributive policies increase the democratic deficit.
H3. Citizens’ dissatisfaction with the quality of education and health policies is positively associated with the exercise of political citizenship.
H4. Citizens’ demands for redistributive policies are positively associated with the exercise of political citizenship.

Description of variables

Outcome variables

I use data from the 2012 survey of the LAPOP for 18 Latin American democracies. The countries included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. The main outcome variables are the Democratic Deficit – the difference between support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy – and several variables for measuring political participation: Voted, Signed a Petition, Solved a Community Problem and Protest
Participation. To measure political participation, I used several questions that ask individuals whether they have voted in the last elections, whether they have signed a petition, whether they have participated in a protest in the last 12 months and how often they have contributed to solving a community problem. The first three variables are coded $1 = \text{yes,} 0 = \text{no}$. Similarly, the variable for “solving a community problem” is coded as $1 = \text{“twice a month” and “once a week” and} 0 = \text{“never” and “once or twice a year.”}

Explanatory variables

To measure the extent of citizens’ Dissatisfaction with education and health, I calculate the average of individuals’ responses to two questions that ask about their level of satisfaction with the quality of public schools and the quality of medical and health services. The resulting variable ranges from 1 to 4 in increments of 0.5; the higher the value, the more dissatisfied an individual is with the quality of education and health policies. Demand for inequality-reduction policies measures the extent to which individuals agree that the government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. This variable ranges from 1 (strong disagreement) to 7 (strong agreement).

Control variables

Several control variables are included to account for other factors that may influence the democratic deficit and political participation. First, there is robust evidence that citizens who have been victims of crime are less satisfied with democracy and more likely to participate in politics (Bateson, 2012). Related work also shows that citizens’ evaluations of government’s actions to fight public insecurity affect their level of support for and satisfaction with democracy (Fernandez & Kuenzi, 2010). Thus, I include a control for whether the respondent has been a Victim of any type of crime in the last 12 months. The variable Government improves public safety accounts for the extent to which individuals believe that the government is tackling the problem of public insecurity. Potential answers range from one to seven, that is, from “not at all” to “a lot.”

To account for the potential relationship between economic conditions and satisfaction with democracy (e.g., Mishler & Rose, 1996), I include two indicators that measure citizens’ evaluations of their Country’s economic situation and their Personal economic situation. Both indicators range from one, “very good”, to five, “very bad.” I also include the level of Life satisfaction to capture individuals’ subjective assessment of their general well-being (Dalton et al., 2010). Potential answers range from one to five: “very dissatisfied” to “very satisfied.”

Several indicators account for individuals’ interest in and knowledge of politics. Individuals who report high levels of Interest in politics should be more likely to participate in politics and be more critical citizens (Norris, 2011). This variable ranges from one to four: “none” to “a lot.” Similarly, I include an indicator of News
attention to measure the frequency with which individuals are informed about politics. This variable ranges from one, “daily”, to five, “never.” Perception of corruption controls for political grievances associated with wrongdoings among public officials (e.g., Seligson, 2002). Potential answers range from one to four: “very uncommon” to “very common.” Left_right accounts for political ideology based on individuals’ self-placement on a left-right scale.

Following the studies on the participation of the indigenous population in social movements and protests (e.g., Van Cott, 2010; Yashar, 2005; Inclán, 2008), I include a dummy variable that identifies individuals who consider themselves to be Indigenous. Individuals who Voted for the incumbent were coded using an item that asks respondents who they voted for in the last presidential election. Those who voted for a candidate who won were coded as 1, and a value of 0 was used otherwise.

Finally, I include the usual socio-demographic controls. The level of education is measured with the number of Years of education that an individual has completed. Income measures individuals’ total monthly household income. This variable has 17 categories based on the currency and distribution of each country. Marital status identifies those individuals who are married. I also include an indicator for Gender, which takes a value of one for Female and zero otherwise. Unemployed individuals are distinguished from the rest. They are expected to experience larger democratic deficits and be more likely to engage in political participation to communicate their grievances. Finally, I also include an indicator for the Age of the individual and whether he/she lives in an Urban area.

Two additional factors that affect protest participation but not the democratic deficit have been included only in the analysis of political participation. These are the frequency with which individuals Participate in group meetings, ranging from two to nine (i.e., this is an average of responses regarding the frequency with which individuals attend community associations, professional associations and political party associations), and Use the internet, ranging from one to five. These variables have been reversed so that, the higher their value, the more frequent the reported activity. Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table 12.1 in the Appendix.

Results

Given the differing natures of the outcome variables, I use a linear regression for the analysis of the democratic deficit and a logistic regression for participation in elections, signing a petition, protest participation and solving a community problem. For the 2012 round, the LAPOP used the municipality as the primary sampling unit. The data are then nested in three levels: individual, municipality and country. Thus, all models are multilevel regressions with random intercepts, using the municipality and the country as the grouping variables at the second and third levels, respectively.

For presentation purposes, regression tables are reported in the Appendix (see Tables 12.2 and 12.3). Figure 12.2 summarises the results for the democratic deficit.
model. According to H1, the size of the democratic deficit is expected to widen as citizens’ dissatisfaction with the quality of education and health policies increases. The results shown in Figure 12.2 provide support for this hypothesis. The average marginal effect of Dissatisfaction with education and health policies is 0.06 and significant at the 0.001 level. The results also support H2, suggesting that the democratic deficit widens as the level of individuals’ support for redistributive policies increases. The average marginal effect of Demand for inequality-reduction policies is 0.03, and it is significant at the 0.001 level.

