

Victims' State

War and Welfare in Austria, 1868–1925

Ke-Chin Hsia



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To my mother, and in memory of my father

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VICTIMS' STATE



The Habsburg Monarchy after 1867



The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Borders of the Successor States. Adapted from "File: Dissolution of Austria-Hungary.png," *Wikimedia Commons*, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dissolution_of_Austria-Hungary.png (accessed 2 March 2022).

Introduction

IN LATE 1915, EIGHTEEN-YEAR-OLD Erich Wolfgang Korngold wrote “Österreichischer Soldatenabschied” (Austrian Soldier’s Farewell) to benefit war relief charities.¹ Inspired by the sad parting of soldiers and their loved ones, the song is sentimental but gently jaunty, the composer indicated; the simple lyrics, probably penned by Korngold himself, are optimistic. The soldier assures his beloved, “Do you believe every bullet strikes? / Do you think every bride grieves? / Up above lives the One who shields / the faithfully loved heart.” The soldier ends on a tender yet patriotic note: “So no tears, my girl! / Inspire me with your brave smile / to fight the foe with valor, / for the fatherland, and for you.”²

In 1921, Korngold returned to the soldier’s farewell song. Revising its key and harmony but keeping the melody mostly unchanged, he asked poet Ernst Lothar for a new set of lyrics. The resulting “Gefaßter Abschied” (Serene Farewell), part of the song cycle *Lieder des Abschieds* (*Farewell Songs*, Op. 14), conveys a very different mood. In place of the original stanza were these lyrics: “Take these flowers that I picked, / red China roses and carnations— / cast off the sorrow that oppresses you; / the heart’s blossom cannot wither.” The end is even more revealing: “Then look again at last on the lovely linden, / beneath which no eye ever espied us. / Believe, trust that I shall find you again, / for he who smilingly sowed will reap!”³ The 1915 original expressed subdued optimism in the face of uncertainty. In “Gefaßter Abschied,” the departing person is dead. The parting is permanent.⁴ The loved one who remains is poignantly asked to accept the separation as final in this world. The serenity comes from resignation, not innocent faith.

When Korngold composed the first version in 1915, the Habsburg Monarchy had already suffered a permanent military loss of three-quarters of a million in what became the First World War.⁵ The scale of the casualties was so immense that it touched even the sheltered musical prodigy, who in 1916 was called to serve and assigned to a regimental musician’s post in Vienna. But there were still hopes that the war would end in Austria-Hungary’s favor and the sufferings be given redemptive meaning. The end of the Habsburg world was far beyond the imagination of the greatest majority of its citizens. By 1920, the empire was gone and

the catastrophic human losses a daunting reality. From a soldier's farewell to the "Serene Farewell," wishful wartime assurance gave way to postwar recognition of the certainty of loss and the uncertainty of one's ability to cope. In the restrained but mournful 1921 revision, Korngold tried to come to terms with the war's undeniable devastation by asking himself, and his contemporaries, to be comforted by the memories of those they had lost and to bear the battered world with fortitude.

Korngold's reputation and connections spared him frontline duties and direct encounters with combat death or permanent disability.⁶ But millions of his fellow Habsburg citizens and subjects were not so fortunate. To them, the finality of the loss of a loved one or one's own health was a daily reality. Moreover, death or loss of health concerned much more than personal grief; they were matters of life and death for the households who had lost their breadwinners. In the small postwar Austrian Republic alone, it was estimated that over half a million out of the roughly 6 million total population could qualify as benefit-eligible war victims—disabled veterans, widows, orphans, and other surviving dependents of dead soldiers and war service workers.⁷ For Austria-Hungary as a whole, the early postwar estimate was that a total of 1.2 million soldiers perished out of the 8 million servicemen and 100,000 servicewomen mobilized from a total population of 52 million.⁸ As a result, the subsistence of at least several million people in Central Europe was endangered, during and after the war, by the loss of one or more family members. To them, the finality of a loved one's death was only the beginning of a difficult struggle for survival.

In the first year of war alone (August 1914 to July 1915), there were more than 900,000 wounded and 720,000 seriously ill soldiers from the Habsburg armed forces who had to be evacuated, in addition to more than 270,000 fallen and 830,000 taken prisoner.⁹ Even before a called-up citizen's death or disability, his prolonged absence for war service was already a severe blow to his loved ones' sustenance.¹⁰ The need to organize care and welfare provision was therefore both immense and urgent soon after the Monarchy's 28 July 1914 declaration of war on Serbia. Finding the necessary material resources, manpower, and medical, legal, and organizational expertise became a massive mobilization effort that forced rapid expansion of both state commitments and voluntary societal participation. After 1916, when the long-term social and economic consequences and immediate political repercussions of death and disability became increasingly ominous, ambitious reforms were proposed and undertaken. These wartime and early postwar arrangements responded to immediate subsistence and political crises. Representing both the continuation of longer-term trends and

revolutionary changes, they shaped the dynamics of state-citizen interaction in Imperial Austria's successor states.

These developments in war-related welfare politics are fundamental to the history of Habsburg Central Europe during the First World War and in the transition from the multiethnic Monarchy to the purportedly national successor states. They have been, however, mostly neglected in the histories of Imperial Austria (the western/Cisleithanian half of the Monarchy) and its successor states. In contrast to the Habsburg Monarchy's ally (and later overlord), Imperial Germany—which has received ample and sophisticated analysis especially in light of the debates over the perceived failure of the Weimar welfare state and the rise of National Socialism¹¹—for decades there were only contemporary or near-contemporary accounts by officials publishing self-serving information about post-1918 experiences.¹² More systematic studies of Imperial Austrian war victims and war welfare have gradually emerged over the last two decades. But with one exception,¹³ most of the valuable works focus on very specific aspects of wartime or postwar services.¹⁴ Or they are framed with an overall nation-state lens that inevitably assumes 1918 and the emergence of the new successor states was the natural point of departure for rigorous analysis.¹⁵ The successor nation-state frame of analysis is undeniably important. But it tends to marginalize key themes vitally relevant to postwar developments, such as the role of wartime experiences in debating and organizing welfare services, the continuity or change in the personnel and institutions, and especially the longer-term political dynamics of war victim welfare.¹⁶ The caesura of 1918 is thus assumed in spite of myriad imperial legacies and continuities.¹⁷

Austrian Citizen-Soldiers and Welfare Provision

This book offers the first integrated account of Austria's response to the needs of soldiers and their families when they faced the adverse consequences of soldiering from the nineteenth century to the early interwar years. It surveys the evolving legal and institutional context as well as the concrete actions taken by public and societal actors in confronting the massive losses in lives, health, and livelihoods, which still are largely unknown to historians of Central Europe and the First World War. It discusses what services were debated, deemed necessary, and delivered; what interventions were initiated and by whom; how they were organized; and what purposes they served. War victim welfare is analyzed as a field of interventions and engagements among multiple actors including public

authorities, semipublic agencies, voluntary organizations, and individual citizens (including war victims themselves). With diverse and sometimes incompatible aims, divergent priorities, and different resources and modes of operation, their attempts to meet overwhelming material, organizational, and administrative challenges in social provision during the war and after constantly reshaped war victim welfare. To describe and examine the field's evolution and internal dynamics, in other words, is to observe and analyze how the war transformed Austrian social politics and political culture more generally.

Grasping such transformation requires beginning earlier than the usual watershed of 1918. The revolutions of 1918, though extremely important, were not all determining in the realm of social policy and welfare politics in post-Habsburg Central Europe. The year 1918 did not mark a complete break with the past, no matter how much successor-state nationalists claimed that to be the case.¹⁸ The Austrian Republic is especially illuminating in this regard. The experience of Vienna—representing first the imperial center and then a vulnerable successor state (and in the Peace Settlements of 1919, a “loser” of the First World War)—shows that the general thrust of wartime welfare policy making persisted and remained on course, even though the Austrian Revolution of 1918 altered the dynamics within the war victim welfare field. Wartime activities, interactions, and tensions set precedents and parameters that in turn shaped expectations for reform as well as visions for postwar developments. Composer Korngold's reworking of his melancholic but patriotic song into a more profound expression of loss and sorrow is emblematic: 1918 was the key turning point, not the starting point. The postwar politics of welfare took place within a web of rules, institutions, practices, and assumptions that had been established before or during the war and then reshaped by wartime actions.

Tracing the origins of wartime and postwar welfare provision, this book charts a longer trajectory of state-citizen relations in Imperial Austria from before the introduction of universal male conscription in 1868. It examines whether the liberal reforms of the 1860s and specifically universal conscription, which ushered in a mass citizen army, signaled new conceptions about soldiers, citizenship, disability, and the state's welfare imperative that underpinned the prewar and wartime military welfare. This new lens allows for a fresh way to approach the history of the late Monarchy without assuming the all-encompassing centrality of nationalist politics. It builds on the revisionist works over the last four decades that have convincingly undermined old narratives about the inevitable decline and fall of the allegedly anachronistic Monarchy.¹⁹ Beyond affirming the new consensus that nationalist politics was compatible with the continuing existence

and even vibrancy of the multiethnic Habsburg polity, it looks at other aspects of public life that may not have been permeated or framed primarily by nationalist mobilizations and rivalries. In these places, citizens could and often did have their needs addressed as citizens, not first and foremost as putative members of this or that nationality. And officials and civil society actors can be seen trying to save their fellow citizens and the multiethnic Monarchy. Welfare politics may be highly nationalist in some instances,²⁰ but in others it opened a door to a less nationalist, even nonnationalist side of the changing political culture in Habsburg Central Europe.

Straddling the conventional historiographical divide of 1918 sheds new light on an underexamined aspect of the First World War in the Habsburg lands: organized benevolence and public provision of care. Rather than the suffering, privation, exploitation and their corollaries in social breakdown, economic collapse, and political revolts,²¹ this book looks at state and societal efforts that were war supporting and centripetal. In doing so, it bridges two potentially conflicting recent historiographies of the late Imperial Austria. The revisionist literature emphasizes the existence of a dynamic and mutually adapting state-civil society relationship and argues that the Habsburg polity was “neither absolutism nor anarchy” in its last decades.²² However, a much bleaker picture is painted by historians of the wartime society and politics of “domestic military imperialism.”²³ They argue that the vengeful Habsburg military attempted to depoliticize Austria, destroy the civil administration’s constitutional and rule-of-law culture, relegate civil society to a subservient status, and monopolize material resources at the expense of the home front, in effect waging a war against its own civilian population.²⁴ In this scholarship, the previously active civil society seems to have been thoroughly deprived of its basis for effective public engagement. Shifting the focus to the war welfare field makes clear that civil society was to some extent still resourceful and resilient. The indispensable welfare activism especially shows that the prewar state-society dynamics—in the institutional political realm—continued in another sphere of action despite the military’s suppression attempts. With the casualties reaching millions, the war victim welfare field itself gained importance as a key arena of legitimate and permitted intervention in public affairs.²⁵ At its core, war victim welfare was intensely political and had strong inclusive potentials even under the extreme circumstances of a totalizing war and a revolution.

The war compelled Imperial Austrian officials to undertake a desperate but ambitious welfare state building because the multinational Habsburg Monarchy, unlike other major belligerents, could not deploy nationalism to generate

a midconflict “second mobilization”; nor could it at least sustain what a French historian called “patriotic gloom” among the general population.²⁶ Their efforts to centralize, systematize, and expand welfare provision, despite ultimately failing to save the Monarchy, had significant postwar resonance. In the perilous landscape of postwar Central Europe, the Austrian Republic continued on the same étatist path despite the deep involvement of civil society actors in the wartime “public” welfare system. The Republic’s leaders sought to build legitimacy and a sense of purpose for the new polity by formally enshrining a robust entitlement citizenship through welfare legislation. The same general strategy was adopted in at least two other successor states, Czechoslovakia and Poland.²⁷ This state-centered welfare expansion was the culmination of the increasing importance of war-related social welfare for citizens in Habsburg Central Europe since 1868. The critically important path-dependency of policy choices and welfare state building across the 1918 divide therefore had a dual character: while democracy and welfare became the Republic’s primary justifying planks, its war victim welfare system followed and amplified the centralizing étatist tendencies that had already emerged under Imperial Austria’s social offensive on the home front. Civil society’s role in direct welfare delivery greatly diminished.

Nonetheless, the revolution of 1918 did usher in a significant change: war victims themselves became a major welfare actor. The empowerment of welfare clients went hand in hand with the expansion of the Austrian state’s purview and the reconceptualization of its basic missions and functions. The claimant-citizens demanded a participatory but strongly interventionist welfare state that centralized and nationalized service provision. War victim welfare became at once a source of political legitimacy and part of the substantive content of the new democracy.

These specific Austrian experiences with war victim welfare add wrinkles to the comparative historical study of disabled veterans. A recent historiographical survey observes that disabled veterans often formed a privileged group, in sharp contrast to disabled civilians’ usual experiences of marginalization and discrimination, because of their close relations and symbolic importance to the modern state. Their obvious sacrifices were key to the making of national identity, and they were often valorized and rewarded as the living model of ideal citizenship and national loyalty.²⁸ But in Austria, favoring disabled veterans was motivated first by the imperial state’s desperate search for a nonnationalist avenue to prove its relevance and legitimacy, and then the rump, for many “stop-gap,” Republic competing for a significant constituency. War disabilities were not a symbol of the state’s martial glory or patriotic integration but of the previous regime’s

crimes and/or failure. The Austrian disabled veterans were therefore used more for negative valorization or justification through remediation, where the Republic proved its sense of social responsibility and capability in comparison to the failed predecessor or the allegedly irresponsible radical competitors. After all, they fought for the defunct multiethnic Monarchy, not the purportedly national Republic.²⁹ The post-1918 experiences of Austrian disabled veterans may be better understood as a form of negative nation building through conspicuous remedial welfare policies. Their history is similar to that of other “losers,” such as Weimar Germany.³⁰ But without the continuity in the state for which they sacrificed, their symbolic meanings and salience were rather ambivalent.³¹

Austria, the Warfare-Welfare Nexus, and Contingent State Building

The historiography of the European welfare state began with a focus on attempts to address the structural insecurities brought about by industrialization and the consequent dynamics of class-based politics.³² Women’s history and gender analysis, with themes such as visions of gender order, maternalist ideals, and women’s activism, offer the more recent interpretations of the growth of state intervention and social policy making in the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries.³³ As historians of women increasingly address the First World War’s ambiguous legacies for women’s citizenship,³⁴ the new insights highlight the existence and importance of a warfare-welfare nexus—which has been discussed almost exclusively in the context of the Second World War³⁵—being also a World War I and interwar European phenomenon. Their research sheds light on the changing expectations of and contestations over the state’s role in safeguarding, regulating, and promoting the welfare (and, as a corollary, specific behaviors) of its population, especially when it addressed, or redressed, the consequences of the First World War.³⁶

Building on this shift to see the First World War as the central generative event for welfare expansion, this work on war victim welfare in Imperial and republican Austria develops a line of inquiry that sees war victim welfare as a “herald of the welfare state.” This has been examined in the cases of the British, French, and German welfare states and social citizenship during and after the First World War,³⁷ whereas this book helps establish an explicit warfare-welfare nexus from the often-neglected Austrian perspective. The first chapters show that the introduction of compulsory military service for all adult males in 1868 changed the relationship between the Austrian state and its arms-bearing

citizens and their families. But its broader welfare implications were not fully appreciated by contemporaries. The military welfare system of 1875, for example, was still designed for professional soldiers and based on archaic understandings of disability, family, and the nature of military service.³⁸ The warfare-welfare corollary of arms-bearing male citizenship and, by extension, the welfare system for the great majority of Imperial Austrian citizens through their male relatives, was only gradually and partially institutionalized.

The scale of mobilization and losses in the First World War activated the potent but mostly latent logic of the more robust modern social citizenship entailed by universal military service. Once a man had been mobilized and/or wounded, he and his dependents would be entitled to the state's provision. The wartime system was still hierarchical and reflected a closed corporate culture that the Habsburg armed forces refused to relinquish. But in the last two war years, especially when the Austrian Republic sought to secure its political legitimacy, the new welfare legislation formally and explicitly established state provision of welfare to the war-affected population as a right endowed by (soldiering) citizenship. Provision was no longer a form of institutionalized poor relief or the grace of the monarch/state. Suffering from mass soldiering helped build modern social citizenship.

This war route to robust social citizenship adds a new historical approach to Austria (Cisleithanian and republican) as a European welfare state. In terms of systematic public measures counteracting events threatening individuals' or families' subsistence ("social contingencies" such as sickness, old age, or unemployment),³⁹ research on compulsory social insurance and labor protection is well established because they have been pillars of the post-1945 Austrian welfare state.⁴⁰ Prompted by the rise of class society and mass politics⁴¹—and promoted first by conservative reformers following the Bismarckian model in the 1880s⁴²—social insurance nonetheless had only limited coverage in the early twentieth century due to sector-specific legislations and eligibility. In 1900, less than 19 percent of the Austrian (Cisleithanian) labor force was covered by compulsory health insurance, introduced in 1888.⁴³ The importance of municipal-communal poor relief and social assistance, complementing those run by religious and private charities, was similarly limited.⁴⁴ In Imperial Austria, such programs were tied to one's legal domicile in a specific community (*Domizil; Heimatzuständigkeit*), which was established through birth, marriage (for women), or holding public office. The impossibility before and then difficulty after 1896 for most migrants to establish legal domicile in the locale where they actually lived and worked meant that many citizens, even long-term residents, were not eligible

for public assistance. In fact, they, the “aliens (*Fremden*),” outnumbered “locals (*Einheimischen*)” in several crownlands and in all major cities, according to the 1890 census.⁴⁵ Compulsory social insurance and municipal social services were expanding, but ultimately they constituted only relatively small safety nets.

In this context, universal military service—and later the military’s ferocious manpower needs during the First World War—had the unintended consequence of creating a strong imperative for broad, state citizenship-based entitlement, not only for citizen-soldiers but also the soldiers’ dependents. War victim welfare, among other immediate postwar welfare legislation,⁴⁶ was the most prominent and purest form of this war-induced welfare state building in Austria. By reconstructing the history of war victim welfare, this book offers an alternative history of the Austrian welfare state.

It is tempting to hold up this story as yet another instance of the pan-European maturation of the governmental state and biopolitics.⁴⁷ Indeed, the need to exert state power in providing for war victims was always justified, among other rationales, by the preservation of the collective’s productive power and the enhancement of its economic future. This was indeed a point of extraordinary consensus: Austrian officials and politicians of all stripes—imperial and republican, conservative and socialist and nationalist—invoked it. The clear intent of the 1917 social offensive to transform Imperial Austria into a welfare commonwealth, the Social Democrats’ ambition of using war victim welfare as stepping-stone to an extensive welfare state, and the wartime *étatization* of welfare and care provision (with the eager participation of nonstate actors and clients) all seemed to suggest a triumphant advance of the governmental state in the Habsburg realm.⁴⁸

By focusing on the dynamics on the ground, however, this book demonstrates that the overall transformation of the Austrian state and citizenship was the result of cumulative and complex interactions among different welfare actors (including citizen-beneficiaries) and disparate sociopolitical forces and events. The local causal links as well as contingent events played essential roles. The war’s disastrous impact on individual lives had to be cushioned, if not really overcome, on the home front. Preserving and shaping future human material/soldier-workers, a hallmark of the governmental state, may be less important for many welfare actors. In Austria, some officials’ long-term professional aspirations for welfare state building,⁴⁹ the postwar ambitions of various political parties, and especially the necessary short-term emergency responses to the subsistence crisis came together to create the proverbial perfect storm that catalyzed the 1917–1919/1920 continuum of welfare *étatization* and expansion. In a polity not known for utopian visions, it is difficult to pinpoint any Bolshevik-style

blueprint or guiding ideology to “cultivate the masses” and refashion society in the midst of war-induced chaos.⁵⁰ Establishing a more efficient way of life for the benefit of both the individual and the collective was on the minds of some Austrian welfare actors, but even that was often out of necessity and improvisation.⁵¹ Contingent, short-term needs were as important to the wartime and postwar transformation of the Austrian state and overall political culture as were long-term structural trends, if not more so.

The Austrian state was neither an inert and inscrutably Kafkaesque entity nor a straightforward agent of avant-garde biopolitics. This book undertakes two concrete tasks to paint a more complete picture of the *longue durée* of the Austrian welfare state in particular and the Austrian state in general.

The first is to map the Austrian war victim welfare field and analyze the dynamics therein, from before the introduction of (theoretical) universal military service for adult males to the mid-1920s. By establishing the fundamentals of war victim (and other wartime) welfare provision, this book examines larger political and social issues that were embodied or represented in the war welfare field. In doing so, it shows how and why the Austrian state, in both the imperial and the republican versions, became self-consciously “social” in the age of mass politics and mass conscription.

The second is to establish the key role of war victim welfare in the formation of modern Austrian citizenship and statehood. This book looks at how welfare provision contributed to the changing “content” of citizenship and, more broadly, how war preparation, the waging of war, and the war’s consequences shaped Austrian social citizenship.⁵² These issues are not unique to Imperial Austria and its successor states but part of the broader histories of modern European state-building and of citizenship. War created its own set of consequences and responses by pulling in many other social and political structural factors, and detailed historical inquiry reveals how these factors mixed with the unpredictable and the contingent. The Austrian story shows that the historical sociologist Charles Tilly’s famous thesis about European state-building, “war made the state, and the state made war,”⁵³ can be adapted to inform analysis of the rise of the modern European welfare state.

This book, then, provides a fine-grained case study to further de-exoticize Habsburg Central Europe. Without denying the importance of nationalist politics for the period,⁵⁴ this history of welfare and citizenship argues for the need to examine Habsburg Austria as another evolving modern state. Like its Western European contemporaries, it faced both the usual and extraordinary challenges

along with but also from its own citizens, who in turn were adapting to the changing world by asserting their own understandings of modern citizenship.⁵⁵

This book is based on close reading of sources generated or received by state welfare authorities and their affiliates, parliamentary records, and an array of contemporary publications by different welfare actors, especially war victims themselves, in order to focus on the people—state officials, civil society activists, and citizen-clients alike—who shaped the evolving war welfare field. Seemingly dry institutional developments, tedious bureaucratic regulations and correspondences, and the minute everyday operations of the state were in fact forms of these people's ideas, actions, and engagements. Treating these sometimes very mundane records with the same care we would give to deciphering intellectual texts is sometimes the only way to gain any glimpse into the world these people inhabited. While war victims' own voices appear as much as possible, these were often the words of literate activists who created records or those chosen by officials or activists to make their own points.

The term "war victims" is used as an aggregate term for disabled veterans, widows and orphans of dead soldiers, and other surviving dependents (e.g., siblings, parents, grandparents), even though the present-day German-language equivalent, *Kriegsopfer*, did not begin to replace the cumbersome expression "war-damaged person (*Kriegsbeschädigter*) and surviving dependent (*Kriegshinterbliebene*)" until the mid-1920s. The growing popularity of the term *Kriegsopfer*, which took advantage of the German word *Opfer*'s double meanings of "victim" and "offering (sacrifice)," was itself part of the difficult search for a stable post-Habsburg Austrian identity.⁵⁶ "Disabled soldiers," "disabled veterans," "disabled men," and occasionally "severely/seriously wounded men" are used depending on the context in which they appear, because these men's formal legal status changed over time and some terms are considered archaic or insensitive today.⁵⁷ However, to convey the "feel" and the connotations of contemporary usages, terms such as "war-damaged persons," "war cripples (*Kriegskrüppel*)," and "war invalids (*Kriegsinvaliden*)" are retained when quoting directly from the sources.

"Austria" and "Austrian" in this book refer to the Cisleithanian, non-Royal Hungarian half of the Habsburg Monarchy and, later, the successor Austrian Republic. "Imperial Austria" and "Habsburg Austria" refer to the pre-November 1918 polity. "Habsburg Monarchy" indicates Austria-Hungary as a whole or the joint institutions. The geographic subject or unit of analysis here may seem to be inconsistent, for in the first four chapters of the book it is Imperial Austria,

while in the remaining three it is a much smaller successor state, the Austrian Republic. This shift, however, brings an important analytical advantage: tracing continuities and changes in the field of war victim welfare across the 1918 divide in a specific context that was at once similar to and different from those of other successor states. Hence the findings and conclusions do not claim to be representative of the entire former Habsburg Central Europe; they are building blocks toward a more comparative and comprehensive assessment of the impact of the First World War in East Central Europe that remains to be undertaken.

In view of the multiethnic nature and various nationalist mobilizations of Imperial Austria in its last decades, the term “national” is avoided when referring to the level of the Imperial Austrian state or of the Monarchy as a whole. The Habsburg and Austrian experiences serve as a reminder that the state or even a country was not always national. When there is no common English name for a specific place, the name found in the sources and its current name are both given.

This book mentions the payment amounts of pensions, living allowances, and other assistance provided. Because of severe material shortages (and thus the black market), price controls, and high inflation rates during the First World War and the early postwar years, the real values of these payments fluctuated drastically.⁵⁸ Therefore the numbers are intended primarily to illustrate the changes in nominal values in comparison to previous provisions.

The chapters of this book can be grouped into three parts, though chronological overlaps are inevitable where particular themes are examined. The first two chapters cover the period up to the end of Imperial Austria, charting the major developments in veteran and war victim policies, laws, and administrative structures. Chapter 1 traces the emergence of state welfare for soldiers and their families back to the late eighteenth century and discusses the changes and continuities brought about by universal military service, introduced in 1868, as part of the broader liberal reforms of the 1860s and 1870s. The general attitude toward veterans and the legal-administrative understanding of military disability serve as guides here, highlighting the fact that the military and political leaders of the time may not have fully realized how fundamental were the changes they helped usher in. Chapter 2 follows the evolution of the legal and institutional infrastructure for war victim welfare from 1875 to 1918. It analyzes the Imperial Austrian state’s slow reconceptualization of its obligations to soldiers—citizens serving in a mass conscription army—and their dependents before 1914. The outbreak of the war in 1914 quickly exposed the prewar designs’ inadequacy, and a patchwork of improvised measures constituted the wartime welfare provision. Among the proposed long-term solutions, the military leadership’s interest

in the so-called warrior homestead colonies (*Kriegerheimstätte*) receives special attention here. This idea exemplified the growing significance of war victim welfare as not only a means of immediate crisis management but also the screen to project broader political visions.

The emergence of the Social Welfare Ministry in 1917 and 1918 marked Imperial Austria's commitment to a social offensive on the home front. The second part of this book focuses on this general strategy to confront domestic social dislocations and, more importantly, to rebuild the imperial state's legitimacy in a time of suffering and deprivation. Chapter 3 examines the Social Ministry's ambitious organizational reform in the disabled soldier welfare system. Welfare state building in this regard was at once a reassertion of the civilian central administration's authority vis-à-vis the military, an attempt to build its capacities, and a mission to salvage the Monarchy's credibility. At the same time, the hoped-for new comprehensive war victim legislation had become a site where competing visions for postwar society were formulated once parliamentary politics was revived in mid-1917. Chapter 4 then looks into more concrete aspects of Social Ministry officials' direct welfare intervention. Working consciously as the lead advocates for war victims vis-à-vis the military and other ministries, the new central welfare officials sought to build a comprehensive information regime as well as "retail" welfare services. Bureaucratic turf conflicts and severe material shortages, however, foiled their efforts. The state agencies' hoarding of resources in 1918 added a further layer of scarcity to the shortages already wreaking havoc on the home front. Seen in this light, the effective end of a more or less coherent Imperial Austrian state already had arrived by the summer of 1918, with the social offensive just one of its victims.

The final part is devoted to post-Habsburg Austrian war victim politics, from the revolutionary days to the mid-1920s. Welfare state building in a revolutionary context is the main theme of chapters 5 and 6. War victims seized the opportunity and became one of the driving forces behind the unfolding events as the subjects, rather than the objects, of welfare politics. Transformed from an abstract population/administrative category into a formidable social movement outside the milieu-party (*Lager*) structures, war victims, chapter 5 argues, formed a "partnership of the weak" with the republican state in the early months of the Austrian Revolution. This partnership gave organized war victims the right to participate in important policy making and decision making processes. But it also constrained and moderated their activism and political potentials. Chapter 6 charts the emergence of the cornerstone war victim welfare legislation, the Invalid Compensation Law of 25 April 1919 (*Invalidenentschädigungsgesetz*,

StGBL. 245/1919) in the wake of the welfare agencies' double nationalization in the German-Austrian revolution. The relatively smooth transition of the state welfare apparatus as well as the rapid legislative process make it clear that war victim welfare was an undisputedly urgent matter of political legitimacy for the Republic. The wave of Communist revolutions and aggressive agitation in Central Europe in 1918 and 1919 became an immediate and compelling impetus for all mainstream political forces to come to a consensus to preempt the Austrian Communists' appeal to war victims. The resulting new law promised a comprehensive, participatory war victim welfare system and enshrined a robust rights-based social citizenship.

While endowing rights and setting norms, the law also created unintended incentives to fracture the war victim movement. Chapter 7 first reconstructs the constant tension within the war victim movement in 1919 and 1920. It then discusses the decline of the early postwar war victim welfare politics built around the Invalid Compensation Law and its companion piece, the Invalid Employment Law of 1 October 1920 (*Invalidenbeschäftigungsgesetz*, *StGBL*. 459/1920), as the deepening financial and fiscal crisis forced a retrenchment of state commitments starting in 1922. The 1924 reforms, engineered by the Christian Socials in the climate of imposed austerity, further depoliticized welfare administration by transforming it into a supposedly more "neutral," bureaucratically controlled apparatus. Organized war victims' institutional influence declined in tandem with the consolidation of the milieu parties' stranglehold on public life in interwar Austria.

In spite of the mixed picture in the mid-1920s, the conclusion contends that war victim welfare in early republican Austria was a qualified success story. It was the culmination of both the long-term evolution of the Austrian citizenship and wartime and revolutionary crisis management. War victim welfare's contribution to political and social stabilization actually led to its loss of importance. But the social citizenship it helped define has remained, even as the First Republic emerged from the postwar consensus and entered a new world of polarized politics, street-marching militias, and growing doubts about parliamentary democracy after the mid-1920s.⁵⁹

Prodigy-turned-veteran composer Korngold reworked the hopeful soldier's farewell of 1915 into a darker contemplation on the aftermath of death just as his new opera *Die tote Stadt* (*The Dead City*, Op. 12, composed between 1916 and 1920) achieved sensational success in Europe and the United States. *Die tote Stadt* centers on the themes of the loss of the beloved and its suffocating commemoration. After an extended and very Freudian dream sequence, Paul,

the protagonist of the expressionist opera, comes to realize that his incessant remembrance and relic-filled cult of his wife is not only futile but also perilous:

A dream has dashed my dream to earth,
 A dream of crude realities has killed
 The dream of fantasy and sweet deception.
 Such dreams are sent us by our dead
 If we live too much *with* and *in* them.
 How far should we give way to grief,
 How far *dare* we, without disaster?
 Harrowing conflict of the heart!

Paul then promises his visiting friend that he will leave Bruges, the dead city. He locks the door leading to his late wife's room and walks off with a last, parting glance at it.⁶⁰ The suggested possibility of moving on from deeply felt loss captured the mood of the time. The opera's ambiguously positive ending, after the protagonist's internal struggle and emotional turmoil, contributed to *Die tote Stadt* becoming an instant success. Korngold gave the immediate postwar audience something they wanted: a glimmer of hope amidst the uncertainty of the future.

To many Austrian war victims, such sublimated and prolonged coming to terms with the heartbreaking past was both an impractical dream and an unaffordable luxury. They had to carry out the hard work of dealing with the war's traumatic consequences, and their efforts were not entirely in vain. Historians of Austria's and Central Europe's wartime and early interwar experiences have much to gain from a perspective that does not assume the Austrofascist (1934–1938) and National Socialist (1933/1938–1945) dictatorships as the inevitable vanishing points of their narratives.⁶¹ The emerging war victim movement, the participatory new welfare system, and a more robust social citizenship, though of complicated origins and constrained resources, embodied determination, initiative, and democratic aspirations. While the sorrow in "Gefäßter Abschied" is sincere and undeniable, *Die tote Stadt's* case for hope was not mere wishful thinking.

Government Poverty and Incentive Pensions in the Nineteenth Century

His grandfather had been a little peasant, his father an assistant paymaster, later a constable sergeant on the monarchy's southern border. After losing an eye in a fight with Bosnian smugglers, he had been living as a war invalid and groundskeeper at the Castle of Laxenburg, feeding the swans, trimming the hedges, guarding the springtime forsythias and then the elderberry bushes against unauthorized, thievish hands, and in the mild nights, shooing homeless lovers from the benevolent darkness of benches.

—Roth, *The Radetzky March*

LEUTENANT JOSEPH TROTTA, HAVING saved the life of Emperor Franz Joseph and become “the Hero of Solferino,” felt he had lost “equilibrium” as a result of the sudden glory. He decided to visit his father, the simple Slovene invalid sergeant living as a groundskeeper in “the frugal government poverty” of a small official apartment in Laxenburg.¹ With this first of several father-son relations that frame the classic novel *The Radetzky March*, Joseph Roth begins his literary commentary on late Habsburg Monarchy.

The Trottas were fictional, but they can help chart the evolution of the relations between the Austrian state and its disabled soldiers. The simple invalid in Laxenburg was treated in typical post-Napoleonic fashion. The Hero of Solferino represented the transitional period between the regularization of retirement in 1855 and the introduction of universal military service in 1868. The only nonsoldier in the family, District Commissioner (*Bezirkshauptmann*) Baron Franz von Trotta, belonged to the generation that saw the universal service-based army and 1875 military welfare law, but did not understand these new developments' profound implications. The district commissioner's son, the disillusioned young Carl Joseph, would fall in 1914, shortly after dutifully

returning to active service when the war broke out. Had he survived the shot but become disabled, or had he left any dependent, he or his dependent(s) would have faced an improvised provision regime because the world war had compelled the state to rapidly transform in its engagement with citizens.

This chapter focuses on two critical moments in the evolution of the Austrian state's military welfare provision in the nineteenth century: the post-Napoleonic Wars consolidation and the post-Austro-Prussian War reforms. The main features and, more importantly, the underlying conceptions and principles of the systems emerging in the aftermath of these shattering military conflicts determined how disabled soldiers and soldiers' dependents were treated by the Austrian state for most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They, in turn, shed light on the issues of how the Austrian state and society in the nineteenth century understood disability, soldiering, and citizenship.

A Disciplinary Regime for the Disabled

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, disabled Habsburg soldiers were promised support from the Imperial Army's coffers. But this was not a system that used the language of entitlement or rights; rather, it operated as an institutionalized form of the sovereign's grace and favor or a system of state-funded poor relief. This early modern form of public assistance was premised on an occupation-based conception of disability. It was also highly disciplinary in its intention to condition the recipient's behavior.²

The Habsburg central state first assumed the responsibility of providing for disabled soldiers in 1750, with the establishment of an Invalid Fund to which disabled officers could seek support payments.³ Before the introduction of a comprehensive pension-based benefit system in 1875, however, the centerpiece of the Habsburg Monarchy's official provisions for disabled soldiers was the residential institution of invalid houses. The first invalid house was officially founded in 1727 in Pest, Hungary, following an order from Emperor Karl VI. By 1842, there were five invalid houses: in Vienna, Prague, Tyrnau/Trnava, Pettau, and Padua.⁴ Disabled veterans were to be assigned to one based on their "nationality"; in practice, the instructions from 1819 and 1828 interpreted "nationality" as "the province in which the man in question was born and had established domicile."⁵

According to the Imperial War Council (Hofkriegsrat, the predecessor of the later War Ministry) regulations of 30 June 1817, beyond the daily invalid pay, each invalid house resident could expect a daily ration of bread and a cash per diem sufficient to buy a half Lower Austrian pound of beef and other necessary



FIGURE 1.1. The Invalidovna in Karlín, the Prague Invalid House, in the 1840s. The extensive Baroque complex was first built in the 1730s and still stands today. The image is from Ludwig Förster and Amédée Demarteau, *Beschreibende und malerische Darstellung der k. k. österreichischen Staatseisenbahn von Olmütz bis Prag* (Vienna: Verlag von L. Försters artist. Anstalt, 1845). *Wikimedia Commons*, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Beschreibende_Darstellung_39_Prager_Invalidenhans.jpg (accessed 24 October 2021).

food. They would also be provided firewood for cooking and heating, candles and bedding, one set of military uniform, cookware, medical care, and medicine, all free of charge; tobacco was dispensed at a discount.⁶ Invalid houses were not only dormitories for single disabled veterans. An 1820 regulation about pay for midwives, teachers, and other service providers shows that some disabled men lived there with their wives, and their children were born and raised there before being sent to other residential educational institutions, such as the Officers' Daughters Institutes in Hernals and Neulerchenfeld.⁷

Who was eligible to reside in the invalid house hinged on the most fundamental question: Who was considered “disabled” or “invalid”? The Habsburg authorities' 15 April 1772 military invalid provision system may be one of the earliest attempts by the Austrian central state to administratively and legally construct a practical concept of disability and lay out its implications for the state's actions.

To define what was “disabled,” the Habsburg authorities first defined what was “able.” The 1772 system had a very narrow definition of the latter: being fully capable to serve in frontline battalions, “not too young or too weak, nor too old and frail.” In contrast, “semi-invalids (*Halb-Invaliden*)” were those with

“lesser [physical] deficiencies, namely those who could no longer undertake arduous marches” even if they could still perform certain hand movements or bodily maneuvers. “Semi-invalids” would be reassigned to guard or garrison units or other logistics stations where the physical demands were supposedly lighter. Those who were not exactly frail or infirm but had certain bodily issues that made them “unfit (*untauglich*)” to perform guard or garrison duties, “such as poor appearance,” would also be classified as such. Soldiers who had lasting and serious injuries that made them unfit even for the lighter tasks of “semi-invalids” were classified as “real invalids (*Real-Invaliden*).” It was “real invalids” who were the main beneficiaries of the 1772 system and candidates for invalid house residency.⁸

There were three further conditions a disabled soldier had to meet before he could fully enjoy the benefits of invalid house residency. First, the disability must have been incurred while on duty and carrying out one’s tasks. Second, the soldier should have been faultless at the disability’s onset; self-inflicted harm, negligence, or official punishment made him ineligible. Third, he should be both militarily unfit to serve and unable to earn a living as a civilian.⁹

As a result, being militarily disabled did not automatically translate to general benefit-eligible status; a man could be a military invalid but an able-bodied civilian. The Imperial War Council claimed that “[a]lthough there are many physical damages that may make someone incapable of serving in the army, it is a well-known fact that they do not hinder his prospect of earning a living as a civilian.” Soldiers in this condition, the 1772 edict added, “should return to civilian status with a formal discharge” and were not entitled to any benefits.¹⁰ This restrictive and occupation-based definition of disability determined the fortunes of disabled Habsburg soldiers for more than a century.

Among the European powers, Austria fought the longest and most frequently against revolutionary and Napoleonic France in wars between 1792 and 1815.¹¹ The five invalid houses simply could not meet the massive needs resulting from more than two decades of almost constant fighting, repeated battlefield setbacks, and the large-scale mobilization—as many as 300,000 combat troops—in the final campaigns against Napoleon.¹² After 1815, some crownlands carried out public donation drives and built their own invalid endowments to assist local disabled veterans. But these endowments, mostly managed by the provincial estates, were meant only as a supplemental support.¹³ The post-Napoleonic challenge to the 1772 system was clearly felt, as Vienna issued a flurry of edicts regarding disabled veterans in the late 1810s and 1820s. The occupation-based conception of disability, however, continued to underpin how the Austrian central state and specifically the military responded to post-1815 needs.