Figure 12.3 shows the effects of both explanatory variables on the size of the democratic deficit. At low levels of Dissatisfaction with education and health policies, the democratic deficit is around 0.07. As dissatisfaction increases, the democratic deficit widens, and at the highest level of dissatisfaction with public services, the predicted value of the size of the democratic deficit reaches over 0.25. Similarly, the size of the democratic deficit increases as citizens’ support for government intervention to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor increases. At the maximum level of support for inequality-reduction policies, the predicted size of the democratic deficit is around 0.2. In sensitivity analyses, I re-estimated the main model on the democratic deficit shown in Figure 12.2, excluding the observations with negative values on the democratic deficit indicator, which could be a sign of
With regard to H3 and H4, Figure 12.4 plots the average marginal effects of the explanatory variables on each act of political participation. The left panel compares the models of voting and petitioning, and the right panel compares the results for community problem-solving and protest participation. The results show that Dissatisfaction with health and education policies and Demands for redistribution have differentiated effects depending on the participatory act. Considering the figure in the left panel, the results show that Dissatisfaction with education and health does not have a statistically significant relationship with either having voted in the last election or having signed a petition. However, Demand for redistribution is significantly associated with having voted in the last election and with having signed a petition. The results for engaging in solving a community problem and protest participation also show differentiated effects. While both Dissatisfaction with health and education policies and Demand for redistribution are positively associated with protest participation, as previous research has shown (Zarate-Tenorio, 2014; Justino & Martorano, 2019), neither Dissatisfaction with

Figure 12.3 Effects of main explanatory variables on the democratic deficit in Latin America
health and education policies or Demand for redistributive policies is associated with the participatory act of solving a community problem.

The results shown in Figures 12.3 and 12.4 provide insights to understand contemporary democratic politics in Latin America. They suggest that citizens expect their democracies to advance towards more inclusionary policies. The current status quo of deep inequalities and insufficient quality social services and their consequences for the democratic deficit communicate failed expectations on the part of citizens. Moreover, citizens are expressing these unmet expectations by resorting to conventional forms of political participation like voting and signing petitions to shape public policy and induce change towards more inclusionary policies. Support for redistribution encourages all forms of political participation, except for solving community problems. This result is expected since demands for redistribution policies are naturally targeted towards the state, while the act of organizing for solving community problems is likely to revolve around the specific issues affecting the communities. In tandem with conventional forms of political participation, popular protest represents a political instrument through which citizens express discontent, raise their demands and pursue social policy change towards more egalitarian societies. The intertwining nature of the different elements of citizenship -political, civil and social- and their relationship to the welfare state that is central to this book (for an elaboration on this see Chapter 1 by Haug) manifests in Latin American societies in the exercise of
political citizenship for the quest of social inclusion in a segmented welfare state that grants access to social policies with differing quality among citizens.

Finally, all the control variables show the expected relationships with the outcomes analysed here. First, the size of the democratic deficit increases as individuals’ views on the Country’s economic situation and their own Personal economic situation worsen. Regarding public safety, whereas having been a Victim of crime does not affect the democratic deficit, believing that the government is improving public safety does reduce the democratic deficit. This suggests that it is citizens’ evaluations of how efficiently the government tackles public insecurity that matters for reducing the democratic deficit, not having experienced crime. Evaluations of the Country’s economic and one’s Personal economic situation are also positively associated with a larger democratic deficit. On the other hand, the effect of Life satisfaction is not statistically significant. Unsurprisingly, beliefs of widespread corruption among public officials increase the democratic deficit.

In addition, the democratic deficit is larger for individuals who report higher levels of Interest in politics. In contrast, News attention does not significantly affect the gap between support and satisfaction with democracy. The more rightist an individual considers herself, the larger the democratic deficit. As expected, for individuals who Voted for the incumbent, the democratic deficit is reduced. The socio-economic variables Education, Age, Income and being Unemployed were positively associated with the democratic deficit. Other variables, such as being Indigenous, Marital status, Female and living in an Urban area do not significantly affect the democratic deficit.

On the other hand, the control variables for all the participatory acts are also as expected. Having experienced crime is positively associated with citizen participation in each act analysed here. This is consistent with previous research that has shown the positive effect of being a victim of crime on political participation and other forms of citizen participation (Bateson, 2012). Not surprisingly, citizens who report a high level of Interest in politics, as well as those who Participate in group meetings, are more likely to become engaged in all forms of participation. On the other hand, individuals who place themselves more to the right on the Left_right political spectrum are less likely to join a protest or participate in solving a community problem. In line with studies that emphasize the role of Indigenous people in social movements, these citizens are significantly more likely to protest as compared to other ethnic groups. However, they are not more likely than other groups to participate in elections, sign petitions or solve community problems. Importantly, the results reveal that Internet usage is positively and significantly associated with protest participation and petitioning. Surprisingly, the Perception of corruption does not significantly affect participation in elections or protests or solving a community problem, but it is positively associated with petitioning. It may well be that political grievances related to corruption encourage other forms of political participation only in combination with other factors or events, such as the implementation of unpopular policies (see, e.g., Hochstetler, 2006).
Conclusion

The findings presented here have broader implications for the study of democracy, the welfare state and the exercise of citizenship in the region. It is well established that poverty, inequality, and the under-provision of public goods undermine the quality of democracy, as they may create conditions for “low-intensity” citizenship (O’Donnell, 1993). However, recent developments in the region shed new light on how the segmented nature of the welfare state shapes demands and discontent regarding social policy issues. By showing that political citizenship is exercised for advancing the social policy agenda in the region, this chapter adds to recent contributions signalling progress towards more inclusionary efforts over the last decade (Kapiszewski et al., 2021). Citizens expect democracies to reduce inequality and deliver high-quality education and health services. Poor performance in these areas is associated with a wider democratic deficit in the region. Likewise, dissatisfaction with the performance of governments on these issues is positively associated with engaging in several participatory acts.

References


### Table 12.1  Summary Statistics

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Demands for social inclusion in truncated welfare states

Table 12.3 Models of the Democratic Deficit and Citizen Participation Multilevel Logistic Regressions with Random Intercepts

<table>
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<th>(1) Democratic Deficit</th>
<th>(2) Petition</th>
<th>(3) Community</th>
<th>(4) Protest</th>
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Standard errors in parentheses

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Note: Table 12.2 reports the hierarchical linear regression model of the democratic deficit, and Table 12.3 reports the corresponding models of citizens’ participation. The number of observations varies within each model because the question on democratic satisfaction, which was used to calculate the democratic deficit, was only asked to half of the interviewees. However, given that this question was asked randomly in every country (i.e., only to individuals with odd questionnaires), potential concerns about selection bias can be ruled out.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Democratic Deficit</th>
<th>(2) Petition</th>
<th>(3) Community</th>
<th>(4) Protest</th>
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Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
13 Citizenship in democratic welfare states

A typology of social exclusion

Marianne Takle and Asgeir Falch-Eriksen

Introduction

The core purpose of citizenship is to determine an individual’s formal membership in a political community (Isin & Nyers, 2014). This implies two types of relationships: one is between the state and the citizens in the form of rights and duties, and the other is between the citizens themselves. We may argue, as Preuss (2016) does, that these types of relationships are closely connected. Possessing individual rights and duties and being a member of a political community are two sides of the same coin. Consequently, being a citizen involves access to rights and duties as a member of a political community regulated by the state.