On 30 June 1817, the Imperial War Council declared that there would be three categories of benefit-eligible “real invalids,” and their official provision was premised on the differentiation between military and civilian disability. The first category of “real invalids” was “patent invalids (*Patental-Invaliden*),” who received a patent entitling them to regular invalid pay from the military. Instead of taking up residence in invalid houses, they were required to live in designated communities written into the patent, usually where they had established legal domicile and could find more “beneficial living conditions” through preexisting social or familial ties. A mix of invalid pay, at the rather meager rate of 3 to 24 kreuzer daily (depending on rank, location, and prior service branch and category); “light work” befitting their reduced strength and capabilities; and “support from their relatives and benefactors” was expected to be sufficient to secure these men’s subsistence.¹⁴

The second category of “real invalids” received nothing but a certificate of conditional entitlement (*Reservations-Urkunde*). These disabled veterans had to fend for themselves. The Imperial War Council claimed that many had done so “for long periods of time, often for the rest of their lives,” because they were still capable of earning a living on their own or relying on relatives’ support. When their condition deteriorated or public assistance became indispensable, they could bring the certificate to one of the invalid houses and ask for an upgrade to “patent invalid” status or be granted permanent residency there.¹⁵

Only those veterans who, “because of old age, serious injury, or other bodily damages,” were no longer able support themselves and had “no friend or benefactor to provide the necessary care and assistance” were to be included in the third category and granted invalid house residency outright.¹⁶

These changes after 1817 underscored the Austrian state’s apparent reluctance to grant benefits even to those who were certified as “real invalids.” In an 1829 circular, the Imperial War Council claimed that disabled soldiers were often classified through “incorrect” implementation of the 1772 system and its 1777 “real invalid” regulations.¹⁷ It reiterated the narrow conception of disability: some “real invalids” should be “excluded entirely from the military invalid provision” and given neither invalid pay patent nor the conditional entitlement certificate.¹⁸ These disabled veterans were not disabled in the civilian world at all. They were supposed to earn their own keep or, failing that, have relatives or “benefactors” available to step in.¹⁹

This implied fourth category of “real invalids”—the militarily disabled but in civilian life nondisabled—sheds light on another underlying principle of the 1772 system as it evolved in the nineteenth century: invalid pay was meant to

be only a partial and conditional relief measure. The November 1829 circular established a minimum threshold of “necessity”: three times the invalid pay. If a disabled man was fortunate enough to have a sizable independent source of income reaching that amount, he would not be eligible for any current or future benefit.²⁰ Military disability benefits were intended only as a supplement or, in the case of invalid house residency, a last resort. Military invalid provision was not a right; it was not even conceived as a quasicontractual obligation of the state to its soldiers. Rather, it was an act of institutionalized charity (*Wohlthat*) from the state administration.²¹

Beyond the continued salience of the narrow conception of disability, the post-Napoleonic state provision for disabled soldiers was shaped by two closely intertwined factors: the attempt to lessen the state’s financial burden and a strong disciplinary intention.

After a costly state bankruptcy in 1811, and in the midst of difficult postwar fiscal stabilization, even the profligate army had to watch its spending closely.²² Military expenditures were to shrink significantly as a share of state revenues.²³ Provisioning for the disabled was necessary after the Napoleonic Wars, but so was the countervailing pressure to contain costs. To achieve the latter, the Austrian military administration emphasized limiting access. After excluding “real invalids” who could function in civilian life, the narrow conception of disability placed a heavy burden for evaluating military “unfitness” on the injured soldiers’ commanding officers. Although the superarbitration (*Superarbitrierung*) panel had the authority to determine whether a soldier was a “real invalid” or a “semi-invalid,” his company or squadron commander had to testify to the enlisted man’s physical deficiencies that could not be “visually observed” by the regiment doctor or the panel.²⁴ This responsibility led to extremely detailed rules holding these officers accountable for misjudging a soldier’s disability. If the officers were found to have given false or mistaken testimony, detention or more serious punishment awaited. At the very least, the officer had to make up for the “damage” to the state’s finances by providing for the misclassified soldier until the latter formally returned to active duty.²⁵ These rules were a clear warning to the officers not to let too many soldiers into the system.

After 1815, many officers tried to help their disabled subordinates obtain state support by interpreting the regulations in a looser manner than the military administration would have liked. The Imperial War Council felt compelled to reiterate the rules to combat the alleged frequent errors. The attempt to pressure officers culminated in an August 1824 imperial edict on certifying disability in the superarbitration process. It would take place only during the annual muster,

and battalion, regiment, and corps commanders were to send only soldiers they were sure to be “both militarily ‘real invalid’ and unable to make a living on their own.” If an unqualified man was knowingly sent, his commanding officer would be penalized for neglect of duty and had to reimburse the state for “unnecessary expenses.” Furthermore, any soldier going on leave had to undergo physical examination both before and after the leave to prevent him from making claims for injuries incurred during the leave; officers had to precisely document that the disability happened during and because of active service.²⁶ A commanding officer became a strict gatekeeper. Being generous to one’s men at the expense of the central state was dereliction of duty.

The Imperial War Council’s crackdown on “undeserving” disabled veterans extended to those already living in invalid houses. After October 1829, a resident might be discharged immediately, with no entitlement to future benefits, if he were found to have properties generating a revenue beyond the “three times the invalid pay” threshold. If he could work to earn an income beyond that threshold, then he would be discharged with a certificate of conditional entitlement.²⁷ The Imperial War Council was convinced that there were too many veterans either trying to gain access to or already benefiting undeservedly from the provision system.

Another measure in 1823 targeted the “semi-invalid” status, which could potentially open the door to the benefits enjoyed by “real invalids.” The Imperial War Council ordered that anyone deemed a “semi-invalid” had to receive the council’s explicit permission before being transferred to guard or other lighter duties. A “semi-invalid” enlisted man already transferred would be subjected to review “if his outward appearance or physical condition seem[ed] to suggest that he [wa]s still able to carry out frontline duties.” In such cases, the man in question was immediately transferred back to regular units.²⁸

By making it harder to grant and easier to revoke the “semi-invalid” status, the Imperial War Council narrowed the path to disability benefits. How many men were affected by this restrictive measure is unknown. But in pressuring officers in the certifying process, requiring final decisions to be confirmed in Vienna, and threatening to reexamine military invalids at will, the council was clearly attempting to make disability benefits difficult to obtain. The power that the military administration gave itself in 1823 to repeatedly call disabled soldiers back for reexamination, with the intention of returning them to active service, would later become a major flashpoint.

The Imperial War Council’s flurry of post-Napoleonic instructions paints a picture of too many “undeserving” veterans granted benefits by their soft-hearted

or gullible commanding officers, while a cash-strapped state desperately looked for ways to refuse any payment. The reality, however, was more ambiguous. Even without the Imperial War Council bent on saving every last kreutzer, the system than began in 1772 was already unpopular among soldiers.

It is ironic that, while the policy was to limit access, officials in the 1830s also complained about too many qualified disabled veterans trying to avoid the invalid house. "Prejudice and aversion" against the institution and "ignorance of this charitable act" were blamed for veterans' petitions to voluntarily forego invalid house residency and take a discharge payout instead.²⁹ Many soldiers believed (wrongly, as the military administration emphatically declared) that one could never leave the invalid house once taking up residency there.³⁰ Life in the invalid house was also seen as equally regimented as the barrack routines for active servicemen. Unmarried residents had to wear uniforms and follow the military code of conduct.³¹ Invalid house residents retained their active-duty soldier status and were subject to military jurisdiction.³²

To the military, those disabled men who declined invalid house residency represented a threat. In September 1835, the Imperial War Council described the situation starkly: "When they exhausted their discharge payout, or when anticipated support in their hometowns failed to materialize, they either denied that they had formally declined [the residency] or claimed they did not understand what they had declined....These old people are unable to earn a living and become a burden on the state. As long-serving soldiers, their difficult situations provoke an ineradicable aversion to the military among other subjects."³³

With destitute veterans seen as damaging evidence of the military's and state's negligence, officials repeatedly issued instructions (1812, 1818, 1826, 1835) to make it more difficult to decline invalid house residency. A "real invalid" had to produce proof that he had "secure[d] future subsistence" in the form of "lifelong support" before he was allowed to decline long-term official benefits, including invalid house residency. But this proof had to be issued by the community where the man intended to live.³⁴ Such a requirement was meant to be an additional hurdle. Asking a community, sometimes very far from where the disabled soldier was stationed, to verify his claim about local support sources was already time consuming and difficult. More importantly, Habsburg soldiers often had to "perform odd jobs during their off-duty hours" to augment their low pay and inadequate rations even before they became disabled.³⁵ Once they were physically impaired, potential receiving communities were understandably reluctant to issue proofs to these likely candidates for public poor relief.³⁶ Just as it was not easy to enter the system, then, it was also not easy to leave.

Discouraging veterans from leaving the military's provision system was intended to protect the army's and the state's reputation. It was also part of a long-established social disciplinary project of preempting and punishing panhandling. Since the seventeenth century, and with the rise of the ethics of productive work, itinerant people and those perceived to be nonworking, exemplified by beggars and vagrants, were seen as a pressing problem to be controlled, sometimes with draconian measures. As the ranks of beggars were often swelled by discharged veterans and deserters,³⁷ military officials set out to eradicate the unwanted sight of disabled men in ragged uniforms begging in public.³⁸

The anxiety over disabled veterans-turned-beggars was most palpable in the case of the Habsburg Army's foreign-born soldiers.³⁹ After the Napoleonic Wars, many disabled foreign-born members of the Habsburg forces, preferring to return to their home countries rather than living in Habsburg invalid houses, took the one-time payout. The Imperial War Council, however, was alarmed by what it saw as abuse in 1818. These foreigners allegedly roamed the Monarchy's crownlands, claiming that what they had received from the state was insufficient even just to travel home, and lived off the public's sympathy. As a response, detailed rules about how the disabled foreign veterans should be provided for, how they should be sent to the border, and especially how to document and monitor their provisions were established to "give no reason for panhandling." This was not merely about public order but also the Austrian state's reputation. The foreign ex-soldiers had to be paid enough "to convince people in other countries that the Austrian state administration takes [sufficient] care of its foreign-born 'real invalids.'"⁴⁰

The post-Napoleonic system was equally explicit in policing native-born disabled soldiers. Rules forbade soldiers from declining invalid house residency without proof of alternate sources of support, so they would not panhandle later. If a patent invalid failed to pick up his regular pay for more than a year, or if an invalid house resident overstayed his leave, he would lose his benefits.⁴¹ Similarly, if a benefit-receiving or-eligible man left the invalid house or the district recorded in his certificate without official permission, his future eligibility for benefits would be forfeited.⁴² These penalties contributed to the long-standing attempt by the Austrian authorities to control population movements.⁴³ The spatial confinement was probably also part of the broader post-1815 policy to reassert authority over a society destabilized by the displacements in the previous two decades. It was certainly not out of character with the old military mentality, which saw enlisted men "either as potential criminals to be punished severely or as children whose every action should be watched."⁴⁴

Disabled veterans' spouses and potential spouses were expected to meet the provision system's standards of proper conduct. Since disabled veterans living in invalid houses were still under military jurisdiction, any proposed marriage was scrutinized by the military for "the conduct and lifestyle of the applicant and the bride, whether her birth was legitimate, as well as the invalid house's space."⁴⁵ Couples also had economic requirements to meet. Disabled officers needed sufficient savings to pay for the marriage bond before the union could proceed, just like active-duty officers.⁴⁶ Disabled enlisted residents had even higher hurdles to overcome. They had to prove that the proposed marriage would "significantly improve his living conditions" or that "he needed a wife to care for him." Furthermore, he had to show some guarantee that, in the event of his death, his wife and potential children could "make an honest living independently." In short, invalid house residents were not allowed to marry women who were deemed either "immoral, or unable to earn a living."⁴⁷

Even disabled veterans who did not live in invalid houses had to receive permission to marry. In addition to military approval, patent invalids and other benefits-receiving disabled men needed their local civil authorities' endorsement of the proposed marriage, certifying that the alliance would be "beneficial and necessary" for the bridegroom's subsistence.⁴⁸ There was a heavy penalty for entering into an unauthorized union: the loss of all disability benefits.⁴⁹ The strict control of matrimony highlighted the key assumption of the pre-1875 provisions: it was meant to ensure the subsistence of individual disabled men and control their behavior, not to promote some kind of normative male breadwinner-headed families. A patent invalid's family (and specifically his spouse) was expected to take on the responsibility of supporting him, not the other way around. The "common" invalid house residents were supposedly single. Aside from the limited services such as schooling for dependent children, there were no permanent dependents' benefits in cash or in kind. The most a widow or an orphan could hope for was the special favor of a one-time payment.⁵⁰

Early nineteenth-century provision for disabled veterans thus limited the recipient's family formation. It was not a novel intervention. Austria already had a long-established practice of restricting the lower classes' marriages to prevent the reproduction of poverty.⁵¹ What distinguished disabled veterans from the usual targets of these restrictions, such as day laborers, servants, journeymen, and local poor relief recipients, was the use of the potential spouse's conduct and lifestyle as an additional criterion. The restrictions on disabled veterans' family formation should then be understood alongside the restrictions on "healthy" serving officers' marriage, as both aimed at preventing socially unacceptable

unions, especially after officers' pay and pension were improved.⁵² The concern with women as potential reputational liabilities permeated the military administration.

Habsburg officials' obsessions with panhandling prevention and the potential political damage of former soldiers' public misery were the driving forces behind the 1772 disability provision system and its post-1815 developments. To them, roaming destitute veterans threatened to undermine the reputation and credibility of the military and the Habsburg state, as well as potentially the public order. The detailed regulations regarding beneficiaries' registration, record keeping, and periodic payment pickup created avenues to monitor disabled veterans amidst antirevolutionary paranoia of the Metternich years.⁵³ State provision for disabled soldiers in the early nineteenth century was as much about disciplining the men as about a support system of the last resort.

The Austrian state's systematic provision therefore did not constitute rights-based entitlements or even contract-based compensation. It was a form of institutionalized poor relief or, at most, an expression of imperial grace towards his or her majesty's poor soldiers, which conveniently served the purpose of showing that the Imperial Army and the state did not forsake their most pitiful servants. The attempts to limit access, pressure commanding officers not to send their men to superarbitration, and arguments that military disability was not identical to civilian disability, however, point to a reluctance to establish the system as anything more than a remedy for the most desperate cases. Consequently, the invalid houses across the Monarchy were the main form of provision, and other, nonresidential supplemental benefits were limited.⁵⁴ The contradictory policies of suppressing panhandling and cutting public expenditure coexisted uneasily.

Ultimately, the narrow, occupation-specific functional conception of disability at the heart of the pre-1875 system reflected an early modern European understanding of individuals as belonging to a society made up of specific occupations, corporate bodies, social orders, or estates. In practice, this embeddedness of individuals means that there was no generalized conception of a person's standard capabilities, rights, or obligations; these were determined by the person's status, locality, occupational roles and functions, and corporate membership. Being "disabled" in one occupation did not preclude being able to perform in another. One was never a "disabled person" per se, only a "military invalid" with the emphasis on "military." Through most of the nineteenth century, the Habsburg military's disability provision system carried the vestiges of preindustrial corporate society: a laboring person was not seen as a general,

interchangeable productive unit, and losing certain physical capabilities did not necessarily mean a loss of the unit's general productive value and wage-earning ability as it would in the emerging industrial economy.

Creating an Army of Citizens

The 1866 military defeat in Königgrätz/Hradec Králové forced the Habsburg Monarchy to undergo fundamental reforms. The stalled negotiations with the Magyar elite over the constitutional status of Hungary received an urgent push after the Austro-Prussian War. Emperor Franz Joseph's decision to satisfy the Magyar elite's demands in exchange for their support and a reliably loyal Hungary ushered in the *Ausgleich* (Settlement or Compromise) of 1867, which created the dualistic structure of the Habsburg Monarchy that lasted until 1918. The *Ausgleich* not only created a nearly sovereign Hungarian state within the Monarchy but also broke the stalemate over constitutional reform for the Austrian half of the Monarchy, in the form of a set of constitutional laws establishing a generally liberal and parliamentary political order.⁵⁵

The flurry of constitutional changes had much to do with Franz Joseph's and his ministers' resolve to maintain the Monarchy's great power status and even seek revenge against Prussia. Military reforms were quickly proposed, with the enemy, the victorious Prussian Army, being the model in many minds.⁵⁶ The Military Law of 5 December 1868 (*RGBl.* 151/1868), along with its companion piece introduced in Hungary around the same time, finally established universal military service for all healthy ("militarily fit") male citizens, with no substitutes, in both halves of the Monarchy.⁵⁷

The 1868 law created a standing Joint Army (*Heer*) and Joint Navy (*Kriegsmarine*), the National Guards (*Landwehr* in Austria and *Honvéd* in Hungary), a reserve force (*Ersatzreserve*), and the *Landsturm*, a kind of last-line reserve existing mostly on paper. All militarily fit men reaching the age of twenty were obligated to serve after passing a physical examination. Based on the target wartime strength of 800,000 (not including the *Ersatzreserve* nor the National Guards, which would add another 200,000) and the legally defined distribution of the annual recruiting class negotiated between Austria and Hungary every ten years, service-liable men would be assigned to the aforementioned branches of service based on the drawing of lots.⁵⁸ Those assigned to the Joint Army would serve three years on active duty, followed by seven years in the reserve and two in the National Guards. Those assigned directly to the National Guards had a twelve-year total service time,⁵⁹ while men assigned to the *Ersatzreserve* received

a short period of training and then periodic reviews.⁶⁰ Mixing features of the Prussian/North German Confederation Army and the French model, the aim, in the words of Reichsrat Deputy Franz Groß, was to field a force with a “truly ‘exorbitant’” size “in comparison with what we had maintained until the unfortunate war of 1866,” one that would belatedly allow the Monarchy to keep up with other continental powers.⁶¹

For many Austrian parliamentarians, the proposed universal service-based army had a significance beyond its internationally competitive wartime strength. Speaking on behalf of the majority in the Reichsrat Lower House’s military committee, Franz Groß stated that “universal military service without substitutes or lot-swapping is the only robust and moral basis for a healthy military system, a relatively inexpensive military organization under the current circumstances, and, with its military training for the young, a bridge for the transition to a militia system; not to mention that [universal military service] would bring the army and the people closer together while addressing the demands of a *Rechtsstaat*.” The new system promised budgetary savings in peacetime while creating sizable wartime strength. Equally important was extending the legal protection of individual’s rights and dignity to members of the armed forces, because universal military service would create an army whose soldiers were also rights-bearing citizens. The “overwhelming majority” of the Reichsrat military committee specifically amended the government’s bill to abolish “corporal punishment and chain punishment . . . as an imperative of the time.”⁶²

Others were even more explicit in seeing universal military service as part and parcel of a new constitutional order in which liberal values and a new conception of state-citizen relations would prevail. Karl Rechbauer and the minority on the Reichsrat military committee saw universal military service as a “democratic institution” and “the only just [military system]” because it was based on the principle of the “same rights, same duties for all.” As an army of citizens in arms, it was meant to serve “a liberal and constitutional *Rechtsstaat*” and defend “the freedom and integrity of the fatherland” against foreign aggression. It was not a vehicle for “military glory, dynastic interests, or the so-called great power status of the empire.” Arguing that the government’s bill fell short of the expectation, Rechbauer reminded his colleagues, “We don’t want a military law that enables the use of the people’s strength for any reason other than their own interests! We want the people to know the purpose for which their lives and properties are sacrificed.”⁶³

The parliamentary debate over the proposed Military Law in November 1868 was long. Mostly an internecine liberal quarrel, some deputies questioned the

claim that the proposed military system would save money, while others worried about the sidelining of the Reichsrat in the nine intervening years between the decennial Ausgleich negotiations with the Hungarians over recruitment cohort size and financial responsibilities. The length of military service and the projected size of the Joint Army were also flagged as too militaristic and undermining the liberal ideal of a democratic citizen militia. But one thing was never in question: the armed forces should “embody a new spirit, the spirit of citizenship.” According to Ignaz Karl Figuly, one of the twenty-nine deputies who ultimately voted against the government’s bill (118 in favor), this was “because the new soldier will know what he is fighting for and because he will fight with conviction for freedom, justice, the fatherland, and the throne. . . . I therefore expect a new army to embody the people’s intelligence and the ideal of youthful citizenship; not just the spirit of military obedience, but civic virtues. I expect the caste spirit to disappear. . . . It will be an army of Austria and not, as people once said, Austria of an army.”⁶⁴

These lofty expectations were disappointed, as the highly punitive and abusive military discipline regime persisted despite the reforms.⁶⁵ More generally, the liberals, finally in power, “made their peace with the military” and compromised on their long-held ideal of a citizen militia.⁶⁶ The relatively closed corporate ethos of the professional officer corps persisted, despite intense debates both inside and outside of the army over its organization, training, social orientations, and even its culture.⁶⁷ Criticisms grew increasingly louder in subsequent years over the reforms introduced by the more liberal leaning military leaders, the war ministers Feldmarschalleutnant (Lieutenant General) Franz von John and, especially, Feldmarschalleutnant Franz von Kun in the 1860s and 1870s. The idea of treating soldiers from all social classes as thinking, autonomous individuals with dignity was even ridiculed as a “sentimental modern humanitarianism” that churned out “weaklings” instead of real men.⁶⁸ Military writers talked about the post-1868 armed forces as “the school of the people,” because the Monarchy’s complicated multiethnic composition made “the school of the nation” impossible.⁶⁹ The lessons offered in the “school,” however, did not match the liberal vision of a society of free citizen-soldiers defending their own constitutional polity. What was emphasized was the positive effect of military discipline on civilian life in terms of “‘order,’ ‘sobriety,’ ‘obedience,’ ‘sense of duty,’ ‘community spirit,’ ‘honor,’ and ‘ambition’” and an authoritarian model of “father-son relationship” between the soldier and fatherland.⁷⁰ From this perspective, universal service continued the armed forces’ old social disciplinary mission—but on a much grander scale.

As nationalist mobilizations and conflicts led to frequent crises after the 1890s, the institution of universal military service itself was questioned. After 1900, some critics from the military saw it as part of a complex of symptoms that needed to be radically addressed, including the dysfunctional parliament, corrupt and petty party politics, nationalism, socialism, the peace movement, and the irresponsible liberal (and other) press. They argued in favor of a loyal professional force as the better option.⁷¹ On the ground, though, the universal service-based Habsburg armed forces seemed to enjoy a significant level of social acceptance. Neither the relatively high rate of no-shows for physical examinations among military-age men nor the low rate (often around 20 percent) of those who had shown up being declared fit for service clearly indicate anti-Habsburg, antimilitary, or antidraft sentiments; other reasons, such as poverty-induced emigration, may better explain the phenomenon.⁷² Moreover, the growing veterans' movement in the second half of the nineteenth century points to "the development of a Habsburg-patriotic milieu in imperial Austria." Universal military service provided an important basis for popular political and social mobilization in certain areas and among certain social classes in the late Monarchy, albeit in a conservative vein, and it made possible "the symbiosis between popular patriotism and military culture."⁷³ The armed forces did not transform into a bastion of democracy after 1868,⁷⁴ but they did become part of accepted social life and an increasingly participatory political culture that some officers found threatening.

New Law, Old Spirit

The Military Law of 1868 was intended to enhance the Monarchy's military power. Ironically, it also raised serious concern about the armed forces "los[ing] the character of a professional army." In public the military leadership did not worry about a new democratic spirit upending the army's conservative, hierarchical, and nonnationalist corporate culture. Rather, they pointed to the potential loss of combat effectiveness resulting from soldiers' shorter active service as well as the reliance on reservists, in spite of the new system's much larger wartime strength. To make up for this perceived loss, they claimed that it was necessary to attract and retain "trained career officers" to maintain an experienced cadre. "Higher pay and better benefits" were identified as the priority.⁷⁵ The Military Welfare Law of 27 November 1875 (*RGBL.* 158/1875) was the answer.

As early as 1870, the Delegations, the representative body composed of select members from both the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments, had demanded that the military administration come up with a new military welfare bill.⁷⁶ In

October 1874, a nine-person special committee of the Lower House of the Reichsrat strongly endorsed the bill presented by the government earlier that year.⁷⁷ The bill was an opportunity that could not be missed, according to the committee, because it would improve the pay and benefits to complete the incentive package for recruiting and retaining professional soldiers and finally align the pension rules with those for civil servants. Moreover, the bill paid “unprecedented” attention to the enlisted ranks, thereby facilitating the retention of a core of “proficient” long-serving noncommissioned officers (NCOs).⁷⁸

The Lower House special committee also believed that this bill could deliver better benefits within the severe fiscal limitations the Austrian state had faced since the 1860s.⁷⁹ High costs would not be a problem, asserted the committee, because the new benefits “would apply only to a relatively small number of beneficiaries.” Current pensioners would continue with the older, pre-1875 benefits if they had retired before the new 1869 salaries were introduced.⁸⁰ The intention to achieve better benefits for individuals but lower total outlay proved to be the most contentious point during the Lower House’s debates.⁸¹

Finally, the committee pointed to Hungary as a reason for accepting the bill much as it was presented by the government. The Austrian defense minister, Colonel Julius Horst, made this point bluntly: welfare provision had to be coordinated by both sides of the Monarchy because members of the Joint Army would be beneficiaries. The bill was the fruit of long negotiation between the Austrian and Hungarian governments, and consent from both parliaments was needed. Making substantive changes to it would force the process to start over again.⁸² If the committee had already declared that the bill had made major “progress . . . because it covers everyone who is a member of the armed forces,”⁸³ there was no point for further delay.

Intended as the companion legislation to the Military Law of 1868, the Military Welfare Law of 1875 did not reflect the new reality of a citizen army. The military leadership saw it first and foremost as a recruiting and retention incentive for professional soldiers, complementing the raise in the salaries and supplements for junior officers in 1870/1871.⁸⁴ It could even be seen as a measure to counteract the potential of a citizen militia by unabashedly favoring the professional core. Not until 1855 had the Habsburg armed forces introduced a retirement age and a pension system for officers that took length of service into account in calculating the pension’s amount.⁸⁵ This basic principle for calculating pensions was carried over to the 1875 law. Those who had served at least ten years and were certified by a superarbitration commission as unfit to carry out military responsibilities would be entitled to a pension; so were those who

TABLE 1.1. Comparison of Pensions for Officers before and after the Military Welfare Law of 1875

Rank Category	Rank	Average old pension listed in the 1873 budget, gulden per year (equivalent service years)	New pension according to the 1875 law, gulden per year (with service years)	New pension percentage in comparison with the old for the same rank and service years	New pension, kreuzer per day (100 kr. = 1 gulden)
XI	Lieutenant	313 (20)	300 (20)	96	82
X	First Lieutenant	375 (25)	450 (25)	120	123
IX	Captain 2nd Class	628 (40)	900 (40)	143	247
IX	Captain 1st Class	628 (30)	900 (30)	143	247
VIII	Major	870 (30)	1,260 (30)	145	345
VII	Lieutenant Colonel	1,245 (35)	1,837 (35)	148	503
VI	Colonel	1,990 (40)	3,000 (40)	151	822
V	<i>Generalmajor</i>	3,100 (40)	4,200 (40)	135	1,151
IV	<i>Feldmarschalleutnant</i>	4,680 (40)	6,300 (40)	135	1,726
III	<i>Feldzeugmeister</i>	6,576 (40)	8,400 (40)	128	2,301

In the 1870s the average daily wage of a day laborer in Vienna was 61.2 kreuzer, which was worth 8.9 pounds of coarse bread (6.9 kr./pound; 1 pound = 0.56 kilogram).

SOURCE: *SPHA*, VIII. Session, 67. Sitzung, 27 October 1874, 2467–2468; Sandgruber, *Die Anfänge der Konsumgesellschaft*, 115, Tabelle 20; 465–466.

reached the age of sixty or had accrued forty service years. In other words, old age and long service were both seen as forms of military disability.⁸⁶

Except for extending eligibility for systematic pensions to disabled and long-serving enlisted men, the 1875 law consisted mostly of improvements within the existing benefit structures. The improvements lay primarily in making full pension easier to achieve and at higher amounts (see Table 1.1). Forty rather than fifty service years qualified an officer for a full pension at the amount equaling his last active service pay, and a more generous pension scale was introduced for those who accrued fewer service years. A minimum annual pension was also introduced, set at 300 gulden in case the new formula yielded a lower amount. The minimum pension, however, was only half of the basic annual pay for a freshly

minted lieutenant in 1868, and at a daily rate it came out to not much better than the average Viennese day laborer's daily income.⁸⁷ Still, for those who served long enough, the 1875 law clearly awarded better benefits (with the exception for lieutenants). The real beneficiaries of the new system were those ranked from captain upward to colonel, the group of officers the military administration apparently most wanted to retain

It is clear that the 1875 law focused on and favored career officers even when its provision for the enlisted ranks was hailed as a breakthrough. For a disabled officer who had not accrued ten service years, one of the following three conditions still entitled him to a pension: disability as a result of injuries caused by enemy fire or "war exhaustion"; "helplessness" brought about by mental illness, epilepsy, total blindness, or paralysis; or external injuries or chronic illness caused by military duties, through no fault of his own, that led to inability to discharge military responsibilities or to resume previously held gainful employment. The third condition was the first clear signal that civilians doing military service might become beneficiaries of the 1875 law, because the Military Law of 1868 introduced the Prussian-style one-year volunteer for those who had completed secondary education or practiced certain occupations (such as priests); their shorter service would be devoted mostly to training that could lead to a commission of lieutenant in the reserve.⁸⁸ However, this condition still enabled the military's own superarbitration commissions to deny benefits to potential reserve officers if their military disability was not seen as also constituting disability for civilian jobs.

The greatest majority of citizens doing their military service in the Joint Army and the National Guards would never be able to satisfy the ten-service-year pension eligibility requirement, because only active service counted. The 1875 law did stipulate the same three conditions for the enlisted ranks as officers to qualify for long-term benefits with less than ten service years. But it explicitly added one more condition before any of those three could be considered: permanent loss of civilian earning power. The fact that officers did not have to meet this criterion made it clear that the 1875 law presumed most, if not all, qualified beneficiaries would be professional soldiers, specifically officers. For career officers, civilian earning power was irrelevant—they had no other career to "return to"—but the government and the Reichsrat special committee assumed that NCOs and common soldiers served shorter terms and presumably had or could have careers outside of the army. Moreover, if an NCO or common soldier was deemed militarily disabled but not so as a civilian, he was not entitled to a pension; only if the disability or injury worsened within five years of leaving

TABLE 1.2. The 1875 Military Pension for the Enlisted Ranks

Rank	Annual Pension after 10 Service Years (in gulden)	Daily Pension after 10 Service Years (in kreuzer)	Annual Pension after 18 Service Years (in gulden)	Daily Pension after 18 Service Years (in kreuzer)	Annual Pension after 30 Service Years (in gulden)	Daily Pension after 30 Service Years (in kreuzer)
Private (<i>Infanterist</i>)	36	9.9	54	14.8	78	21.4
Private First Class (<i>Gefreiter</i>)	48	13.2	72	19.7	104	28.5
Corporal (<i>Corporal</i>)	60	16.4	90	24.7	130	35.6
Sergeant (<i>Zugsführer</i>)	72	19.7	108	29.6	156	42.7
Master Sergeant (<i>Feldwebel</i>)	84	23.0	126	34.5	182	49.9
Warrant Officer (<i>Offiziers- Stellvertreter</i>)	108	29.6	162	44.4	234	64.1

SOURCE: *RGBL*. 158/1875, Beilage I.

the service could he become eligible for a permanent pension. In other words, citizens severely wounded while doing their military service might be discharged physically or mentally broken but empty handed. The 1820s assumption persisted in the 1875 law: military disability was still not civilian disability.

There was only one exception to this fundamental favoring of career officers. An NCO who had served uninterrupted for eighteen years or more would be entitled to a permanent pension without the need to prove his military disability. Affirming the underlying thinking that equated old age and long service with disability, this was also the main incentive for enlisted men to stay in active service.⁸⁹ But unlike an officer's pension, which was calculated based on his last active pay, such "automatic" pension for a long-serving NCO or common soldier followed a fixed schedule, as Table 1.2 shows.⁹⁰

Despite the claim that the new law gave “unprecedented attention” to their “often sorrowful lot,”⁹¹ the 1875 base pension of even a long-serving NCO was meager. A Viennese day laborer’s average daily income in the 1870s was higher than the daily pension of all but the longest-serving warrant officer. In an expensive place like Vienna, an enlisted man’s invalid pension alone was insufficient to maintain a decent working-class life. The Reichsrat special committee even admitted this: “Although not enough to fully support the soldier who becomes disabled, it is still substantial assistance.”⁹² Furthermore, beneficiaries of the enlisted ranks, but not officers, could be given “temporary pensions” for only one to three years if their conditions were deemed improvable. The beneficiary would be required to return to the military’s superarbitration commission for reexamination before the period was up. The 1875 pension system’s underlying design and assumptions, and the impulse to find savings, were not that different from those of its 1820s predecessor.

The 1875 law included two other forms of welfare provision—injury supplement and invalid house residency—both of which favored officers over the enlisted men. Injury supplement was first proposed in May 1871,⁹³ mostly to recognize sacrifices made in action. If a soldier lost specific limb(s) or organic function(s) and became disabled while carrying out his duty, he would, in addition to a pension, receive a supplement not entirely dependent on rank or service length. Losing, for example, a hand or a foot meant a 400-gulden supplement to an officer’s regular pension regardless of his rank; losing two limbs or all eyesight meant 900 gulden. But for NCOs and common soldiers, the supplements for the same losses were only 96 and 144 gulden, respectively.

Invalid house residency also had different rules and benefits for officers and the enlisted men. Since 1858, militarily disabled officers at the rank of captain and below who were placed in retirement had been eligible for invalid house residency plus 90 percent of their last active pay as salary and other benefits.⁹⁴ For disabled enlisted men to be granted residency, however, they had to have thirty years of continuous service, been severely wounded on duty or ill, and in need of “special care and supervision.” The 1875 law listed very specific provisions invalid enlisted men were entitled to in an invalid house—their last active wage, room and board, clothes, and tobacco—that were not specified for officer-residents. Likewise, the law listed several reasons for which enlisted invalid house residents could lose their residency, including habitual drunkenness or house rule-violating cantankerousness, but there was nothing of the sort for officers.

The bifurcation of conditions for officers and enlisted men pointed to persistent negative assumptions about the latter. The military officials probably

thought there were too many poor veterans who would exploit the system and lacked self-control. So a few more hurdles for entry, an explicit catalogue of in-kind provisions, and a list of reasons for disqualification specifically for enlisted men were added to the law. Thus the disciplinary nature of the invalid house from the first half of the nineteenth century was largely carried over in the new law. The nondebate over this part of the bill in 1874 suggests that the lawmakers more or less shared the same view: those who entered the invalid houses were likely to be lower-class poor who were prone to alcoholism and behavioral problems.

The 1875 law certainly aimed to provide better benefits, but doing so without growing the state's military budget was equally important. Reichsrat Deputy Gustav Held, the author of the special committee's report, made this clear during the debate over retroactively awarding the new benefits to those who had been receiving old pensions: "It is always unfortunate that the sense of obligation, here the obligation to consider the financial situation of the state, is in conflict with the heart's wish. . . . Nevertheless the committee believes it should not give in to the [good-hearted] impulse. . . . The financial situation of the country has to be a priority."⁹⁵

Not extending the new benefits to old pensioners was not enough. Defense Minister Horst, speaking on behalf of the Austrian government, acknowledged that controlling the number of soldiers who would be declared eligible was also essential. He promised that the superarbitration process for officers would be conducted "in the strictest possible way."⁹⁶

The fiscal imperative led to a somewhat farcical debate over horses: whether making captains in field units ride horses would be an effective way to reduce welfare spending. According to Horst, half of the pensioned former officers had retired at the rank of captain on grounds of military disability. The reason was mostly physical exhaustion due to the wear and tear of active field duty. It usually took an officer fifteen to sixteen years to reach the rank of captain, and those who worked hard were often physically worn by then. Making them ride would preserve and promote hardworking officers, instead of rewarding only endurance or even lack of diligence. The state would then save on the pensions paid to relatively young former officers.⁹⁷ Although the special committee endorsed the government's idea of employing horses as a money-saving strategy,⁹⁸ many deputies remained very skeptical. In the end, this was the only part of the 1874 bill and the committee amendments that the full Lower House rejected.⁹⁹

The disagreement over horses notwithstanding, there was a very high degree of consensus over the proposed system's overall design and concrete provisions.

The language used during the Reichsrat debate in 1874 showed that the political elite—whether on the side of the government and the military or their critics—shared a basic understanding that underpinned the government bill and the eventual 1875 law. Defense Minister Horst reassured the Reichsrat that when a relatively young officer had to be committed to a psychiatric institution, the state would honor its obligations and pay all the salary or benefits he was entitled to, for decades if necessary, until his death. It was the state's obligation to take care of a servant of the state who could no longer serve.¹⁰⁰ The government bill's most dogged critic, Deputy Friedrich Brandstetter, talked about "fulfilling the duty" toward "loyal servants of the state" and "our obligation to give fair recognition to their claims" when concluding his long objection to the government's refusal to apply the new law to old pensioners.¹⁰¹ The fact that both sides adopted the same language of "state servants" and duty-obligation was telling: the elite of the 1870s saw military welfare not as a general form of entitlement based on citizens' general rights but as a special commitment to a specific category of people based on what they had done for the state.

This shared understanding and vocabulary of duty, obligations, and state servants pointed to two intertwined but different conceptions of military welfare benefits that underpinned the consensus. The first conception was to see welfare provision as a concrete expression of the monarch's beneficence: his or her kindness and grace would ensure that those who had served the monarch would not fall on hard times. When a soldier was no longer able to serve, the monarch (the state) had, in theory, the option not to offer anything beyond the last installment of the agreed-upon regular pay. Anything beyond the soldier's conventional pay (in cash or in kind) was an act of extraordinary intervention. The case-by-case "character pensions" granted before the 1855 introduction of regular retirement and pensions were an example of this expression of the monarch's (and state's) goodwill. It can be argued that the post-1855 regular pensions were a systematized version of the old monarchical gesture of grace and gratitude. The close identification between Emperor Franz Joseph and the Habsburg armed forces ensured that "dutiful servants of the state" would be properly rewarded. The persistent and widespread use of the term "servant" in military welfare discussion was especially revealing, as it underlined the direct personal relation between the monarch (the state) and his soldier, a nineteenth-century version of the mutual relations between a generous lord and his or her loyal, socially inferior, personal servants.

The second conception was that the soldier, by virtue of being a member of a standing, professionalized, and bureaucratized army, was at least in a

quasi-employment relation with the state (the monarch). Strictly speaking, the relation between the state and the career soldier was not a private contractual one between an employer and an employee.¹⁰² But developments since the days of Empress Maria Theresa had gradually turned military officers into state servants with regular pay, formalized training, recognizable credentials, defined responsibilities, and relatively clear career paths.¹⁰³ In this context, and especially after 1855, the pension became a regular, expected part of the compensation that the state had to honor for the service rendered and the risks assumed, though the act of payment would be deferred to a later date. It was no longer something granted at the monarch's pleasure; the soldier in question could make claims. Talk of "fulfilling the duty" to old and disabled soldiers, then, imparted to military welfare an element of a legally binding transactional contract. Disability pension became the legally binding compensation for realized risk and thus a replacement for lost income for the career soldier in question. The state was not only morally or even politically obligated to pay, it was also legally bound to do so.

In the 1870s, these two conceptions coexisted to shape the political elite's views on military welfare. They helped construct a discourse about why military welfare provision was necessary at this point in time and in the particular, narrow form of the 1875 law. The typical beneficiary imagined under the new system was a (military) servant of the state by occupation. Officers—the prototypical state servants and Emperor Franz Joseph's own—and their needs stood at the center of the new law's design. This explains why, over the course of the Lower House debates in late October, career officers' entitlements were subject to so much vehement disagreement and passionate advocacy. NCOs and common soldiers were included as potential beneficiaries and had dedicated sections in the bill. But their eligibility and concrete welfare provisions were almost never discussed. In fact, the only time these were brought up was when Deputy Johann Fuchs, a community physician from Silesia, complained about the "sorry state" of disabled men of the enlisted ranks. Under the existing (pre-1875) system, "all other pensioners," such as commissioned officers and military bureaucrats, were paid at the beginning of each month. But patent invalids of the enlisted ranks received their meager pension only at the end of each quarter. This practice "exacerbate[d] the sorry state," according to Fuchs, who thought the payment schedule should be brought in line with that of other beneficiaries. The modest request was supported by his colleagues. But that was the end of the Lower House's interest in the enlisted men's benefits: only *when* it was paid, not the amount being paid.¹⁰⁴

If even professional noncommissioned soldiers were ignored in the parliamentary debate in 1874, it is no surprise that citizens who did only a few years of military service in the Joint Army or the National Guards were a nonissue. Throughout the parliamentary deliberation, nonprofessional soldier-citizens appeared only as a kind of abstract “taxpayer” whose financial contributions to the state the Reichsrat claimed to be guarding vigilantly.¹⁰⁵ The political elite gave little thought beyond the prototypical state servant: the career officer. Citizens doing military service for a few short years were theoretically covered under the new law, with very stringent conditions for eligibility: fully disabled militarily and for civilian life and blameless for their disabilities. But the political elite did not consider the full implications of what they had created; they certainly did not entertain the possibility that temporary soldiers would become the majority of welfare recipients—and in large numbers. The parliamentarians focused instead on the fight to retroactively apply the new benefits to the former career soldiers who were receiving old benefits, and they lost.¹⁰⁶ They were debating the past, not the future they had helped to create in 1868.