In this book, we have examined three phenomena in combination. Firstly, we are concerned with citizens who are at risk of being socially excluded. We have studied the requirements set by the state for citizens to be eligible for social benefits, and we have studied citizens who struggle to exercise their rights in practice as members of society. These citizens are all at the margins of the welfare state. The threat of poverty and social exclusion is increasing in Europe. As Falch-Eriksen discussed in Chapter 2, in 2021, Eurostat released the statistical claim that one-fifth of the EU population was at risk of poverty and social exclusion. In 2020, almost one quarter of the child population was at risk of poverty and social exclusion (Eurostat, 2022).

Secondly, we concentrate on welfare states. The core notion of the welfare state is that the state has collective responsibility for the well-being of its citizens. As Haug thoroughly discussed in Chapter 1, there are many different forms of welfare states, and post-war welfare states have changed over time (Kourachanis, 2020). Our main concern is that the status quo that has brought peace and prosperity to the post-war welfare states is currently threatened by a series of challenges. As discussed in the Introduction to this volume, many challenges expressed and resolved at the national level stem from changes crossing national borders. In this book, we have discussed how environmental damage has put pressure on states to find new sustainable solutions for future welfare. We have shown how the COVID-19 pandemic, which rapidly spread to all corners of the world, was putting even more pressure on citizens’ social lives. States are deregulating markets within the framework of global liberal capitalism. Accordingly, we have seen increasing economic insecurity for many citizens, with growing difficulties in accessing the labour market.

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for marginalised groups. Furthermore, we have shown how borders that were once open to people who are living increasingly transnational lives were closed during the COVID-19 pandemic. This raised questions about solidarity across national borders and also how each state could provide for the welfare of its own citizens.

Thirdly, we concentrate on constitutional democracies. In a constitutional democracy, the citizens are the authors of the law, and this gives legitimacy to the rule of law. As Falch-Eriksen thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, for a democratic welfare state, modern citizenship includes constitutional rights, democratic rights and social welfare rights within one membership scheme that each member carries equally as part of the social and political order. It is important that the citizens decide the democratic rights to political participation for themselves. In this way, citizenship establishes a concept of egalitarian justice and lays out a formal expression of solidarity. In a democratic welfare state, studies of citizenship can therefore tell us the extent to which common norms are shared between its members, as well as whether these norms are built to ensure continuous and simultaneous social reproduction and integration. Studying citizenship and how these political and social mechanisms function can provide us with key insights into the threat of social exclusion.

The ongoing war in Ukraine is intensifying many of these challenges. It is changing our understanding of the possibilities of war in Europe and increasing our compassion for those who stand in the middle of it. The war has also intensified the energy crisis in Europe, which will have significant consequences for citizens living on the economic margins.

By focusing on the risk of social exclusion for citizens in the democratic welfare state, our aim has not been to assess the merits or shortcomings of the welfare state per se. Instead, we have used the empirical cases to throw light on challenges that are relevant across nation-states attempting to maintain and improve their welfare systems (Taylor-Goodby, 2019). Parallel to the changes in democratic welfare states, citizenship is constantly being reconstructed (Clarke, 2022; Kourachanis, 2020). There is therefore a constant need for empirically based analyses of which mechanisms lead to the social exclusion of citizens, as well as how different concepts of citizenship can help us understand this exclusion.

The purpose of this chapter is to show how a concept of citizenship can create new insights into how we collectively coordinate and resolve social challenges through the democratic welfare state. To narrow down this broad topic, we concentrate on two specific questions: What kind of political and social mechanisms are at play when citizens are exposed to exclusion, and how would different concepts of citizenship respond to social exclusion?

The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first part, we discuss the role of citizenship in democratic welfare states and various mechanisms of social exclusion. In the second part, we analyse how various categories of people live at the margins of the welfare state. This is based on the findings derived from the empirical studies in the chapters of this book. In the third part, we suggest a typology for social exclusion based on how four ideal types of citizenship respond to social exclusion within democratic welfare states. Finally, we conclude by discussing how any form of social
exclusion is a cause for concern and, in most cases, the very purpose of the welfare state is to solve these problems.

Part I: citizens and the mechanisms of social exclusion

The scholarship on citizenship often refers to citizenship as the sum of civic, political and social (welfare) rights. This definition originates from the well-known categorisation performed by Marshall (1950). The sum of these rights constitutes the fundamental formal building blocks of the legal status of citizenship, that is, the status of a legal personhood that carries a set of legally specified rights (Cohen, 1999). As discussed in Chapter 1 of this book, Marshall kicked off modern citizenship studies. While civil rights emerged in the eighteenth century, the political right to vote originated in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, citizenship expanded along with social rights as a virtue of membership within a community aimed at securing the well-being of its members (Marshall, 1950). The substantial content of citizenship thereby becomes a fundamental formal, political and normative reality for the nation-state and what it means to be a member of it. In parallel to citizenship there is a corresponding and fundamental duty on the part of the nation-state to enforce rights. Consequently, rights can have massive implications if the nation-state performs its formal duties of enforcing rights, and as it does, the nation-state can address social exclusion very differently depending on how citizenship is conceived.