The Reform for Continuities

The years between 1867 and 1879 were the heyday of Austrian political liberalism. Liberals worked hard to enshrine the concept of rights-bearing citizens in the constitutional laws and, with that concept, to redefine state institutions and practices.¹⁰⁷ The post-1868 army, accordingly, was broadly conceived as a force of citizens, and “soldiers should be no more than citizens in arms.”¹⁰⁸ The law made it clear that emigrating to another country or acquiring foreign citizenship would lead to the loss of all benefits, thereby firmly establishing the armed forces as an army of Austrian (and Hungarian) citizens, not an army of the ruling house where soldiers’ personal loyalty to the monarch, rather than their citizenship, was the paramount requirement. The principle of legal equality among citizens was also partially reflected in the military, a hierarchical institution by nature, with the introduction of a systematic invalid/retirement pension to the enlisted ranks and in the new supplemental injury benefit. Still, preferential welfare provision for career soldiers marked the new Military Welfare Law of 1875. It was even emphasized to attract and retain career officers. The Austrian political and military elite of the liberal reform era created an army of citizens led by a professional officer corps. But in terms of welfare provision, they only thought about the needs of the new hybrid structure’s professional side.

Thus the full political implications of universal military service were not reflected in the Military Welfare Law of 1875. Even the more critical liberals, who used the language of citizenship and democracy in describing their visions for a new military force of the people, may not have anticipated how universal military service would embed the logic of egalitarian rights-bearing citizenship in the most tradition-bound “imperial” institution, the armed forces. In the constitutional era, why did the new welfare law fail to address or anticipate the new world that the Military Law of 1868 would ultimately usher in? Why did the reforming political elite fail to fully appreciate how revolutionary the changes were that they were injecting, not only into the institution of the military but into the meanings and implications of citizenship?

This chapter points to a fundamental conservatism shared by both the liberal political and military elite.¹⁰⁹ At the most basic level, disability continued to be understood in an occupation-specific frame. Military disability was therefore the defining criterion for welfare entitlement before and after 1875, but reduced earning power as a civilian was not. This also explains why old age continued to be seen as a form of (military) disability and that the pensions old soldiers received were called invalids’ pensions, while the damage done by service-induced injuries to a man’s subsistence as a civilian—most relevant for noncareer servicemen—was not fully appreciated or addressed.

By the same token, the basic assumption that a typical beneficiary was a career officer remained unaltered. It was a persistent and unquestioned belief that short-service enlisted men—a poor foot soldier of the early nineteenth century or a citizen doing three-year active service after 1868—would have somewhere else to turn for his postmilitary livelihood. The rules about temporary pensions for disabled enlisted men and the five-year period for retroactive pension claims testified to the lasting power of this belief. The 1868 reform remade the armed forces, as the political and military elite recognized. But to them it was still career soldiers who defined the military as a social, political, and economic institution. The 1875 military welfare law could even be seen as an attempt to counteract some of the changes of 1868.

This strong continuity in military welfare provision also emphasized social discipline. The 1820s assumption that many disabled soldiers needed to be subject to behavioral control did not disappear with the liberal reforms. Family formation by disabled soldiers was still viewed with suspicion, because officials worried that women only married disabled soldiers for their pensions. So the 1875 law disqualified wives who married after the men had retired or were invalidated

out of service from receiving the death pay (three months' worth of the regular pension). And only dependent children born within wedlock or who were properly legitimated could receive that benefit. The elite of the 1870s expressed less explicit worries than did their 1820s predecessors about disabled men roaming and panhandling in the Monarchy's main streets. But under the 1875 law, a disabled enlisted man, unlike a disabled officer, did not have the option of living outside the invalid house to which he was assigned. He could choose only between living there and being subject to military discipline or taking an invalid pension and giving up his claim to the residency. The impulse to control disabled benefit recipients remained strong.

Finally, the limited funds available for military welfare remained a paramount constraining factor and discouraged new thinking. In fact, one of the alleged merits of the 1875 law was its supposed tightening of the pool of eligible beneficiaries. In the 1820s, the military welfare measures were intended to save money and, at the same time, discourage panhandling and other public embarrassment. The 1875 law was intended to save money but also to improve the benefits so as to make a long military career more enticing. Caught between two incompatible goals, the 1870s military disability welfare system could not bring about truly fundamental reform, even as liberal constitutional transformations of the state and citizenship were taking place.

As for the Trotts, the sergeant-turned-groundskeeper lived in "frugal government poverty" in Laxenburg because post-Napoleonic military welfare was by design insufficient to fully sustain a disabled man. Menial employment at the Laxenburg Palace, a concrete expression of the emperor's favor, was what really provided for the sergeant's needs: a modest income and lodging.¹¹⁰ A comparable form of imperial favor was to grant the state tobacco monopoly's retail license to long-serving disabled soldiers or soldiers' widows, a tradition first started by Emperor Joseph II in 1784. The insufficient military welfare made the tobacconist kiosk (*Trafik*) the "symbol of security and peaceful twilight years" in the eyes of many old soldiers.¹¹¹

Not everyone was as lucky as the Hero of Solferino, who, though not having served long enough nor been injured severely enough to qualify for a pension, could leave the Imperial Army with a grudge but no financial worries. He married his colonel's "not-quite-young well-off niece," and her family's property was enough for a relatively comfortable life.¹¹² He could afford to bypass the never-generous 1772, 1855, or 1875 benefits that defined the Austrian state's welfare provision for its disabled and old soldiers.

The Emergence of the War Welfare Field from Peace to War

THERE WAS A CONSPICUOUS omission during the October 1874 Reichsrat debate on the proposed military welfare bill: the Lower House deputies did not discuss how the soldiers' dependents would fit into the larger scheme. The resulting 1875 Military Welfare Law was reticent, except for the promise of a death payment to the dead pensioner's family. Throughout the legislative process, only the Upper House brought up the issue explicitly and urged the government to more equitably align the benefits for soldiers' widows and orphans with those granted to the surviving dependents of dead civil servants.¹

The omission was not a coincidence. The 1875 law was designed mainly for professional officers. A career officer could marry only after posting a marriage bond, proving that his future spouse and potential offspring could survive on his legacy should he die prematurely.² With this guarantee, welfare for officers' surviving dependents did not seem to be a priority. The old mentality behind the 1875 law also overlooked noncareer soldiers' dependents. The law did not intend the state to take full responsibility for the care of all disabled soldiers, and certainly not for those whose calling was not soldiering. It permanently covered only the most catastrophic cases and rarely to the fullest extent.³ As the draftee's duty to serve had an expiration date, the state's generosity was also limited.

However, the citizen-army logic inherent in universal service could not be ignored indefinitely. As the liberal conception of individuals with equal rights became more firmly embedded through the expansion of male franchise and the rise of mass political movements,⁴ the policy and political implications of all adult male citizens' duty to serve became more explicit. Between 1875 and 1912, state officials and elected politicians introduced more military welfare provisions, and the evolved legal framework included nonsoldiers as potential beneficiaries on account of their relations to male citizen-soldiers. That framework would be severely tested when the mobilized citizen army went to the field following the

assassination of the Habsburg heir apparent and his wife in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 and the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia in July.⁵

Tracing the development of Austrian military welfare's legal and administrative framework between 1875 and 1918, this chapter argues that activation of the citizen army in the age of increasingly assertive participatory politics led to a gradual and reactive expansion of the state's welfare commitments. The Austrian state's changing relations to soldiers and their family members and the involvement of new welfare actors testify to the growing importance of the emerging sphere of welfare actions before, and especially during, the First World War. Two aspects of the state's wartime welfare intervention—living allowances for called-up soldiers' dependents and the formation of the official wartime system of provision for disabled soldiers—reveal that the prewar military welfare framework was overwhelmed by the full mobilization and unending multifront war. The war's unprecedented scale of destruction forced a series of improvisations, resulting in cumbersome arrangements and complex stopgap measures. Massive civil society contributions, both in manpower and in material resources, became indispensable. Facing obvious inadequacies, the military leadership saw an opportunity to turn a potential long-term solution into a grand vision of remaking Austria.

The Central State's Expanding Commitments

It took a few years before the Reichsrat considered expanding the military welfare's pool of potential beneficiaries. The 1875 Military Welfare Law assumed someone other than state authorities—families, local communities, or charities—would shoulder the lion's share of providing for most disabled noncareer soldiers. The military disability pension, only available for the most desperate cases, was therefore not part of a generous welfare-state expansion or innovative collective risk sharing but more in the character of institutionalized public charity. Similar limitations also characterized the Law Regarding Military Taxes, Military Tax Fund, and the Support for Mobilized Persons' Needy Families of 13 June 1880 (*RGBl.* 70/1880), which provided the funding for the 1887 law awarding pensions to dependents of the fallen, whether career or reservist/draftee soldiers.⁶ Along with the 1912 law promising living allowances (*Unterhaltsbeitrag*) to dependents of those called to active service,⁷ these laws formed the core of the regular public provision for all mobilized men and fallen soldiers' dependents throughout the First World War.

The Habsburg Army's 1878 occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for which a partial mobilization was ordered, made the question of how to sustain

dependents of the called-up reservists unavoidable. As the response, the 1880 law instituted the military tax, to be collected from all adult males declared unfit to perform or complete the three-year active military service. There was no shortage of payers, because budgetary constraints—due partly to the reluctance of both the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments to authorize larger armed forces and partly to the Magyar elite’s leveraging dualist structure to pursue their nationalist ambitions—forced the Habsburg armed forces to draft only a fraction of young adult males of service age.⁸ The relatively stringent physical standards rendering most adult males “unfit for service” also helped in this regard. Between 1870 and 1882, no age cohort in Imperial Austria had a “fit for service” rate above 26.3 percent; between 1883 and 1893 the global rate of “fit for service” was 20.2 percent.⁹ The military tax was supposed to equalize the burden of military service: some served, while others paid to offset the risks the former assumed. Assessed based on the exempted man’s or his family’s properties and income, it reached far beyond the adult male age groups in question.¹⁰

The military tax fund was to be used to improve the care of disabled soldiers through special grants on top of the regular 1875 military pensions. It would also pay for the care of needy widows and orphans left behind by those who died in service. Funded by the collected military tax, the promised widow and orphan pension finally materialized in 1887. Like the disability pension, the amount of the widow and orphan pension was based on the rank of the husband/father. A 50 percent supplement was added to the base pension if the husband or father died in action or as a result of battle wounds within a year of the initial injury.¹¹ The service-year and rank-based rules, which made the 1875 military pension law more of a charitable relief measure than a genuine entitlement for draftees, appeared in the 1887 law under another guise in determining the base pension for military widows and orphans. The provision again favored career soldiers’ dependents. The state had only minimum obligations, and only in the worst cases, to the unfortunate draftees’ dependents.

By making the exempted male population pay the costs of long-term provision for military widows and orphans, the 1880 law kept the central state from tapping its own resources in most cases. It was a way to demonstrate the state’s responsibility without making the corresponding financial commitment. The state played a role somewhat closer to that of the administrator of a compulsory charitable fund, collecting the “tax” from one section of society to fund the pension program for the other. Moreover, the central state also did not “manage” the fund for free. It kept part of the collected military tax as revenue despite the explicitly stated purpose of the tax.¹²

Through its 1870s and 1880s legislation, the Austrian state established a system in which its own resources were committed in a descending order. Career soldiers were most favored; then those common people who bore arms for the state temporarily; and finally widows and orphans. Structurally, the relationship between the central state and society that this order entailed was not that of two partners with binding obligations to each other, with the state extracting human and material resources in the name of guaranteeing the safety of the governed. Rather, the relationship was closer to a triangle in which the central state dictated to the other two corners, demanding military-worthy bodies from one and money to pay for the care of them from the other. The two nonstate corners were mutually more bound to each other than to the domineering central state. As it had done during the absolutist period, the central state took for granted its power to mobilize social resources.

The 1912 Law Regarding Living Allowances for Mobilized Persons' Dependents (*RGBl. 237/1912*) offered a much-needed update and more comprehensive support for families whose breadwinners were called to serve. It was passed after the 1908–1909 Bosnia-Herzegovina Annexation Crisis and amid the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, both of which led to the partial mobilization of reservists in the Monarchy, exposing the inadequacy of the state support for mobilized men's dependents. Especially problematic was its condition of only aiding "the needy"—the definition for which was never clear—and the inability of the authorities to process applications in a timely manner. By then, Imperial Austria already had a lively, expanding participatory political culture buttressed by universal male suffrage introduced in 1907.¹³ A vibrant civil society—in the narrow sense of the multiplicity and networking of nonstate voluntary or social organizations—and increasing experience in taking advantage of constitutional instruments had made advocates for assorted issues and social interests more assertive and skillful vis-à-vis state authorities.¹⁴ In fact, it was due to pressure from the public—in the form of newspaper articles, petitions, and pamphlets—and repeated prodding from the Reichsrat that the living allowance law was finally presented and passed.¹⁵

The 1912 Living Allowance Law marked a change in the relationship between the central state and society at large. It moved them toward a more mutual and equal relation, as the state assumed wholesale responsibility for supporting all families of called-up reservists. Moreover, the amount of the living allowance, paid from the central treasury, was no longer determined by rank or accrued service years. Rather, it was based primarily on the household's place of residence and the number of eligible family members (including illegitimate children and

their mothers) who relied substantially on the income of the called-up individual. Base per diem per capita payments for different regions were published annually by the Joint War Ministry, and dependents in the same region generally received the same amount of public support, no matter how much their male family breadwinners earned before mobilization. Dependent children under the age of eight received half the amount, and people who lived in rented houses or apartments received an additional 50 percent rent supplement. As of 1914, the base living allowance per diem per capita in Vienna was 0.88 kronen, with an additional 0.44 kronen rent supplement where relevant. The household of a hypothetical called-up Viennese man with a wife and three children, aged 7, 9, and 10 respectively, would thus receive a total of 4.62 kronen per day, as long as this amount was not higher than his previous average daily income.¹⁶

The 1912 law's minimum income guarantee for all soldiers' families meant that the central state finally assumed the role of surrogate wage earner to many families. It was the substantiation of the official image of the emperor-as-father that was assiduously projected by the imperial house and the Austrian government as the centerpiece of the official state ideology to (partially) justify the Habsburg rule.¹⁷

The Living Allowance Law took a more comprehensive view of the needs of soldiers' dependents. The allowances would continue for six months after the death of their called-up breadwinner was confirmed. This stipulation gave dependents some breathing room before the first payment of the military pension.¹⁸ More importantly, the 1912 law addressed the terrible inadequacy of small 1887 military widow and orphan pensions. The six-month "grace period" presumably offered a stopgap measure before a desired improved pension scheme could take effect. In fact, a new comprehensive military welfare system, which would supersede the 1875, 1880, and 1887 laws for all soldiers (professional or not) and dependents, was considered before the First World War. A draft law was circulated for comment in 1913 and 1914 and had reached one of the last steps before being presented to the Reichsrat, but the outbreak of the war stopped its progress, leaving the existing laws, with minor improvements, in effect for most of the war years.¹⁹

In offering state-funded living allowances and preparing for a new military pension system, the Imperial Austrian central state in 1914 demonstrated a changed understanding of what ought to be done for citizens who were adversely affected by war service. This might just be updated paternalism, because Emperor Franz Joseph was the symbolic father of all Austrians in the official iconography and ideology. But the unprecedented commitment to living allowances

meant that mobilizing men for war was akin to the state “renting” adult male citizens from their families. It certainly was a huge step from simply ordering some adult males to serve and making nonserving ones shoulder a significant part of the inevitable long-term consequences. The central state more consciously marked out a specific sphere of indispensable action that it had previously more or less left to charities.

The paltry pensions and stringent qualifying conditions prescribed in the old military welfare laws remained an unsolved problem when the war against Serbia and Russia proved disastrous.²⁰ The Habsburg Army was defeated by the Serbs multiple times before the end of 1914. In the north, the Imperial Russian Army quickly pushed the invading Habsburg forces into chaotic retreat in September 1914, occupied most of the crownland of Galicia, and laid siege twice to the important fortress city of Przemyśl with its 120,000-man garrison.²¹ The most shocking consequence of the intense fighting between the mass armies, oftentimes using out-of-date tactics such as frontal assault by massed infantry without adequate artillery support, was the previously unimaginable casualty numbers. During the disastrous Galician campaign in late August and early September 1914, the Habsburg Army registered 100,000 dead, 220,000 wounded, and another 100,000 taken prisoner by the Russians. In just seventeen days, one-third of the original August 1914 Habsburg combat effectives—around 900,000—was lost.²² The humiliating defeats in Serbia in 1914 resulted in the loss of 273,000 men, including over 30,000 deaths, 173,000 wounded, and 70,000 POWs, from the 450,000-strong force deployed in the Balkans.²³ By the end of 1914, the Habsburg armed forces had suffered 189,000 deaths, 491,200 wounded, 291,800 sick, and 278,000 taken prisoner: a total loss of 1,250,000 out of the 3,350,000 mobilized in a period of just over four months.²⁴

Then, the disastrous Carpathian Winter War of January to April 1915 claimed 800,000 more casualties. Between 23 January and 5 February 1915, the Austrian-Hungarian Third Army lost 89,000 men out of the original 135,000 and the 30,000-strong reinforcement. At least half of the casualties were attributed to illness and severe frostbite; many froze to death.²⁵ The Second Army also lost around 40,000 of its 95,000 men between late January and mid-March, many of them, again, to illness and frostbite.²⁶ The Russians did not fare much better.²⁷ By the end of 1915, the Monarchy had suffered a permanent loss of 756,000 men due to death, injuries, or other reasons.²⁸ The casualties for the calendar year 1915 alone topped 2 million.²⁹ The prewar regular Habsburg forces had lost most of its junior officers and experienced noncommissioned officers by the end of the Carpathian campaign. The “militia” army

that emerged in its wake, composed of hastily trained and poorly equipped second-line reserves, was led by similarly hastily trained reserve officers and collapsed under the weight of the Russians' (Brusilov) Offensive in June and July 1916, suffering as many as three-quarters of a million casualties (380,000 taken prisoner).³⁰ The losses in these two years reduced Austria-Hungary to a satellite of Imperial Germany.³¹

Heavy censorship or loyalty to the emperor and the country were no longer adequate to curb popular discontent, as millions of adult males were called up and the casualties skyrocketed.³² Using its extraordinary wartime powers, the Austrian government scrambled to make it easier to qualify for military pensions. For soldiers with fewer than ten service years (the great majority of the called-up men), the small pensions had been awarded only when they were permanently unable to hold a civilian job—in other words, 100 percent disabled. The new order lowered the eligibility threshold to losing 20 percent of one's civilian earning power. The military disability pension, lacking updates after 1875, was too small to be of real help, but the lower threshold opened the door to other benefits and any later care measures. The government then resorted to emergency add-ons to make total benefits more realistic. Improved injury supplements, which could be significantly higher than the base pension for enlisted men, were introduced first.³³ On 12 June 1915, another supplement based on a soldier's degree of disability (starting with 20 percent) was added. With these updates, a fully disabled private would be entitled to a base pension of 72 kronen, an injury supplement of 288 kronen, and the new disability supplement of 180 kronen, for an annual total of 540 kronen.³⁴

More importantly, in February 1915 the Joint Council of Ministers extended the payment of living allowances to families of certified disabled soldiers for the entire duration of the war, plus an additional six months after its conclusion, provided that the soldier could show, month by month, that he could not earn the income he needed beyond the meager military pension granted by the 1875 law. The more generous 1912 living allowances were used as a temporary fix to make up for the lack of a new military pension scheme. For example, the hypothetical Viennese father of three children (ages 7, 9, 10) who was declared 20 percent or more disabled and receiving an injury supplement of 192 kronen annually would be entitled to a combined state support of 5.32 kronen per day, seven times the face value of the base 1875 military pension of 0.77 kronen. The 1 August 1917 Living Allowance Law revisions further raised the pay to this hypothetical family to 8.72 kronen per day. With the special state subsidy, introduced on 1 April 1918, they might receive even more.³⁵

These raises in public assistance were still insufficient, especially for unmarried disabled enlisted men. Before the 1918 special state subsidy, these soldiers received a pension of only between 0.6 and 1.4 kronen per day (including injury supplements or case-by-case special grants), hardly enough to live independently.³⁶ It was no surprise, then, that many disabled soldiers tried to stay in hospitals as long as possible because of the free room and board. Many also became wandering beggars after leaving the hospital, frequently turning to charities for handouts because a “meager pension precluded any possibilities to lead their own lives.”³⁷ What the military administration had feared throughout the nineteenth century had become a reality on a large scale.

As in 1912, popular pressure and parliamentary politics pushed the government to improve provision, especially the Living Allowance Law.³⁸ When the Reichsrat reconvened in mid-1917, it immediately expressed the frustration that had long been brewing in the general population. Presented and passed in August 1917,³⁹ the revised Living Allowance Law raised the amount of payments to offset the effect of inflation and included unmarried cohabitants of called-up men as beneficiaries.

The revised Living Allowance Law also gestured toward a more responsive and consultative state through a change in the award decision-making process. The original 1912 law established a three-member panel at the district (*Bezirk*) level to review and decide on the merit of each allowance application. Representing the interests of both the central state and the autonomous crownland administration, the crownland governor appointed his representative to serve as chair; the other two members represented the central state finance administration and the crownland’s autonomous administration, respectively.⁴⁰ The 1917 revision added two more members to this panel, to be selected from a pool of residents representing the district’s major occupations. Ideally they would be knowledgeable about the occupation of the mobilized man in question.⁴¹ The panel’s decision was no longer purely administrative but included input from the applicant’s local community.⁴² The central state not only extended its commitment to the material well-being of war-affected citizens, it also began to directly involve civil society in relevant decisions.

Furthermore, the panel’s decisions could be contested through a more practical channel. Previously the Administrative Court—one of Imperial Austria’s supreme courts—was the only place to seek redress, and the court was overwhelmed soon after the war broke out. The 1917 revision designated the crownland-level Living Allowance Commissions and the Austrian Ministry of Defense as two higher instances to which appeals could be made.⁴³

Both the 1912 law and its 1917 revisions came on the heels of a potent combination of muscle flexing by representative institutions and vivid memories of recent military conflicts. The 1912 law came into being after the 1907 introduction of universal male suffrage and through the participation of party politicians (the Christian Socials) in the cabinet and followed the Bosnian Crisis of 1908–1909 and the Balkan War mobilization. The 1917 revisions were introduced soon after the Reichsrat was reconvened, while there was still no end in sight to the massive losses and suffering. The two legislative initiatives responded to long-standing problems that had remained unaddressed. When the public provision of care was exposed as inadequate and popular representation became more forceful through a (larger) institutionalized platform, the Austrian central state was forced to commit more of its resources to ease the pressure from party politicians and the ever larger and more assertive constituencies they represented.

These concessions also meant deeper penetration by the state into society and into areas the central state might not have intended to enter or simply could not previously have entered. What may seem like a moment of weakness was paradoxically a springboard to a more extensive state presence in citizens' everyday lives. However, this expansion out of necessity entailed greater risk for the state's legitimacy. As the central state assumed more direct responsibilities for taking care of a battered population's basic needs, expectations grew in tandem. The Habsburg Monarchy mobilized 8 million men during the war.⁴⁴ As of 1 July 1917, there were already 49,662 officers and 1,421,998 enlisted men in both halves of the Monarchy going before the Military Superarbitration Commissions to determine their degree of disability and eligibility for military pensions. Among them, 2,775 officers and 344,400 enlisted men were declared absolutely unfit for any kind of military duty, and another 7,318 officers and 420,495 men were classified as temporarily or partially disabled.⁴⁵ This meant that as of mid-1917, the Monarchy as a whole had to pay living allowances to millions of family members, including those of the almost 800,000 soldiers or ex-soldiers who were also entitled to the small 1875 military pension and assorted supplements. More than half of these "clients" were in Imperial Austria.

This expansion of the welfare sphere, with millions more or less dependent on the state for subsistence, represented a heavy political weight, not just financial, for the state. The initial enactment of the Living Allowance Law and the following reforms served both as solutions to the pressing social problems at hand and gestures signaling the state's "caring" intentions. Failure to deliver, therefore, could cause frustration, anger, and disillusionment. Habsburg imperial paternalism indeed went bankrupt when the symbolic father, the emperor,

failed to deliver his people from severe wartime deprivations.⁴⁶ The state's cumulative war welfare programs created not only an expectation for its obligations to arms-bearing citizens but also a tangible yardstick by which the state's competence, and by extension its credibility, would be measured by millions, if not tens of millions, of citizens.

Political leaders were cognizant of this threatening logic. Following the spontaneous general strike in January 1918, increasingly frequent food riots, street brawls, and further diplomatic and military humiliations, the Reichsrat adopted legislation on 28 March 1918 granting the aforementioned special state subsidies to mitigate the inadequacies of the existing provision.⁴⁷ Urging his Upper House colleagues to support this initiative, Wilhelm Exner laid out the shared new understanding of the war-mediated state-citizen relation: "Because these invalids have fulfilled their [citizen's] duty to the state, the state must adopt this law with the sense of duty-fulfillment, and not out of some form of gracious benevolence or goodwill!" The aristocratic Upper House responded with "enthusiastic cheers and applause."⁴⁸

In this context, the new comprehensive military welfare law was finally on the state legislative agenda after years of delay. As early as August 1914, Emperor Franz Joseph allegedly wrote to both his Austrian and Hungarian minister-presidents asking for such a law, but even the imperial wish was not able to generate enough momentum.⁴⁹ The military leadership, which had enjoyed unprecedented power since 1914 but not made the new military welfare law a reality, suddenly became very eager to see it through. In the mid-September 1918 Congress for War Victim Welfare, the Monarchy's joint war minister, Colonel General von Stöger-Steiner, declared that welfare for disabled veterans was "the most urgent and noble among the tremendous tasks for the state. . . . It is also the way for the state to pay back its debt of gratitude to those good soldiers who suffered because of their loyal fulfillment of the duty to defend the fatherland."⁵⁰ But it was too late for the military to learn the logic of state-society give-and-take. In less than two months, the Monarchy collapsed.

Multiple Actors, Improvised Institutions, and Inconsistent Procedures

One of the most pressing issues in the fateful summer of 1914 was the subsistence of mobilized soldiers' families in their absence. Few anticipated a prolonged conflict. But even a short absence by the male family member and the loss of his income threatened the survival of families from lower social classes.

The Social Democratic organizations in Vienna knew that few if any of the called-up men and their families really understood what their military service-related rights and obligations were. They quickly published a pamphlet, half catechism and half how-to guide, to educate their constituents. The pamphlet broke down both the application process and the award decision making, emphasizing repeatedly the need to apply immediately, because living allowances would not be paid retroactively. The safest way to ensure a speedy receipt of the allowances, the pamphlet suggested, was for the mobilized man to go to the communal or municipal office in person, with his mobilization notice and other supporting documents in hand, and fill out application forms under the guidance of officials there before the date he was to report to the designated reserve unit. To expedite the process, dependents were advised to choose a main contact person since the authorities considered the mobilized man, not his individual dependents, as the case unit and sent all payments to only one address even if there were eligible dependents living at different addresses.⁵¹

Apparently this nimble move addressed a new public need and even scored a political point or two, which the Christian Social-controlled Viennese City Council and municipal government could not ignore. The Viennese City Council began operating the Municipal Counseling and Relief Center for War Invalids, Their Dependents, and Deceased Soldiers' Survivors on 26 October 1915 to offer advice and information about state benefits and public assistance available to disabled soldiers and their dependents and to help them negotiate the application process. Aware of the fact that military welfare provision was beyond its jurisdiction, as well as its political rivals' active grassroots mobilization capitalizing on welfare issues, the Christian Social-controlled Viennese municipal government also took the position of advocate. It actively persuaded the military authorities to make more generous changes regarding the amount of and eligibility of benefits.⁵²

The redefined bond between the state and the citizenry had to be effectively communicated and understood to be functional; a better information flow was desperately needed to make any care provision system work, no matter what inherent strengths or shortcomings the system had. The central state was under pressure to become caring and responsible. The new clients also needed guidance to negotiate the emerging world of wartime welfare. The Social Democrats' and the Christian Social-controlled municipal authorities' interventions in Vienna proactively bridged the gap and assumed the indispensable role of intermediary between the state and its citizens.

The emerging new field of wartime welfare was populated not only by an unprecedented number of clients and self-appointed party intermediaries but also a host of public, semipublic, and private agencies and organizations old and new, with different geographical coverage, target beneficiaries, and funding sources.⁵³ The growing domain of state responsibilities and intervention into the life of almost every citizen posed a challenge to the already complicated administrative structure in Austria. The living allowances, a commitment made by the central state, were a good example. After the called-up man or one of his dependents submitted the application at the communal or municipal office of his or her place of residence, the self-governing community or municipality in question was responsible for verifying the case's merit. Then the application was forwarded to the three-member district living allowances panel, which was a joint operation between the state civil administration and the crownland autonomous administration. Finally, the Austrian military administration made the actual payments and supervised the overall implementation.⁵⁴

This process relied on seamless cooperation among multiple authorities: between the self-governing local community and the central state, between the central state and the autonomous crownland administration, between the finances service and other executive apparatuses within the state's civil administration, and, finally, between the state civil administration and the military. The multiple delegation of responsibilities, the diffuse decision making, and the need to reconcile the interests and viewpoints of different authorities—with their long-standing differences or even rivalries—in each individual case within a temporary structure created many points of friction or confusion, not to mention the hugely increased workload suddenly falling on the shoulders of officials who still had their original assignments to complete. This inevitably led to frustration among both clients and administrators of the improvised wartime welfare.⁵⁵

The evolving realities of a long war, the need to coordinate so many welfare authorities, and the inevitable challenge of interacting with citizen-beneficiaries generated a constant flow of new guidelines, amendments, and regulations. Meant to improve care or tackle pressing old and new problems, they created an even more impenetrable legalese for first-line officials and various state agents, the real faces of the “caring” state, not to mentioned untrained citizens. When the Viennese municipal official Rudolf Hornek compiled a comprehensive wartime welfare handbook in 1915, it covered the (old) military pension system based on the 1875 law, disability benefits from several other sources, various forms of assistance available to healthy homecoming soldiers, and, of course, the

living allowances currently in effect. The all-inclusive *Military Care Provision and Invalid Welfare for Enlisted Soldiers* was just over sixty pages long.⁵⁶ In February 1918, his much more narrowly focused new handbook, the third edition of *State Living Allowances and Subsidies*, ran to more than 100 pages of small-print laws, regulations, and directives, with the rules for their implementation and commentaries in even smaller print.⁵⁷ The special state subsidy of March 1918 for enlisted soldiers and their dependents immediately created the need to publish commentaries.⁵⁸ As the ever-deteriorating material shortages on the home front made the state's welfare performance increasingly critical, practitioners had to work even harder just to keep up with the ever-growing body of implementation instructions and exegeses of the laws.

The dependents' living allowance was only one of the civil administration's manifold wartime welfare responsibilities. The civil administration was also thrust into the wave of improvisations in military medical services.⁵⁹ The pre-war mobilization plan, which foresaw 191 military hospitals and other medical facilities with a total capacity of 16,708 beds, was quickly considered inadequate. The scramble to accommodate wounded and recovering soldiers resulted in the creation of more than 870 hospitals and facilities, many of them improvised ("barrack hospitals") and under multiple jurisdictions, with a total capacity of more than 95,000 beds.⁶⁰ As it turned out, treating wounded men to expedite their return to the front, as the military had hoped, was unrealistic; many simply could not recover in a short period of time or never recovered enough for any military task.

The mass citizen army had changed warfare; the ensuing consequences were changing welfare. Long-standing care options, such as military invalid houses and dedicated charitable funds, were made obsolete by the unprecedented casualty numbers.⁶¹ The old narrow emphasis on limited and rank-dependent pension or only on returning wounded men to active military service was recognized by many officials as out of sync with the new environment.⁶² As one edict to crownland governors phrased it, new care services and welfare provision had to be at once medically rehabilitative and socioeconomically restorative; the civil administration, the military, and voluntary associations such as the Red Cross were expected to complement one another serving the returning disabled soldiers so that these men "could be reintroduced to working life as useful members of society and prevent them from the fate of alms receivers."⁶³

The improvised patchwork of the early war months, comprising old and new service providers and initiatives that sometimes worked in isolation from one another,⁶⁴ was unable to meet the combined challenge of the increasing number

of help seekers, creeping material shortages, and inevitable political-bureaucratic struggles. After some crownland-level initiatives,⁶⁵ the Austrian Interior Ministry stepped in and ordered each crownland to establish a Provincial Commission for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers (*Landeskommission zur Fürsorge der heimkehrende Krieger*) on 16 February 1915. The Provincial Commissions were not permanent, fully funded welfare departments directly implementing welfare programs; their task was to ensure administrative congruence and coordinate existing welfare service providers, especially those essential for a mass citizen army's need to help severely wounded men return to decent civilian life. The Provincial Commissions, placed under the supervision of crownland governors, were composed of representatives from the military, the central state's civilian authorities, the crownlands' own representative bodies and autonomous administrative apparatus, and various social insurance carriers. They also included government experts in medical, industrial-occupational, and educational fields. Representatives from local occupational groups and industries (including major landowners representing agriculture and forestry), major private welfare agencies (the Red Cross, for example), and philanthropic groups active in individual crownlands were also commission members.⁶⁶

Rather than a full-fledged welfare bureaucracy with integrated executive power and resources, the wartime solution to the problem of coordination was a temporary forum that gathered the interested parties together to facilitate cooperation. The result was the ballooning number of regular members on each Provincial Commission. The Styrian Provincial Commission, for example, had 117 government, civic, industrial, and labor leaders, including two women (both of them countesses and one the wife of the Styrian governor).⁶⁷ The size of each full commission was hardly conducive to efficient collaboration; it was more a reflection of the broad social mobilization necessary to meet the need for social provision. The actual operation of the Provincial Commission had to rely on specialized committees and an emerging small group of dedicated welfare officials.

A 1916 report on the Tyrolean Provincial Commission for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers offers a glimpse into the commission's internal organization and operation. Established on 9 March 1915, it had two main standing units: a steering committee and a counseling station in the Imperial and Royal Sanatorium for the War-Damaged Persons in Innsbruck. The counseling station offered weekly occupational counseling to the sanatorium's soldier-patients and drew its members from several official or officially recognized agencies: the Tyrolean governor's office, the State Trades School, the Innsbruck Bureau of the Imperial-Royal War Invalid Job Placement Service (*k. k. Arbeitsvermittlung an*

Kriegsinvaliden), and the Trade Guilds' Association. By the end of 1915, the counseling station had discussed medical treatment, job training, and future employment with more than 400 disabled men. "One of the primary goals" of the counseling station was to encourage the majority of these disabled men—"especially agricultural workers"—to "stay loyal to their old occupation and not join those who have migrated to cities."⁶⁸ The personnel carrying out this mission reflected the nature of many official wartime welfare institutions: a temporary taskforce to which regular agencies or organizations sent their representatives to work on their "home" agencies' behalf. Disabled soldiers' welfare in particular, and war welfare in general, were not yet issues considered worthy of their own dedicated staff and resources.

A second main area of the commission's work was to organize long-term care and surgical and/or orthopedic treatment for severely wounded men. In 1915, this was done through the Sanatorium for the War-Damaged Persons and in "the neighboring [Innsbruck] university clinics and the new Orthopedic Institute at the General Hospital." The sanatorium was established by the local military command in August 1915 and commanded by a high-ranking military doctor. Between its opening and the end of the year, 489 men were taken in, mostly sent by the military authorities via the commission; 380 of them received orthopedic treatment at the university surgery clinic. Of these 380, 105 had received prosthetic treatment. Of the 489 patients, 27 had been judged fit for frontline service again, 17 fit for lesser services, and 38 returned home after undergoing superarbitration. For those suffering from tuberculosis, the commission's job was to find them places in convalescence institutions. The war blind had a dedicated charity, the Fund for the War Blind, so the commission played no major role in their care.⁶⁹

Tyrolean officials complained that the sanatorium did not do much during 1915. This was because it took months to organize its operations, and the workshop barracks—important to practical job training—was not transferred to the sanatorium until the end of the year. Many patients needed several months' worth of treatment and recovery just to be ready for initial prosthetic preparations. The officials also blamed some patients' "psychosis" for the lack of good results; some allegedly suffered from "hysteria," others lacked "the will to overcome adversity," and still others were suspected of passive resistance to the prescribed treatment. The number of patients jumped significantly during the first quarter of 1916. Still, officials were somewhat optimistic about the added workload, believing that they were better prepared after eight months of experience. The sanatorium's most important achievement thus far, they declared, was setting

up a workable procedure to accurately evaluate each individual soldier-patient's condition and match specialized treatment with his needs.⁷⁰ The commission's role was to coordinate and track the medical treatment (and secure the supplies necessary for it) in a military institution, the sanatorium. The actual medical services were provided by institutions (university clinics, for example) not under its control.

Job training was the third area of the commission's work. Job training and occupational rehabilitation were key for helping disabled soldiers, socially and economically, to return to their prewar status. Skilled tradespeople received treatment and training aimed at returning to their old occupations or something similar. If a man came from agriculture, he was supposed to go back to it. The agricultural training courses sought to uphold prewar class differentiations in the countryside. Sixty disabled soldiers, mostly farm owners or expected owners-to-be, attended a "theoretical-practical winter course for farming" from November 1915 to April 1916 in the Provincial Agricultural School in Rotholz. Beginning in April 1916, the same school offered former agricultural workers dairy, fruit-growing, and bookkeeping courses as well as training to become agricultural credit union paymasters and community clerks.⁷¹

The commission's main task here was to match patients with existing facilities that agreed to accommodate severely wounded or sick soldiers. These (re)training activities were mostly designed, funded, and run by other institutions, such as the sanatorium, the State Trades School, the State Agricultural School, the Tyrolean autonomous administration, and the military authorities. All that was left to the Provincial Commission was to keep statistics and express gratitude, because it did not have sufficient funds at its disposal. The crownland government was already overextended. To a significant extent, the commission relied on the public's war relief donations.⁷² The Lower Austrian case illustrates this point. With contributions from various government and private bodies and the proceeds from public collection drives, the Lower Austrian Provincial Commission set up the Welfare Fund for Homecoming Soldiers in Lower Austria. The Provincial Commission itself was not a fully authorized agency with executive power; it needed the fund, a special-purpose endowment that had legal person status, to manage and use the collected money to sustain its own operation.⁷³

Over the course of the war, the Provincial Commissions grew increasingly important due to their mission as the official clearinghouses for relevant information and statistics and their role as the channel through which the central government could reach actual service providers. Their tireless work to integrate previously scattered welfare actors into the care system certainly helped.⁷⁴ On

top of these, the increasing number of patient-soldiers helped push the commissions onto a more assertive path and elevated their standing.⁷⁵ In Tyrol, for example, the Provincial Commission proposed to provide long-term monetary subsidies to some retrained disabled men who actually found employment. These men's combined earnings—the military's disability benefits and the wage from the jobs in which they were placed—were not enough even to reach subsistence level, observed the Tyrolean officials. The Provincial Commission, in essence, suggested that the Interior Ministry should fund an expanded “emergency aid”—run by the commission—beyond its original function of bridging the gap between a disabled soldier's superarbitration and employment.⁷⁶

Nevertheless, actual care and welfare programs were still run by the different public authorities and private organizations, which reported to their own superiors or boards. Officials on the Provincial Commissions still had to coordinate and appease different service providers, which continued with their own agendas and operations. In their report reviewing the Provincial Commission's 1915 work, Tyrolean officials cautiously expressed their wish to build a robust understructure at the district level. They hoped this would allow the commission to come closer to the ideal of a specialist executive organ capable of directly providing first-line services to wounded soldiers, returning disabled ones, and their dependents.⁷⁷ As early as spring 1916, some in the provinces had begun imagining more capable alternatives to the limited Provincial Commissions.