In this regard, social exclusion can be used as an analytical tool with which to unravel what different types of citizenship do when confronted by exclusion, as well as how they react within a welfare state that is created to ensure the welfare of each member in one way or another. The social dimension of citizenship connects the individual explicitly to the welfare state via the way it refers to individuals’ social rights and duties in relation to their individual welfare. The root of this dimension can again be found in Marshall’s (1950) studies. He was concerned with how social inequality led to obstacles to citizens’ participation in social, cultural and political life. In contrast to how capitalism led to increased inequality, citizenship represents the principle of equality and social integration (Marshall, 1950). For Marshall and scholars who have followed his ideas, it is a shared understanding that individuals who do not have social rights or who have social rights that are not enforced are excluded from exercising their full membership in the political community to which their citizenship belongs (Kourachanis, 2020). By extension, we can argue that social rights become crucial in the effort to safeguard each individual’s dignity and ensure that a sense of justice pervades society through social redistribution (Habermas, 2010).

While citizenship has traditionally been a tool with which to ensure the inclusion of individuals into a polity, it has always implied the exclusion of non-members, that is, those who do not carry membership and cannot take part in the political community or receive welfare benefits and services (Bauböck et al., 2006). There are zones of differentiated access to rights, in which some individuals only have access to certain rights and duties without having access to all of them. Many social
rights and obligations are detached from formal national citizenship in most European welfare states (Dominelli & Moosa-Mitha, 2016). For instance, the right to cash benefits, including sick pay and disability benefits, unemployment benefits, old age pensions and paid parental leave, is generally linked to formal employment and paying statutory social insurance contributions. This shows what Bauböck et al. (2006) calls a mismatch between citizenship and the territorial scope of legitimate authority. This mismatch between state, territory and people also leads to the questioning of citizenship as a meaningful practice.

Nevertheless, classical sociology reminds us that social and political orders, such as the nation-state, depend on social integration to reaffirm, sustain and reinvent themselves across time (Habermas, 1996; Held, 1996; Parsons, 1951; Weber, 2001 [1930]). In this regard, citizenship, if properly construed, can act as a significant integration mechanism. The idea is that citizenship, as a set of civil, political and social rights and as a political practice, can help create feelings of belonging to a political community. Social inclusion is the active public effort to sustain social and political order by including and integrating each member of the social order as a citizen. The ways different approaches to social inclusion include citizens also vary regarding how they deal with social exclusion.

Social exclusion can imply anything from a barely significant inequality to an indicator of the disintegration of the social and political order. Citizenship is connected to the threat that social exclusion poses to a nation-state’s social and political order because of the fact that it is based on the idea that each person is bestowed with a membership that entails a specific configuration of individual rights and duties for all (Cohen, 1999; Marshall, 1950). By distributing citizenship equally within a nation-state and configuring it through democratic means according to what the population would want from such membership, citizenship becomes integrative to the social community itself. It carries with it many of the societal expectations that serve to bind society together.

The proportion of national citizens with civil and political rights but not social rights seems to be growing across European welfare states. As we also discussed in the Introduction, Bloemraad et al. (2019) call this “membership without social citizenship.” They describe how a broadening of legal, social and cultural membership in Western societies appears to be accompanied by a reduction in the social rights of citizenship. The authors’ point of departure is Marshall’s argument that modern societies are characterised by a progressive extension of civil, political and social rights to a more significant number of individuals, recognising, in principle, the right of the citizens to a minimum standard of living. In terms of the extension of rights, Bloemraad et al. (2019) show how new and diverse groups, such as racial, sexual and religious minorities and immigrants, gain access to formal national citizenship in Western societies more easily than they did 50 years ago. However, in contrast to Marshall’s expectations, Bloemraad et al. (2019) do not see an extension of the distribution of welfare resources given the simultaneous granting of social rights to these citizens. The authors document more demanding judgments about who should receive access to public assistance in the form of either increasingly harsh judgements about who “deserves” public support or “welfare
chauvinism.” While Bloemraad et al. (2019) show that the segment of the national citizens seen as deserving of redistributive support has shrunk, they conclude that this trend is not universal, linear or equal for all vulnerable groups and that there are differences between countries.

By extracting some standard features, Kourachanis (2020) elaborates on the transformation of the concepts of social citizenship and the welfare state in their parallel evolutionary paths from the post-war period to the present. He describes the changes over time in that social citizenship is transformed into responsible citizenship. Based on these changes, we will highlight two general tendencies. According to Kourachanis, the most critical transformation is the shift from an emphasis on social rights to an emphasis on citizens’ obligations and responsibilities, that is, a shift in emphasis from rights to civic duties. Another significant change is the shift from focusing on social class (cf. Marshall) to emphasising the cultural aspects of social inequality. While the first tendency concerns the social rights dimension of citizenship, the second relates to the membership aspect.

Kourachanis’s (2020) main point is that these changes in citizenship exist in parallel with the restructuring of the welfare state. In both areas, he sees conceptual and ideological shifts leading to the introduction of new conditions for citizens to be eligible for social benefits. He calls this an exclusion filter. Like the findings of Bloemraad et al. (2019), Kourachanis’s (2020) central point is that citizens must demonstrate that a rights claim is legitimate and that it triggers support, rather than receiving public assistance, as a type of right extended to everyone in the polity. Accordingly, we elaborate on the political and social mechanisms that may worsen social inclusion.

Part II: empirical findings – at the margins of the welfare state

In line with Kourachanis, we define an exclusion filter in terms of what citizens must demonstrate to be eligible for a social benefit from the state. Furthermore, we distinguish between two types of exclusion filters. The first consists of the eligibility criteria the citizen must meet to obtain goods and services based on their social rights. The second is the citizen’s struggle to exercise his or her rights in practice. Both types of exclusion filters can be at work simultaneously, as well as in various combinations. By more closely examining each chapter’s contributions, we elaborate on whether and how we can observe an exclusion filter in terms of the conditions for a citizen to be included socially.

As discussed in the introduction, the volume is organised around a distinction between legal-political and sociological perspectives on citizenship. In line with the legal-political perspective, some chapters study laws, public policies, and bureaucratic logics governing citizens’ access to social protection. Other chapters apply the sociological perspective and examine subjective feelings of membership, belonging or identity, as well as opportunities to participate actively and be included in different areas of society. This involves how individuals and groups experience the consequences of how laws and public policies are implemented in practice.
In this concluding chapter, we go beyond the legal-political versus sociological distinction to show that these types of relationships are connected. As discussed earlier, having special rights and duties and being a member of a political community are two sides of the same coin (Preuss, 2016). The following analyses are organised around how the chapters examine different categories of people with common challenges, specifically those who live at the margins of the welfare state: people with disabilities, people who are unemployed, families with children in vulnerable life situations, people crossing national borders, people who express discontent over social welfare schemes and, finally, future generations.

**People with disabilities** are often excluded from the labour market (Vornholt et al., 2018). In many countries, the employment rate of people with disabilities is significantly lower than that for those without disabilities. For disabled people, this form of marginalisation has been a critical marker of social exclusion (Barnes & Mercer, 2005). This is the theme of both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this volume. In Chapter 4, Kaja Larsen Østerud, Janikke Solstad Vedeler and Nora Framstad show how employers' perspectives on hiring disabled workers resonate with the Norwegian work inclusion policy, the Inclusion Dugnad enacted in 2018–2022. This policy was introduced with a welfare state sustainability narrative, highlighting how employers should contribute to the societal economy by hiring disabled people. State employers struggled to meet the quota. The political and social mechanisms of this exclusion process are such that employing disabled people is portrayed as a charitable act, and the hiring employers have trouble addressing disability as an asset. This is an exclusion filter concerning how the policy was communicated and practised, as it reproduces the idea that disabled people do not live up to the image of the ideal worker. From this chapter, we learn that attempting to incentivise employers to hire disabled people for the sake of the welfare state, in effect, concedes that disabled people fail to live up to employers' notion of an ideal worker, rendering them second-class workers.

Employers' role as crucial actors in disability employment policy work is also the central theme of Chapter 5. With data from the United States, Jaskirat Kohli and Janikke Solstad Vedeler describe laws attempting to extend economic and social security to individuals with disabilities. Still, these are not enough to improve the social exclusion these citizens experience. The political and social mechanisms of this social exclusion are related not to a lack of laws but, rather, to whether or not employers extend group membership to individuals with disabilities. Three types of exclusion filters are revealed based on the dynamics of ingroup/outgroup membership. Firstly, efforts to improve job prospects for women and ethnic minorities cloak the exclusion of individuals with disabilities. Secondly, the employers' perceived threat of lawsuits fosters a compulsion to engage in compliance and cost/risk analyses. Thirdly, employers judge individuals with disabilities as inferior to those without disabilities. We learn from this chapter that labour market participation is a civic right and duty, one that cannot be ensured without employer involvement.

**Unemployed people** can generally be seen as being at risk of social exclusion. This does not only apply to people with disabilities, as discussed earlier. Because the
right to meaningful employment is essential to discussions of citizenship, such exclusion implies that these citizens’ opportunities to participate in all areas of society are weakened. What does the state do if a citizen is unemployed in the short or long term? This question is explored in Chapters 3 and 9 using the Norwegian welfare state as a case. The welfare state does not guarantee its citizens the right to work, but if a citizen cannot provide for their subsistence, they have the right to income support from the state.

In Chapter 3, Kristian Heggebø and Axel West Pedersen show an example of a welfare state that introduced more inclusive unemployment benefit regulations in response to the increasing unemployment rate due to the COVID-19 pandemic. People with weak labour market attachment and/or non-standard employment contracts are not covered by the generous out-of-work benefit available in the Norwegian welfare system – a clear example of an exclusion filter. In March 2020, the Norwegian welfare state altered the eligibility criteria, replacement rates and the maximum period of income support so that the level of generosity increased noticeably. The policy changes revealed existing gaps in the unemployment benefit regulations – for example, the precarious position experienced by freelancers, the self-employed and newly graduated students. While all policy amendments were explicitly announced as temporary, the chapter concludes by questioning whether these changes could have any long-term implications by leading the policy domain in a more inclusive direction. An important lesson from this chapter is that the Norwegian welfare state responded to deteriorating economic conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic with more social inclusion for a disadvantaged group, namely unemployed people without access to the unemployment benefit. This generous out-of-work benefit will no longer exclude citizens with weak labour market attachment and/or non-standard employment contracts if the temporary changes become permanent.

In contrast to the above focus on citizens who are active in the labour market but temporarily out of work, in Chapter 9, Helle C. Hansen and Erika Gubrium reveal how service users who do not obtain paid employment often circulate in the welfare system over time. The chapter shows how the service users experience Norwegian activation policies to prevent social exclusion through labour market participation. The social mechanisms are both inclusive and exclusive. In terms of civic participation, the programme is affirmative – in the short term for those who are in the programme and in the long term for those who find work after participating. A vital exclusion filter is that the qualification programme is based on an adult worker norm, with the expectation of full-time programme participation. This universal norm prevents the possibility of transformative change. From this chapter, we learn that activation may result in the further subordinated status and social exclusion of citizens who already experience difficulties complying with the societal norm of participation and becoming a full member of society.

Families with children in vulnerable life situations may be excluded from critical aspects of citizenship in at least two ways. One form of exclusion would be the result of state bodies intervening in family life so that children and parents lose the right to family life. The other form of exclusion is that the state does not support or
intervene in families that need help to enable individual family members to become full members of society. These forms of state interference in families, or the lack thereof, are crucial for social inclusion and exclusion from family life and participation in the broader community.

While respect for family life allows parents and children to enjoy one another’s company without state interference, there is also a need to protect the child’s right to be sheltered from abuse and neglect within the family. Consequently, Child Protection Services (CPS) is legally mandated to protect family life and remove children from their parents in some situations. As Simen Mørstad Johansen shows in Chapter 6, this state–parent–child triangle can be balanced in different ways in national laws and policies concerning the legal rights to child protection. Such differences must, however, be seen within the framework of how international human rights conventions set standards for how democratic welfare states should protect family life and, thereby, the cosmopolitan citizenship of the child, which is based on these standards. Accordingly, the chapter reveals various political mechanisms in Romania and Norway regarding how preventive child protection and family welfare policies emphasise parents’ education. In Romanian legislation, there is a solid, explicit emphasis on the responsibility of the parents, and there is a low threshold for providing measures to improve parental competence. In contrast, Norwegian legislation focuses on the rights of the child, and the legislation lacks a focus on parental competence. The result may be exclusion from family life. From this chapter, we learn that Norwegian legislation and policies regarding parents’ education are not in line with international human rights conventions.