Tracing the process of providing care to individual disabled soldiers provides us a better sense of the improvised wartime welfare “system” based on multiple independent actors. It took almost a full year of fighting and 2 million men killed or wounded for the Joint War Ministry to finally issue clear guidelines on the division of labor between civilian and military authorities in care and welfare provision. The timing was notable because crownland officials had completed, or nearly completed, their work setting up the Provincial Commissions, following the Austrian Interior Ministry's February 1915 directive. These coordinating offices, despite their shortcomings, posed a threat to the military's control of all facets of care for wounded soldiers and, thereby, to the total control it desired over warm bodies that could be sent to the front. Determined to maintain its predominant role, the military administration announced that medical treatment for injuries suffered in war would be undertaken in military-controlled medical facilities. Prosthetic limbs and other devices, if necessary, would be provided at the military's expense, except in certain cases where private donations covered the costs.⁷⁸

After medical treatment, soldiers who were declared fit for military service would be sent to their reserve units for reassignment. Those who could not recover sufficiently for military duties would be assessed by Military Invalid Superarbitration Commissions. The decisions on their degree of disability determined the soldiers' eligibility for military pension and other benefits. The disabled soldier's military district command had the final say on whether the Superarbitration Commission's decision would be accepted or overruled. Then the military pension, as well as any applicable supplements, were initiated and managed through the military command's pension office.⁷⁹ The injured soldier's preference or opinion were totally irrelevant; medical treatment decisions, diagnosis of disability, and the amount of pension were all in the hands of the military authorities and the experts they appointed.

The next phase of a "certified" disabled soldier's journey was to go through any follow-up medical treatment deemed necessary by the experts and to receive job skill (re)training in preparation for reentering civilian life. Depending on the specialists' evaluation, a disabled soldier might receive training that would allow him to practice his old trade or prepare for another occupation that suited his partially rehabilitated work ability. For this phase of care, the military used both newly founded and existing hospitals, medical spas, convalescence homes, sanatoriums, and military hospital-affiliated invalid schools. In the big cities especially, the capacity that was needed to handle follow-up treatment and job (re)training often came from the Red Cross, private organizations and businesses, and civilian authorities that had to be integrated into the official system.⁸⁰

The military agreed to pay for follow-up treatment and job training for up to a year in each individual case. But at this stage, civilian welfare actors began to go beyond just providing care services for the military. Before job (re)training, an occupational counseling committee, made up of medical and other civilian experts and under the supervision of the crownlands' Provincial Commissions for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers, decided what exactly a man should be trained for. In other words, the occupational counseling was (in theory) not beholden to the military,⁸¹ even if the disabled soldier in follow-up treatment and job (re)training was still technically under the military jurisdiction. Thus this phase of care provision was already a joint operation requiring more coordination between the military and civil administrations.

When the disabled soldier finished his follow-up treatment and the prescribed job training, he moved to the third stage: job placement. The civil administration was responsible for this phase, though the military was not absent—it promised




FIGURE 2.1. An idealized image of the wartime official care for disabled soldiers: imperial beneficence and medical expertise met contented patients. Archduchess (later Empress-Queen) Zita, fourth from right in a dark hat with white feathers, talked to card-playing disabled soldiers in Vienna Reserve Hospital No. 11 in 1915. She was accompanied by orthopedist Professor Hans Spitzzy (standing with his back to the camera) and others. ÖNB/Vienna LIZ 1915 V20,S.614.

to find suitable jobs for disabled veterans as civilian employees in its many offices. To ease the (re)trained disabled ex-soldiers back to gainful employment, there were “exceptional preferential treatment in entering or practicing skilled trades, preferential hiring by the state, crownland, or municipal agencies, awarding tobacco licenses by the State Monopoly, facilitating the attending of university or other educational institutes, and cash subsidies to purchase shops, tools, and other materials that were necessary to help disabled soldiers find livelihoods.”⁸² All these placement efforts were unfortunately overshadowed by the military’s constant search for warm bodies. Many certified disabled soldiers were repeatedly called to be reexamined in the military’s bid to reclassify them as fit for war service. Many local employers were hesitant to hire disabled men as a result.⁸³

A new layer of complexity emerged in this third phase, supposedly purely the civil administration’s responsibility. Rather than letting the existing Provincial Commissions for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers take charge, it was

the Imperial-Royal War Invalid Job Placement Service, authorized by the Austrian Interior Ministry in most crownlands at the end of 1915, that was tasked with overseeing this stage of welfare service for disabled soldiers. The Invalid Job Placement Service was organized differently in each crownland, because its crownland bureaus and subordinate branches were mostly founded and run by volunteers—local dignitaries or officials who worked on placing disabled soldiers in addition to holding regular jobs—and relied exclusively on local resources for operations. In short, the Invalid Job Placement Service was “a state institution based on voluntary collaboration from the public.”⁸⁴ These “state institutions” functioned more like indigenous and autonomous voluntary associations whose success depended to a large extent on their leaders’ social capital and local influence.

The Invalid Job Placement Service’s crownland bureaus, therefore, often provided services independently of those in the previous stages. The lack of integration made it impossible to generalize individual disabled soldiers’ experience in this last stage of care. Even officials in Vienna did not know what exactly had taken place on the ground. In early 1918, at the request of the new Social Welfare Ministry, representatives from the crownland bureaus of the Invalid Job Placement offered the following:

- In Upper Austria, the bureau had a dense network of fourteen care committees, 440 local representatives, and “constant communication” with the Provincial Commission;
- In Moravia, the bureau was initially set up only as an “organizational node” but later became a true working agency out of necessity;
- In Styria, the bureau was a committee of the Provincial Commission and worked closely with the general labor exchange service (which served the wider population);
- In Carinthia, the bureau and the Provincial Commission were one and the same agency, housed in the same office and with the same staff, and the director of the former doubled as the general secretary of the latter;
- In Lower Austria/Vienna, the bureau did not have a close working relationship with the Provincial Commission;
- In Austrian Silesia, the bureau director was also a member of the Provincial Commission and the personal contact allowed for a smooth cooperation;
- In Salzburg, the two agencies cooperated but were strictly separated institutionally, and the bureau relied on the general labor exchange in its actual placement services.⁸⁵

The institutional separation as well as the highly local nature of the Invalid Job Placement system only added more complexity and fragmentation to the chain of care provision. The resulting need to coordinate multiple independent parties led to a frustrated outburst from some ministerial and Styrian officials when they met in January 1918: "As for finding trained disabled veterans employment in the labor market, it has to be said that we don't have any set rules [about how to proceed] because the Imperial-Royal War Invalid Job Placement Service is too independent. It seems that it would be more efficient to just dissolve it and incorporate its functions back into the Provincial Commission!"⁸⁶

Improvisations in 1914 and 1915 created a wartime care and welfare provision system that was diverse, diffuse, complex, and cumbersome. For a single disabled soldier's case, two not-always-overlapping collections of collaborators in public offices (the Provincial Commission and Invalid Job Placement) within the civil administration, private organizations, and local contacts delivered services and care beyond those directly managed by the military. They had to work along with the military's expanded wartime medical service, which pursued a very different goal: returning as many men to the battlefield and as soon as possible. Worse still, the necessary coordination between the military and civilian agencies could not be assumed even when a standard division of labor was agreed upon. In November 1915, the Styrian and Bohemian Provincial Commissions asked the military administration if their own officials could attend the local Superarbitration Commissions' proceedings to record the cases where the soldiers in question were declared disabled, thereby accelerating their placement in civilian jobs. The Austrian Defense Ministry denied the request but ordered the Superarbitration Commissions to prepare lists of soldiers declared disabled for the relevant Provincial Commissions and instructed the newly declared invalids to be in touch with those Provincial Commissions.⁸⁷ This seemingly mundane new arrangement betrayed the reality on the ground: apparently, before November 1915, the military authorities did not, or at least not systematically, inform civilian welfare agencies of their forthcoming new "clients"; civilian officials responsible for job placement had no idea who would be coming, if they came at all, because some men were not told about the job placement service after they were declared disabled. Disrupted or nonexistent information relay could easily nullify all the efforts to meet the needs of disabled men.

With so many different sets of rules, personnel, organizational cultures, and resource bases, extraordinary efforts were needed to organize them in the first place and then to ensure smooth interorganizational coordination lest the chain of service delivery break down. In more rural areas, where the density of public

and private service providers was low to begin with, actual care provision was a “hopeless mess” by 1918.⁸⁸ In wartime Austria, there were uniform war welfare laws, rules, and regulations but no uniform or united welfare apparatus to implement them. This resulted in constant calls for reforms, so that the capacity and efficacy of the state war welfare system would not be overwhelmed by the unending crisis of provision.

Internal Colonization as Salvation?

The haphazardly patched together “system” needed fundamental reform, but how and under whose leadership? On 22 December 1916, the Army High Command (hereafter AOK) sent a memorandum to the Austrian and Hungarian minister-presidents, interior ministers, defense ministers, the Joint War Ministry, and other central military offices about the need to systematize and expand war victim welfare provision. The AOK signaled its recognition of war victim welfare as a critical sphere of state action and its interest in steering future developments; potentially it might even engage in social policy with its extraordinary wartime power, which was so extensive that even the head of the emperor’s military chancery, General Arthur von Bolfras, complained about Austria “being ruled by the Army High Command.”⁸⁹ In the state’s and the army’s long-term interest, the AOK identified five areas as most important: “1.) Welfare for disabled soldiers, including disabled officers; 2.) provisions for widows and orphans of fallen or missing soldiers and related youth welfare measures; 3.) the adoption of a new Military Welfare Law; 4.) housing provisions for demobilized soldiers; and 5.) warrior homestead colonies (*Kriegerheimstätte*).”⁹⁰ The AOK wanted a new centralized authority in each half of the Monarchy that could command and supervise all welfare actors—state, crownland, local, public, and private—and their resources. The new office would implement policies that would constitute a more “permanent institution for the people” and “pave the way for an ordered society” after the war.⁹¹

Centralization and systemization stood at the center of the AOK’s welfare reform push. But the AOK had an even more concrete project in mind: internal colonization. Articulated through a seven-page attachment to the imperious December 1916 memorandum, it was an excerpt of a pamphlet written by the Prague professor Heinrich Rauchberg in which he promoted warrior homestead colonies as the ideal long-term solution for war victim welfare.⁹²

The idea of warrior homestead colonies had German origins and many Austrian variations. Borrowing from prewar nationalist settlement ideas,⁹³ it aimed

to settle disabled veterans loyal to the Austrian state, along with their nuclear families, on underutilized or uncultivated but arable lands. With the chosen families living in farmhouses built for them and cultivating their assigned plots or engaging in skilled trades, the settlements would form agricultural colonies strategically located in various parts of the Monarchy.⁹⁴ The hope was that the newly settled farming families, not all originally from the countryside, would find permanent housing solutions and sources of livelihood on their initially state-subsidized homesteads and farms. The public purse would be spared longer-term responsibility after these settlers became self-sufficient. The supposed healing effect of physical labor for disabled and convalescent veterans was also frequently mentioned.⁹⁵ The idea was promoted most often as an organic, long-term solution to problems as wide ranging as housing shortages, “flight from the land,” insufficient food production, underemployment, and finding adequate but cheaper ways to handle long-term welfare needs. On top of these, proponents claimed that warrior homesteads would raise the critically important agricultural output, reenergize society as a whole with people who needed both a wholesome environment and work, and give a shot in the arm to the idealized (but by now declining) rural way of life, remedying the ills of modern, urbanized, industrial society.⁹⁶ Neither how the disabled man would be able to carry out physically demanding farming tasks nor how much of that was supposed to be done by his wife and children were ever discussed in detail.

It was not entirely surprising that the AOK promoted Rauchberg’s warrior homestead colonies in 1916. Some generals were attracted to the idea of strategically settling disabled soldiers in the borderlands for political and economic purposes no later than 1915. On 27 August 1915, the Second Army submitted a proposal to the AOK and suggested that the farms confiscated from those who had deserted, committed treason, or aided and abetted the enemy according to the 9 June 1915 imperial edict (*RGBl.* 156/1915) should be distributed to disabled soldiers. “Settling state-loyal elements in regions most under the politically disloyal influence,” the field commanders believed, was a good way to “carry out a colonization of East Galicia to serve military interests.”⁹⁷ The proposal was endorsed by the AOK and passed on to Austria’s minister-president Stürgkh, but it seemed to have stalled by the end of the year despite “warm support” from the Joint War Ministry and the interior minister. The civilian cabinet ministers’ doubts about the legality and practicality of such property transfers likely played a role.⁹⁸

Sending the Second Army’s proposal to the highest level of the Austrian government was part of a larger AOK campaign to promote internal colonization.

In fall 1915, the AOK also raised the idea of setting up a “border protection zone,” a belt twenty-five kilometers deep along the Monarchy’s eastern (Russian), southeastern (Romanian, Serbian, Montenegrin), and southwestern (Italian) borders free of any alien residents, foreign-owned businesses or properties, and even politically “unreliable” Austrian and Hungarian citizens. These alleged troublemakers would be forced to move inland, insulating the Monarchy from insidious nationalist and irredentist influence from across the border. The expellees’ properties, the AOK suggested, could be bought up by the state and resold to disabled veterans. The hope was that the protection zone would be similar to the military border established along the Hungarian-Ottoman frontier with mainly Balkan Christian refugees in the sixteenth century and gradually dismantled after 1868.⁹⁹ The protection zone would be a form of internal colonization that, like the military border in the past, supplied loyal and tenacious soldiers. Most enticingly, the land and its residents would be permanently under military jurisdiction, free from the interference of quarrelling—or even, in the generals’ eyes, treasonous—party politicians and the scheming civil administration.¹⁰⁰ This naked power grab met with strong Hungarian opposition, out of fear that Hungary’s autonomy would be undercut if encircled by a belt of army fiefdoms. The discussion dragged on and finally petered out in the first half of 1917.¹⁰¹

The next push for an agricultural colony for disabled veterans also came from a top field general. The southwestern (Italian) front commander, Colonel General Archduke Eugen, aggressively lobbied for warrior homestead colonies in early November 1916. He wrote to several high places advocating settling people in newly conquered or vacated land, recycled barrack hospitals, and refugee and POW camps. Archduke Eugen’s detailed proposal included, unsurprisingly, the standard argument that settlers in rural areas would stem the tide of migration to cities and increase food supply. He also added that new roads and railways could be maintained for the long haul by the settlers and hinted at an even grander vision of using (disabled) veterans to build future green metropolises. As proof of the approach’s feasibility, he referred to his Army Group Command’s agricultural warrior homestead colony in Pfatten, Bezirk Bozen (Tyrol), built on land confiscated from alleged Italian irredentists. Notably, Archduke Eugen, in his letter to Archduke Franz Salvator, specifically identified disabled soldiers as the first homestead settlers who would, under highly centralized planning and control, build a new society from the bottom up.¹⁰²

The field generals’ interest in warrior homestead colonies coincided with a wave of warrior homestead colony–related pamphleteering that suddenly emerged in early 1916, around the time the Fourth Austrian Housing

Conference was held. In fact, warrior homestead colonies were the conference's main agenda item, and Heinrich Rauchberg was one of the keynote speakers.¹⁰³ Participants in the conference even agreed to form the Imperial Association for Warrior Homestead Colonies.¹⁰⁴ The sudden surge in interest within and outside the military leadership was likely the result of a general realization that the war had brought irrevocable changes to society. But it might also relate to a brief period in early 1916 when, after some military successes against Russia in the second half of 1915, there was a more optimistic outlook that the war might conclude in the Central Powers' favor.

A closer look at Rauchberg's warrior homestead colony proposal, which recalled the prewar Austrian-German nationalists' version of internal (German) colonization,¹⁰⁵ reveals what the AOK envisioned as the ideal postwar society. To Rauchberg, warrior homestead colonies were to be the basis for a much larger social renewal project:

[The warrior homestead colony] should serve the care-provision needs not merely of disabled soldiers, widows, and orphans, but also of uninjured homecoming soldiers, as it gives them a home and employment. . . . The main tasks [are]: internal colonization, and then war victim welfare. The former is far more important because it has the more far-reaching missions. . . . The former could help to control [problems such as] the declining birth rate, excessive emigration, undesirable population movements within the Monarchy, upheavals caused by the agricultural population's move into industries, and insufficient food production.

As the panacea for all kinds of perceived social ills, the warrior homestead colony was not only "a wartime measure, but [to] become a permanent people's homestead." To the AOK, war victims were only "a relative minority," but it was easier to attract support for their care, making them a good first step toward an ambitious policy that targeted millions of returning soldiers and their dependents.¹⁰⁶

War victim welfare would therefore help achieve the ideal size and makeup of Austria's future population. The declining birthrate allegedly caused the "degeneration of the *Volk*" and threatened the state's military and economic prowess. Moreover, rapid urbanization and industrialization also deprived the country of its best soldiers, because farming families were inclined to have more children and produced the majority of fit-for-service young men in their draft cohorts. Raising a healthy, fertile, and loyal next generation who would reside in the right places, Rauchberg argued, warrior homestead colonies could "secure

the future borders of the Empire with reliable people. Behind the border wall a human wall would stand impenetrable for foreign propaganda.”¹⁰⁷

Fraught with nationalist conflicts and weary of irredentist and Pan-Slavic agitations, it was politically imprudent or impractical to aspire to a thorough identity of nation, race, and state as the future of the Austrian polity. But in the AOK's Rauchberg excerpt, a caveat, “national character of the settlers must be taken into consideration,” was added to the wish to secure the Monarchy with a sturdy, loyal, and reproductively active population.¹⁰⁸ This additional qualifier was a veiled statement about using the warrior homestead project to reengineer the ethnic/nationality composition of the borderland population.

This was exactly the aim of the most prominent prewar internal colonizing projects, organized by the radical German nationalists of the Südmark circles. Underpinned by Rauchberg's 1905 research on “national property (*nationaler Besitzstand*),” Südmark bought properties in the so-called language frontiers that were perceived to be endangered by the Slavs. They then recruited “suitable” German-speaking settlers to buy these properties at a discounted price and settle there to defend “German land” against alleged Slavic encroachment. Südmark German nationalists also boasted about such internal colonization's effect on counteracting urban living's physical and moral damages.¹⁰⁹ Through Rauchberg, the AOK injected Südmark-style nationalist-colonialist thinking into the discussion of war victim welfare reform. Making an Austrian nation out of myriad nationalities was not likely an attainable goal. Rather, it was to erase nationalist politics and bolster the influence of the nationalities perceived as loyal over others. The AOK's mistrust of Czech and Ukrainian soldiers and civilians, often unfounded, and its problems with the Italians during the war made it clear that the vaunted ideal of disabled soldiers-cum-agricultural colonialists-cum-vanguards of social renewal would probably not be recruited from these groups.¹¹⁰

Using a nationalist idea to subdue nationalist politics may seem illogical, but promoting warrior homestead colonies was consistent with the AOK's opportunistic bid to seize control over civil society and the Monarchy as a whole. Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, the army chief of staff, had long professed the belief that war ought to be a “replacement for politics,” a direct contradiction of the famous Clausewitzian axiom.¹¹¹ Believing that the Habsburg Army “perfectly expressed the values of the Habsburg central state” in its bureaucratic-absolutist, antinational, anti-mass politics, centralist ethos, the AOK embarked on an aggressive path to subjugate civil society while “upholding a rigid boundary” between itself and the latter after the war broke out.¹¹² The 25 July 1914 decree

extended military jurisdiction over civilians for both “political” and other violent crimes “against authorities” in the entire Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy.¹¹³ Military courts replaced civilian courts and meted out harsh punishment to those whom the military considered subversive.¹¹⁴ The 31 July 1914 decree authorized the AOK to take over a crownland governor’s administrative power and jurisdiction, as well as that of the self-governing municipalities and communities in designated war zones. Only Upper Austria, Lower Austria, Bohemia, and parts of Moravia escaped this wholesale military intervention in civil administration.¹¹⁵ The suspension of basic civil rights and trial by jury was extended even to these crownlands, as was the jurisdiction of the military-controlled War Surveillance Office.¹¹⁶ The military also sought to appoint its officers to replace the autonomous crownland administrations’ officials who it deemed too nationalistic or unreliable.¹¹⁷ Strategic industries and key resources were put under the military jurisdiction, and workers there were subject to military discipline by virtue of the War Service Law (*RGBL. 236/1912*).¹¹⁸ The military leadership took advantage of its extraordinary wartime power and tried to depoliticize Austria for good, seeking to relegate civil administration and civil society to what it felt was their rightfully subservient status.¹¹⁹

Turning attention to war victim welfare in 1916 was therefore a logical step. The rising casualties meant that a large number of citizens would become clients of the military’s despised competitors, the state civil administration or the crownlands’ many sectarian, nationalist politicians in the welfare field. For example, German and Czech nationalists in Bohemia had built their own comprehensive networks of service providers that the central state decided to rely on to manage the expanding wartime child welfare.¹²⁰ Positioning itself as the main benefactor to the mobilized and their dependents could only help the military claim more resources and edge out others, especially those, such as the (Czech) nationalists, whom the military leadership saw as enemies. Steering social policy making was to occupy future political commanding heights in order to shape postwar Austria as the military leaders saw fit.

The AOK’s intervention in late 1916 also came at a critical moment. By then the army was nearing the end of the manpower supply necessary to sustain the three-front war. In May 1916, the AOK had called up the draft cohort of 1898 (age eighteen) seven months ahead of schedule to replenish the losses from previous campaigns, after exhausting other ways to find men for military duties. Not many were left to be sent to the front.¹²¹ More disheartening, it was impossible to avoid the bitter reality that the Monarchy had lost its autonomy in the conduct of war and strategic planning. After repeated military disasters and the

attendant repeated need for German relief, the mid-1916 Brusilov offensive had ended Austria-Hungary as an independent power. German emperor Wilhelm II became the head of the united Eastern Front Supreme Command in September 1916, and most Austrian units now belonged to army groups commanded by German generals and staffs. The Dual Monarchy was relegated to junior partner status and despised by the German military leadership.¹²²

After the early 1916 optimism, the mid-1916 military disasters, and the ensuing political and diplomatic humiliation, the AOK ratcheted up its effort to shape the postwar society as compensation. It had no more patience for further discussion on warrior homesteading: "The question has been scientifically and repeatedly studied, discussed, and convincingly laid out by prominent people to the last detail so that any further commentary is dispensable."¹²³ The AOK's vision had radicalized from the backward-looking, sedition-preventing defensive mechanism of the protection zone to an aggressively forward-looking and population-molding welfare program of people's homesteads. The colonizing nature of warrior homesteads provided a glimmer of hope in the face of some Habsburg leaders' frustrated expansionist ambitions. Before and during the war, some top Habsburg generals and diplomats were as aggressive as their European colleagues in pursuing, or at least scheming about, imperial expansion.¹²⁴ If German supremacy in the east after mid-1916 precluded significant territorial gains or extensive Habsburg spheres of influence, there was the consolation prize of military colonization along the borders and, more intriguing to the generals, in the hinterland. Vacant internment, refugee, and POW camps, state-owned or confiscated properties, and depopulated areas were suggested as the first locations, and many of these were not on the Monarchy's margins.¹²⁵ Internal colonization, through warrior homesteads, would be the way to bring about the generals' hierarchal, authoritarian, agrarian, and apolitical postwar Austria.

Radical fantasies were both appealing and difficult to realize in a desperate time. Before the AOK intervention, some very small, scattered local and private initiatives for warrior homesteads were undertaken.¹²⁶ The Joint War Ministry's own War Welfare Office began serious discussion about the idea in late 1915.¹²⁷ In Tyrol, an Innsbruck warrior homestead association and several similar lobbying groups were founded after the February 1916 Housing Conference. In the first half of 1916, Tyrolean officials identified several vacant properties that could potentially become warrior homesteads. Meetings and lectures were held in March and April to draw up implementation guidelines, when officials from the Tyrol and Vorarlberg Governor's Office found themselves having to change the guidelines' wording to preempt misunderstandings—the project was

to focus on strengthening the loyal elements, not promoting Germanization in South Tyrol.¹²⁸ But even in receptive Tyrol, the project did not take off. In February 1917, the Tyrolean Provincial Commission for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers had to reiterate its interest in the warrior homestead idea to all communities and asked them to relaunch the survey of potentially suitable properties. The local responses following the initial May 1916 request, as it turned out, were often based on misunderstandings.¹²⁹

The AOK's ideal, a large-scale, government-backed project, never came close to fruition. Throughout 1916 and most of 1917, military officials in the War Welfare Office repeatedly ran up against the insurmountable dual obstacles of financial constraints and legal concerns. How to retain "ownership" of the homesteads after granting them to disabled soldiers was a major legal hurdle. Nor were the civilian ministries, despite the lip service they paid, enthused by the December 1916 AOK proposal. In private, a senior Commerce Ministry official called it "very amateurish" and thought that the memorandum only served to show the military's support for a centralized state welfare system, which was good news for the ongoing planning for a Social Welfare Ministry.¹³⁰ Central state-directed and -managed warrior homesteads remained on the drawing board, despite repeated attempts at more modest projects.¹³¹

Reviewing war victim welfare documents transferred from the Interior Ministry in spring 1918, Friedrich Hock of the newly established Social Welfare Ministry wrote on the last page of what was the Interior Ministry's copy of the AOK's December 1916 memorandum that it "contains no new aspect that is not already in formal negotiation."¹³² Hock, who started his welfare administrator career in the War Welfare Office and later led the war victim welfare division in the post-war Social Ministry,¹³³ acknowledged that the memorandum reflected and, to a large extent, set the agenda for the broader planning in immediate and long-term war victim welfare reforms.¹³⁴ The December 1916 memorandum raised the political stakes of welfare provision for disabled soldiers. But it was ironic that some military leaders lamented the absence of a proactive, central welfare authority that could have led the way from the beginning of the war.¹³⁵ Given the extraordinary power the AOK enjoyed before the Reichsrat reconvened in May 1917, if the military leadership had determined to do so, it could have done much more for warrior homesteads in particular and war victim welfare in general. Disabled soldiers' welfare, in the end, was for the generals a means to a political end after the war had gone horribly wrong, the canvas upon which military leaders projected their fantasies in the midst of the "hopeless mess."

State-Society Relations Reframed

With successive legislation on care provision for war victims between 1875 and 1918, the Imperial Austrian state gradually put its fate in the hands of its citizens—and not only in the form of their battlefield performance. Collectively, these laws confirmed the state's provider role, redefined the state-citizen relationship, and created expectations. Without admitting or even being conscious of this gradual development, the Imperial Austrian state had made a pact with its citizens: the latter would fight on the state's behalf, and the state would take care of their and their families' needs. Contemporaneous with and prompted by the democratization of political culture, the Austrian state reactively but cumulatively created a potentially huge welfare clientele in wartime, and the state's delivery on its promises became a visible yardstick for its legitimacy.

When the real test came, the pre-1914 framework, even with wartime additions and revisions, proved vastly inadequate. Aside from the older laws' anachronistic stipulations and focus skewed toward career officers, the sheer scale and duration of the war far outstripped anyone's imagination and preparation. Simply taking care of the short- and long-term needs of soldiers and their families demanded an unprecedented amount of resources and manpower. To implement the necessary welfare measures, new welfare actors, public and private, had to be mobilized or created.

The "public" welfare providers capitalized on the population's patriotic and philanthropic outpouring to mobilize additional social resources for the state's war effort.¹³⁶ The three major central war welfare agencies, the War Welfare Office of the Joint War Ministry, the Austrian Interior Ministry's War Assistance Bureau and its War Assistance Fund, and the ubiquitous semiofficial Austrian Red Cross,¹³⁷ not to mention various crownland funds providing assistance to local war victims and soldiers' dependents, all relied on donated money to fund services. Despite its close collaboration with the military, the Red Cross organizations, for example, depended on the general public, other charitable organizations, and voluntary personnel—many of them women—to sustain their ever-expanding operations.¹³⁸ These included operating and staffing field hospitals, medical evacuation, treatment and long-term convalescence care in the hinterland, and recruiting and training nurses for the military and integrating private care initiatives.¹³⁹

New state welfare agencies, moreover, needed civil society and local notables to offer the necessary services to disabled soldiers. From its 1915 beginning, the



FIGURE 2.2. A nurse reading in the makeshift hospital ward that was converted from a building's corridor, ca. 1916. Many wartime hospitals were set up in public buildings, often in schools, to treat the unprecedented number of severely wounded soldiers. The wartime military medical services relied on volunteer nurses to function. ÖNB/Vienna WK1/ALB095/28399.

official Imperial-Royal War Invalid Job Placement Service relied on the goodwill of private citizens and organizations to fulfill its missions. At least in three crownlands, it was unsalaried volunteers, with no official titles, who founded and led these new state agencies.¹⁴⁰ At the lower, district level, the official job placement service could not function without private individuals and local dignitaries. Oftentimes it was all-volunteer care committees that offered disabled veterans advice about the local labor market and served as the intermediary between them and the crownland bureaus.¹⁴¹ At the time of urgent needs, civic leaders were embraced and courted by the state because they possessed indispensable knowledge and social networks. They were anointed as a new breed of “officials” to cover the new ground the central state felt obligated to cover but was unable to. At the local level, this flexibility was the only conceivable solution to bridge the gap between the state’s limited capabilities and its increasingly expansive promises.

The blurring of the lines between the official and the unofficial and between state and society shows the flexibility of Austrian officials in co-opting and controlling civil society's contributions. It is also a reminder of the degree to which civil society was willing to offer resources to support the war-waging state.¹⁴² War enthusiasm may have worn increasingly thin, but civic welfare activism testifies to both the tenacity of civil society under tight bureaucratic-military control on the one hand and the deep investment by certain sectors of Austrian society in the Habsburg cause on the other.¹⁴³ This consenting activism is one important reason why the Imperial Austrian state survived so long despite catastrophic casualties and repeated battlefield disasters. And since the state needed those private or civic welfare actors for both battlefield and home front, the nonstate welfare actors gained a realm for politically meaningful "public" action when conventional politics was suppressed, and they even gained the confidence and leverage to challenge state authorities. The AOK's dream to depoliticize civil society was simply impossible.¹⁴⁴

The improvised system that uneasily bound many welfare actors and programs together was neither adequate nor sustainable. There were simply too many points of friction and conflict, not to mention the inherent challenge of taking care of so many needy citizens with no end in sight. The improvised system handled a huge number of cases, but this did not mean they were handled satisfactorily. The postwar claim that nearly 80 percent of all disabled soldiers had resumed gainful economic activities,¹⁴⁵ even if true, did not prove that the patchwork system was the main reason. A new field of war welfare had emerged, but it urgently needed integration, long-term strategies, and, above all, more resources. Internal colonization was not the answer.

A Social Offensive on the Home Front

THE DEVASTATING WAR GREATLY strained the Austrian home front not long after the hostilities began. Flour and bread had to be rationed in Vienna beginning in April 1915.¹ The situation in the crownlands began to deteriorate drastically in 1916.² The successive harvest failures of 1916 and 1917 were compounded by the military's insistence on feeding its soldiers at the expense of civilians, rapid inflation, the vicissitudes of military actions in former key agricultural regions such as Galicia, and the general shortages of labor, manure, and draft animals due to mobilization and fighting. By the end of the war, a "non-self-providing" Viennese resident was entitled to rations totaling only 830.9 calories per day. In reality, Austrians on the home front often had access to even less than that amount.³ Subsistence crisis had serious political consequences. It weakened the home front's willingness to "hold out" for the promised victory and seriously undermined social solidarity. The Habsburg state's legitimacy was in question.⁴

Austrian state officials and the new emperor Karl himself were not oblivious to the social-political crisis at hand. Faced with the deprivations and perceived societal degradation,⁵ they did not wait for the elusive battlefield victory to magically cure home-front ills. In spring of 1917, the Austrian central state began a last-gasp but bona fide comprehensive welfare state expansion. This social offensive on the home front was an ambitious plan to greatly expand the central state's promise to and purview over society; officials in Vienna sought to actively build up the state's capabilities both to supply the population's immediate needs and address long-term social problems.

The social offensive of 1917–1918 was war-induced welfare state building. Suffering from both its late timing and the same material shortages it sought to alleviate, the social offensive did not save the Monarchy, and it has therefore attracted little scholarly attention.⁶ However, it was a key moment in the long-term development of the Austrian welfare state, paving the way for a more active and interventionist state during the First Republic. Some aspects of the

social administrative apparatus at the Republic's disposal could trace their origins directly to the reform measures taken during the social offensive.

Reconstructing the development in war victim welfare during the Monarchy's last months helps shed light on the motivations and concrete measures of the social offensive. A centralizing as well as expansive reform of the war victim welfare system was from the very beginning a key component of the social offensive. Through ambitious organizational initiatives, the state civil administration wanted to consolidate the war welfare field and to become the primary caring agent in war victim welfare.

The focus of this chapter is on the formation of the new Social Welfare Ministry,⁷ its 5 March 1918 infrastructure reform concerning disabled soldiers' welfare, and the different visions for the future war victim welfare that emerged after mid-1917. By probing the institutional and structural dynamics at work, changes in the war victim welfare system reveal fundamental transformations in the role of the Austrian state and its relations with citizens. The competing plans for a new war welfare law anticipated the elevation of war victims in the political imagination and legitimacy on the one hand and the point of departure in designing the postwar system on the other. In this regard, the social offensive set the stage for war victim politics in the Austrian First Republic and beyond.

The Emergence of a Rehabilitative Ministry

The idea of setting up a central agency to design, coordinate, and implement social policies was not entirely new to wartime Austria, but the real impetus for a dedicated Ministry of Social Welfare was the First World War's immediate and expected longer-term social consequences. With the new emperor Karl's backing, Joseph Maria Baernreither, minister without portfolio in the Clam-Martinic cabinet (December 1916 to June 1917) and a veteran advocate for youth welfare reforms, began in early 1917 to work on a detailed proposal for an integrated Social Welfare Ministry. In Baernreither's view, the government was "forced onto the path of social reforms" for two reasons. The first was the socioeconomic need to protect and regenerate national strength, which had been drained by war losses and the population's deteriorating health. The second reason was overtly political: "The millions returning from the trenches" expected to see a more comprehensive welfare provision at home; otherwise "social eruptions" were inevitable. The central state had to take the lead because "people expect[ed] example-setting action of the state . . . especially look[ing] for its forceful guidance, leadership, and organization of all state and voluntary

efforts.” A new Social Ministry embodying “new ideas and institutions” was a necessary expression of the government’s resolve and sense of urgency. Baernreither used the ongoing revolution in Russia to warn his colleagues of the consequence of hesitation.⁸

His proposal was accepted in principle by the cabinet on 25 March 1917, and Minister-President Count Clam-Martinic began to draft an imperial speech that would initiate formal preparations for the new ministry. Emperor Karl’s handwritten note, dated 1 June, closely followed the proposal’s productivity argument but left out the revolution-prevention one. It made the connection between the war and the state’s new social mission crystal clear: “Guided by my wish to confront, in the best possible way, the consequence of the long-lasting war—a loss in national strength—and to secure a concentration of the activities of the central state, the autonomous administration, and the society at large addressing that loss, I resolve to create a Ministry of National Health and Social Welfare.”⁹

In the early conception, this new ministry’s main areas of responsibility were to be “combating wartime epidemics, social welfare services for war-damaged persons and surviving dependents of fallen soldiers,” and other “big, interrelated issues” such as public health, youth welfare, housing, and social insurance.¹⁰ War victim welfare was listed in the emperor’s note before all other long-standing social policy items except epidemics. Its prominence was because, according to Baernreither, “the most precious capital, people . . . should be preserved as part of productive society.”¹¹

Political wrangling in summer 1917 forced the shelving of the original plan to combine health and welfare agendas under one single authority. A second handwritten note by the emperor, dated 7 October, served as the Ministry of Social Welfare’s formal founding.¹² The Reichsrat was bypassed in the process until the very last step: the parliament had to pass a law to adjust other ministries’ legally defined jurisdictions so as to concentrate the specified social policy agendas in the Social Welfare Ministry. But before both chambers of the Reichsrat did so in November and December, respectively, an embryonic ministry and the social minister were already in place.¹³

As a response to social pressures and public protest and in the context of the reconvened Reichsrat, the Seidler government’s extraparliamentary approach to establishing the new ministry—following the precedent of establishing the Ministry of Public Works with an imperial note in 1908—was especially striking. It was unclear whether this strategy originated from a tactical concern to avoid premature tainting by nationalist politics or the authoritarian, depoliticizing

reform dreams still harbored by some in government circles.¹⁴ The wording of the imperial note indicates that, even if the Social Welfare Ministry was a response to popular pressure, the façade of imperial beneficence and paternalistic initiative had to be upheld.

The two-article law that gave the Social Ministry some traces of parliamentary approval was terse and technical. But the Seidler government's "Explanations" for the proposed law, presented to the Reichsrat on 16 October 1917, in fact comprised a master plan for welfare state building. All five main policy areas envisioned for the new Social Welfare Ministry in the report—youth welfare, welfare for "war-damaged persons" and survivors of fallen soldiers (i.e., war victims), social insurance, labor law and worker protection, and housing services—were discussed as direct or indirect responses to the social and economic realities created or exacerbated by the ongoing war.¹⁵ For example, the need for a specialized and flexible Youth Welfare Office within the new ministry was presented as a solution to the "failures of familial upbringing" due to wartime social dislocation.¹⁶ Likewise, in charting a more comprehensive social insurance system for the future, the report suggested that the existing workers' accident insurance system's facilities and experience would be both the conduit and the reference for improving military welfare services.¹⁷

An interventionist central state was proclaimed through the Social Welfare Ministry's primary mission: "vigorously tending to the national weal as well as improving the conditions of working and less well-off social classes." The Austrian central state would proactively manage social issues in the five key areas, some of which, such as youth welfare and housing shortages, had previously been marginal to or even totally outside of the central state's purview. Without discounting the work done by crownland and local authorities as well as private organizations, the legislative report made it clear that all the current welfare actors in these areas would be drawn into the supervisory orbit of the new ministry.¹⁸ The central government planned to offer regular subsidies to encourage their continued contributions. But the new ministry would also actively advise, assist, and control nonstate service providers.¹⁹ Carrots and sticks—monetary incentives and the implied threat of legal or administrative sanction—were to make nonstate welfare actors fall in line with what the central state deemed appropriate and necessary.

The new Social Welfare Ministry was the state civil administration's assertion of authority vis-à-vis other welfare providers. The return of the Reichsrat meant that parliamentarians complained publicly about the below-subsistence-level provision for working-class disabled soldiers and the fact that these disabled men

had to rely on charities to get by.²⁰ This may have convinced the government to pursue a more centralized approach to welfare expansion in order to prove its sincerity and capability in assisting the citizens in need. This development was all the more significant because bureaucratic centralization was not in the original blueprint. In the spring 1917 design, the new ministry's executive vehicle was meant to be flexible, collaborative, expertise driven, and nonbureaucratic. What Baernreither envisioned then was a welfare infrastructure built on "autonomous corporate bodies, self-help organizations, voluntary associations, etc." and run by contract employees who were experts in what they were tasked to do.²¹ A nimble agency, not just another rigid paper pusher, would be the realization of his long-term dream of a central yet nonbureaucratic leading authority, an innovation in the Austrian civil administration fit for the changed environment.²²

Baernreither's innovative social ministry and his dream of becoming the first social minister were thwarted in a striking advance of parliamentary influence in Imperial Austria's final months.²³ After the reconvening of the Reichsrat in May 1917, and with the parties' sudden willingness to engage in normal parliamentary give-and-take, the Seidler government needed to appease various nationalist factions. Baernreither's association with the German nationalists became a liability. The planned ministry was split into two, headed by ministers representing a balance of the nationalities, in order to secure a progovernment majority in the Reichsrat.²⁴ Despite Baernreither's wish to continue after the fall of the Clam-Martinić government,²⁵ Emperor Karl relieved him of his duties in August. Viktor Mataja, the head of the Commerce Ministry's Social Policy Division since 1908, took over the bulk of the preparation work and became the first social minister on 22 December 1917.²⁶

Still, the mission of the new Social Welfare Ministry closely followed the rationale Baernreither had proposed in March. In discussing the need for a more comprehensive social insurance system, the government's "Explanations" emphasized "mitigation of economic consequences of damages to health and ability to work." As for medical care and welfare services for disabled soldiers, it was even more overtly rehabilitative and productivity oriented: "The efforts [rehabilitative care under the auspice of the central state] . . . aim to achieve the goal of preserving and strengthening the war-disabled person's ability to work to the largest possible extent, so that the majority of invalids will return to society as members who not only have *joie de vivre* and enjoy a productive life, but also are ready to rejoin the national economy in suitable ways."²⁷

Offering welfare services to war victims was likened to offering social insurance or statutory protection to the working population, as the same "ability to

work” justification was invoked. In both cases, the general productive power of society was the ultimate measure, and providing for the disabled was a means to salvage what was left in them for the good of the national economy. The talk of “national strength” meant specifically their economic productivity. The ministry was thus conceived discursively more as the administrator of the Austrian state’s remedial and rehabilitative efforts than as the culmination of the decades-long demand for a labor-protecting, rights-based social policy.²⁸ Nor was it presented explicitly as a ministry of paternalistic sympathy or dynastic charity, though it carried those connotations. In a time of horrific losses and suffering, the Social Ministry was sold to the public as much as a ministry of care as a ministry of (long-term) economic recovery.