As mentioned earlier, families with children can also be excluded from society due to a lack of support from the state. In Chapter 8, Sigurd Eid Jacobsen and Kjetil Klette-Bøhler take inspiration from recent theories on affective citizenship to offer an analysis of the affective ramifications of being entitled to or excluded from social services, education and health. Empirically, the authors focus on qualitative interviews that explore how Norwegian families with disabled children experienced societal participation and access to welfare services during the pandemic. The study shows how the pandemic hampered these families’ well-being, as well as their participation in society more broadly, because several welfare services were shut down due to infection-control measures. More importantly, social exclusion had deep affective consequences for those involved, as it generated tears, anger, frustration and feelings of being abandoned by the welfare apparatus according to the informants. More importantly, such feelings were socially mediated in complex ways during the pandemic, as it placed increased pressure on the family at large. According to the author, the focus on affective citizenship and the emotional costs of social exclusion fills a lacuna that is often neglected by citizenship scholars who focus exclusively on the allocations of rights and duties while neglecting citizenship’s affective ramifications. We learn from this chapter that infection-control measures hampered families’ sense of recognition within Norwegian society.

People crossing national borders are often excluded from parts of society that are more easily accessible to citizens who live their whole lives within the territory of one nation-state. By crossing national borders, they do not fit within the
traditional understanding of (ideal-typical) distinctions between nation-states on which citizenship is based, in which there is a correspondence between territory, state administration and population (Preuss, 2016). This applies to people who live transnational lives, that is, those on the border between multiple legal statuses and those who move permanently from one country to another.

These challenges became even more pressing during the COVID-19 pandemic. As Justyna Bell, Anne Balke Staver and Ida Tolgensbakk show in Chapter 11, the travel restrictions introduced because of the pandemic affected non-citizens with ties to Norway and Norwegian citizens with family ties crossing national borders. The chapter finds that some individuals have experienced that their relationship to Norway has become weaker than they had previously anticipated, while others have been confronted with a situation in which their citizenship status was inadequate to secure their family life. This chapter shows how COVID-19 has exposed the disjuncture between the legal rules and the lived experiences of citizenship. Thus, in this case, the exclusion filter surfaces in the citizens’ struggle to exercise their rights as members of society.

For immigrants who have permanently moved from one country to another, the challenges are not travelling restrictions and border control but, rather, whether and how they can become full members of a community. They become well integrated into society’s major arenas legally, politically and socially in the Marshallian sense of citizenship. Immigrants are usually disadvantaged economically for some years after arrival. Still, one may assume that their economic and financial situation will gradually approach that of comparable natives. However, in Chapter 10, Jon Ivar Elstad and Kristian Heggebø analyse the economic incorporation of African and Asian refugees in Norway, showing that this is not always the case. The chapter reveals that the income gap “up” to the natives narrowed rapidly during the first years after arrival, but the positive trend was soon reversed because the income gap increased again after some ten years of residence. Moreover, a more recent refugee cohort that arrived around 2010 had actually a worse income trajectory than an earlier refugee cohort that arrived around 2000. Persistent precarious labour market attachment seems to be a major reason for such unfortunate tendencies, but the analyses also indicated that lower educational levels among recent refugee cohorts could be involved. An important lesson we draw from this chapter is that, in the long run, a lack of economic incorporation may lead to lasting marginalised citizenship status for African and Asian refugees in Norway.

**People who express discontent over social welfare schemes** may have civil and political rights, which makes it possible to express their dissatisfaction. This means they use their political rights to protest against social exclusion. This is the theme Barbara A. Zarate-Tenorio discusses in Chapter 12. She shows how people exercise citizenship in the quest for social inclusion in truncated welfare states in Latin America. Using data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project for a sample of 18 countries, the chapter reveals that the democratic deficit is widening. The chapter shows how discontent over public social services and support for redistribution are positively associated with several forms of political participation among citizens, such as voting in general elections, signing petitions, community projects
and protests. One essential political mechanism affecting this political participation seems to be that citizens in this region expect democracies to reduce inequality and deliver a good quality of welfare services. This chapter explains how political citizenship rights are exercised within the struggle for social citizenship rights in democracies with truncated welfare states.

**Future generations** can be defined as young individuals who do not have the right to vote and individuals who have not yet been born. They are excluded from the welfare states because they have little or no influence on current political decisions regarding their welfare. This implies they are highly dependent on the political choices made by the present generations, who can also affect the future ecosystem more than ever. Due to these political and social mechanisms, in Chapter 7, Marianne Takle develops analytical tools that can be used to understand what it would mean to include future generations in the contemporary concept of citizenship. The aim is to bring future challenges closer to the current generations’ lives, allowing us to better understand what is required of us today if we include future generations in our welfare state considerations. By applying these tools to Norway, as an example of how around 30 countries have included ecological protection clauses for future generations in their constitution, the chapter shows conflicting ideas about whether to impose long-term political and legal restrictions on the current generations. What we can learn from this chapter is how global environmental challenges to the welfare state have led to contestations over national boundaries and cosmopolitan ideas intended to ensure the welfare of future generations.

Altogether, the various chapters show how different forms of exclusion filters are at work when marginalised groups or, more precisely, categories of people are excluded from different arenas in society. Some citizens have challenges meeting the requirements to obtain social rights, while others struggle to exercise their rights and duties in practice as full members of society. In some cases, we also find citizens who both face challenges to meet the requirements to obtain social rights and struggle to exercise their rights and duties. Moreover, the chapters show how some citizens are excluded from different arenas within society. While some are excluded from working life, others are excluded from having a family life, and still others are excluded from participating in political and social life at large. Our main point is that all these forms of exclusion affect these individuals as citizens, particularly their need for economic security and the opportunity to live a decent life.

**Part III: a typology for social exclusion**

The main lesson we draw from these empirical studies is that the different forms and arenas of exclusion affect individuals as citizens. We have shown how social exclusion encompasses a series of different situations in which individuals become detached from the social and political order. Whatever type of social exclusion exists, there is the potential for a greater understanding of how it works, including the political and social mechanisms at play.