Most parliamentarians welcomed the new Social Welfare Ministry but complained about not being given the chance to pass a law to create it in the first place.²⁹ Nevertheless, the Reichsrat was ready to move on and even gave the government more power to move additional jurisdictions from other ministries to the Social Ministry as it saw fit in the future.³⁰

Thus, the Social Welfare Ministry received not only a wide-ranging mandate to rehabilitate the wounded bodies and the body politic but also a license for future expansion. Under the pressure of the war, the importance of social policy to the Austrian state’s viability was finally recognized. Born in the months of the revival of parliamentary politics, its founding was nonetheless extraparliamentary. An emperor’s gesture of paternalistic care, it was presented as an economy-centered solution for the postwar future. As social strains became political dangers, the rehabilitative ministry was also to rehabilitate the battered Monarchy itself.

Centralizing Reformers and Crownland Old Hands

In the new Social Welfare Ministry, the Second Division was responsible for organizing and supervising the provision of “welfare for war-damaged persons.”³¹ But not all civilian benefits or beneficiaries were moved under its jurisdiction.³² Only through a later official announcement were dependents of the disabled and survivors of the fallen, with some exceptions, subject to the new Social Ministry’s purview.³³ The real challenge, moreover, was to make the Social Ministry relevant in the welfare field. It was legally the top authority for the nonmilitary side of war victim welfare, but for all intents and purposes it was a new player in a field that had taken shape before its emergence. Aside from the crownland-level Provincial Commissions for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers, the

Social Ministry did not have a ready infrastructure in place, either. The months of rapidly deteriorating supply of material goods and labor unrest in early 1918 certainly did not help to translate its authority on paper into real power. How, and with what instruments, could it bring the social offensive on the home front to welfare clients—all citizens of Imperial Austria—and shore up popular support for the imperial state?

The Social Ministry, declared the government, needed to harness the combined forces of the central state, autonomous authorities of the crownlands, and voluntary organizations in the welfare field. Otherwise the new welfare offensive stood no chance of succeeding.³⁴ For all that, the Viennese welfare officials needed to know who the players on the ground were and what they were doing in the current patchwork “system.” But this information was exactly what the new ministerial officials did not have. The government admitted as much by including “immediately gain[ing] an overview of the existing care facilities, and then expand[ing] them” as one of the ministry’s first tasks.³⁵

Just two days after becoming operational on 1 January 1918, the Second Division asked each Provincial Commission for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers to prepare a list of all organizations that provided care and assistance to disabled soldiers and their dependents in their respective crownlands. It had to include organizations of all sizes and shapes and operating at all levels—crownland, district, and communal.³⁶ Surveying the welfare field was the ministry’s first step in building the basis for future policies and interventions.

In the absence of any such reliable overview, the Second Division’s officials called in crownland officials for consultation. In a wide-ranging discussion on 14 January 1918, Staff Director Ackerl of the Styrian Commission for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers, Second Division Chief Otto von Gasteiger, and Gasteiger’s deputy Friedrich Hock went over Ackerl’s experience and discussed options for the immediate future.³⁷ The three officials agreed that “one-stop shops” for welfare clients were best opened at the level of the administrative district or even lower at the community level, in order to foster a closer relationship with individual disabled clients.³⁸ With these “one-stop-shops,” the goal was to finish processing each new case within twenty-four hours. The head of the office should be the actual manager of war victim affairs, with sufficient power and prestige to lead disparate actors in the same direction. The best candidate, therefore, would be the district commissioner, who led the entire district government and reported to the crownland governor. Acceptable alternatives would be mayors or respected local “private persons.”³⁹

The choice of directors for the new district-level war victim welfare offices was a good example of the reform's centralizing ethos. Appointing district commissioners to direct these offices meant having the central state's top representative in each district leading the new effort. The proposed alternative to district commissioners, on the other hand—mayors or respected local “private persons”—might at first look like a mere continuation of the pre-Social Ministry practice of relying on local notables. But in the context of the social offensive, there was an important difference: these notables would serve as part of a new welfare bureaucracy and be subject to much tighter control. The officials at the meeting agreed that from then on, “job placement service should be organized by official or semi-official authorities, and not left to private hands. Employers and employees should cooperate, and the government should keep an eye on it.”⁴⁰ Local volunteers would act as state officials who happened to be local dignitaries when carrying out what Vienna ordered. Following this path, the new welfare operation at district or lower level would in effect *étatize* previously autonomous local welfare actors.

Against this centralizing backdrop, the meeting participants' ideas about funding these new bridgeheads of state welfare intervention seemed to be contradictory. Ackerl, Gasteiger, and Hock thought that the new district welfare offices should take advantage of private collection drives and community donations as much as possible. Only after available local resources were exhausted should the Provincial Commissions become involved. Direct cash infusions from Vienna were to be the last resort, though state credit was deemed inevitable. Previous experience with private donations showed that “if someone has his money in [the welfare services], then his interest in it will last longer.” Therefore, the new district war victim offices should remind philanthropic “private persons” that their contribution to the state's war victim welfare office was necessary.⁴¹ The officials wanted to encourage a positive feedback loop to reinforce civil society's interest in the endeavor by highlighting its key role in local services. Ideally, any direct welfare interventions by the state would attract, rather than discourage, more societal resources to the state's cause.

The much-promoted proposal of warrior homestead colonies was also a topic for discussion in the meeting. Unlike the eager military commanders, the gathered welfare officials were not enthusiastic at all. They pointed out that any colony project was unlikely to materialize, “for no one has donated the necessary land, and building costs would simply be prohibitive.” Moreover, if many disabled soldiers lived close to one another in such settlements, “it only breeds

unjustified demands and leads them astray into dissatisfaction.⁴² These concerns about practicality and social control discouraged the officials from spending time on the question.⁴³ After the meeting, the idea resurfaced from time to time in different guises, but it was never at the top of the ministerial officials' agenda.⁴⁴ Its inclusion in the Seidler government's "Explanations" seemed to be a way to satisfy a specific constituency—likely German nationalists and their allies in the military—to ensure the passage of the proposed law and the acceptance of the new Social Ministry.

Gasteiger and Hock then took a momentous step in launching the reform of the war victim welfare "system": uniting the Provincial Commissions and the crownland Bureaus of the War Invalid Job Placement Service. Arguing that "job placement, in the end, is only the last link in the chain of indispensable welfare service for any individual case" and could "achieve complete success only if it has intimate contact with the other welfare measures," they told crownland governors that the current dual-track arrangement, which separated follow-up treatment, occupational counseling, and (re)training (under the Provincial Commissions' watch) from the job placement service (run by the Job Placement Bureaus) was "not always in the war invalids' best interest." Because all the medical care and welfare services before the actual job placement were under the commissions' jurisdiction, the Social Ministry wanted the commissions to absorb the agendas of the Imperial-Royal Job Placement Service.⁴⁵

The decision to unite the services and put the commissions fully in charge in the crownlands had nevertheless had a much longer gestation process. The Job Placement Service system had more extensive contacts and networks of representatives below the crownland level, while the commissions were mostly coordinating points, without their own executive arms directly reaching welfare clients. As reform ideas were considered in 1917, it was not a foregone conclusion that the new Social Ministry reforms would favor the Provincial Commissions. A Styrian Job Placement Service Bureau memorandum sent to the Interior Ministry on 17 March 1917, for example, suggested that a merger of the crownland bureaus with each crownland's general labor exchange could constitute the core of a more holistic labor market intervention. With an eye on the postwar influx of "healthy" veterans, the Styrians argued that the Job Placement Bureau already had a network to make the general crownland labor exchange more effective in overcoming disabled men's current high failure rate in landing jobs despite a general labor shortage. The upgraded labor exchange could also help disabled men competing with "healthy" veterans after the war.⁴⁶ In essence, the Styrian officials offered an alternative path of consolidation that focused on the nature

of the specific service to be provided (job placement), rather than the target of the service (disabled soldier).⁴⁷ Absorbing the Job Placement Bureaus into the Provincial Commissions, then, was not the only or even predetermined option for reorganization.

However, the Social Ministry officials were unconvinced by the performance of the current dual-track system. They pointed out that “often in the process of job placement, the results of follow-up treatment, job (re)training, and occupational counseling, which are crucial for individualized job placement, are not taken into consideration. Consequently invalids often fail to secure more permanent employment.”⁴⁸ The solution to this allegedly self-defeating practice was to consolidate all the services for disabled soldiers into one single authority everywhere. In the 14 January 1918 meeting between Ackerl, Gasteiger, and Hock, they concluded that “the Imperial-Royal War Invalid Job Placement Service is too independent. It seems more effective to just dissolve it and incorporate its functions back into the Provincial Commission” as a preferable direction of reform.⁴⁹ The merger of the two tracks was decided.

The “newcomer” ministry had to proceed cautiously after deciding for the Provincial Commissions as the surviving agencies after the merger. The Viennese officials knew that crownland Job Placement Bureau staff were often volunteers and difficult to replace for reasons of cost, and their goodwill toward the new Social Ministry was indispensable for the upcoming reforms. Despite internal agreement among his deputies that more talks would probably not change many minds, Gasteiger invited the heads of the Job Placement Service’s crownland bureaus to a meeting on 7 February to “preemptively soothe any sensitivities that the (merger) decision could possibly stir up among [them].” Additionally, some bureau directors, given their crownlands’ complicated political dynamics, were invited to meet with Gasteiger and his staff individually.⁵⁰ The new, reformed organization could not afford to alienate the old hands from the job placement services.

The February meeting offered a window onto the crownland welfare officials’ views of the disabled men they served. When Gasteiger strategically phrased the merger as “planned concentration” and “connection” of services aiming to remedy the ineffectiveness of a “complete separation of the job placement agendas from that of the Provincial Commissions,” crownland job placement officials argued the main problem was the clients themselves, something that the merger itself would not solve. The Upper Austrian Bureau representative, Trade Inspector Aich, pointed out that there were 1,242 disabled soldiers registered as job seekers at the Linz Bureau in 1917. Only 446 really needed placement services,

because there were 550 farmers on top of those who could find work or support for themselves. Most of the real job seekers unfortunately wanted only clerical positions. The local military administration indiscriminately heeded these wishes and exhausted the available positions too quickly.⁵¹ The lack of effectiveness was due to clients' unrealistic preferences not aligning with what the Job Placement Bureaus could find for them.

More crucially, Aich reported that many job-seeking disabled men were of "low moral quality." At one point, among the 295 job seekers under consideration, only 41 percent had no criminal record. Furthermore, if the bureau found a suitable job for a client, the chances that he would keep it were low; after one year, only 20 percent of placed clients stayed in the places to which they were referred, 33 percent left because of "wanderlust," and 12 percent left because of assorted shortcomings ("embezzlement, etc."). Aich's view was echoed by others. In Lower Austria, 25,947 open positions were reported to the bureau in 1917, but only 6,939 of the job-seeking disabled soldiers were placed in employment. The Austrian Silesian representative concurred, saying that the job placement staff had to treat the disabled men like "big children."⁵² In job placement officials' experience, many clients were fickle, ungrateful, prone to wanderlust and/or legal troubles, and unwilling to devote themselves to productive activities.

If the clients themselves caused many difficulties, the job placement leaders felt it was unfair to attribute the ineffectiveness to the care committees and "the incompetence of the leading personalities" up and down the job placement system. Aich argued that lacking industrial centers limited employment opportunities in Upper Austria. The solution was not to blame the quality of the personnel and the resources at their disposal but to increase the quantity of both. It was difficult to recruit volunteers to work on local job placement. The success of any future endeavor would hinge on "offering an adequate honorarium."⁵³

During the meeting, Aich and some of the provincial officials were obviously unhappy with the Viennese officials using their words to highlight the job placement system's alleged inadequacy and explain away their achievements.⁵⁴ The Moravian representative talked about his Brünn/Brno staff having gathered 4,022 available position offerings, handled 2,441 job applications, and completed 1,156 successful placements in 1917 (a 47.4 percent success rate).⁵⁵ The Viennese officials were not impressed. Gasteiger emphatically reminded everyone that the Moravian "success" was attributed to many things the Moravian Bureau did "beyond the framework of mere job placement service," without specifying these extracurricular services.⁵⁶ Gasteiger and his deputies made it clear that

they did not believe the results of the “mere framework of job placement service” justified its separate existence.

On the other hand, Gasteiger and his deputies welcomed experiences that “proved” the advantage of the planned merger. In Carinthia, “the offices of the general secretary of the Provincial Commission and the director of the Job Placement Bureau are united” in one person, and the officials from both organizations participated in job counseling sessions. Neither Gasteiger nor his lieutenants felt the need to explain the Carinthian experience away as being the result of something “beyond the framework”—a *de facto* Provincial Commission—led integration of the two systems.⁵⁷

Gasteiger had called the meeting to preempt “sensitivities,” but despite the obvious lack of enthusiasm of crownland bureau directors in attendance,⁵⁸ any reservations they harbored were not expressed until Gasteiger took too heavy a hand in steering the discussion in favor of his merger project. Even so, no one objected when he declared that all participants agreed to the merger at the end of the meeting.⁵⁹ On behalf of a newcomer ministry to the war victim welfare field, Gasteiger and his deputies did not want to—and could not—impose policy in a top-down fashion. They sought to build support from both the Provincial Commissions—the “winners”—and the Job Placement Bureaus—the “losers.” On 7 February, the ministerial officials’ insecurity might have gotten the better of them. The crownland “sensitivities” they sought to soothe, ironically, bubbled to the surface because of their defensive overreaction. Fortunately, everyone agreed that reforms were necessary. Aich’s suggestion that grassroots welfare volunteers should be compensated even echoed the ministerial intention to *étatize* and regularize welfare actors. Gasteiger and his deputies were not preaching to the choir, but they did not have to face open opposition either.

The Reform of 5 March 1918

What did the social offensive mean for war victims and welfare actors on the ground? Beyond improvements to living allowances in 1917 and adding the special state subsidies in 1918, reforms to the apparatus that delivered the care and welfare services were clearly a priority, especially after the 7 February meeting in Vienna. But what would the new organization of war victim welfare look like, how would it be carried out, and what difference would it make? Grassroots volunteer welfare officials were anxious. Those who ran district-level care committees on behalf of the crownland bureaus repeatedly asked for clarifications.

In Upper Austria, the Provincial Commission had to reassure all fourteen district care committees that their contribution continued to be valued and that their “spirit of sacrifice” had successfully “foster[ed] self-sufficiency” among disabled men.⁶⁰

Linz officials assumed the upcoming reform would be a continuation of previous developments: mobilizing more local societal resources to cover new services ordered by Vienna but with the locals still managing them more or less autonomously. The Provincial Commission told local volunteer officials that the all-inclusive district welfare centers correctly rumored to be coming would not constitute an entirely new system. Moreover, the fourteen district care committees of the Job Placement Bureau already served as the fourteen district committees of the Provincial Commission in Upper Austria; volunteer officials in the districts wore two hats.⁶¹ The care committees were urged to carry on their work as usual and told that their managing directors would be given proper honoraria.⁶² To address the foreseeable additional workload, the Linz officials suggested recruiting more volunteers.⁶³

The Upper Austrians would be surprised. The Social Welfare Ministry’s first major reform in war victim welfare was not a mere expansion of the current model. On 5 March 1918, the social minister issued a directive to all Provincial Commissions entitled “Welfare for the War-Damaged; Organizational Measures,”⁶⁴ in which he detailed immediate organizational reforms for war victim services. The seemingly straightforward plan envisioned an aggressive expansion of the central state that not only highlighted the growth of its social service portfolio but also had lasting influence: it built up the administrative apparatus and norms on which the Austrian First Republic would rely to deliver its welfare services.

The directive proclaimed the central state’s two immediate goals for war victim welfare. First, current welfare organizations should be expanded so that the state could “actually guarantee service coverage to all disabled soldiers.” Second, each disabled soldier should receive individualized services according to his specific circumstances. These two goals, once achieved, would help the disabled soldier welfare system accomplish its primary mission: “reintegrating war invalids into the economic life” of the country.⁶⁵ This mission, echoing the Social Welfare Ministry’s overall rehabilitative focus on economic productivity, also remained unchanged, though not unchallenged by war victims.

However, the directive did not break new ground in terms of the civil administration’s main services for disabled soldiers: follow-up treatment for injuries, job (re)training, occupational counseling, job placement, and measures

necessary to enable disabled veterans' economic self-sufficiency, following the military-civilian division of labor agreed on in 1915. What was new were the detailed instructions on how to deliver these services and who would do so.⁶⁶

To achieve full coverage and individualized service, the ministry ordered a massive expansion of infrastructure at the subcrownland level. Until then, the primary "local" disabled soldier welfare agency was each crownland's Provincial Commission for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers. Below the crownland level were volunteer-based, autonomous care committees working only on job placement matters; in some crownlands there were no care committees at all. The Provincial Commission was not a suitable instrument for the new tasks; its crownland-wide jurisdiction was too unwieldy to be "successful as a direct provider of individualized welfare service," and its officials usually had full-time duties elsewhere and worked on war victim issues only on the side.⁶⁷ A new, more robust service-delivery structure was needed to shorten the physical and social distance between welfare officials and their clients.

The district-level Invalid Office (*Invalidenamt*), under the supervision of the Provincial Commission, was to spearhead this new service-delivery structure. It would be a new kind of official first-line "one-stop shop," carrying out welfare measures as part of the Vienna-led state civil administration. It was also expected to build more personal relationships between individual clients and state officials. The Invalid Office had to be nimble, well informed, and alert to local details in order to "take into consideration every case's specifics, and make decisions that correspond to the client's personality, his family circumstances, and the economic situation of his current place of residence or hometown." The Provincial Commissions were tasked with building a dense network of Invalid Offices to reach "the smallest communities" in each service office's respective jurisdiction.⁶⁸

The 5 March 1918 directive ended the dual-track system that had been improvised over the course of 1914 and 1915. The Provincial Commissions—reporting to the crownland governors and the Social Welfare Ministry—were ordered to take over job placement functions from the War Invalid Job Placement Service's crownland bureaus, and the new Invalid Offices or local offices of the commissions were to replace or incorporate the existing Job Placement Bureau's local branches and care committees.⁶⁹ Just as the Ministry of Social Welfare would preside over all civilian welfare affairs, welfare agendas for disabled soldiers would be centralized in the ministry's new pyramid of subsidiaries.

How to proceed in building unified, all-purpose Invalid Offices was left to each crownland's Provincial Commission. But this delegation of power to the

crownland capitals could not mask the directive's aggressively centralizing character. Ensuring procedural uniformity and administrative standardization across Imperial Austria overrode local circumstances. The Provincial Commissions decided how to proceed, but the ministry set clear guidelines for the internal structure of each Invalid Office as well as its exact competence areas and assignments. The Invalid Office had to mirror its superior Provincial Commission in internal organization. It was also expected to appoint local (subdistrict-level) representatives to collect and distribute information *in situ* on its behalf,⁷⁰ continuing to lean on local volunteers to extend the official service's reach. As decided in the 14 January meeting in Vienna, the local volunteers would be subjected to tighter control and act more as state functionaries than community leaders.

The Social Welfare Ministry was aiming for a concentration of power, information, and resources in the hands of its new subsidiaries at the subcrownland level. The Viennese officials wanted Invalid Offices to "inform themselves of the essence, aim, and purpose of all [private invalid welfare] organizations" in their jurisdictions. The office would then use this knowledge to better define each private welfare actor's role and coordinate their work in the district. The ministerial directive even stated that the Invalid Offices should strive for a "systematic merger with these local organizations."⁷¹ The ministerial officials clearly believed that the state apparatus was the best way to overcome practical difficulties in delivering care and services on the ground—as long as they were given all the available resources. They wanted to kill two birds with one stone: shoring up the state's capabilities while eliminating or at least better controlling the (nonstate) competitors.

The drive toward monopolizing resources and power was motivated in part by a strong desire to make the civil welfare apparatus operationally less dependent on the military administration. In the 5 March directive, the Social Ministry indicated that being in command of complete information on each disabled man was the only way to ensure that "no single person in need of welfare services should be left to fend for himself."⁷² Under earlier work procedures, civilian welfare agencies were unable to take any action until military authorities had passed along individual disabled men's official invalid forms. But these forms, bearing key medical and personal information and, most importantly, the superarbitration decisions on benefit eligibility, often took a maddening two to three months to arrive after the superarbitration process.⁷³ The slow pace made it impossible for civilian welfare agencies to monitor disabled soldiers and provide them with necessary services, because the agencies had neither precise knowledge nor official proof of eligibility about any given new disabled soldier showing up in their jurisdictions.

In response, the 5 March directive instructed officials in the Invalid Offices and the Provincial Commissions to build their own information systems. Rather than waiting helplessly for invalid forms to arrive, the Invalid Office would fill out its own detailed case form on each returning disabled soldier. At this point, the former War Invalid Job Placement system's community representative networks, to be inherited (where they already existed) or created (where they did not) by the Invalid Offices, would spring into action; the volunteers in small towns and villages, or the Invalid Office directors themselves, would locate each new returnee and conduct in-depth interviews. They were tasked with recording the soldier's military rank, personal data, legal domicile, current address, medical/injury history, superarbitration findings, current welfare benefits, work history, occupational training and education, family background, property ownership, personal preference for future employment, and so on. The case forms, to be duplicated, would be deposited in both the Invalid Office and the Provincial Commission.⁷⁴ They would form the core of each known disabled soldier's case folder opened at both the local welfare office and the Provincial Commission and would be updated regularly for all the decisions and actions taken. The ministry even ordered that case folders should be archived in designated file cabinets to allow for quick overview.⁷⁵ In short, the reform inaugurated by the 5 March 1918 directive was as much about organizational expansion as about creating a capable and proactive information regime. Actionable information was the civilian welfare administration's path to the precious independence from the mercurial military.

This insatiable hunger for actionable information meant that "self-reporting"—a euphemism for a disabled soldier previously unknown to civilian authorities who paid the latter a surprise visit—would be seen as a sign of intolerable failure. "Self-reporting" had been an important way for the authorities to discover newly returned disabled soldiers.⁷⁶ But each instance of "self-reporting" also meant that many more probably had fallen through the bureaucratic cracks during their transition back to civilian life. To prevent any future returnees being missed, the Social Welfare Ministry strongly recommended that every Provincial Commission establish regular contacts with territorial military commands. Following the precedent in Bohemia, Provincial Commissions were expected to convince relevant military commands to send a short notice to them immediately after each superarbitration. Knowing too well the complications this recommendation entailed, the Social Welfare Ministry officials promised to "offer the warmest support" to Provincial Commissions in the latter's negotiations with military authorities. The ministry even offered a one-page form letter,

based on the one used in Bohemia, as a convenient model notice to encourage the territorial military commands to cooperate.⁷⁷

The advance notice arrangements between Provincial Commissions and territorial commands would round out an anticipated uniform three-step procedure for gathering and seamlessly transmitting information about each disabled soldier. The first step was that the informal advance warning, a form letter notification, would be initiated by the territorial command immediately after a soldier's superarbitration. Containing no more than basic personal information, the degree of disability, and the amount and length of the military pension awarded by the superarbitration panel,⁷⁸ this short alert was to inform the relevant Provincial Commission and Invalid Office about the said soldier's certified status and pending return. A new welfare case would then be opened before the man's arrival. The second step was filling out the Invalid Office's aforementioned internal case form. This was done through in-depth interviews with the disabled man, conducted by the Invalid Office director or his community representatives, immediately after his arrival. The last step was the transfer of the formal, military-produced invalid form, which would ensure the legality of welfare provision and serve as the basis for dispute resolution, to the local welfare authorities. It was hoped that all three steps together would give the reformed welfare system standardized, detailed, cross-checkable, and traceable records on each disabled soldier until the state's services were no longer needed.

Under the new information regime, disabled soldiers entered a growing welfare system more as the subjects of the state's rehabilitative work—both physical and economic—than as rights-bearing citizens with particular needs and choices. Though instituted to enable individualized care and services, the various standardized forms were, in effect, a mechanism that transformed individual disabled soldiers into classifiable, quantifiable cases to be processed.⁷⁹ The ministry-mandated case form's questionnaire layout dictated what kind of profile, within a predetermined range, each disabled soldier would have in the eyes of the welfare apparatus. The astonishingly detailed and uniform work procedures prescribed by the 5 March directive for Invalid Offices and Provincial Commissions, moreover, facilitated a system of interviews, form filing, data structuring, record keeping, and interagency exchange of information that reinforced each client's transformation into a standardized packet of information to be managed.⁸⁰ "Individualized services" could be aspired to only within this standardization drive.

The 5 March reform was also part of the deep wartime transformation of the Austrian central state: citizens' institutionalized participation in the state's

civil administration at the moment when the state became more intrusive. The assumption behind the pursuit of administrative omniscience was that more and better information about both the welfare sector and individual clients would enhance the welfare apparatus's capacity to deliver services. The directive devoted much more space to detailing how to gather and handle information than it did to the actual uses of the new information in action, nor did it bring about substantial changes in the services being offered. The 5 March reform's new information regime enabled and embodied the expansion of the state's reach, through information gathering and processing, into spatial (small communities), social (local social networks), and personal (volunteers and disabled men) territories where it previously had little or no direct access.

But it was not a development in one-way domination. The Social Welfare Ministry was cognizant of the reality that nonstate actors were absolutely indispensable in making many services, and the 5 March reform itself, possible. The ambitious expansion of the state's purview required more resources than ever, which could only be marshaled by further co-optation of societal actors. The ministerial officials were glad to inherit the system of communal representatives from the Job Placement Bureau's contact networks. The ministry also instructed the Provincial Commissions to expand on the job placement system's formal involvement of nonstate actors in managing the services. Each Invalid Office would, in addition to the director and his secretariat, organize a general committee. The officials believed that it was essential to have expertise and experience from "all economic, social, and occupational circles . . . for example, representatives from industry and commerce; trades and handicraft; agriculture and forestry; employers as well as employees; state, crownland, and communal authorities; suitable war invalids; and especially physicians and 'specialists' of various kinds related to occupational training."⁸¹

The inclusion of societal representatives in the future official welfare service signified not only a quantitative expansion of the older Job Placement Bureaus' participatory practices but also a qualitative change in conceiving who the stakeholders were. Representatives of local disabled soldiers, the welfare system's clients, were brought onto the institutionalized platform to discuss the care of their fellow veterans with local notables and officials. This participatory change certainly had its limits. The invitation to clients was extended only to "suitable" ones, those whom the Viennese officials knew to be loyal to the crown and perhaps even members of patriotic veteran associations.⁸² In 1915 the Invalid Job Placement Bureau had invited civic leaders and experts to participate in its operations in order to tap into more societal resources. As the war's social and

economic effects became more wide ranging and acute, clients' input came to be understood as important as well. This was the first time that clients' voices were institutionally included in the official administration of their welfare and care.

The addition of select clients' representatives to the local disabled soldier welfare administration also marked a new development in the Austrian welfare system, though their presence in the management of welfare programs was not entirely new in Imperial Austria. The Workers' Accident Insurance Law of 28 December 1887 (*RGBl.* 1/1888) built territorially organized accident insurance agencies, and their governing boards each drew a third of the members from employers, a third from insured workers and employees, and a third from Interior Ministry appointees. Likewise, the diverse but autonomous health insurance funds, as designed and regulated in the Workers' Health Insurance Law of 30 March 1888 (*RGBl.* 33/1888), had governing boards that consisted either of only insured workers or a mixture of insured workers (two thirds of the seats) and employer representatives (one third).⁸³

But there was a crucial difference in terms of client participation between these two 1880s social insurance systems and the disabled soldiers' welfare services. The former were contribution-based systems, and the proportional participation in self-governance more or less reflected the degree of monetary contribution to the fund—employers covered a third and employees covered two thirds of the contributions to many health insurance funds. Clients therefore sat on the boards to manage their own money. The disabled soldier welfare services and medical care, by contrast, were partly the realization of a political bargain the central state struck with those who sacrificed in its name and partly a policy for the economic future of the Austrian state and society. Disabled soldiers drew compensation from the public coffers, not from what they had earlier contributed or saved (unless their previous tax payments are considered as a form of insurance contribution). They participated in the general committees as clients and beneficiaries whose experience and presence were deemed intrinsically valuable in managing the service programs.

Thus the first sign of a participatory welfare administration appeared on the horizon, foreshadowing what was to come under the Republic. The inclusion of clients in the state welfare administration signaled a subtle transformation of the Austrian citizenship. Central state leaders might still speak in paternalistic terms about providing and expanding welfare to its injured citizen-soldiers, as exemplified by Emperor Karl's note. But by inviting the object of its action to participate in the management of that very action, the Austrian state entitled a (male) citizen to have a voice about his treatment in the welfare system.

Crucially, this entitlement to participate was based primarily on citizenship *per se*, rather than on any philanthropic contributions or a person's social status. It was citizenship that obligated a man to serve in war, and the same citizenship entitled him to the care and welfare services from the state and then to participate in managing those. By virtue of the entitlement to participate, the wartime Austrian state had in its last months conceded a limited, specific, but symbolically important entry for military service-eligible male citizens *qua* state welfare clients into the public administration. Before full democratization under the First Republic, it might be premature to call this entry a "right" of a (male) client-citizen. However, with the institutionalized and prevalent inclusion of clients in the welfare administration in the early years of the First Republic, wartime welfare politics was indeed the harbinger of the democratization of social provision and public administration more generally.

The Limits to the Organizational Reform

In the wake of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (3 March 1918) with the Russian Bolshevik government, an estimated 2 million POWs were expected to return, many of whom would probably enter the medical and care systems. The 5 March 1918 reform's expansion of organization and personnel was desperately needed.⁸⁴ There was also a political imperative to move quickly with organizational reform: the promise of welfare state expansion might even backfire if the state apparatus was too slow in meeting the popular expectations. The Social Welfare Ministry set a hurried schedule for Provincial Commissions to construct the planned infrastructure in their crownlands: at least one local war victim service office (an Invalid Office or even an office at the communal level) should be fully operational in every administrative district in Imperial Austria by July 1918.⁸⁵

To accelerate the desired network expansion, the Social Welfare Ministry offered the most effective incentive they could think of: cash subsidies for setting up Invalid Offices or local welfare stations. In the 14 January 1918 meeting, the official agreed that the costs for setting up Invalid Offices would best be shouldered by the locals or the Provincial Commissions. But in the interest of timely implementation of the 5 March reform, the ministry decided to pay for office furnishings, supplies, and especially the salaries of the directors as well as their staff, as long as detailed lists of the Invalid Offices' employees and the general committee members were submitted.⁸⁶ Ministerial subsidies were also granted to facilitate the Provincial Commissions' internal reorganization and absorption

of the job placement offices. Extra costs incurred in the first six months of 1918 would be covered against prepared budgets.⁸⁷

Direct state funding, intentionally or not, reinforced the effort to build the desired information regime. Since subsidies would be paid on the condition that the requested information be submitted to Vienna, the Social Welfare Ministry would receive detailed, up-to-date information on the individuals staffing the lower rungs of the new welfare bureaucracy.⁸⁸ For the first time, local welfare actors would be made legible to the central state.

The end-of-June 1918 deadline for all crownlands turned out to be too optimistic. Progress was at best uneven. The Viennese Invalid Office's secretariat, the actual service provider, was formed on 20 June after the merger of the War Invalid Job Placement Service's Vienna Bureau with the Viennese Municipal Counseling and Relief Center for War Invalids, Their Dependents, and Deceased Soldiers' Survivors. Occupying the space of the former job placement office at 32 Neubaugürtel in the 7th District, it offered job placement service, cash or in-kind assistance, small business–founding assistance, and follow-up medical treatment arrangements. It also continued the primary mission of the Municipal Counseling and Relief Center of advising disabled soldiers and their dependents about benefits and application processes. The new Invalid Office's staff came from both the Job Placement Service and the municipal government.⁸⁹

The on-schedule founding of the Viennese Invalid Office could be attributed to the pressure as well as the support from the Viennese municipal government. The Viennese City Council had repeatedly petitioned the Austrian government for immediate reforms in both the military welfare laws and welfare provision systems since October 1914. In 1918, the City Council and Mayor Richard Weiskirchner even abandoned the conventional deferential language to pressure the “higher-ups” with resolutions and proposals, loudly positioning themselves as the voice for the suffering people against the unresponsive central authorities.⁹⁰ In a 29 June meeting in the Vienna Invalid Office, Mayor Weiskirchner claimed the credit for its founding on behalf of the City Council.⁹¹ It was in the interests of both the Social Ministry and Viennese local politicians to open the Invalid Office on time; nothing could be more concrete than a brick-and-mortar operation in representing welfare infrastructure building. Local clamoring for more central state intervention in this case became the needed support for the aggressively centralist 5 March reforms.

Despite the centralist impulse for uniform organization, local circumstances and the devolved implementation of the 5 March reform created a variety of organizational affiliations for Invalid Offices in the crownlands. The Lower

Austrian Provincial Commission reported several different modalities of its twenty-four Invalid Offices as of 19 September. Besides the independent Vienna Invalid Office and Floridsdorf Invalid Office (serving the northern suburbs of Vienna), the majority were set up within local municipal governments or district commissioner's offices. But the St. Pölten Invalid Office was formed within the city's own labor exchange, and the Oberhollabrunn Invalid Office was affiliated with the district poor relief office.⁹² Things moved relatively smoothly in Upper Austria, too, notwithstanding the Upper Austrian leaders' skeptical attitude. The crownland War Invalid Job Placement Bureau simply became a department of the Provincial Commission on 1 July.⁹³ The Invalid Offices, modeled after the Viennese one, emerged on time and began operations as scheduled.⁹⁴ The more developed network of fourteen care committees became the foundation—organizationally, personnel-wise, and in terms of practical experiences and local connections—for the new Invalid Offices, as the Linz officials had correctly predicted back in February.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, the detailed information about the new Invalid Offices' personnel and internal service guidelines was only reported to the Social Welfare Ministry at the end of August, nearly two months after their opening.⁹⁶ How ready the Upper Austrian Invalid Offices were to assume all their responsibilities on 1 July is unknown.

In other crownlands, the progress was not encouraging. On 31 July, a full month after the deadline, Friedrich Hock from the Social Welfare Ministry politely admonished Styrian crownland officials for having missed the deadline. Since the Styrians prided themselves on already having a *de facto* unified welfare service for disabled soldiers, setting up Invalid Offices, in Hock's understanding, should have involved only formalities.⁹⁷ For unknown reasons, it seems that as late as November 1918—when the Austrian Republic had been proclaimed—the project of opening Invalid Offices in all districts was still not completed there.⁹⁸

In Tyrol, or at least in its capital city of Innsbruck, the Invalid Office was not established at all until spring 1919, and then only under pressure from organized disabled veterans. On 27 December 1918, almost six months after the initial deadline had passed, the Association of German-Tyrol War Invalids (*Verein der Kriegsinvaliden Deutsch-Tirols*) wrote to the Republic's State Office (Ministry) of Social Welfare to ask for help in securing an Invalid Office for Innsbruck.⁹⁹ Despite the Imperial Ministry of Social Welfare's best efforts to induce the provincials (cash subsidies, for example) to work on its behalf, crownland officials were content with or had no energy or resources to really revisit the improvised system they had assembled in the early war years. In fact, Innsbruck did not get

its Invalid Office until serious misunderstandings were cleared up in early April 1919; as late as March 1919, the Tyrolean Provincial Commission thought that the Association of German-Tyrol War Invalids did not want an all-inclusive Invalid Office.¹⁰⁰ Only then did the Tyrolean Provincial Commission resolve to consolidate all disabled soldiers' welfare affairs into one Invalid Office.¹⁰¹

The savvy welfare officials understood that a semifederal approach to the centralizing welfare expansion was inevitable.¹⁰² The implementation of the social offensive in war victim welfare depended as much as the pre-reform system on the circumstances and willingness of the local and non-state actors to succeed. The centralizing 5 March reform aimed to change the balance of power in the central state's favor. But experiences in Styria and Tyrol show that even if setting up Invalid Offices involved only bureaucratic formalities, there was no guarantee the locals would proceed as the top-down plan had intended. Even the promise of cash subsidies from Vienna was insufficient to make the organizational reform happen on time.

More fundamentally, the 5 March 1918 reform was inherently limited. It focused on creating an information regime and a more centralized and capable welfare apparatus, but it said little about what was to be delivered to war victims.

Competing Futures

There were indeed concrete proposals for an extensive, even fundamental reform of war victim welfare during the social offensive on the home front. It was obvious to contemporaries that the Military Welfare Law of 1875 and the Military Pension Law for Widows and Orphans of 1887, even with the wartime updates (*RGBL.* 161/1915, 162/1915), were inadequate for addressing the havoc wreaked by the ongoing war. But the alleged interest of the Imperial Austrian government, and especially from the military, in a new war welfare law never led to tangible results. The revival of parliamentary politics in May 1917, in contrast, saw impatient political parties proposing several blueprints for such a legislation. This in turn forced the Imperial Austrian government to finally introduce a new war welfare bill in 1918. The competing proposals represented very different visions for the postwar social order, different conceptions of entitlement citizenship, and different roles for the postwar state.

The Christian Socials were the first to present their demands. In two 5 June 1917 motions, they pressured the government to act immediately because "the first and the holiest duty of the state as well as every individual citizen is soldiers'

welfare,” but the current improvised measures and private charitable activities simply fell short.¹⁰³ According to the Christian Socials, the ultimate goal of the new law(s) should be the preservation or restoration of the prewar social hierarchy. In their plan, four criteria would determine an enlisted man’s disability pension: career soldier or not, military rank, preservice civilian income level, and the percentage loss of earning power in his old job (five classes were designated, beginning with 25 percent loss). Two of these criteria, measuring the loss of earning power “only by his prewar civilian occupation” (rather than by a universal work ability scale) and military rank, strongly reflected prewar social status and educational attainment. Surviving dependents’ pension benefits would be determined by the same four criteria, but dependents were entitled to them only when they could not “secure other employment.”¹⁰⁴ Dependents’ benefits were meant to be a last resort reflecting prewar socioeconomic differences, not literally replacing household income to the prewar level.¹⁰⁵

The Christian Socials’ plan would also enforce specific notions of proper gender roles, marriage, and family. Boys could receive a pension until they reached the age of eighteen, but girls would be eligible only until fifteen (a minor improvement from the 1887 law’s cutoff ages at sixteen and fourteen, respectively). With this the Christian Socials reinforced the contemporary societal expectation of girls entering working life or ending formal schooling earlier than boys.¹⁰⁶ They also insisted on a clear distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. In the hypothetical case of a fallen private with a prewar annual income of 1,200 kronen, his legitimate daughter would receive an annual pension of 270 kronen as a paternal orphan, but an illegitimate daughter would receive only 180 kronen.¹⁰⁷ The Catholic Christian Socials’ plan underlined the normativity of a particular family model in postwar society by discriminating against illegitimate children and retroactively punishing the dead father and surviving mother. The same sacrifice for the fatherland would not be reciprocated by the state in the same way, even in cases of similar class background.

The Social Democrats believed that a new comprehensive law was “a most urgent duty with absolutely no room for delay.” The key principle of the new law, according to the Social Democrats’ 6 July 1917 proposal, should be equal treatment for the same loss. Military personnel and “war service workers”—those who worked in the war industries—and their surviving dependents should be eligible for the same benefits if they suffered the same degree of loss. How one died or was permanently disabled or what his military rank was at the time of death were irrelevant.¹⁰⁸ Unlike the Christian Socials, the Social Democrats

refused to retain the core criteria of the 1875 system still in effect—military rank and service length—in their desired future system.

The Social Democrats' plan foresaw four disability classes, based on the disabled soldier's loss of working ability in his prior civilian occupation, from 25 percent loss upward, to determine the amount of the pension (similar to the Christian Social proposal).¹⁰⁹ This structure tacitly admitted prewar economic-social differences as a factor in future benefits. With a much higher cap on the combined benefit amount for a disabled man or a dead man's family, and without the Christian Social caveat limiting benefit entitlement to absolutely needy dependents, the Social Democratic plan was more generous, especially for more affluent citizen-clients.¹¹⁰ They certainly did not intend to use war victim welfare for drastic social leveling or to specially favor their working-class voters.

The principle of egalitarian provision also guided the Social Democrats' view of surviving dependents' benefits. Sons and daughters would both receive pensions until the age of eighteen, regardless of illegitimacy or their parents' marriage status. The Social Democrats' explicit statement, "qualifying dependents include the wife or the cohabitant, children born in or out of wedlock, stepchildren, parents and grandparents," was probably written with the Christian Social discrimination against illegitimate and unmarried survivors in mind.¹¹¹

Most importantly, the Social Democrats conceived of war victim welfare not as a special "thanks from the fatherland" but an integral part of a comprehensive social insurance system for the near future. The Social Democrats' plan would let social insurance carriers manage the medical facilities devoted to the treatment and rehabilitation of disabled soldiers. Health insurance funds would cover the treatment of those who succumbed to illness during military service. Disputes over war victim benefit decisions would be adjudicated by the very same insurance arbitration panels, chaired by judges and including welfare client representatives, foreseen in the future social insurance system.¹¹² Ideally, war victim welfare would be a pioneer component of a comprehensive social insurance-based welfare state, not a separate military welfare program.

The German nationalists returned to their obsession with warrior homesteads as the main war welfare solution in their first proposal (3 July 1917). Disabled soldiers or surviving dependents should be entitled to use designated land for housing or farming, with land ownership retained by the central state or the local community but any aboveground structure available for purchase by the residents at a preferential interest rate. This warrior homestead idea was supposed to alleviate the housing shortage that had long plagued Imperial Austria's more industrialized regions. Unlike the Christian Socials, the German

nationalists made no mention of different or discriminatory treatment for illegitimate children or cohabitants.¹¹³

The German nationalists sought to outdo the Social Democrats in their second, twenty-one-point proposal (9 July 1917). They castigated the existing military welfare provision as “making a mockery of all the demands of equity and justice.” But they planned to retain the current system’s basic design. While agreeing with the other parties that the loss of civilian earning power should be a factor, the German nationalist plan called for a host of different allowances, calculated based on specific physical loss or impairment, to be added to the rather meager base pension, which alone was to be determined by the loss of earning power. The most important allowance was the ominously named “mutilation allowance,” an updated version of the existing system’s “injury allowance.” Losing a hand, arm, foot, leg, eye, or the ability to hear or speak, for example, would each be worth an additional 360 kronen a year, an improvement from the 192 kronen each at the current rate. An especially unfortunate person could receive up to 1,200 kronen in mutilation allowances. In comparison, the base annual pension for a fully disabled private would be only 480 kronen in their plan.¹¹⁴ Despite the rhetoric, the German nationalists only demanded higher amounts of the same benefits. They did not ask for more fundamental changes.

What the German nationalists really focused on was how each disabled soldier could convert part or all of his pension into a lump-sum payment to facilitate property ownership in a cooperative building or resettlement program or to fund his farm or business.¹¹⁵ The military pension clearly would be only a complement or even an encouragement to warrior homesteads. In the option to convert pension benefits to a one-time payout, the German nationalists found a way to solve the main problem that had haunted warrior homestead colony projects since 1916: lack of funding. Welfare beneficiaries would ideally use the payout to self-capitalize the project, thereby realizing the German nationalists’ dream of making disabled veterans the pioneers of agricultural colonization in the allegedly threatened (German) national territories. Whether disabled men or surviving dependents were in a condition to sustain themselves in these settlements was as usual not addressed.

Although the government did not respond to this wave of parliamentary intervention immediately, the stakes of the main parliamentary parties’ criticisms and visions for the future—enforcing a specific family model for the Christian Socials, laying stepping-stones to a general social insurance system for the Social Democrats, and promoting warrior homestead projects for the German nationalists¹¹⁶—were constantly amplified by the deteriorating food supply and living

conditions. The pressure to reform long-term war victim welfare was increasing. A government draft of the new military welfare law was finally shared with the Hungarian government at the end of 1917, a necessary legislative step to ensure that the two halves of the Monarchy would agree to offer comparable benefits.¹¹⁷

The military administration-prepared ur-draft, however, was a great disappointment when it was revealed after a long period of gestation.¹¹⁸ The well-connected private welfare service provider, the Society for the Care of War Invalids (*Gesellschaft zur Fürsorge für Kriegsinvalide*), mockingly contrasted “the public being pleasantly surprised by the quick succession of new draft laws being introduced by the government” (the ur-draft following the 28 March 1918 special state subsidy law) and how “little the draft military welfare law . . . meets the widely-held expectations.” The ur-draft retained the old system’s distinction between officers and men, using military rank rather than one’s civilian social status and income to determine pension benefits. In 1918, the society argued, this was already an obsolete way of thinking. Most people had come to believe that, as the duty to perform military service was the same for all social classes, one’s prior civilian income and status should definitely be considered.¹¹⁹

Retaining the basic tripartite benefit structure (base pension/injury supplement/war supplement) of the updated 1875 system for the enlisted, the society further worried that the promised significant raises in benefit payments would not even materialize. Many disabled soldiers’ war-induced disabilities did not result from the physical injuries specified in the injury supplement rules, and therefore they wouldn’t receive any improved supplements. A totally disabled private might end up receiving much less than what he would have received under the existing system.¹²⁰ Even if the ur-draft introduced more egalitarian benefits for widows and orphans, disregarding the dead soldier’s rank and the dependent children’s sex or legitimacy,¹²¹ it was only a reform in degree and not as generous as advertised.

On 14 September 1918, more than a year after the political parties made their proposals public, the Austrian defense minister, *Feldmarschalleutnant* Karl von Czapp, finally presented the new military welfare bill to the *Reichsrat* for deliberation.¹²² The proposed law did not depart too much from the ur-draft. The “innovations” and “reform” were mostly improvements on the existing systems: raising the base pension for all ranks following the ur-draft’s schedule; adopting the ur-draft’s five-class base pension schedule and making permanent the temporary (since 1915) eligibility threshold of 20 percent loss of earning power; granting enlisted men eligibility for residency in the Invalid Houses; adding new categories for injury supplements to include nonbodily impairments (partially

addressing the society's criticism); and providing benefits for a larger circle of dependents following the *ur-draft's* recommendations.¹²³

The government—or, more precisely, the military administration that drafted the new bill—openly admitted that the September bill would disappoint. A separate “special” Supplementary Pension Law in the future, argued the military administration, would be a better way to address the inadequate income replacement for noncareer soldiers and their dependents.¹²⁴ Two reasons were given for this strikingly incomplete “reform” bill. First, the previous military welfare legislation had been enacted more than forty years earlier; it was time to equalize military personnel's benefits with those for civil servants and fulfill “the state's general obligation to its servants.”¹²⁵ Second, better compensation and benefits were preconditions for “maintaining the Monarchy's war-waging capabilities.”¹²⁶ In the Habsburg military administration's conception, the link between state welfare and war readiness was not about ensuring the size or health of the population, which motivated much prewar and interwar European welfare legislation,¹²⁷ but harkened back to the reasoning of 1874: attracting and retaining career soldiers. The military leadership's main concern was about the professional core, not its conscripted mass. It unabashedly told the Reichsrat that the new military welfare law was primarily intended to restore “the attractiveness of the military profession,” which had been undermined long before the war by unsatisfactory compensation and benefits.¹²⁸

The 1918 bill thus embodied the military leadership's stubbornly anachronistic thinking that seemed to have changed little since 1874. Of the 160 articles, only five were devoted to provisions for noncareer soldiers and their dependents, even though they would constitute the overwhelming majority of future beneficiaries.¹²⁹ The military leadership of 1918 sought to maintain or re-create the disappearing divide between the military and civilian spheres and was reluctant—or downright refused—to see their soldiers explicitly as citizens-in-arms in a militia army.¹³⁰ By insisting on stripping away benefits from recipients if their “immoral conduct [for example, engaging in prostitution] offended public decency” or if they received a jail sentence longer than six months, some military leaders seemed not only to want to continue with the nineteenth-century disciplinary rules, but they also saw in expanding state welfare the potential to rectify the perceived wartime moral collapse.¹³¹ Just like its advocacy for warrior homestead colonies, the military leadership's postwar vision was backward looking.

But the political pressure from the parliamentary parties could not be ignored. The military administration grudgingly acknowledged the “heavy sacrifices . . . the non-professional military personnel made” and that the “totally

inadequate military welfare so obviously on display” had to be addressed.¹³² The “special law” was therefore a compromise. The new military welfare law in the form of the September bill would maintain its focus on the professional core, while the “dirty work” of placating the general population and the political parties would be fulfilled by a separate Supplementary Pension Law. The obligation to compensate for, or restore, the income of dead or disabled called-up men was recognized. But conceptually, the military still refused see the called-up citizens as “their own.”¹³³

From the 1917 proposals to the September bill and the Supplementary Pension Law, two competing conceptions of war welfare entitlement emerged. The political parties agreed that the new law should focus on the mobilized citizen-soldiers and their families. The neglect of professional soldiers in their proposals revealed more than antipathy toward the military establishment. Parliamentarians recognized that the totalizing war had fundamentally transformed the armed forces into a citizens’ militia, and its soldiers as well as their dependents were the constituents they vied to speak for. To party politicians, citizenship had become the basis of war welfare, because it entailed war service for most adult males and some adult females, and therefore it should include social entitlements to be equitably enjoyed by all citizens who served or were affected by that service. The expanding military welfare was a matter of citizens’ rights and duties and should focus on their present circumstances and future needs.

On the other hand, the military leadership held onto the military’s special status within the Monarchy. The September bill represented a conception of entitlement based explicitly on dedicated service rendered to the state within a corporate body. Those who chose to serve the state professionally were the archetypically intended beneficiaries and constituted a separate category. Half-hearted welfare expansion for called-up men was based on a reluctant extension of this “state servant” status to arms-bearing ordinary citizens, not a direct result of the duties and rights associated with citizenship itself. It could be argued that the difference between the military leadership’s and parliamentarians’ conceptions weren’t that different, as both began with obligatory service in the ongoing war. But the September bill showed that there was a limit in extending the “state servant” status. Regular citizens were still considered second-class or supernumerary “state servants,” even if they deserved improved treatment. A condescending “special law” was the firewall to protect the preeminent and separate status of professional soldiers. The rapid succession of events in fall 1918 showed how much the world had outgrown the mentality that underpinned this conception.

Welfare State Expansion as a Political Solution

The mass mobilization of citizens to fight a totalizing war accelerated a strong reciprocating process. The more the state needed its citizen-soldiers, the more it had to expand its social services portfolios. The emergence of the Ministry of Social Welfare, after years of failed attempts and three years of exhausting sacrifice, was a key step in the long-term development of the war-welfare nexus. The ongoing war had made social welfare a new top arena of political action for both state and nonstate actors. With its ambitious welfare buildup, the civil administration aimed to recover some of the ground lost to the military and nonstate actors in the early months of the war by becoming more interventionist in societal needs and problems. The Ministry of Social Welfare's emergence was part of a larger counteroffensive by the civil administration in domestic politics to reclaim initiative and influence.

The ministerial quest for administrative omniscience was also directly linked to the political benefits of welfare state building. The larger aim of the Austrian state's social offensive was to combat the social and economic crisis that gravely undermined its legitimacy, which was already severely shaken by the military's deliberate assault on the "Habsburg constitutional and rule-of-law state."¹³⁴ Building an information regime with strong surveillance potential would make the civil administration better informed to meet the needs of actual and potential state welfare clients, thereby lessening the threat of destabilizing popular discontent.¹³⁵ Given the exhaustive manpower mobilization, the potential client pool for war victim welfare was already the bulk of the fit-for-service adult male population, of which only the military had had good knowledge. The new information regime, if it worked as the ministerial officials hoped, would enable the civil administration to continue monitoring the injured men (and their dependents) for their needs and their behavior on the one hand, while on the other hand creating the necessary information basis from which to vie with the ambitious military for political mastery at the hopefully favorable conclusion of the war.

Creating the more centralized welfare apparatus through a devolved approach had its limits. In the Bohemian Lands, the rival German and Czech nationalists' private welfare agencies were so far "ahead of the state" that Vienna had to rely on them when expanding youth welfare programs.¹³⁶ This prompted the suggestion that the Social Welfare Ministry's new initiatives might have "reinforced the influence and popularity of regional nationalist forces."¹³⁷ But in the war victim welfare field, state officials did not have to contend with such

established competitors; even the private welfare organizations critical of the state were often openly “patriotic” and had no overt political agendas.¹³⁸ In terms of claiming political credit for welfare state expansion, nationalist hijacking was only part of the story.

The increased political significance of war victim welfare can also be seen in the political parties’ competing war victim welfare proposals; welfare was in fact the platform to present different visions for the future. In comparison, the Austrian government seemed to focus narrowly on “organization as solution,” a reform of the apparatus that would deliver welfare provision. The slow formulation of the government’s war welfare bill—what would be delivered—stemmed to a large extent from the continued division of the war victim welfare jurisdiction and specifically from the military’s continued control over soldiers’ provision.

Still, galvanizing popular support was the goal of the new welfare infrastructure. Including client representatives in the local Invalid Office, in particular, signaled a new dimension in the developing Austrian social citizenship. As organized labor’s participation was accepted and institutionalized by the central state in the wartime political economy,¹³⁹ the inclusion of clients in the new official welfare agencies suggested that the pressure of a total war had forced the political elite to rethink its relationship with the ruled. Not only were local civil society contributions more fully integrated, but clients were to become part of the new welfare bureaucracy as well. The Social Welfare Ministry represented a strong centralizing impulse of the Austrian state. But the planned new welfare apparatus revealed that a more participatory administrative culture was contemplated and even practiced, albeit in a limited way, in areas where the central state officials knew their own limitations. By 1918, under the extraordinary expansion of state power, the wartime relationship between the welfare provider-state and citizen-clients had moved, paradoxically, in a more democratic direction.

The Last-Ditch Effort to Save the Monarchy

THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL Welfare formally began operation at the start of 1918. Its Department 7 was tasked with manning the public-facing service desk to provide legal assistance or relevant information to disabled soldiers and their dependents. Seeing more and more visitors having “fallen into desperate situations,” the Department 7 officials felt they had to do something more than dispatching help seekers to the “right” places. After consulting their superiors, a small discretionary fund was made available. On 7 May, the officials began to give small amounts of cash to visitors who were obviously at the end of the road. These cash handouts were modest, usually between 10 and 40 kronen, and granted rather sparingly.¹ The program marked the new ministry’s entry into “retail” welfare services.

Administering piecemeal public charity was out of character for a central agency. That this initiative came from ministerial bureaucrats themselves is even more striking, as the lasting image of Austrian officials has been by turns distant, inscrutable, arrogant, slow, temporizing, tormenting, incompetent, and, ultimately, bureaucratic.² Department 7’s initiative certainly contrasted sharply with the image of Interior Ministry officials who, before 1918, were responsible for coordinating the civilian side of war victim services but often failed to respond to others’ inquiries and proposals.³ A very different sense of purpose and urgency was palpable.

Desperate war victims visiting the ministry for help meant that the old problem of information flow—between authorities, citizens, and service providers—persisted as material shortages worsened. As hundreds of thousands of POWs were returning from Russia and many disabled soldiers were released from medical treatment or job (re)training, information deficiencies aggravated an already serious subsistence crisis and compelled desperate citizens to go to the new welfare ministry for help. The officials there had to directly face not only the material void but also the information one. Though they did not proclaim that “information is the alpha and omega of our work” like the Russian Bolsheviks,⁴

gathering and disseminating information was in fact a central part of their work for both practical and political reasons.

The self-initiated cash handouts exemplified the proactive approach of the Social Welfare officials. Individual cases were opportunities for the new ministry to build both capability and credibility in the bureaucratic jungle. Positioning itself as the advocate for the suffering citizens, the Social Welfare Ministry sought to create a sharper profile as the central agency that worked in the people's interest, especially when it was not coterminous with that of the military. Such actions, moreover, suggested a counteroffensive from the civil administration to (re)claim the welfare field as its natural responsibility. By intervening on behalf of individual military welfare clients, the Social Welfare Ministry worked to demilitarize war welfare, one case at a time.

Emergency cash handouts could not solve the root problems. Similarly, the social offensive ultimately did not save the Monarchy, whose final fate was probably determined, more than anything, by the fortunes of its domineering Imperial German ally.⁵ The short career of the Imperial Social Welfare Ministry sheds light not only on the previously unrecognized last-gasp social offensive but also on an underdiscussed dimension of the Monarchy's end. The last part of this chapter uses the case of procuring civilian clothes for disabled soldiers to show that the divided Imperial Austrian state apparatus, manifested in agency hoarding and rivalries, undermined its own last-ditch effort to survive the war on the home front.

A Ministerial Quest for Authority

Three weeks after issuing the key 5 March 1918 reform directive, officials from the Social Welfare Ministry made another move to further tighten the welfare administrative structure. They ordered all crownland Provincial Commissions for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers to stop writing directly to other ministries or central military offices, effective immediately. This new order was justified with seemingly practical reasons. Since other central agencies had been forwarding crownland requests to the Social Welfare Ministry anyway, the ministerial officials claimed that the common practice of direct communication between crownland agencies and ministerial or military authorities had resulted in too many unnecessary delays.⁶ Furthermore, crownland officials bypassing the Social Welfare Ministry also caused difficulties for the latter in gaining a precise picture of the current situation.⁷ The ministerial officials reminded their crownland counterparts that henceforth they were the exclusive channel through which crownland authorities ought to connect with Vienna.

The newcomer Social Ministry was not automatically treated as the top state welfare authority even by crownland welfare officials. The 27 March directive showed that they did not necessarily see themselves as part of a new welfare bureaucracy reporting exclusively to the new ministry. Acting in the interest of their crownlands and reporting to crownland governors who, in turn, reported to the Interior Ministry, they simply did what they used to do—communicate directly with any central state agencies as they saw fit. Moreover, the superior-subsidary relationship between the Provincial Commissions and the Social Ministry was not expressly defined in the latter's 1917 founding documents. The 27 March order was therefore an attempt to control the information flow for a larger purpose: creating a *de facto* hierarchical and exclusive link between the ministry and the Provincial Commissions and a centralized welfare administration stretching from the dedicated ministry in Vienna to the Invalid Office in each administrative district.⁸

The second justification for the 27 March directive also painted a dim picture of the new ministry's starting point: the blessings of the Reichsrat and the emperor and an ambitious agenda could not make up for lack of support (or even courtesy) from other ministries. As the Constitution Committee of the Reichsrat's Lower House pointed out, the Social Welfare Ministry would be working in areas where "the state administration has not" intervened or claimed jurisdiction, or at least, "not in such a comprehensive way."⁹ Even if the possibility of an uncooperative or downright obstructionist attitude from other agencies is discounted, the new ministry's information hunger was evidence demonstrating that directly organizing welfare for disabled soldiers was novel to the Austrian central civil administration.

To break out of the information darkness, the Social Welfare officials needed precise, up-to-date aggregate statistics about current and potential beneficiaries as well as the resources needed and actually available. Unfortunately, these were not easily forthcoming. The patchwork system for the care of wounded and disabled soldiers led to a scattering of information. Most crucial data about the clients and their movements were either controlled by the military administration or in the hands of local welfare providers. And the Joint War Ministry was not eager to help. The Social Ministry should provide the printed case form as indicated in the 5 March 1918 directive free of charge to all territorial military commands, the Joint War Ministry somewhat indignantly demanded on 20 June, before those commands could pass the information to the relevant Provincial Commission about each soldier who was certified as disabled.¹⁰ The Interior Ministry, which before 1918 handled most disabled soldier-related

issues that fell within the state civil administration's jurisdiction, had transferred many relevant documents to the Social Welfare Ministry.¹¹ Yet it does not seem to have passed on enough actionable, up-to-date information. Making matters worse, no evidence suggests that the military offered up-to-date aggregate statistics to its civilian counterparts, either before or after the Social Ministry's emergence.¹²

Since the latest statistical overview available to the state civil administration was from 1916, officials of the Social Ministry were forced to initiate a new round of tallying, after rounding up available case files, to update the "big picture" themselves.¹³ This first effort generated the baseline statistics for war victim welfare policy making, until precise information for a much smaller Austria became available in 1924. As of 31 March 1918, there were 161,779 certified disabled soldiers of Imperial Austrian citizenship. Some 126,991 of them were in various kinds of medical facilities (94,613 were in hospitals and 32,378 were in convalescence facilities), and 34,788 were on file at their local authorities (i.e., released from military jurisdiction).¹⁴

Most disabled soldiers hailed from Bohemia (47,508; 29.4 percent), Galicia (39,958; 24.7 percent), Moravia (14,937; 9.2 percent), or Styria (9,234; 5.7 percent); and most of them were currently in Bohemia (29,378; 18.2 percent), Vienna (26,971; 16.7 percent), Moravia (18,692; 11.6 percent), or Galicia (13,283; 8.2 percent). The preponderance of Bohemians and Moravians among disabled soldiers gave additional weight to the feedback from crownland officials and military authorities in Bohemia. This also explained the frequent exchanges between Vienna and Prague and between Vienna and the Military Command at Leitmeritz/Litoměřice.¹⁵ An enterprising army captain, Karl Eger, who represented the Military Command on issues concerning disabled soldiers, became a frequent correspondent and favored informant about local experiences and reform recommendations in the process. Senior officials in the Social Ministry even considered hiring him away from the military.¹⁶

Some long-term consequences of the war, which Emperor Karl alluded to in his 1 June 1917 Social Welfare Ministry founding note, could be projected most concretely from disabled soldiers' ages and prewar occupations. The largest age groups were those born in 1890–1894 (27.1 percent), 1885–1889 (22.2 percent), 1880–1884 (16.9 percent), and after 1894 (16.2 percent). Most of the disabled had worked in the agricultural sector before their mobilization (38.1 percent), followed by those who worked in "clothing and cleaning" (5.8 percent), "food processing" (5.5 percent), and "steel and metal production" (4.8 percent). These

were men at the peak of their productivity. With the loss of these men's income, the number of people who were affected—primarily their dependent family members—could be several times the disabled soldiers' number.

Most disabled men had also worked in economic sectors directly related to producing living necessities. Especially in agriculture, the disabled soldiers might not be easily replaced unless the urban population could be persuaded to move to the countryside. If they could not be physically rehabilitated, the partial or total loss of their labor would be compounded by the additional costs of providing them with long-term care. Therefore, even though 161,779 disabled men, and several hundreds of thousands more wounded soldiers who would ultimately be classified as such, constituted only a small proportion of the 4 million men who had been mobilized in the Austrian half of the Monarchy,¹⁷ the fear of losing these men's productive power was justified given their magnified effect on the economy, especially after factoring in the productivity loss due to the hundreds of thousands of war dead.¹⁸ In this context, the persistent interest in warrior homestead colonies as a long-term care solution appeared much more understandable.

The statistical compilation of March 1918 was still not satisfactory. In an internal memorandum from mid-September, the Second (Disabled Soldiers) Division of the Social Ministry expressed its strong desire to directly gather information about military welfare beneficiaries in the upcoming 1920 census. The officials conceded that census data might not be immediately useful. Still, they insisted that including questions in the census about war victim welfare benefits—what kind, what amount, and why eligible—would have its own merits, not the least of which was “to complement and verify” data reported by military or crownland agencies. Results from the census would encompass not only disabled soldiers but also widows and orphans of fallen soldiers, thereby offering more than the mere numbers reported by service providers. The census could also answer an important new question: occupational change as a result of war-related disabilities. The officials wanted to know how the war affected employment patterns and how much job (re)training for disabled soldiers played a role in the labor market.¹⁹

The Second Division had good political reasons to worry about overreliance on the military or crownland agencies to gather data. Several important components of broader war welfare, such as disability pensions, dependent benefits, and the evaluation and certification of disability, were still under direct military control or influence.²⁰ With the military leadership belatedly discovering its interest

in reforming war victim welfare in the second half of 1918,²¹ the Second Division officials assumed that the military was determined to play a leading role in the postwar welfare system and thus would be their main rival even after the war.

The supposed subsidiaries of the Social Ministry, the Provincial Commissions, posed another kind of challenge. Always under the shadow of the volatile crownland politics, nationalist quarrels, unsurprisingly, had already seeped into disabled soldiers' welfare services in Bohemia. In June 1918, the German nationalists loudly criticized the Social Ministry's centralizing reform, accusing it of promoting preferential treatment of (mainly Czech-speaking) disabled soldiers in Prague, procrastination, and repeated refusals to extend support to disabled men residing in "German Bohemia." The German nationalists had been agitating for a separate German-Bohemian welfare authority.²² As crownland institutions were embroiled or even implicated in nationalist struggles, the Social Welfare Ministry was concerned that welfare statistics generated by crownland authorities might become fodder for political squabbles.²³

Having sources of information independent from the military and the Provincial Commissions was, therefore, a way for the Social Welfare officials to consolidate and protect their authority. As the power balance in the postwar field of disabled soldier welfare was still uncertain, data from the census would be an asset enabling the ministry to assert its expertise and thus supremacy in the long run.²⁴

The Social Welfare officials generated some tentative information about their clients early, but it proved more difficult to map the broader welfare landscape and survey major crownland welfare actors. Instructions for compiling a list of welfare providers in their respective jurisdictions were sent to the Provincial Commissions for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers on 3 January 1918. Some results came back in the same month or in February.²⁵ But over the summer of 1918, Second Division chief Gasteiger had to ask the Feldkirch (Vorarlberg) chapter of the Austrian Silver Cross for the necessary information. As late as September, the planned overview of relevant welfare services in Imperial Austria was still not ready.²⁶ The ambition and urgency of the ministerial policies were not matched by the pace of execution in the hungry and chaotic days of 1918.

Information about each (potential) citizen-beneficiary promised to equip the Social Welfare Ministry for both present and future interventions. Unlike the control-centered wartime censorship, the information aspects of the social offensive were intended to win the support of the citizenry through a transformed state that knew them—and could respond to them—much more intimately.²⁷ The censorship system was intended to interdict and suppress information; the

welfare intelligence machine, on the other hand, encouraged its growth and flow. But the unfolding of this ambitious intelligence state required time. Through most of its short existence, the Imperial Austrian Social Welfare Ministry never came close to reaching its goal.

An Advocate for Disabled Citizen-Soldiers

While operating mostly in the dark, the Social Welfare officials faced the difficult task of navigating the conflicting opinions and interests of multiple central agencies. It was even handcuffed, by design, in several of its main areas of interest. The Social Ministry was declared the state authority responsible for “the welfare of the war-damaged, especially follow-up treatment, job (re)training, occupational counseling, job placement, and their settlement” and “the welfare for the surviving dependents to the fallen, . . . especially the welfare of war widows and war orphans.” But in exercising its power in these areas, the ministry had to respect the jurisdiction of the new Ministry of National Health—originally planned to be part of the Social Welfare Ministry, according to Emperor Karl’s 1 June 1917 note—over medical and public health issues. Likewise, the Social Welfare Ministry had to work with the Ministry of Public Works in the technical and vocational instruction that was essential in (re)training disabled men for civilian employment. The Agriculture Ministry was given power over any homestead colony project and was not hesitant about reminding the Social Welfare officials of its stake in war victim issues.²⁸ The military also shielded many philanthropic funds or foundations—built with private donations designated for war victims—from the new ministry.²⁹

Complicating matters further, on the most important issue for the future of war victim welfare—designing and implementing the expected new comprehensive welfare law for disabled soldiers and surviving dependents—the Social Welfare Ministry was only to “cooperate,” not lead the process.³⁰ The military administration was the real center of drafting this new law. Its interests had to be taken into account in any major war victim welfare initiative from the Social Welfare officials.

Even who would be involved in implementing specific war victim policies often remained an open question. The Provincial Commissions for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers were supposed to be the agencies for the civilian side of their implementation. In reality, they were sometimes bypassed. In early 1918, pressure from “patients themselves, their family members, and the Reichsrat” forced the Joint War Ministry to consider releasing certain soldier-patients—who

mostly suffered from tuberculosis and had little prospect of returning to front-line duties—to the care of their families or other dedicated civilian institutions. These men were still soldiers, and in order to devise a procedure for supervising and compensating them (with their regular soldier's pay and the equivalent of their military room and board), the Joint War Ministry needed the civil administration's cooperation. But instead of the Social Ministry, it was the Interior Ministry that was asked by the military to work out the details.³¹

The agreement reached made these "farmed-out" soldier-patients similar to temporary wards of the Interior Ministry, to be monitored by the latter's administrative apparatus. The Provincial Commissions would only be assisting agencies.³² To some extent, asking the Interior Ministry to execute this program was not a random decision; it had long been the country's highest public health authority (until the new Health Ministry's founding), and its political administration controlled the population registration, policing, and surveillance mechanisms. The Social Welfare Ministry's administrative infrastructure, on the other hand, was still mostly on the drawing board. Such seemingly practical arrangements created one more bureaucratic interface with which the Social Welfare officials had to contend. The proliferation of official welfare actors did not stop when the new specialist ministry was created.

Presented as an ambitious response to the legitimacy crisis of the Monarchy, the continuation of the divided jurisdictions showed that the social offensive in practice was nevertheless a product of compromise. Faced with an existential crisis, ministerial officials and leading generals may have agreed that reforms were needed. But each felt that its established bureaucratic turf, resources, and influence should not be challenged. This frame of mind led to the overall strategy of "organization as solution," emphasizing organizational rearrangements and better coordination within the existing institutional (and power) constellation to optimize administrative effectiveness and reach, not drastic or innovative policy about using power and resources—no matter how limited they were—beyond it.

As the Social Welfare officials painstakingly planned the welfare administrative infrastructure in the spring of 1918, a new commission was created on 20 April to coordinate the interested central agencies. The Inter-Ministerial Information Commission for War Invalid, Widow, and Orphan Welfare met once a month in the Joint War Ministry. Composed of representatives from the Joint War Ministry, the Joint Finance Ministry, the Austrian Ministry of Social Welfare, the Austrian Health Ministry, the Austrian Defense Ministry, the Hungarian Defense Ministry, the Hungarian Interior Ministry, and the Hungarian National War Welfare Office, the commission aimed to exchange information

and experiences about specific measures and prepare and evaluate proposals for the future.³³ The commission was a much-needed platform in interministerial communication, but it was not an integrated strategy in war victim welfare. Moreover, the heavy military presence and the fact that the Joint War Ministry convened the commission underlined the strong military interest in continuing leading, if not outright controlling, war welfare matters. The Social Welfare Ministry had to carve out its niche under the military's shadow.

In this complex bureaucratic tug-of-war, the newcomer Social Welfare Ministry consciously assumed the role of the advocate for disabled soldiers and protector of crownland welfare actors. It sought to establish the primacy of care and welfare provision over military priorities by intervening in concrete cases and using these cases to stake its claims on the institutional and policy level.

Who would pay for the expenses of treating, rehabilitating, and training seriously wounded and disabled soldiers? According to the 1915 division of labor agreement, the military was responsible for each seriously wounded soldier's treatment and (re)training for up to a year.³⁴ This principle was often exploited by the military, alleged the Social Welfare Ministry in a March 1918 complaint to the Austrian minister-president. Of the 90,000 "war-damaged" soldiers who received treatment or training each month, the greatest majority would be transferred to civilian jurisdiction at some point because their chances of returning to military duties were very low. But because the manpower-hungry military was reluctant to declare any wounded soldier disabled, these men often still lived in military barracks beyond the one-year mark while receiving treatment and training organized by civilian welfare agencies.³⁵ The longer the military delayed the decision, the more civilian authorities had to reimburse the military. This led to protests from the Provincial Commissions, which could no longer afford the expenses. With no solution in sight, the Social Welfare Ministry stepped in on 25 May 1918. It promised to pay for disabled soldiers' meals or rations taken in military establishments while undergoing civilian institution-managed therapeutic sessions or job training.³⁶ The military may have won this particular round of the contest, but the reasoning behind the ministry's decision to cover the Provincial Commissions' expenses should not be underestimated. Assuming the crownlands' financial responsibility was a way to establish the new ministry's position as both the superior and the benefactor of the preexisting Provincial Commissions.

Similar interagency disputes over financial responsibility gave the new ministry many opportunities to stake its leadership claim in the contested welfare field. In March 1918, a severe coal shortage forced the closing of a Bohemian Red Cross hospital where two disabled soldiers, who were enrolled in a weaving

course, received room and board. Their 3 kronen per diem was too low to cover the expenses elsewhere. The Bohemian welfare officials asked the Ministry of Public Works, which was responsible for the overall supervision of job (re)training, to provide an additional stipend so the two men could finish the course. The Ministry of Public Works refused, arguing that within the one-year window it should be the military's responsibility. The Bohemians then asked the Social Welfare Ministry to intervene. The Social Welfare officials gladly took up the case with their Public Works counterparts.³⁷

The stability of a disabled man's status was another arena where the new ministry publicly positioned itself as the defender of the people against the mercurial military. By 1917, the Habsburg Army was at its wits' end trying to find warm bodies to make up for the mounting casualties. Already "8.42 of the 9.12 million men found fit for military service had been conscripted," with the rest working in war industries. With 4 million draftees lost to death, captivity, or severe injury, there were very few military-age men left to call up beyond those already classified as unfit for service.³⁸ The military authorities intensified their combing of the home front to identify possible candidates.³⁹ Disabled men who had returned to civilian life were often easy targets.

The military's strategy for filling its depleted ranks with reclassified and recalled disabled men upset the officials in charge of job placement services. In a 15 January 1918 overview of its 1917 operation, the Karlsbad/Karlovy Vary (Bohemia) District Office of the War Invalid Job Placement Service, which was also the district's general labor exchange, reported that it had only succeeded in finding employment for 57 disabled soldiers out of 184 applicants (from a pool of 133 available positions), as opposed to 6,387 successful cases out of 7,917 applicants (from a pool of 9,843 available positions) for general, nondisabled job seekers during the same period. The Karlsbad/Karlovy Vary officials attributed this drastic difference in success rates to the military's repeated examinations of discharged disabled men to see if they could be called up again: "Many employers do not hire war invalids, because they fear that they will soon lose these men to conscription."⁴⁰

Similar cases of disruptive military practices were numerous. Karl Koch had both of his lungs badly damaged in fighting and was only able to return to his old civilian job after a prolonged and difficult recovery. Certified as disabled, he was nonetheless reexamined by the military and declared fit to serve in noncombatant roles. Koch was then sent to District Command 39 and worked as a clerk in a "scribe company." Koch's case made it all the way up to the Social Welfare Ministry, where the officials chose his experience as the main exhibit in a general complaint lodged against the Joint War Ministry. In the welfare officials' view,

the military's relentless attempt to reclassify certified disabled men torpedoed welfare agencies' efforts and greatly undermined the disabled men's chances of landing and keeping jobs.⁴¹

The military's insatiable search for manpower also jeopardized rehabilitative welfare programs. In wartime Bohemia, licenses to operate cinemas were issued or extended on the condition that a portion of their profits be given to the Bohemian equivalent of the Provincial Commissions to fund its clothing provision, rent subsidies, business-founding grants, and other material assistance to disabled soldiers. This program was so successful that one Prague cinema operator, Rudolf Fries, contributed 25,000 kronen to the crownland agency in one year.⁴² But in May 1918, the cinema's projector operator, infantryman Wladimir Wokoun, whose military "day job" was to work in the electrotechnical firm Otto Glückauf in Prague, received notification that he would be reassigned elsewhere. Not only would the cinema lose its projector operator, the decision also threatened the official training course on projector operation that Wokoun led in Rudolf Fries's theater. The Bohemian agency pleaded the case with the Social Welfare Ministry.⁴³ The Social Welfare officials intervened successfully on behalf of the Bohemians and the Joint War Ministry decided on 23 July that Wokoun could remain in the same Prague unit and be allowed to continue teaching the training course.⁴⁴ The Wokoun case was a rare instance of the military softening its stance.

Reexamining certified disabled men for possible reclassification was not enough. Field army commanders clamored for a wholesale recalling or rehiring of permanently disabled men who allegedly could replace noncombatant military personnel, with the latter then available for frontline duties. This could also spare the disabled man the difficulty of finding regular employment in a deteriorating labor market. The field generals' demand for such a drastic measure became so vociferous that the Chief of Replacement Services, Colonel General Samuel Hazai,⁴⁵ declared on 22 February 1918 that he saw no good reasons for a mass recall of certified disabled men. Employing them in war-related industries and institutions would be irresponsible, he reasoned, because after the war these men would have to be laid off to make way for "healthy" veterans. They should have every opportunity to find more stable employment in the civilian sector before the end of the war. General Hazai added that many disabled men were not really fit for any military function and "some of them did not want to work at all."⁴⁶

In less than five months, however, the military leadership reversed its position. The Habsburg armed forces were hemorrhaging men even without a major campaign because hunger, miserable material conditions, low morale, and political agitation led to a series of riots, mutinies, and desertions. The need for soldiers to

suppress mutinies and round up deserters—estimated in the hundreds of thousands—in the rear echelon areas took much manpower away from the front.⁴⁷ Then another 142,550 men were lost in the disastrous Piave campaign in less than two weeks in June.⁴⁸ The flood of bad news overran any long-term consideration for disabled men's employment prospects that General Hazai had expressed.

In light of these developments, the Joint War Ministry suddenly developed an interest in finding employment for disabled veterans. If they were employed, more previously exempt men would be made redundant and thus available for frontline service. Using a Graz report on disabled veterans' unemployment, the Joint War Ministry criticized other central agencies for not working hard to hire disabled men. It was an "extraordinary social danger" for the labor market to continue ignoring them; state authorities should set an example by facilitating and actually hiring the war-disabled men.⁴⁹ Lamenting the "decreasing help and support from private and state-owned businesses" for disabled soldiers, the Joint War Ministry wanted the Social Welfare Ministry to pressure state-controlled enterprises to hire more disabled veterans.⁵⁰

The Joint War Ministry even had preferred job assignments for disabled men. In a 2 May 1918 inspection report, military officials had only good words for the Salzburg War Invalid Cooperative Society, which "produced crates at a cost 80 percent cheaper than" its Viennese counterpart. Renting a workshop from a called-up carpenter and already planning to expand, the cooperative employed fifty disabled men, 90 percent of them not yet formally certified (i.e., still soldiers), and paid them on average 1 krone per hour. Most of them earned around 70 kronen per week producing munitions crates. The net profit was to be shared by all the disabled men who worked there.⁵¹ The report strongly recommended the expansion of the Salzburg model in other cities. Indeed, employing not yet certified disabled men in this kind of cooperative setting was the best possible scenario for the military: not only procuring supplies at a much lower price, but also retaining full control over the great majority of these worker-soldiers. In the name of taking care of the disabled, these men's productive power freed up "healthy" workers for the front.

The Joint War Ministry formally proposed calling up previously exempt employees in war industries and government offices and replacing them with discharged war-disabled men during the 2 July 1918 meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Information Commission. According to the Social Welfare Ministry representative at the meeting, "it was clear in the course of the discussion that the military administration's and the Social Welfare Ministry's standpoints do not converge—we should not assume a priori that the situation could have turned out

differently. . . . The military's sole purpose is obviously to find as many previously exempt men as possible for military service, whereas the Social Welfare Ministry has to make sure that the war invalids who will substitute for the previously exempt men find genuine long-term employment in the industries, rather than merely temporary jobs." Sensing that there was no immediate means to stop the military disguising its manpower grab as a welfare measure, the Social Welfare representative used an old bureaucratic tactic: he had to consult the Provincial Commissions before presenting his ministry's view. To the Social Welfare officials' relief, the Joint War Ministry representative, General von Zednik, promised that it would first implement the policy only for outside vendors doing business with the military and only after the Social Welfare Ministry agreed to it.⁵²

If the Social Welfare officials could not stop the military's scheming, they at least found some success in advocating for and defending war victims' entitlement to welfare benefits from the military. Two months after the introduction of the March 1918 special subsidy for dependents of called-up soldiers, many disabled men and survivors of fallen soldiers had not received any payment. The law was a highly symbolic response to the massive strike wave across Austria in January 1918, and it was not surprising that the officials were dismayed by the delay, if not outright inaction, in its implementation.⁵³ On 31 May, the Social Welfare Ministry ordered all Provincial Commissions to follow the guidelines that were published recently in its official bulletin.⁵⁴

Unfortunately, the implementation of the special state subsidy was even slower than the officials thought in May. A disabled soldier's mother, Marie Pirger, wrote in July to both Emperor Karl and the brand-new Invalid Office in Vienna asking for help.⁵⁵ Frau Pirger desperately needed a permanent job to support herself and her disabled son. Furthermore, there had been no word about her special state subsidy application, filed two months earlier. The Invalid Office passed her petition onto the Social Welfare Ministry and reported that it had written to officials in the 17th District, where the Pirgers resided, to urge an expedited processing.⁵⁶ Obviously, she was a deserving applicant left waiting too long and, in the local welfare officials' view, needed the central agency's attention.⁵⁷

Around the time that the Social Welfare Ministry ordered the Provincial Commissions to work on the special state subsidy immediately, the Silesian Provincial Commission asked the Social Welfare Ministry to pressure the military authorities to pay the amended basic 1875 military pension to eligible men. Richard Hirsch, a veteran who was certified as having lost all earning ability (100 percent disabled) on 23 January 1918, had not received any of his military pension. Hirsch wrote to the pension office of the Second Corps to complain,

but nothing happened. His case was not an anomaly. There were more and more nonpayment cases, and military authorities often used the same excuse: “unaware of the fact that the beneficiary had moved.” In the Hirsch case, however, the Silesian officials said the beneficiary’s alleged change of address was definitely “not well-founded.” The Social Welfare Ministry informed the Silesians on 4 July that it would intervene on Hirsch’s behalf.⁵⁸

Apparently some military officials had had enough of complaints like these from the Social Welfare Ministry or Reichsrat deputies. Using an earlier inquiry it had received, the Austrian Defense Ministry on 10 July vehemently denied that the military was responsible for missing payments. The Defense Ministry’s internal investigation determined that the most common reason for nonpayment was that the beneficiaries’ addresses were incorrect and thus the monthly installments were returned by the post office as “recipient unknown.” Either the disabled men failed to give exact addresses during the superarbitration process, or they moved after being certified, argued the Defense Ministry. Furthermore, some disabled men allegedly did not give sufficiently precise information, so pension offices had difficulty deciding who the true beneficiary was when several men shared the same name. The Defense Ministry concluded that “in almost all cases” the military was not at fault and warned that, if disabled men did not follow the instructions in the brochure given to them, problems would persist. The Defense Ministry defiantly added that “considering the huge volume of military welfare payment cases, these problems were isolated cases.”⁵⁹ Welfare officials, they complained, were making a fuss about things they did not understand.