What are the common denominators of social exclusion? How can we better understand the interconnection between social exclusion and citizenship in democratic
welfare states? One approach to understanding social exclusion is to refer to social exclusion instead of poverty (see Byrne, 2005), but this type of definition seems more like rebranding poverty as a euphemism than bringing in something new. A more tangible approach, which brings in something new, is to connect exclusion to that which it is excluding individuals from, namely the interconnected roles of the social and political order at large, as well as the congruent sense of non-belonging that follows from exclusion. This can entail poverty, but the point of departure is the mechanism causing the disintegration of the social and political order and exclusion from it, as currently configured. With a focus on the dynamics of disintegration, social exclusion can be a common denominator for a wide range of observable phenomena (see Byrne, 2005).

In this book, we have applied a concept that is better equipped at understanding not only social exclusion but also the extent to which it is a threat to a particular social and political order. Such a concept may also be able to explain what is implied by social exclusion when the role of citizenship enters the equation, including when the citizen, by virtue of citizenship, is being pushed towards the fringes of society. Citizens can be pushed or even relegated to the periphery of society, where the benefits of being a member of society incrementally decrease, opportunities are gradually revoked and simply living life becomes difficult. For a nation-state set to ensure the welfare of its citizens, such a scenario is contrary to its very purpose.

In this concluding chapter, we aim to further develop the relationships between citizenship and social exclusion. We draw on four ideal types of approaches to citizenship to make sense of the different forms of social exclusion: instrumentalism, communitarianism, civic-republicanism and cosmopolitan citizenship. These ideal types are thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, and here, we recapture their major aspects, with the aim of developing a typology of social exclusion. These types can be applied to empirical studies and developed further in future research.

Now, with regard to these ideal types, empirically, they are very often all at play within nation-state contexts. However, using the types as a conceptual grid for analytical purposes, based on different modes of rationality of democratic self-govern-ment, will enable us to elaborate on the different types of social exclusion that are operative, to what degree they are operative and what effects they may have. We seek to enable scholars to provide new insights into the conceptual intercon-nections between citizenship, social exclusion and the democratic welfare state.

In this respect, landing on four traditional ideal types may seem reductive, but the purpose of this approach is to show there is a need to better understand the concepts we already have, rather than seeking out new ones. Although there could be an even broader differentiation than our four ideal types of citizenship, we can assume they capture key principled differences in how a political order is estab-lished and functions. All of the ideal types have different underlying principles of membership roles of the citizenship and relate to national identity in different ways. Most importantly, they draw on widely different concepts of legitimate political ac-tion and social exclusion, which opens many paths to reducing the threat of social exclusion. In this way, we must also extrapolate these ideal types from different types of normative orders.
All these types of citizenship must be guaranteed materially, on a constitutional level, because the sovereign nation-state stands as the only entity that can enforce the rights and duties prescribed by citizenship. Thus, citizenship can imply different things depending on what type of nation-state one lives in and is contingent on the historical-political development of the normative composition of belonging to the membership. When we empirically investigate how a nation-state’s citizenship deals with social exclusion, it is pointless to think that one will find only one of the ideal types. One will always find a combination of the four.

Instrumental citizenship is stripped down in the sense that it is developed for the sole purpose of effective problem-solving and coordination. The legitimacy of the instrumental type of citizenship, in terms of welfare, is based on how effectively it enforces services. Because social exclusion can be deemed a threat to any social order, instrumental citizenship deals with exclusion in the most cost-efficient manner conceivable.

The Aristotelian version of communitarianism is an approach that establishes the nation as a pre-political entity (not necessarily in any factual sense) and that lays out the premise of belonging and identity. The idea of contextual belonging as a prerequisite for citizenship also denotes who the welfare state is supposed to serve, as well as the type of ethic the community at large possesses. According to this communitarian version, the threat of social exclusion is addressed by ensuring that individual citizens threatened with social exclusion are provided with education and opportunities according to the same moral compulsion as others within the community.

Within a communitarian understanding, only individuals who share pre-political bonds, based on blood or ancestry affiliated with a cultural community, can become or remain as citizens, where the state is not neutral with regard to social integration. Communitarianism thereby has an in-built foundationalist ethos, referring to what can be deemed metaphysical principles or complying with majority paternalism. The criteria one chooses for who can become members define the community and with whom one will act in solidarity. Social exclusion can be both about purifying the community from what is conceived of as disintegrating factors such as pluralism and also developing how the community works.

The civic republican approach is a product of the French Revolution. It altered the sense of belonging expected within the political order forever, as it made the nation into a political identity with a corresponding sense of belonging that could be designed and wielded as part of strategic political development for citizens of a democratic polity. The main difference with Aristotelian communitarianism is that the modern version is an ascribed national identity that can be defined in universal terms, as opposed to a contextual polity developed through belonging to contextual norms.

By being able to politically ascribe citizenship to a citizen’s sense of belonging within the parameters of the nation-state, national membership in the democratic polity is also acquired. By defining citizenship through politics within the nation-state, the contextual norms are replaced by a purely politically ascribed membership right. Citizens within a democratic polity receive their membership as part of a formally established community, not through descent. Thus, communities will comprise variations of many different sub-identities that are ascribed to the
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political community in question. However, within the civic republican approach, the building blocks of citizenship can vary greatly across time because this approach is supposed to be more attuned to the variations caused by the democratic rule of law. Consequently, what is defined as social exclusion and how to deal with it will vary across time and according to majority rule.

In the cosmopolitan type, the normative foundation is universal and typically associated with the demand to enforce a human rights standard through human rights norms. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is often cited as the origin document of human rights, but we also can add the series of international human rights conventions that have come about in its aftermath. A conventional approach to cosmopolitan citizenship is that it is a constitutionally settled guarantee for safeguarding each citizen’s dignity as a matter of right (Habermas, 2010). Consequently, human rights conventions are, in various ways, approached as a way to secure each individual citizen’s dignity. In this sense, human rights consist of rights norms that advocate the protection, emancipation or empowerment of each citizen equally.