By intervening repeatedly on behalf of disabled men, the military implied, welfare officials were encouraging the supposedly erroneous perception among disabled men that pension offices tended to delay payment. Disabled veteran Peter Dorotiak had not received his military welfare payment since August 1917. His 18 May 1918 complaint caught the attention of military officials. Instead of conceding that something was not in order, the Joint War Ministry officials decided to use Dorotiak’s case to vent their frustration at the disabled soldiers and their ministerial advocates. Again in July 1918, the Joint War Ministry officials told the Social Welfare Ministry that military authorities had done nothing wrong in the nonpayment cases. If beneficiaries did not immediately report address changes, they had no one but themselves to blame.⁶⁰

The Social Welfare officials did not believe the military’s explanation of the missing payments. The Richard Hirsch case suggested that crownland welfare officials had by now seen the excuse often enough to anticipate this “change of address” response. The military’s criticism leveled against the disabled man and the

welfare bureaucracy in July, in fact, prompted the Social Welfare officials to teach crownland welfare officials ways to preempt the military's standard refrain. Relaying the Joint War Ministry's irate message about the Dorotiak case to Provincial Commissions on 31 July, the Social Welfare officials instructed the latter to inform all disabled men of the Joint War Ministry's explanation. Should anyone plan to complain about nonpayment, the Social Welfare officials recommended, they should remember to "make it clear that no address change was made!"⁶¹

The summer 1918 correspondence over missing payments showed that the Social Ministry's aspiration to be the lead advocate for disabled men was increasingly acknowledged through bureaucratic routines. Nonpayment complaints were not necessarily routed through or endorsed by Social Welfare officials before reaching military authorities. But the irritated military's attempts to stop the allegedly unjustified complaints were directed at the Social Welfare Ministry. Because of that, the military created an occasion for Social Welfare officials to orchestrate the preemptive tactic against the military's standard excuse and strengthen their leadership claim in the welfare field. When on 16 July, Reichsrat Deputy Dr. Freißler inquired about the nonpayment problem, which was after all the military's jurisdiction, he directed his questions to the Social Welfare Ministry. The lead war victim welfare official, Otto Gasteiger, then wrote on 10 August to warn the Defense Ministry about the issue's political implications.⁶² The misery of individual disabled men and the stubborn complacency of the military generated a feedback loop on which the Social Welfare officials built their reputation as the official defender of citizen-soldiers against the military.

This political positioning led to occasional open subversion of the military's authority. Max Klampfer was drafted into the 5th Dragoon Regiment in 1911. On 26 February 1915, while stationed in Ropa, Galicia, one of his hands was severely injured in a meat-grinding accident. He was evacuated to Vienna for treatment and then sent back to Marburg/Maribor (Lower Styria) in April. Assigned to train new recruits there, he tried to commit suicide and failed, but lost his eyesight on 20 June 1916. As a result of his self-inflicted injuries, Klampfer was released from military service on 17 February 1917 but without entitlement to military welfare benefits. He was married on 18 November 1917 to a factory worker, Maria Duvay. Local welfare officials suspected that Duvay married Klampfer because she thought he was war blinded and entitled to welfare payments.⁶³ The new Mrs. Klampfer was reportedly very disappointed when she found out that her husband was not eligible for benefits. Since she did not earn enough as a seasonal stoker in the main post office of Graz to support both of

them, Klampfer, wearing his Karl Troop Cross, a medal marking the bearer's "real"/deserving warrior status, panhandled on Graz streets.⁶⁴

The Styrian Provincial Commission for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers was very nervous at the public spectacle of a medal-wearing veteran, who appeared to have been blinded during his service to the fatherland, begging on the main streets of the crownland capital. In the Styrian Commission's own words, the scene would "undermine the [commission's] public image." It requested that the Social Welfare Ministry secure long-term public assistance from the Joint War Ministry for "this truly needy person"—that is, to reclassify Klampfer as war disabled.⁶⁵ The Styrian officials were conscious of what was at stake: Klampfer's panhandling would become a public indictment of the incompetence or, worse, heartlessness of state authorities.

In the Social Welfare officials' view, the military had made a mistake that should be remedied. "Considering the fact that Klampfer severely injured his hand while fulfilling his military duties," he "should be treated as a war-damaged person and receive [the Styrian Provincial Commission's] care and services following the existing guidelines and rules."⁶⁶ The ministerial officials ignored the military's legally binding decision. Instead of the contestable (and disqualifying) self-inflicted blindness, they focused on the indisputable meat-grinding accident and reached their own eligibility decision. Civilian welfare officials had no power to make or change superarbitration rulings, but in this case the ministerial instructions to the crownland officials were a *de facto* overrule of the military decision in the area where civilian officials had jurisdiction. When the welfare bureaucracy's standing in the eyes of citizens and, by implication, that of the social offensive and the legitimacy of the Habsburg state were at stake, the ministerial advocate was willing to enter the murky world of semilegality or even outright illegality.

The willingness among welfare officials to do more than the rules prescribed had been clearly detectable since 1917. In April of that year, the Tyrolean Provincial Commission asked the Interior Ministry to fund the expansion of a supplemental cash subsidy program for disabled men who were superarbitrated and earning wages from employment. It was the accepted practice for their employers to pay them only prorated wages according to their work ability. Unfortunately, the military disability benefits were often "not in the remotest way sufficient" to make up the difference. Tyrolean officials consequently felt "compelled to support [these disabled men] with an annual subsidy if [they were] to protect [their] credibility," because the reduced wage "has depressed disabled men's willingness to seek gainful employment," and the lack of proper remedial measures would become "material for agitation of a serious nature."⁶⁷

These were not empty words, as Tyrolean disabled soldiers had more openly expressed their frustrations since at least 1917. “When the requests for support were referred to other authorities, they often took it as an affront, responded with crude language, and emphasized that their service to the fatherland” was repaid with “insufficient allowance . . . [impossible] to make do with so little income under the current circumstances.”⁶⁸ With the February Revolution in Russia and feared nationalist agitation in mind, welfare officials were very sensitive to any political implications of their work. They explicitly used the political concerns to justify new, bottom-up initiatives. The Klampfer decision in 1918 was part of a larger pattern of welfare officials’ bending (or seeking to change) rules, competing for resources, and fighting bureaucratic turf conflicts in the name of political necessity.

Over the summer of 1918, Social Welfare officials set their sights on a fundamental part of the military’s influence in overall welfare provision: the Military Invalid Superarbitration Commission. The commission determined the degree of each wounded soldier’s loss of earning ability in his prior civilian occupation and thus his entitlement to and the amount and/or kind of welfare benefits. The Social Welfare officials wanted to use the argument that “the issue of the loss of civilian earning ability has no military consequence, but belongs solely to the sphere of civilian economic life” in order to break the military’s monopoly over this pivotal link in state welfare provision.⁶⁹ Receiving support in the 3 September 1918 meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Information Commission for War Invalid, Widow, and Orphan Welfare, the Social Welfare Ministry proposed to reform the superarbitration process by allowing the chronically ill (mostly suffering tuberculosis or heart diseases) or disabled soldier to appeal the military panel’s decision about his fitness to serve or his degree of disability and by adding civilian experts, both to examine the man in question and in the panel’s decision making.

The representatives from the Joint War Ministry immediately objected. They superciliously claimed that a formal right of appeal was simply unacceptable, as redress could be sought through the Joint War Ministry. And they insisted that any civilian expert on the Superarbitration Commission could only be in a nonvoting capacity. More importantly, if the physical examination, on which the Superarbitration Commission’s decision was based, was to be conducted by civilian doctors, the military demanded that it must be done in the presence of the full Superarbitration Commission, even if that meant a much longer process.⁷⁰

The Social Welfare officials were determined to hold their ground. They were confident that the military’s demand to limit the influence of civilian experts

was a “direct contradiction of what the broader public desires.”⁷¹ Indeed, at the beginning of October 1918, the Czech Socialists in the Reichsrat made almost the exact same demands to add civilians—experts and physicians—to Super-arbitration Commissions and to establish an appeal mechanism for disabled soldiers.⁷² The Social Welfare Ministry could reasonably expect support for its proposal from other Reichsrat factions as well.

A major confrontation between the military and the Social Welfare Ministry over the superarbitration mechanism and, more generally, the character of war welfare—whether citizen and society oriented or serving military exigencies—loomed. However, the Bohemian Lands declared independence, and the Habsburg Monarchy effectively collapsed before the next monthly Inter-Ministerial Information Commission could take place. The demilitarization of war welfare would not happen under the watch of an *Imperial* Austrian Social Welfare Ministry.

The Emperor Had No Clothes

When Austrian male citizens reported for active duty between 1914 and 1918, they had to surrender the civilian clothes they wore to local reserve units. It was understood that once they were discharged from military service, they were to receive what they had deposited with the reserve unit. The vicissitudes of the war made this rule difficult to follow, as an official report from September 1918 stated that “a loss of around one million pieces of clothes is confirmed.”⁷³ The men whose clothes could not be found would be entitled to fair compensation. But largely due to the military administrators’ hardline attitude, many disabled soldiers did not receive adequate replacements or even compensation.⁷⁴ These cases revealed how the Austrian authorities, in the midst of a social offensive, ultimately failed to respond to the deepening crisis.

On 1 February 1918, the Austrian Social Democrats’ *Arbeiter-Zeitung* published an exposé of the ill-treatment of twenty-two-year-old Corporal Rechter. A landowner’s son from Bukovina, he volunteered to serve with the Ukrainian Legion in April 1915. In July of the same year, he was injured on the front and lost most functions in his right arm. As a result, he was superarbitrated and sent home. In January 1916 he was reexamined, declared fit for “light duties,” and recalled to serve as an attendant in a Cracow hospital. In March, Rechter’s status was upgraded to “fit for guard duties”; he was sent to a military school, which further upgraded him to “fit for front service.” After training, he was reassigned to a mountain regiment, sent to the Italian front in November 1916, promoted

to corporal, and suffered a severe nervous disorder fighting in the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo (August-September 1917). Receiving treatment for incessant bodily trembling and tuberculosis in Cracow, Rechter recovered somewhat. With the support of a leading physician and her colleagues in the hospital, he was granted a superarbitration hearing on 25 January 1918. The panel decided that he should be discharged from military service. At this point, he had lost both of his parents. His father had died in fighting in June 1916, and his mother had—according to the newspaper—been “kidnapped” to Kiev by the invading Russians, where she died in an epidemic hospital. The family’s estate was also devastated.⁷⁵

Rechter’s second superarbitration, unfortunately, was only the beginning of more ordeals. On 27 January, his Cracow unit sent him to Vienna, because he asked for civilian clothes and it was not possible to retrieve his own clothes deposited in Czernowitz. Military officials told him that the War Invalid Job Placement Service in Vienna would be able to help. But the Job Placement officials told Rechter that he was not a Lower Austrian resident and therefore was not eligible for their services. He was then referred to a refugee service center but was told that the center’s contract with the Interior Ministry did not allow it to serve him, either. A visit to the Joint War Ministry’s War Welfare Office did not yield an encouraging result; Rechter was told to wait two more weeks, when the clothes he needed would be sent from Cracow. Given 10 kronen and a rations card, he was sent to the War Welfare Office’s Schwarzenbergstrasse branch. Again the trip came up empty—the branch demanded an authorization from the War Invalid Job Placement Service in order to release its stock of civilian clothes. Being sent from one agency to another, Rechter was stuck in Vienna, with no place to stay nor enough money to support himself.⁷⁶

Scandalized by the “brainless” handling of Rechter’s case, the officials at the Ministry of Social Welfare investigated the clothing situation for disabled soldiers and whether the newspaper’s account was credible. The Central Welfare Office for War Refugees reported back on 15 February 1918; clothing items were issued to discharged soldiers who qualified for state refugee service—that is, those who hailed from the declared war zones—and passed a means test. Disabled men leaving the military but not qualified for such provision would be referred to the regular Clothing Office. On the same day, the Interior Ministry added that refugee service agencies—under its jurisdiction—were never supposed to provide clothes to discharged soldiers if the latter did not originate from one of the war zones. But the military and other civilian authorities continued to send unqualified veterans to refugee service centers. The Interior Ministry, in fact, demanded the Social Welfare Ministry clothe those discharged

men who were in urgent need of civilian garments.⁷⁷ The Lower Austrian government's Clothing Office, on the other hand, adamantly pointed the finger at the military.⁷⁸ No civilian authorities denied there were problems. But no agency stepped up to take the responsibility or volunteer to fill the gap.

The Social Welfare Ministry's investigation then turned to the military. On 28 February, it claimed to have learned, during its short existence, about a series of cases where disabled men received neither their own deposited clothes nor substitutes from their district reserve units when discharged.⁷⁹ The Defense Ministry responded in mid-April by sending the Social Welfare Ministry copies of its previously unknown and unshared mid-March 1918 rules governing the provision of civilian clothes to discharged disabled soldiers. The Defense Ministry's preferred solution continued to be returning deposited civilian clothes to their owners. The burden of arranging the return, however, ought to fall on the medical institutions where disabled men stayed for follow-up treatment before their discharge. If a soldier's clothes were lost or in unusable condition, his reserve unit should provide him with a military uniform properly converted for civilian use and used shoes; or the disabled soldier could request monetary compensation. It is worth noting that this set of clothes-provisioning rules also regulated the procedure by which previously distributed civilian clothes or converted uniforms would be retrieved.⁸⁰ The rules reflected the military's defensive attitude; they implied that many who could not find their own clothes or proper replacements had no one but themselves to blame or that the men preferred military uniforms as a more effective panhandling prop.⁸¹

These rules were a surprise. On 6 May the Social Welfare Ministry alerted all Provincial Commissions for the Care of Returning Soldiers of their existence.⁸² The Social Welfare officials may not have been able to get to the bottom of the alleged abuses, but they at least could discover the precious information about how things were supposed to work. It was very likely that their inquiry forced the military administration to clearly spell out the rules for the first time,⁸³ for the Joint War Ministry issued this same set of mid-March 1918 rules, titled "Clothing the War Invalids," to all regional military commands and disabled soldier welfare agencies in Austria, Hungary, and Bosnia-Herzegovina only on 29 May, perhaps for the first time. The Joint War Ministry emphasized that issuing clothing converted from used military uniforms and used shoes or, when even these were in short supply, issuing uniforms stripped of all military markings, should be done as a lease to the recipients, so that they had something to wear on their way home. Unless their deposited clothes proved to have been lost or decayed beyond repair on the military's watch, all the issued substitute

clothing should be returned to the military's inventory in due time. Only the absolutely destitute, with local authorities' documented support, could keep the clothing for good as a last resort.⁸⁴

Echoing the nineteenth-century antippanhandling intention, the Joint War Ministry urged the Social Welfare Ministry to come up with a "stricter law against begging" because of reports of "increasing vagrancy." One of the Social Welfare officials must have been flabbergasted to read this, since he jotted a big question mark next to the request.⁸⁵ This obsessive drive to control even already converted/altere uniforms testifies to both the severity of the material shortage and the military administration's tendency to hoard material resources. This had serious consequences for the social offensive.

On 2 May 1918, the Salzburg Provincial Commission's president reported to the Social Welfare Ministry that "day by day the number of war invalids and other war-damaged persons who come to the Commission to ask for clothes, underwear, and shoes continues to rise." The majority of them were men who had been certified as disabled and discharged recently, but whose deposited civilian clothes were lost. "The substitute uniforms [they received] according to the applicable military rules are in absolutely horrible condition."⁸⁶ He added in another report two days later, "The war invalids were afraid to go out in these clothes, let alone making their appearance presentable in order to find jobs."⁸⁷

The Salzburg officials felt that they could not "just sit back and ignore these cases" because they were the military administration's responsibility. There were more than 1,200 disabled soldiers with legal domicile in Salzburg as of 31 March 1918.⁸⁸ All of them would soon come under the Salzburg Commission's watch. However, the commission had neither clothing stocks nor enough money to meet these people's "absolutely urgent" needs: new suits cost 300 kronen apiece and used ones 150 kronen; the total cost of any purchase would just be prohibitive. Worse still, underwear and shoes were no longer available for purchase locally.⁸⁹

Desperately trying to find something for the disabled men who had nothing but rags on their backs, the Salzburg officials' first idea was to give some disabled men youth-sized clothes. Recalling that the War Assistance Bureau of the Social Welfare Ministry had announced the availability of 7,000 youth-sized, mixed cotton-paper suits for distribution at cost on 18 March, the Salzburg Commission president asked the Social Welfare Ministry to advance 6,000 to 8,000 kronen so that his commission could obtain at least 60 to 100 youth suits and some underwear and headwear items.⁹⁰ The second idea was to take needed clothing items from the Regional Refugee Garment Depot (serving war refugees in Salzburg and Tyrol). Since the refugee service in the region had been winding down,

and such quantities of ready supplies were rare, it would be the best solution. He asked the Social Welfare Ministry to persuade the Interior Ministry, which controlled the depot, to release 500 suits, 400 coats, 800 shirts, 1,000 pairs of socks, 400 caps, and 500 pairs of shoes to the commission.⁹¹

Neither of these attempts yielded much, in spite of the Social Welfare Ministry's strong endorsement. The Salzburg Youth Welfare Agency refused to relinquish its suit stocks, saying that by regulation they could only be used for youth welfare purposes. Then the Interior Ministry denied the request to share the stocks of the Salzburg Refugee Garment Depot. Though the depot was being dissolved, the Interior Ministry insisted that it was not in a position to give out any clothing for nonrefugee service uses before all current programs were discontinued.⁹²

Recognizing the Salzburgers' search was fruitless, on 25 June the Social Welfare Ministry turned to the Assistance Campaign of the War Welfare Office, a private donations-funded charity controlled by the Joint War Ministry.⁹³ They thought the fact that the Social Welfare minister being the board chairman of the Assistance Campaign might help.⁹⁴ Since the Assistance Campaign had at least 2,000 pairs of shoes in stock, the Social Welfare Ministry requested at least 200 pairs,⁹⁵ as well as usable underwear and other clothing items, to be sent to Salzburg, with the Salzburg Commission paying the cost. The Social Welfare officials also made their displeasure known to their Interior Ministry colleagues by extolling the more collaborative Imperial German example.⁹⁶

The difficulties that Salzburg's disabled soldiers and welfare officials encountered were not isolated. A report from the Carinthian Provincial Commission around the same time reads like an exact copy of the Salzburg saga. As early as 15 April 1918, the Carinthian Commission asked the Social Welfare Ministry to help secure clothing supplies from the Joint War Ministry. On 5 June, the Carinthians followed with the observation that "what the war invalid received from the reserve units are bad and unfit clothes. The compensation for the missing deposited civilian clothes is set so low that the war invalid cannot buy anything at the current market price." The lack of civilian clothes "has unleashed significant discontent and bitterness among destitute and poor war invalids."⁹⁷

Disturbingly, the military administration was indeed enforcing its ruthless clothes-retrieval policy. Those "superarbitrated disabled soldiers who are still in the follow-up treatment and job (re)training stages had to relinquish their military uniforms and wear their own civilian clothes in the hospital or working in the training workshop" before being formally discharged. Although technically still under military jurisdiction, the military had effectively disowned

these soldiers symbolically and materially by taking away their uniforms without providing anything for them to wear. The commission had tried, unsuccessfully, to acquire better-quality used military uniforms for those in job (re)training; the military administration just repeated that there was no such surplus available. The frustrated Carinthian officials concluded that “the Joint War Ministry seems to want to do nothing about [the clothing problem].”⁹⁸

Just like their Salzburg counterparts, the Carinthians wanted the Social Welfare Ministry to directly negotiate with the war economy authorities who controlled the distribution of fabrics, leather, and shoemaking materials, so as to circumvent the unhelpful military. On 1 August the Social Welfare Ministry used the Carinthian appeal to pressure the Assistance Campaign and reminded the latter that it was still waiting for the Assistance Campaign’s response to the original 25 June request. The Carinthian appeal was also enlisted in another bid to persuade the Interior Ministry to open the Salzburg Garment Depot.⁹⁹

The Social Welfare officials’ frustration could hardly be contained as this point. In a 1 August memorandum to the General Commissariat for War and Transitional Economy, they reminded the latter that the Social Welfare Ministry was behind the Assistance Campaign in the latter’s request for supplies, for those would be used to clothe provincial disabled veterans. Then the Social Welfare officials wrote, “~~procurring civilian clothes for superarbitrated and destitute war invalids, in the aftermath of repeated failures of the responsible military authorities,~~ has now become an utmost urgent (matter) that cannot suffer (tolerate) any (more) delay.”¹⁰⁰ In a rare moment of candor that was later thinly disguised, the Social Welfare officials put the blame squarely on the hoarding military.

The flurry of requests, appeals, and lobbying seemed to finally result in some good news. On 8 August, the Assistance Campaign declared that they could provide a fraction of what was needed in Salzburg: 100 pairs of leather shoes with wooden soles. This was only half of the 200 pairs the ministry had requested back on 25 June, which in turn was a major reduction from the original Salzburg request of 500 pairs. The Assistance Campaign explained that, because of serious material shortages, it received almost no twine to make suits, and its own request for fabric supplies was referred from one agency to another, to no avail. “Unfortunately we have had to leave our invalids without civilian clothes.” The campaign even asked the Social Welfare Ministry to help it obtain more materials.¹⁰¹

Successful or not, the Social Welfare Ministry’s *modus operandi* in the days of severe material shortages was to engineer complicated, multiagency solutions. Before the intervention on behalf of the Salzbergers, the Social Welfare officials had asked the Commerce Ministry on 20 June to provide raw materials and

clothes to the Assistance Campaign, which, with the backing of with the Emperor and King Karl Welfare Fund (Kaiser u. König Karl Fürsorgefonds), was hoping at the time to replicate its Viennese clothes-distribution operation in the province.¹⁰² It also lobbied the War Economy Commissariat on the campaign's behalf. The Assistance Campaign then reciprocated on 8 August by promising to partially fulfill the ministry's 25 June request on behalf of the Salzburgers. In this chain of requests and responses, the Assistance Campaign benefited from better access to precious materials from the war economy authorities, thanks to the Social Welfare officials' backing. Then it repaid the latter by addressing the call for help from the Social Welfare Ministry's provincial protégés.

But all these complex dealings produced little immediate result for needy disabled men. There was a big gap between the intention of providing fabric to a charity organization and distributing wearable clothes to discharged disabled soldiers in the crownlands. Upstream promises—like the one from the Commerce Ministry on 19 August that 2,000 meters of wool fabric, 25,000 meters of half-paper fabric, and a similar amount of paper fabric would be allocated to the Assistance Campaign—were simply too far away. It was no surprise that the Salzburg Commission made another urgent request on 27 August. Anticipating the cold days not far ahead, it emphasized that the real help would be proper clothes and shoes ready to wear. So far, after great effort, the commission could only procure paper-based fabrics that were not warm enough for mountainous Salzburg.¹⁰³

Winter was an imminent threat. Procuring proper clothes became a matter of life or death, not merely a problem of making discharged disabled soldiers employable. On 5 September, the Salzburg Commission again urged immediate delivery of promised materials before winter's arrival. If ready-made clothes were not available, the commission could organize disabled veterans who were trained tailors whenever raw material was available. All they needed from the Commerce Ministry was 500 meters of appropriate fabrics to make 100 shirts and 100 pairs of underpants, as well as enough cotton supplies to make 100 pairs of winter socks.¹⁰⁴

However, the most promising prospective supply line to Salzburg was soon cut off. On 24 September, the Assistance Campaign reported that because of its futile appeals to the Commerce Ministry and the Chamber of Trades, it had to "shut down clothes provision for 14 days." After clothing 344 war invalids in July and 200 in August, the Assistance Campaign in turn had to turn to the Emperor and King Karl Fund to see if it could scrape together something.¹⁰⁵

Surprisingly, the military changed its position of relentless hoarding near the end of September, just as it became enthusiastic in finding employment for

disabled veterans. General Intendant Rainer of the Joint War Ministry's 13th Department, presumably after repeated requests, finally agreed to release 8,000 meters of wool cloth, along with lining materials, twine, and buttons from its Brünn/Brno (Moravia) depot, in addition to another 100 pairs of leather shoes. These supplies would conceivably answer the repeated calls from Salzburg. Somewhat shocked, the Assistance Campaign leaders admitted that it was the first time the military administration had made a contribution to its services for disabled soldiers. So surprised—and grateful—were the campaign leaders that they solemnly reminded the Social Welfare officials to formally thank the Joint War Ministry for that first-ever contribution.¹⁰⁶

Agency Hoarding and the Incomplete Social Offensive

To a significant extent, the Social Welfare officials' earliest work was the work of information: its collection, management, and distribution.¹⁰⁷ It was the way to overcome the new ministry's latecomer disadvantage, but it also served to make the war welfare field and potential clients legible and hence more open to state actions. The real welfare services, though, had to be delivered, despite a difficult institutional setting and under the severe constraint of general material shortages. Lacking control of material resources to directly and instantly address disabled men's needs, the Social Welfare officials did favors or lent help to other agencies and accumulated bureaucratic clout and goodwill. They worked to translate these bureaucratic "credits" into tangible resources for the programs and services under their watch.

In parallel with and complementary to these interagency dealings, the Social Welfare Ministry's strong advocate-defender role on behalf of individual disabled men and the Provincial Commissions succeeded in establishing itself as the authority others turned to when facing the powerful military. When the military demanded that the ministry discourage what it saw as unfair and unfounded complaints, it showed that the new ministry was becoming a leader in the ongoing civil-military struggle. This advocate-defender role nonetheless revealed a sad reality: the advocate-defender could talk, appeal, negotiate, and even admonish. But direct relief often had to rely on other hoarding stakeholders, since the ministry itself had little to offer in actual material relief.

In a concrete way, the Salzburg clothing saga highlighted the growing insistence among many state agencies on hoarding material resources and jealously protecting their own bureaucratic turf. Facing the uncharted waters of exhausting but indefinite fighting—or the very likely but extremely unpleasant outcome

of either victory by the Entente Powers or permanent domination by Imperial Germany—it was clear that the Habsburg Monarchy would not survive in its old form. Aware of how fundamentally the war had changed the basic terms of politics, some Christian Social and Social Democrat leaders had reached the point of “think[ing] the unthinkable, imagining a state without a supranational Dynasty and a nation without a multinational state.”¹⁰⁸ When it was hard to foresee the future, the material resources at hand were among the few remaining solid things people had to hold on to. They were precious political capital with which to position themselves for the inevitable power realignment.

At the moment when resources needed to be marshaled and used most efficiently and effectively, the hoarding mentality made officials even less flexible about the uses of scarce but still available resources at disposal. Agency hoarding, mainly but not limited to military authorities, became an insurmountable obstacle to official welfare provision, even though the latter might have given the Monarchy a chance by containing popular discontent. State agencies stopped working as a coherent whole and behaved like small fiefdoms single-mindedly concerned with their own individual interests. This disastrous vicious circle—the more urgently welfare provisioning was needed, the lower the willingness to collaborate and make it possible—suggested that the social offensive, no matter what potential it might have, was paralyzed not only by the material shortages but also by an internal breakdown of the Imperial Austrian state. The self-destructive behavior of the state apparatus at the most pivotal moment stacked the odds too high for the social offensive.

In the end, those disabled Salzburg veterans did not appear to receive the urgently needed winter clothes in time. The disintegration of the Monarchy and the field army between early October and early November 1918 brought back even more disabled soldiers who were not adequately provided for. The Salzburg provincial government, in a 7 December telegraph, was still asking the State Office (Ministry) of Social Welfare for help in securing 490 sets of clothes from the same Refugee Depot of the State Office (Ministry) of the Interior. This was a repeat of the May 1918 scene, featuring the same cast of agency actors—with mostly the same central state and provincial officials—and following the same script. The only new twist was that two days later, on 9 December, the Salzburg government added new categories of clients—war widows and orphans—in an appeal for Vienna’s intervention.¹⁰⁹ The provisioning crisis worsened for the successor Republic,¹¹⁰ which seemed to show that the social offensive was an exercise in futility. But at this moment of despair, a new force in welfare politics emerged and strengthened the social turn of the Austrian state initiated under the Monarchy.

War Victims as a New Power Factor

IN JANUARY 1919, ACTIVIST First Lieutenant Kauders confidently proclaimed, “People may be thinking that they can continue to put us off with only beautiful words. But today we already are a real power factor. Even a half-reasonable government has to take us seriously.”¹ Recruiting fellow war victims to join the Central Association of German-Austrian War-Damaged Persons (Zentralverband der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten, hereafter the Zentralverband),² his words had a ring of hyperbole. But it was not exaggeration. At the time, his organization had representatives sitting on an interministerial commission for war victim policy making, and other Zentralverband activists were working in the provinces to mobilize their fellow sufferers. Their demands for resources and influence were often heeded by local and central state officials.

Before the end of the war, the field of war welfare was populated by military officers, civil service officials, high society philanthropists, medical and other experts, parliamentarians, civil society organizations, wealthy donors, local dignitaries, and assorted middle-class volunteers. War victims were often the muted objects of intervention—examined, studied, and cared or provided for, but their voices were rarely heard directly. Their desires and their emotions were often seen or heard only through refraction.

The Revolution of 1918 ushered in a fundamental change in the welfare field. War victims entered as citizen-clients, activists, lobbyists, organizers, and the partners of the republican state and actively shaped their own future. War victims had agency and even a share of power in the field.

Why did the war victims’ movement achieve prominence so quickly? How did a Viennese organization become the officially recognized representative for all war victims? What did organized war victims want? The success of the Zentralverband in organizing war victims and making policy interventions should be attributed to its leaders’ organizational skills, its relatively nonpartisan mobilization, and its readiness to enter into a partnership with the legitimacy-seeking state. The partnership forged in the early months of the Republic

benefited both partners and upended the dynamics of the previously top-down, elite-driven war victim politics.

The Revolution of 1918 opened up the political space and made war victims' self-mobilization possible. The war victim movement, in turn, prompted rapid democratization in welfare policy making and administration.³ This chapter, therefore, is also a study of the Revolution of 1918 and of the continuity and change in war victim welfare after the imperial social offensive.

From Abstract Category to Social Movement

Even before the Habsburg Monarchy's final collapse in October 1918, war-disabled soldiers had started to organize themselves, especially in the provinces.⁴ Small-scale and spontaneous organizing started in Vienna by 5 November, when a committee of ten from a certain Association of War Invalids sent a letter to the temporary highest decision-making body of the new Republic, the Council of State. They demanded office space in the Vienna Invalid Office so that they could "begin the preparatory work of setting up the proposed Invalids' Council (Invalidenrat) and exercise permanent supervision over the Invalid Office and other welfare agencies."⁵ Emerging from among the artillery arsenal's workers,⁶ the group was inspired by the radical soldiers' and workers' councils, which in turn imitated the soviets in revolutionary Russia. Its bold advance was ignored by the government,⁷ but disabled veterans' activism would soon be a force to be reckoned with.

The organization that ultimately became a lead player in interwar war victim politics began on 11 November 1918, when Heinrich Gallos and Karl Burger held a disabled veterans' meeting in the Railway Workers' Club. A week later, a leadership team was elected in a second meeting, including the organization's future first president Hans Hollitscher. The very first number of the group's newspaper, *Der Invalide*, was also ready for distribution then. Made possible by subsidies from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry,⁸ *Der Invalide* became the most widely circulated war victim publication and an indispensable organizational and mobilization tool for the war victim movement.⁹

Even before the 18 November meeting, this organization, which became the Zentralverband, had already achieved many of its twenty-three-point demands.¹⁰ Among others, the state authorities had promised the new organization office space in the imposing former military courthouse near the Josefstädterstrasse station of the Vienna Municipal Railways.¹¹ The Ministry of Social Welfare agreed to provide an immediate subsidy of 10,000 kronen, on top of

other immediate provisions for disabled veterans: (1) the public clothing center would begin to distribute free clothes and shoes under the supervision of the Zentralverband; (2) unemployment benefits would be paid as temporary cash assistance, applicable to former agricultural workers and farmers who previously were excluded from such insurance benefits; (3) those suffering from tuberculosis would receive the same kind of rations as those categorized as “seriously ill”; (4) inpatient hospital treatments would be guaranteed as long as medically necessary. The Zentralverband was also allowed to send representatives to the war materiel demobilization (*Sachdemobilisierung*) agency to monitor the sale of surplus equipment, vehicles, raw materials, and sundry articles.¹²

With its initial successes, the organizers of the Zentralverband stepped up their recruiting efforts. On 24 November, another public Zentralverband meeting attracted representatives from the provinces, helping boost its claim to represent all disabled veterans in the new state of German-Austria and “work for the benefit of war invalids in a nonpartisan manner.”¹³ Local chapters quickly sprang up in and outside of Vienna.¹⁴

The rapid growth of the disabled veterans’ movement could be attributed to several factors: disabled men’s activism (in some cases aided by the ongoing soldiers’ council movement); local authorities’ appeasing cooperation under the pressure of a volatile environment; and local communities’ charitable contributions. Together, these made some local chapters much more than just advocacy groups for their members. In Bruck an der Leitha (Lower Austria), the local chapter became the officially recognized intermediary between the authorities and disabled veterans. It exercised screening power to determine individuals’ access to public resources. Local chapter activists provided information to their returning comrades who, contrary to the military’s claims, were mostly not informed of the health and welfare services to which they were entitled nor where to access them. Local chapters also distributed living necessities procured through both official and private channels, sometimes acting as authorized agents of the public authorities.¹⁵ Access to information and material resources in a time of scarcities gave disabled veterans and other war victims strong incentive to join local organizations.¹⁶

According to *Der Invalide*, disabled veterans enthusiastically embraced the idea of a national interest group dedicated exclusively to their and (to a lesser extent) their dependents’ interests. The Zentralverband’s goal was to have at least one local chapter in each and every administrative district.¹⁷ The actual expansion of the network far exceeded that, with many local chapters established during the last two months of 1918 and the first months of 1919 at the

municipal or communal level. A Zentralverband functionary attributed this explosive growth to many disabled men's sheer desperation: they "rushed to join the Zentralverband in the hope that by simply entering the organization they would immediately be liberated from all the hardships."¹⁸ The Zentralverband's early practice of handing out emergency cash assistance of 10 or 20 kronen to its members bolstered this belief.¹⁹

The Zentralverband activists worked proactively to find those willing comrades and to deliver the promise made at the organization's founding: "We are ready to heed any call to send in experts, to prepare model bylaws for local chapters; and to do, in short, all we can to enable our comrades to join the organization."²⁰ There were two aspects to this organizational work: recruiting disabled veterans for local chapters founded by the Zentralverband and persuading already existing disabled veterans' associations, especially in the provinces, to affiliate with it.

Tireless Zentralverband representatives often spoke at local chapters' founding meetings. Their talks, mainly about the hardships suffered by disabled veterans, the need to organize, and the benefit of being part of a large movement, were the mainstay of *Der Invalide's* small-print "News from the Local Chapters" section. There, the Zentralverband's functionaries projected a collective image of energy and missionary fervor. The editor-in-chief of *Der Invalide*, Karl Burger, visited at least four different Lower Austrian local chapters' founding meetings on top of his active organizing work in Vienna in a span of four months. During this period, he also participated in a Graz meeting to plan for a Styrian Provincial Association that would introduce a more hierarchical three-tier structure (Vienna-provincial association-local chapter); up to that point, local chapters interacted directly with Vienna. Burger did all this while writing for and editing *Der Invalide* and simultaneously engaging in a fierce leadership struggle with Hans Hollitscher's supporters.²¹ His colleagues had similarly busy schedules, combining organizational work in Vienna with visits to provincial meetings. Successful local chapter leaders even exported their experiences to other communities. For example, a member of the Leoben (Styria) local chapter, Mr. Trautmann, represented the Zentralverband in several other Styrian local chapters' founding meetings. The chair of the Bruck an der Leitha organization, Franz Bauer, brought his expertise to the important Styrian industrial town of Kapfenberg and helped set up the local chapter, even serving as its first chair.²² The success of this "missionary work" was evident in the growing directory of local chapters published in each issue of *Der Invalide*: from 25 at the beginning of 1919 to 102 local chapters and 33 additional sublocal branches by mid-May 1919.²³

This kind of self-presentation in *Der Invalide* targeted disabled veterans who felt deserted by society at large. The knowledgeable Zentralverband activists cut sharply contrasted figures with nondisabled members of society, who were perceived as ungrateful and indifferent. They were also presented as a clear alternative to state or local officials, often viewed as unsympathetic or incompetent bureaucrats. After reading about the Zentralverband's ubiquitous helping hands, the Viennese activists hoped that disabled veterans everywhere would be inspired to organize themselves locally into this movement of "self-help"—a term laden with positive connotations in a time of bleak confusion as well as implied threats of direct action—in a fight for themselves, their families, and their comrades-in-suffering.

Boasting of its access to public authorities and especially to high officials was also critically important to the Zentralverband's recruiting campaign. When the Zentralverband published its twenty-three-point "Memorandum on Disabled Veterans' Demands," it was presented in a *Der Invalide* article about the successful meeting with ministerial officials on 21 November 1918. The author emphasized the fact that the demands were met with "not only full understanding but also extensive concessions." Then the Zentralverband strengthened the impression by meticulously acknowledging all the ministerial representatives at the meeting, especially the Social Welfare Ministry's Otto Gasteiger and Friedrich Hock, the two highest-ranking career officials responsible for war victim affairs.²⁴ Unsurprisingly, this interministerial meeting also featured prominently in a speech given by the Zentralverband chair Hans Hollitscher at the 24 November meeting. Gasteiger and Hock were acknowledged again in the presence of the provincial representatives, and the speech and the acknowledgment were duly reported in *Der Invalide*. The access to the ministries became a key component in the Zentralverband's message: the organization was not only "officially recognized by the German-Austrian Ministry of Social Welfare as the central representation of war invalid associations," but it had Gasteiger and Hock on its executive committee.²⁵ There is no corroborating evidence for the two officials' alleged committee membership. Nevertheless, the effect of the repeated suggestions of official endorsement at a time of confusion should not be underestimated.

By touting its close relationship with the ministry, the Zentralverband expected a reciprocal effect: the active recruitment campaign would strengthen its leadership's hand in negotiating with state authorities, while the officials' accommodating attitude and especially material favors would highlight the benefits of joining the Zentralverband. The larger the Zentralverband, the more effective it

could be in wresting concessions from state authorities. This would then make a stronger case for other disabled veteran associations to join the Zentralverband.