Thus, cosmopolitan citizenship must be embedded in the rule of law as constitutional restraints with respect to other types of regulation. Rights would become meaningless if they could easily be set aside by interim majority rule, by single politicians or in any other arbitrary manner. Individual human rights must be accompanied by a duty to uphold rights claims whenever they are raised. This duty is universally distributed without discrimination so that each individual’s dignity is equally protected. Social exclusion thereby becomes an infringement on the protection of individual dignity. If any individual fails to achieve what they could reasonably lay claim to as compared to others with the same access, the infringement is a type of social exclusion relative to that person. In this manner, social exclusion becomes a violation of each individual’s dignity.

How citizenship is shaped through democratic law-making while simultaneously abiding by the constitutionality of basic rights, democracy and popular sovereignty guides the affirmation and reaffirmation of the citizenship design. Citizenship thereby combines the two main building blocks of law-making not as a “closed chapter in the history of ideas” but, rather, as a vital tool with which to secure and sustain order (Habermas, 1996). As long as constitutional rights norms are operative and guide popular sovereignty, law-making can be argued to be ultimately self-imposed and carry a claim of being legitimate. Popular sovereignty becomes embedded in the formal regulation of the citizenship construct and a part of democratic self-government. In this way, basic constitutional rights norms lay the ground for what can and cannot be done to any individual, as well as securing each person’s dignity. The constitutional protections that rights provide can thus be said to provide democratic law-making with a claim to legitimacy.

Conclusion – democratic design with constitutional restraints

The modern concept of citizenship was developed in the context of the modern nation-state, with industrialisation, the political regulation of capitalism, the expansion of democratic rights and developed welfare systems. In short, the nation-state itself has not existed in its current form for that long, and it has become the
strongest tool with which to ensure collective problem-solving and coordination, as well as keeping the social order integrated. The vast scholarly literature on citizenship that has developed has partly incorporated the enormous complexity of modern constitutional democratic welfare states, and there is a current debate about the reconstruction of the concept (Clarke, 2022). A crucial question is whether contemporary models of citizenship capture the new, complex and dynamic challenges to the democratic welfare state or if they, rather, blur this discussion and make the phenomena of citizenship meaningless.

In this concluding chapter, we have shown how a concept of citizenship can create new insights into how we collectively coordinate and address social challenges through the democratic welfare state. By focusing on social exclusion, we argue that the concept of citizenship is particularly relevant within a democratic welfare state context. The threat of social exclusion constitutes a source of tension against which democratic welfare states must always be vigilant if they are to abide by the basic doctrine of redressing unjust social exclusion and securing the welfare of all equally.

Furthermore, we have shown how the various chapters in this volume reveal the kinds of political and social mechanisms that are at play when citizens are exposed to exclusion. We discussed this in terms of the exclusion filters that are at work when marginalised categories of citizens are excluded from various arenas in society. We have shown how some citizens have challenges in meeting the requirements to obtain social rights, while others struggle to exercise their rights and duties in practice as full members of society. We have also shown how some citizens are excluded from working life, while others are excluded from family life and from participating in political and social life at large. The main lesson we draw from these empirical studies is that the different forms and arenas of exclusion affect individuals as citizens, particularly their need for economic security and the opportunity to live a decent life. Social exclusion encompasses a series of different situations in which individuals become detached from the social and political order.

Whatever type of social exclusion there is, there is the potential for a greater understanding of how it works and what political and social mechanisms are at play. To elaborate further on this, in this chapter we have suggested how different concepts of citizenship would respond to social exclusion. Based on our discussion in Chapter 2, we have drawn on four ideal types of approaches to citizenship: instrumentalism, communitarianism, civic-republicanism and cosmopolitan citizenship (Held, 1996). In this concluding chapter, we have developed a typology of social exclusion, as shown in Table 13.1.

**Table 13.1 Citizenship and social exclusion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Central legitimising norm</th>
<th>Socially excluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Efficient problem-solving</td>
<td>Non-identified problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communitarian</td>
<td>Ethical compliance</td>
<td>Non-belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Republican</td>
<td>Democratic participation</td>
<td>Inconsequential participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitan</td>
<td>Safeguard individual dignity</td>
<td>Individual dignity threatened</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The purpose of establishing such a typology is to better capture how different membership types establish different corresponding types of social exclusion, with different solutions following. We can also assume that, provided certain key challenges facing modern welfare states, certain solutions to social exclusion are unrealistic or even illegitimate.

While all these forms of exclusion are often at play within democratic welfare states, we find various combinations from one country to the next. By using this typology for analytical purposes, we can elaborate on the various types of social exclusion that are operative, to what degree they are operative and what effects they may have. In this respect, we seek to enable scholars to provide new insights into the conceptual connections between citizenship, social exclusion and the democratic welfare state.

Furthermore, the typology shows that how a democratic rule of law works has vast implications for whether social exclusion is dealt with. For instance, in parliamentary systems, democracy is accomplished via electing an assembly that, on a basic level, is intended to represent the entire population governed. However, those who govern are representing the winners of the election or the majority within the assembly. Based on the ruling majority’s priorities and choices of action, social exclusion of different kinds can receive different degrees of priority. In most cases, the whims and desires of majorities are what separate democracies. If the constitutional rights carried by citizens are respected and enforced, we can still see variation in both priorities and choices from one nation-state to the next. Some nation-states will choose to lean into citizenship that is more communitarian, thus treating social exclusion differently from, for instance, those that lean into cosmopolitanism.

Within a democratic welfare state, any type of social exclusion is a cause for concern, and in most cases, it is the very purpose of the welfare state to resolve. We can assume that the welfare of those excluded is, arguably, in peril due to exclusion. In many ways, the development of the democratic welfare state is motivated by a desire to prevent intolerable social exclusion among citizens and ensure political and social dynamics are in place that assist each citizen who is at the brink of exclusion so that they do not fall out of society (Goodin, 1986). With membership in welfare democracies, where a driving ethos is to ensure the welfare of each citizen, social exclusion becomes a matter for political craftsmanship; citizenship becomes a device that modern law-making can develop so as to regulate the interactions between strangers and redistribution, as well as ensuring a threshold of well-being.

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