The Zentralverband began as a Viennese group with national aspirations. Other disabled veterans not affiliated with this group had similar ambitions. They took exaggerated names or claimed greatly inflated membership numbers—just as the Zentralverband did when it started. In the midst of revolutionary changes, enterprising leaders could reasonably entertain grand visions in a suddenly wide-open field for political and social action.²⁶

If the Zentralverband wanted to be the legitimate speaker for all disabled veterans in the new country of German-Austria, it had to find ways to connect with disabled veterans in other organizations. These organizations were potential helpers, because they could be the foundation for a rapid national expansion.²⁷ The actual unification work, however, was not easy. Some provincial organizations were in fact potential rivals to the Zentralverband. They had their regional power bases and pursued their own expansion projects.²⁸

The Upper Austrian Union of War Invalids (Bund der Kriegsinvaliden Oberösterreichs), based in Linz, claimed to represent all Upper Austrian disabled veterans. It had written directly to the Ministry of Social Welfare in late November 1918 in the name of all disabled veterans about the inadequacy of the recently announced emergency allowance program. The Upper Austrians complained that those who were not eligible for compulsory health insurance before the war would still receive nothing, since the emergency program was based on the sick pay of such insurance plans. The ministry found the question important enough that it had an internal discussion and soon after issued a clarification and additional instructions to all provincial authorities.²⁹ In late 1918, emerging provincial organizations did not need a Viennese conduit to be effective in speaking for their constituents and beyond.

The Zentralverband had been directly involved in the establishment of at least one organization in Upper Austria around the same time. Its representative, a Mr. Kasper, was present in Steyr for the 1 December 1918 constituent meeting. Following a speaker who argued that disabled veterans should unite in one organization and, more specifically, with the Zentralverband, Kasper made the now standard recruitment pitch about its productive and close relations with the state authorities.³⁰ The founding of a local branch in the important industrial center of Steyr, however, pitted the Zentralverband against the already active Linz organization. A head-on competition seemed inevitable.

It was therefore worthy of a celebratory announcement in *Der Invalide* that the Upper Austrians had declared their intention to join the Zentralverband

on 7 December.³¹ Nevertheless, it took nearly two months for the leaders of the two organizations to formalize the affiliation. In the 27 January 1919 agreement, the Upper Austrians emphatically asserted their autonomy in all internal affairs even though they agreed “with the Zentralverband on all the invalids’ [twenty-three-point December] demands.” The Upper Austrians were also entitled to send a representative who would participate in “all central leadership’s decisions as a voting member.”³² This may not seem like a particularly high price for the Zentralverband to pay to make good its claim of national representation, but a future internal struggle within the Zentralverband could be traced partially to this and similar deals with provincial leaders. With the knowledge of what transpired in April and May 1919, when the Zentralverband refounded the Upper Austrian organization for unclarified reasons,³³ it could be surmised that the initial deal with the Linz competitor did not work out as intended.

The Tyrolean provincial organization, the German-Tyrolean Association of War Invalids and Widows (*Verein der Kriegsinvaliden und-Witwen Deutschtirols*), was another case in point. It began in early November 1918, when an action committee of seven from Barrack No. 3 of the Sanatorium for the War-Damaged Persons on Innrain marched to the provisional Tyrolean government to protest having been deserted by everyone. Taking matters into their own hands was necessary, they claimed, “because the captain disappeared, the higher commands had lost their authority and ambition,” while food provisioning in the sanatorium was in question.³⁴ The only alternative to starvation was taking confrontational action. As one disabled veteran leader remembered, “Good or bad, we had to take advantage of the excellent democratic institution, [that is] building an action committee. But it was difficult. Democracy could not overcome a battle-hardened Tyrolean front-soldier overnight.”³⁵ After the action committee forced its way into the governor’s office and met with him, the movement took off. The Tyrolean organization attracted sixteen new members from the sanatorium barracks on its first day of recruitment. After the Tyrolean Provisional National Council, the governing board of the province, awarded them a subvention of 20,000 kronen, membership soared. By 18 November, it already had 516 members. The association proudly declared that there were 2,000 members in attendance at the first general meeting of Tyrolean disabled veterans on 19 February 1919.³⁶

The Tyroleans had ambivalent relations with both the Zentralverband and the central authorities in Vienna. A letter to the Ministry of Social Welfare dated 27 December 1918 showed that the Zentralverband intervened on behalf of the Tyroleans about setting up a full-service Invalid Office in Innsbruck. But

the Tyroleans had their own course of action and made parallel demands directly to the ministries in Vienna.³⁷ To their great disappointment, the demands “led to little movement in the ministries and nowhere did we experience any concrete action,” even with the Tyrolean provincial government’s prior endorsement. The Tyroleans spared their provincial authorities and saved their harshest criticism for the central authorities in Vienna. In the words of the organization’s president, “It was impossible to get anything from Vienna.”³⁸ While the Viennese activists issued warnings to the central authorities, the Tyroleans went a step further and publicly accused them of willful neglect.³⁹

This anti-Vienna attitude coincided with a general swing of opinion in Tyrol about its future. The initial declaration of Tyrol’s attachment to the new German-Austrian state on 1 November 1918 was quickly replaced by other, more conditional statements invoking the Tyroleans’ right to self-determination in deciding the future relations between Tyrol and the Vienna-led Republic. Many locals even argued for independence, on the grounds that it would give them a better chance of preventing South Tyrol from being ceded to Italy. It was also a way for conservative-leaning Tyrol to distance itself from the Social Democrat–led central government. The Social Democrats’ pro-Anschluss (union with Germany) policy, a goal most Austrians supported, did not endear them to Tyroleans, either. This centrifugal development began during the second half of November 1918 and reached its peak in the Provisional Tyrolean National Assembly’s 3 May 1919 self-determination declaration, in which the option of an independent Tyrolean state was explicitly stated.⁴⁰

The 19 February 1919 Innsbruck meeting of Tyrolean disabled veterans was held in the midst of this rising separatist sentiment. As one of its invited guests, Dr. Seidle, who spoke on behalf of the absent provincial governor, publicly stated, “It is not clear at all if a German-Austrian state will continue to exist; further it is not clear what kind of constitutional relationship between Tyrol and German-Austria will come into existence.”⁴¹ The widely acknowledged inadequacy of welfare measures for disabled veterans certainly did not help bolster the popularity of the central state among the locals.

The uncertainty about the future seemed to have muddied the Tyrolean association’s relations to the Zentralverband, too. The disabled veteran meeting in Innsbruck was given detailed and serialized coverage in *Der Invalide* in three installments, yet in their meetings the Tyroleans never discussed the Zentralverband. Deviating from *Der Invalide*’s convention of reporting such membership meetings of local chapters, the coverage did not mention the presence or speeches by any Zentralverband representative. The Zentralverband was likely not invited

at all, since other invited but absent dignitaries had excused themselves through statements read to the attendees. At the end of the meeting, an eleven-point resolution, directed at the public at large and the Constituent National Assembly in Vienna, was adopted. The Zentralverband was again not mentioned, and there was no trace of coordination between Innsbruck and Vienna in the resolution. Furthermore, the resolution did not mention disabled comrades in other provinces at all, despite the fact that some of the demands were not Tyrol-specific.⁴² The serialized report did not give the impression that the Tyroleans talked or acted with a sense of being part of a larger movement or organization. The Zentralverband's claim to represent all disabled veterans was more a work in progress than reality in early 1919.

The Power of Large Numbers

To become the overarching voice for disabled veterans, the Zentralverband was determined to strike a generally nonpartisan path in order to appeal to as many fellow disabled men as possible. As Berger put it, "Only when all invalids and war-damaged persons of German-Austria, irrespective of their differences in military rank or status, gather in a solid organization can we achieve many, or even all of our demands."⁴³ The Zentralverband aimed to create a social movement from a bureaucratically defined population category ("war-damaged persons") and strategically chose to focus on clearly war disability-centered issues to appeal to all those in that population category. The very first version of the Zentralverband's bylaws, approved by the Interior Ministry on 21 December 1918, stated that "the Zentralverband is nonpolitical and aims to safeguard and promote the moral and material interests of its members."⁴⁴ This point was not lost in late 1919, when a Lower Austrian Zentralverband leader explained to local officials that his organization's members came from all political parties and that, in the Amstetten area, they were mostly village farmers—not a natural constituency for the left—even though the leadership was perceived to be left leaning. Only by being politically neutral and sticking to economic issues, he insisted, could the organization serve disabled veterans successfully.⁴⁵

In the early twentieth-century Austrian context, "political" mostly referred to party politics. This conscious decision not to identify with a party was a public announcement of the organization's intention, if not the reality, to preserve some degree of independence from the political parties and their socioeconomic milieu bases. The milieus and their respective cultural outlooks and practices, normative values, and the sometimes segregated everyday worlds nourished the

three main political forces—Christian Socials/Catholic conservatives, Social Democrats/leftists, and the German Nationals/later National Socialists—that had fundamentally challenged the liberal order and its politics of local notables since the 1880s.⁴⁶ Integral to these milieu parties were myriad flanking organizations and groups encompassing many aspects of their constituents' everyday life, ranging from clubs of leisure and sport activities to educational institutions, mutual aid societies, and banks.⁴⁷ As the milieu parties became the new Republic's political masters, disabled veterans seemed to be destined to be absorbed into the milieu structures; their organizations could not but align with preexisting socioeconomic status and political loyalties. However, this was not the case in 1918 and 1919.

Since there were many disabled veterans of lower social classes congregating in the large cities, mostly due to the concentration of military hospitals there, the Social Democrats stood a good chance of harnessing the disorientation and bitterness of disabled veterans and rallying them under the banners of social justice, equality, and antimilitarism. Julius Deutsch, who in 1919 became defense minister, proposed a partnership between the Social Democratic Party executive and the socialist Trade Union Commission to found a new "party secretariat for invalid protection" as early as 4 April 1918.⁴⁸ Five months later, another Social Democratic leader Otto Glöckel reported that preparation for the "Social Democratic Soldier Protection" office was underway. The project was duly approved, and the office opened with full-time party employees.⁴⁹ At the very least, the Social Democrats were well positioned to become the patron of disabled veterans in Vienna.

The speed and energy with which disabled veterans spontaneously organized themselves completely surprised the Social Democrats. On 16 January 1919, Glöckel disappointedly admitted his party's failure to capture this new constituency and, consequently, the redundancy of the party's effort. "Unfortunately we neglected to build a soldier protection organization and contented ourselves with only a service office," Glöckel told the party executive. "Dr. Hollitscher's neutral soldier protection organization now has 172,000 members. The Trade Union Commission recommended closing our office. With great difficulty we set up the office that has handled 1,091 cases during its two-month operation. . . . We cannot stop the services abruptly." The party executive had no other option than to offer its furnished service office to the Zentralverband and asked the latter to retain the staff.⁵⁰ Another party leader, Robert Danneberg, reported in May 1919 that the Soldier Protection staff had found other jobs, the disabled veterans on their files had been referred to the Zentralverband, and the last remaining employee would stay on for three more months to handle the old cases.⁵¹

The Social Democrats failed to attract disabled veterans qua disabled veterans to form a direct relationship with their party. Instead of being passively drawn into the orbit of yet another party-affiliated organization or party-organized service, the disabled veterans joined “neutral” organizations, the Zentralverband in particular, that sprang up spontaneously. The Zentralverband’s alleged numeric strength seemed to shock the Social Democrats into giving up their own efforts, which, to be fair, were not very ambitious to begin with. Anton Hölzl, the Social Democratic parliamentarian and the party’s liaison to the Zentralverband, put it succinctly: “The ‘Soldier Protection’ planned by the party was overtaken by these events [i.e., the Zentralverband’s founding and expansion] because it was not ready for operation when the Monarchy collapsed.”⁵² Fast reaction and the power of large numbers worked in favor of the Zentralverband in elbowing out a potential competitor.

More important, the Social Democrats failed to anticipate disabled veterans’ independent activism. Expecting disabled veterans to be merely victims waiting to be organized and guided, the party did not foresee that this bureaucratically defined population category, made up of people who shared the same source for their sufferings and similar hardships, would morph within a short period of time into a social group conscious of its common experience and determined to pursue common goals collectively. Alert politicians and skilled organizers though they were, the Social Democratic leadership in 1918 underestimated the degree of discontent and radicalization of its own rank-and-file members in January strikes,⁵³ as well as the agency and resourcefulness of disabled soldiers. It could be said that the party leadership had more pressing concerns by late 1918, such as the fate of the Monarchy, the new Republic’s constitution, the Constituent National Assembly election, and the new country’s stability and security. But it was also clear that it repeatedly underestimated the political energy of the people it claimed to represent.⁵⁴

The source of war victims’ suffering made it possible for the Zentralverband to emerge outside of the milieu universe. Modern industrial warfare’s indiscriminate destruction did not distinguish among victims based on rank, social and economic background, or prewar political convictions. Class difference was often reproduced in military rank, but as disabled veterans, men from different backgrounds shared common experiences and interests if they chose to see their disability as the defining feature of their postwar existence. Patriotic propaganda and the myth of front or trench community possibly enhanced the perception of this leveling effect. Even though some Zentralverband leaders were registered party members,⁵⁵ and some Viennese war victims openly campaigned

for the Social Democrats during the Constituent National Assembly election on 16 February 1919,⁵⁶ Hölzl observed that “the organization itself comprises both men and officers from all political groups.”⁵⁷ The same revolution that propelled the Social Democrats to the commanding heights of institutional politics also opened a space for nonmilieu groups and their burgeoning activism.

The ecumenical composition helped the Zentralverband to overcome even its antimilitaristic rhetoric and forge an alliance with career soldiers’ organizations. In early February 1919, the Zentralverband announced it would formally collaborate with the German-Austrian Economic Association of Non-Active Officers and Their Equivalents (*Wirtschaftsverband nichtaktiver Offiziere und Gleichgestellter Deutschösterreichs*) and the Central Association of German-Austrian Career Soldiers (*Zentralverband der deutschösterreichischen Militärgagisten*). The three agreed to work together in a joint Invalid Section to better represent the interests of disabled officers and officials;⁵⁸ they even published announcements in the long-running military newspaper *Militär-Soziale Rundschau*, the forerunner of the conservative *Österreichische Wehrzeitung*.⁵⁹ This alliance was struck more out of necessity than conviction and did not seem to last long. Nevertheless, the surprising spark showed that the construction of a specific disabled veteran identity was underway even among career officers, who before the end of the war were legally and practically a separate status and social group.⁶⁰ In the revolutionary whirlwind, grassroots activism and solidarity among disabled veterans did override, no matter how briefly or partially, class differences and the partisan tendencies supposedly inherited in a milieu-structured society.

Although there is no clear evidence detailing why the state authorities decided to recognize the Zentralverband as the main if not the sole representative of disabled veterans as early as mid-November 1918, it is safe to assume that the Zentralverband’s successful recruiting campaign was a major factor in keeping this decision intact afterwards. As early as January of 1919, the Zentralverband claimed that it had a membership of 170,000 and counting,⁶¹ which was more than half of the estimated 300,000 war victims in German-Austria at the time.⁶²

These and other similar numbers were cited repeatedly.⁶³ But the estimates were based on the Zentralverband’s self-reporting, and even it admitted that there was no precise membership information when it appealed for local chapters’ help in February and March 1919.⁶⁴ Later statistics show the Zentralverband membership reaching 160,618 in 1921 and 198,698 in 1922. But as late as the spring of 1922, officials at the Ministry of Social Administration (the Social Welfare Ministry’s new name since May 1919) complained that the Zentralverband membership information was still self-reported, of poor quality, and

Dank- und Gedächtnisfeier
der heimgekehrten für die gefallenen Krieger.

An den blutigen Opfern dieses unseligen Krieges haben die deutsch-österreichischen Stämme den größten Anteil. Ihr Blut ist überall geflossen, wo es galt, die Heimat zu schützen, sie haben der beschworenen Pflicht gehorcht bis zur letzten Stunde.

Das Vaterland aber hat seiner Krieger und ihrer Opfer vergessen!

So wollen wenigstens wir, die Überlebenden Kampfgenossen vier schwerer Kriegsjahre sowie sie schon heimgekehrt – das letzte und schwarze Kriegsjahr damit beschließen und das erste Friedensjahr damit beginnen, daß wir der gefallenen Kameraden und Volksgenossen in mannhafter Traue denken, ihren Mäßen Ehre und Achtung zollen.

Mit der Dankagung der Überlebenden wollen wir das Gedächtnis an die Toten verbinden und durch dieses kameradschaftliche Gedächtnis allen die Seele stärken, die schwer an den gebrachten Opfern und an der Lieblosigkeit des Hinterlandes tragen.

Alle Heimgekehrten – Mann wie Offizier – in diesem das Gefühl innerer Zusammengehörigkeit aus den Tagen gemeinsamer Kampfes noch lebendig, rufen wir hiermit auf, an der

Sonntag, den 5. Jänner 1919 um 3 Uhr nachmittags in Wien auf dem Vorplatz der Karlskirche stattfindenden

deutschösterreichischen Krieger-Dank- und Gedächtnisfeier

teilzunehmen. (Felduniform oder dunkles Zivilkleid.)

Die Gedächtnisreden werden der Vizepräsident des Verbandes der nichtaktiven Offiziere und Gleichgestellten Deutschösterreichs und zwei Mannschaftervertreter der Soldatenräte halten.

Der Wiener Männergesangsverein wird die Feier mit einem Chor einleiten und beschließen.

Den Wägen, Wägen und Knopflöcher der Gefallenen und den Invaliden ist ein Ehrenplatz bei der Feier reserviert.

Staat und Volk laßt es überlassen, ihre Bestallnahme gegenüber den toten und Überlebenden Opfern des Krieges durch ihr Erscheinen zu bekunden.

An selben Tage und zur selben Stunde finden gleichartige Dank- und Gedächtnisfeiern auch in den Hauptstädten der deutschösterreichischen Länder statt.

So soll die Pietät für die Toten die Lebenden unterschiedslos einen und verbinden.

Zentralverband deutschöster. Mäitragasten. Zentralverband der Kriegbeschädigten.
Deutschösterreichischer Soldatenrat. Volkstrugauschutz des Soldatenrates
Zentralstelle Wien. der Volkswehr.

☞ Die Feier findet auch bei ungünstigem Wetter statt. ☞

FIGURE 5.1. “The fatherland has forgotten its soldiers and their sacrifices!” A poster urging veterans of all ranks to attend the 5 January 1919 demonstration in front of the Vienna Karlskirche. The Sunday event was jointly sponsored by the Central Association of German-Austrian Career Soldiers, the Zentralverband, the German-Austrian Soldiers’ Council, and the Executive Committee of the Soldiers’ Council of the Volkswehr (the Republic’s left-leaning, improvised militia army), which suggested that collaboration between the ideologically diverse groups had begun before the February 1919 announcement. ÖNB/Vienna PLA16304263.

incomplete.⁶⁵ The ministry’s decision not to carry out a thorough audit, because “on the one hand such need did not exist at the moment, and on the other it was not advisable to do so because of political reasons,” made those Zentralverband numbers look rather suspicious.⁶⁶ Even if the Zentralverband did not intentionally lie, the numbers still begged the question: How could it achieve the instant high-water mark of 170,000 at the beginning of 1919 and then plateau at that level through 1924?⁶⁷

The Social Ministry conducted its own estimate in October 1919 and concluded that the Zentralverband had around 100,000 members.⁶⁸ In November 1919, one Zentralverband functionary publicly admitted, with no trace of embarrassment, that the membership was around 56,000 when it held its first

national convention on 19 and 20 April 1919. Since then it had achieved the feat of growing to “147,000 without counting orphans and dependents.”⁶⁹ These numbers mean that a membership of 170,000 at the beginning of 1919 was a bold exaggeration.

But the inflated number served important purposes. As a confidence booster, it encouraged potential members to sign up. The hesitation could be overcome by the (false) sense of security of being part of an unprecedented display of collective will. The impression of a large and ever-growing movement also gave the Zentralverband leverage when bargaining with authorities or shocked others—like the Social Democrats—into retreating. At the moment when no one, including the Zentralverband itself, knew exactly how many disabled veterans existed, or how many were actually organized under what banner, a movement comprised of people from across class, occupational, regional, and even party boundaries that counted 100,000-strong—per the ministry’s estimate—was indeed very formidable in a country with a total population of just over 6 million.

Moreover, the Social Ministry officials knew that the Zentralverband could speak on behalf of most, if not all, disabled veterans. In a 1920 estimate, the ministry believed that 75,627 disabled veterans (not including other categories of war victims) remained members of the Zentralverband and its affiliates after some internal turmoil.⁷⁰ Even this low estimate still represented three out of every four disabled veterans, based on the ministry’s early 1919 estimate of 100,000 as the total number.⁷¹ Organized war victims were a bona fide political force, and this was even more true given that state authorities lacked the means to verify the real numeric strength of any substantial political movement in 1918 and 1919.

State officials were also cognizant of the political risks of losing war victims. In the presence of representatives from the ministries and all the main political parties, the Zentralverband president Hollitscher complained about the slow progress of the promised new welfare law in the 9 February 1919 meeting of its Viennese chapter. He concluded with a threat: “Don’t delay! If this warning is not heeded, we know what we are going to do!”⁷² The Social Ministry’s Gasteiger quickly told the meeting attendees that “treating war invalids badly was a danger to every state. War victims need a law that will free them from depending solely on the goodwill of the powers that be.” He hastened to add that the draft law would be shared and thoroughly discussed with war victim organizations.⁷³

Others also saw the political weight that war victims carried. A small but active group of Communists tried to capitalize on their radical potential.⁷⁴ The police were concerned. In a 13 April 1919 report to the Interior Ministry, the

Viennese police noted that disabled soldiers were often visible in street demonstrations by unemployed people and homecoming soldiers (the two usually overlapped), presumably exploited by the Communist masterminds behind the scenes. In one instance, disabled veterans with prosthetic limbs marched at the head of the demonstration and forced a taxi on the Praterstrasse to carry them.⁷⁵ The Zentralverband condemned this tactic during its first national conference and asked its members to stay away from gatherings with a strong party-political color: "People tried to push invalids to the front of the demonstration to disguise their putsch attempts. They calculated that our Volkswehr soldiers, because of the moral pressure involved in shooting poor invalids, would not open fire. This is, for example, what happened on the bloody Holy Thursday [of 1919] and since then [has] been tried repeatedly."⁷⁶ Some disabled veterans, known to be close to the Communists, also broke into Schönbrunn Palace on 16 April.⁷⁷ After the palace administrators reluctantly allowed them to use the section they had occupied, the group moved to seize more apartments, helped themselves to the furniture, and forced the remaining palace staff to surrender keys to other rooms.⁷⁸ Similar "self-help" activities were known to be planned or already taking place elsewhere.⁷⁹

The Communists' recruitment appeals and their alleged influence ironically gave the Zentralverband more political leverage. The growing war victim organization became an even more important constituency to secure as state officials combated the Communist threat.⁸⁰ The more visible war victims were in street demonstrations and radical direct actions, the more the Zentralverband could pressure officials; the Communists' bid for disabled veterans' allegiance unintentionally strengthened the Zentralverband's hand in parlaying its perceived numeric strength into real power.

The "First Creditors" of the Austrian State

War victims comprised approximately 5 percent of the Austrian Republic's population in 1919.⁸¹ They enjoyed disproportionate attention from the state, mainly because of their successful mobilization and organization. Despite sometimes confusing or conflicting language, organized war victims had one clear goal from the very beginning: making the state pay what they were owed. War victims talked about the duty of the fatherland to show its gratitude. But by presenting themselves as the "first creditors,"⁸² they made it clear that what the state should do involved not merely tokens of gratitude but fulfilling moral and even contractual obligations.⁸³

The war victims' state-centered mentality and practices were conscious choices. The justification for their many demands centered on the imperial state's war making. Many shared the blame for the war's destruction and people's miseries, but ultimately the imperial state should be held responsible, because "it believed it could be the ruler of Central Europe within a short period of time. . . . [It] believed it was called upon to punish entire peoples for a crime committed by two murderers, though the state itself had committed enough crimes to atone for."⁸⁴ A letter from a provincial widow, Mitzi Schwarz, best exemplified this thinking. She began by complaining about the general societal indifference to the plight of widows, but she left no doubt who needed to do something about it: "It is the same everywhere for widows. We are defenseless, and are treated as the dregs of society. . . . And the Father State is not conscious of its duty. It forgets us poor creatures who were ruined by it. But now our patience runs out; even widows have a right to live. . . . We want to remind the state of its duties, because things cannot go on like this anymore."⁸⁵ It was the state's fault that one became a widow, a disabled person, or an orphan, and they had the right to be compensated by the state.

The state-centered mentality of war victims can be illustrated by another example: the meaning of "self-help" in the war victim movement. In spite of the emphasis on the individual's own effort, what war victim activists meant by "creating their own future" was not self-reliance as it is commonly understood. Self-help, in this context, meant taking matters into one's own hands, aggressively asserting one's rights, forcing the state to acknowledge those rights by all necessary means, and then using state provisions to regain one's ability to lead a dignified and economically independent life.⁸⁶ This not only showed state-centered thinking, but also discursively assumed the continuity of the state that had waged the war—if the state that wronged them disappeared, it would be difficult to identify a culprit to hold responsible. War victims did not distinguish between the imperial and the republican Austrian state.

Organized war victims' unfavorable view of charity was inseparably linked to the state-centered conception of "self-help." To them, charity would interfere with, if not undermine, claims to public resources. They argued that the sacrifices of war victims must be honored and compensated in a solemn and just manner; accountability was the core issue. Charity, on the other hand, was tantamount to opening an escape route for those who should be held responsible.⁸⁷ From the very beginning, the Zentralverband, as the only state-recognized national war victim's organization in 1919,⁸⁸ consistently opposed begging or reliance on charity. Its leaders insisted that it was not just an issue of dignity but a basic question of the state's and society's obligation to those who had suffered

in their names. They demanded a legally established public welfare system as the more neutral, egalitarian, and collective way to provide care that symbolized the participation of the whole society.⁸⁹ The Tyrolean war victim organization, for example, declined the local Volkswehr's offer to host a ball for their benefit because they "totally do not agree with the basic idea behind this kind of charity event. Our position is that we are not a beggars' association, and we want our demands to have a solid legal grounding."⁹⁰

This general anticharity position, however, did not prevent war victim organizations from receiving donations or acting as an intermediary between private benefactors and war victims in need. The Zentralverband kept a list of benefactors who were willing and ready to open their wallets when asked, and through this channel some war widows received emergency cash from anonymous donors. In practice, charitable donations were not refused as long as certain gestures, such as requesting anonymity, were made.⁹¹

Focusing almost exclusively on the state also had another purpose: insisting on the state's duty to step in where civil society had failed. Ignoring reasons such as economic dislocation and social unrest that had forced society at large to partially retreat from its previous active provision for war victims, war victim groups complained about Austrian society's short memory and ingratitude.⁹² Feeling exploited and then deserted were sentiments that permeated the war victim movement's public rhetoric. The state thus became the last resort for war victims seeking systematic, long-term welfare. The substantial contribution civil society had made to war victim welfare during and, to a much smaller degree, after the war was lost in the angry, disappointed rhetoric. As in post-World War I Germany, perceptions of betrayal were most powerful in shaping veterans' and other war victims' attitudes.⁹³

The war victims' state-centered mentality was in part based on their conception of the state as a moral entity with inherent responsibilities to ensure and cultivate the general welfare of all its citizens. Their ideas and expectations of the state were therefore more or less in line with the enlightened-interventionist tradition of the Austrian state administration: the state's mission was to safeguard a just order as well as to promote social improvements and economic prosperity.⁹⁴ Following this all-encompassing understanding, the individual's economic productivity and psychological well-being would naturally fall under the state's purview,⁹⁵ especially if the damage or obstacle to well-being and independence were traceable to the state's actions.

This conception can be better teased out from war victims' demands for privileged treatment compared to other disabled persons. War victims insisted that

their sacrifices and losses were different. It was not enough to treat them like victims of industrial accidents who had suffered similar losses because “the majority of other disabled or ill persons are victims of their jobs. We, on the other hand, are not, but are *the victims of a violence that deprived us of our freedom of action and forced us to go to war; a violence, if it was still existing today, against which usual channels of asserting our claims of compensation would not be available.*” The Civil Code and the Workers’ Accident Insurance Law of 1888 provided the legal basis for injured and disabled workers to seek compensation. But from the perspective of war victims, there was no comparable legal basis or precedent for their situation.⁹⁶ Being disabled or widowed was not their fault—and particularly not an unfortunate result of any free choice or labor contract. Contrary to the view shared by a host of their contemporaries that World War I soldiers were laboring in industrialized warfare in a manner comparable to that of industrial workers,⁹⁷ war victims did not see themselves as workers in an industry that produced mass deaths.⁹⁸ Their relationship to the state was different from an employer-employee one, and their disabilities or losses were not a case of infringement on private property. They therefore disagreed with leading state officials, including the social minister Ferdinand Hanusch, who believed that “war-victim care on the whole should fall into the categories and existing welfare system for the handicapped and the injured.”⁹⁹ Organized war victims demanded a dedicated public welfare system for them “as a totally special group in social life.”¹⁰⁰

The state’s duty to take care of war victims, following this logic, was a moral act of self-justification. A person who served the state and suffered damage or loss should be seen either as a victim of the state’s exploitation and coercion (being forced to fight), as an unfortunate servant for a higher cause (defending the fatherland and the homeland), or both. If war victims were the victims of the state’s abuse, then the state as an ethical being had an existential need to make reparations to justify itself.¹⁰¹ If war victims were unfortunate public servants, then the state, again as an ethical being, must represent the community as a whole to support those who had sacrificed for the collective good.¹⁰² Either way, this argument insisted that the state’s care provision for war victims was a necessary act of redemption; the *raison d’être* of the state hinged on it.

This conception allowed war victim activists to overlook the problematic issue of the constitutional continuity between the Monarchy and the Republic. If the Republic was a total break from the Monarchy, then what kind of guilt did it bear *vis-à-vis* war victims? To what extent did it still owe them? Most leading political and legal minds of the day subscribed to the view that the Republic was not a legal successor to the Monarchy, let alone *the* legal successor, and hence

it inherited no legal or moral obligation from the war-making imperial state. The Republic, they argued, was a new state in international law by virtue of the Revolution of 1918.¹⁰³ This posed a potential problem for the war victims' argument for preferential treatment, which rested on the continuity of the state and its duty to atone for its past. Without this legal and political continuity, war victims would become just another needy constituency competing for limited public resources.

By invoking the state's inherent duty to safeguard people's well-being, uphold rights, and affirm justice, some war victim activists could make the same strong demands even if "the state" was no longer the same entity that had sent them to war. When the Viennese leaders of the Zentralverband presented their first comprehensive demands in November 1918, they acknowledged that the Republic was trying to save what could be salvaged from the ruins of its monarchical predecessor: "German-Austria and its current state administration is the creditors' committee of the failed former state entity, and we war invalids . . . are its first creditors whose demands should be met with full power immediately."¹⁰⁴ The new Republic was construed here as the executive body of the suffering people and, by definition, had the obligation to faithfully carry out its mandate. Organized war victims took advantage of the ambiguities in the continuity of state power and an expansive understanding of the state's obligations to make their case. Even if the authorities did not agree with their reasoning, the unclarified (or even unclarifiable) issue of continuity allowed room for war victims to select from different, even mutually exclusive, arguments leading to the same conclusion: the Austrian state had special obligations to care for them.

The war victims' moral conception of the state also entailed a competent administration staffed by responsive professionals. War victims complained about mistreatment at the hands of some officials. They also correctly recognized the fact that, despite the revolution, the Republic had retained most of the same agencies and their personnel.¹⁰⁵ However, war victim activists generally did not seek a structural revamping or a wholesale purge of the civil administration. The Zentralverband concentrated on forcing the existing state and local agencies to respond to its demands. All it wanted was more "caring" authorities staffed by officials willing to cater to war victims' needs and act in a "modern spirit"—efficiency oriented and treating citizens with respect.¹⁰⁶

In fact, the long list of time-sensitive twenty-three-point demands the Zentralverband made was premised on the current state apparatus's continued effectiveness.¹⁰⁷ If the state and its civil administration were to be constituted anew, organized war victims' arguments would lose much of their urgency, because

it would be more difficult to hold a whole new organization accountable for what was not its responsibility. A thorough reconstitution would also delay the fulfillment of their demands. It was therefore common for organized war victims to discursively assume the continuation (and the necessity) of the old state apparatus and then try to co-opt the state administration, rather than dismantle it. The majority of war victims still believed in the Austrian state and the ability of civil servants to work for them, even, or especially, in a time of scarcities. Despite threats of allying with radicals, organized war victims did not seriously contemplate a world without an interventionist or even paternalistic state staffed by experienced career officials.¹⁰⁸ In the realm of social welfare, they even expected the state to be able to foster, organize, and guide civil society and its private initiatives,¹⁰⁹ exactly one of the goals of the imperial social offensive. As long as state administration showed a new, citizen-oriented service ethos to reciprocate war victims' belief in its omnipotence, the republican state had a willing constituency.

Negotiating the Balance of Power

The "state-friendly" disposition of organized war victims contributed to the most remarkable developments in welfare politics under the Republic: their organization was treated as an indispensable partner in creating war victim welfare policies. War victim representatives were invited to negotiations and became regular members of the interministerial platform that coordinated relevant policies and measures. The general revolutionary atmosphere—and specifically the pressure from the proliferation of Bolshevik-inspired soldiers' and workers' councils¹¹⁰—may have played a role in prompting officials to involve war victims in important decisions. But the existence of such a partnership and its benefits for both organized war victims and state authorities was undeniable. The Zentralverband had its say at the top level of welfare policy making and administration. Welfare officials, for their part, took advantage of the interest group's presence to achieve what they had been unable to during the Monarchy's social offensive: collapsing old bureaucratic boundaries to build an all-encompassing, powerful state welfare apparatus.

On 16 December 1918, a leading authority in orthopedic rehabilitation and the de facto director of Reserve Hospital No. 11 in Vienna, Professor Hans Spitzky, convened a meeting with delegates from the hospitals' disabled soldier-students, representatives from the Zentralverband, and officials from the Ministries of Social Welfare and Justice to discuss the future of the hospital's

affiliated Invalid Schools. Most pressing were the issue of staff salaries and the roles of the Invalid Schools in the future. Spitzzy quickly elevated these questions to the level of jurisdiction over disabled soldier welfare services. He complained that as many as five ministries had direct jurisdiction over these schools—the Reserve Hospital itself was under the Ministry of National Health, the craftsman-instructors were employed by the Ministry of Public Works, the hospital was still led by military personnel reporting to the Ministry of Military Affairs, the Agriculture Ministry had control over the agricultural training courses and instructional staff, and, last but not least, the Social Welfare Ministry supervised and paid for the schools' training and welfare programs. But the schools' three goals—work therapy, enabling disabled men to return to their old occupations, and preventing patients from idling in the hospital—could not be separated. Furthermore, only 5 percent of the trainees needed to learn a new trade, which rendered the Ministry of Public Works' involvement mostly irrelevant. Spitzzy wanted the Ministry of Social Welfare to unite all these jurisdictions for a smooth transformation of the schools for the future. The Zentralverband's Hollitscher quickly seconded Spitzzy's proposal and underlined his organization's desire to see all war victim welfare services united under the Social Ministry.¹¹¹

Spitzzy reciprocated Hollitscher's support immediately. He gladly seconded the Zentralverband's wish to establish a codetermination administrative board—with three Zentralverband appointees and four trainee appointees on the sixteen-person body—to oversee the Invalid Schools. Spitzzy also supported Hollitscher's demand that the Council of State should concentrate the power, resources, and personnel related to training disabled soldiers in the Social Welfare Ministry. This proposal received unanimous support from the meeting's attendees.¹¹²

What transpired during and after the 16 December 1918 meeting suggested that the welfare power concentration proposal was encouraged, if not silently orchestrated, by the Social Welfare Ministry. As if they had scripted the exchange, the duo of Spitzzy and Hollitscher, one an expert medical official and the other the head of a new interest group for welfare clients, gave the Social Welfare Ministry a democratic, bottom-up cover to assert its leading position in welfare policy making. Welfare officials found in organized war victims an ally in realizing the state's new mission as the primary and direct welfare provider. The presence of organized client-citizens helped officials fight bureaucratic battles to create a unified and robust welfare bureaucracy.

The 16 December 1918 resolution led to a Council of State decision to clarify the jurisdiction over disabled soldier welfare. In response, Social Minister

Hanusch convened an interministerial conference on 27 December. The Zentralverband was invited to sit at the table as a legitimate and central stakeholder with the delegates from other ministries. Revolutionary though that may have been, the next logical question, concerning the power balance within this new state-client group partnership, remained to be determined.

Hanusch acknowledged that the fragmentation of welfare services for disabled soldiers had “become a burning” issue at the 27 December meeting. But it was impossible to introduce fundamental changes immediately because “the incoming [Constituent] National Assembly would ultimately decide the future shape of the state administration and any necessary reform.” As a stopgap solution, he proposed a new interministerial commission. This “highest official body” of decision making and coordination would be crucially different from the 1918 informational interministerial commission, in that organized disabled soldiers would participate fully. Technically, the new interministerial commission would still be of an “advisory” nature, discussing and drafting consensus proposals so that the responsible ministry could formulate its legally effective decisions. The Provincial Commissions for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers would be placed under the interministerial commission’s supervision, and organized disabled soldiers would participate in their day-to-day operations. Hanusch asked the attendees “whether the provisional solution was adequate to eliminate existing difficulties” and “whether organized disabled soldiers agree to it.”¹¹³

His proposal faced two challenges. Representatives from other ministries unsurprisingly wondered whether the allegedly inherent problems with fragmented jurisdictions were exaggerated and questioned the necessity of yet another interministerial commission. They suggested that the Social Welfare officials already had overall supervisory power over multiagency operations. This challenge immediately met with rebuttals. Hanusch’s top lieutenant for disabled soldier affairs, Division Chief Gasteiger, declared the supposed supervisory power of the Social Welfare Ministry “illusory” as long as the necessary resources were controlled by others. Hanusch, again, emphasized that the interministerial commission was conceived “absolutely only as advisory, not a decision-making organ. Executive decisions would still be made by the responsible ministries.”¹¹⁴ Julius Strommer, a disabled soldier representative, blamed the “manifold jurisdictional conflicts” for unacceptable delays, which “have become catastrophic.” Strommer urged the officials to take an even more drastic step: making the proposed commission an executive entity, not merely an advisory one. Compared to Strommer’s demand, Hanusch’s proposal suddenly looked moderate.¹¹⁵

Strommer's preference to do away with any jurisdictional division was where the second challenge lay. What Hanusch deemed legally possible and politically realistic did not satisfy war victim activists. Knowing well that their influence in the proposed interagency body was a foregone conclusion, the Zentralverband representatives raised the stakes by asking the proposed interministerial commission to be invested with as much power as possible. Believing themselves to be negotiating from a position of strength, the activists sought to formalize and elevate the institution they would be part of.

Organized war victims wanted to work with(in) the state, but their agenda did not fully align with that of the similarly collaboration-ready Hanusch. Calling their demand an attempt to run "a parallel government," Hanusch asked war victims to trust his coalition government that operated "in the realm of the possible" and had invited disabled soldiers to collaborate in the first place.¹¹⁶ To appease the disabled veterans, Hanusch and Gasteiger explained that the proposed commission would not, after all, be strictly advisory. The ministries would designate permanent representatives to participate in ongoing discussions. Before each meeting they would obtain clear instructions from their ministers on each of the issues on the day's agenda. Then they would be expected to "vote without reservations" and reach "agreements" on behalf of their agencies with organized war victims in the commission meetings. The agreed proposals would then be forwarded to the responsible ministries.¹¹⁷ What was left unsaid was that the ministries were expected to abide by the new commission's consensus. In essence, the proposed commission would be a genuine decision-making organ in all but name.

The Zentralverband representatives were not satisfied. One of them, Josef Löweschek, emphatically denied any desire for a parallel government or "striving for a state within a state." The proposed commission fell well short of their expectation of "a unified central agency to which [we] can turn for any issue." But they were willing to accept a commission being authorized to "make immediate decisions over less important matters." To Hanusch, what Löweschek asked for was still impossible; the government ministers, who by law had the final authority over any decisions that would involve their agencies, would not have time to personally attend the commission meetings to make its resolutions formal and legally binding. Hanusch again invoked the more-than-advisory role of the proposed commission: "Invalids should be assured that any realistic resolution [of the proposed commission] would be accepted by the responsible minister."¹¹⁸ Formal and strict adherence to legality in a revolutionary environment would

be complemented by flexibility in actual processes. The letter of the law would be followed, but power would be tacitly exercised through a consensus model.

Hanusch helped democratize welfare politics by formally involving war victims in policy making. He also had to contain their grassroots radicalism, as the activists wanted to wield the new (semi-)institutional power to bring about immediate changes as they saw fit. They repeatedly demanded “an immediate unification of all agencies tasked with providing disabled soldier welfare service in ONE building, in ONE official center, under ONE leadership” in the meetings.¹¹⁹ After several back-and-forth exchanges, an exasperated Hanusch shot back, “The invalids’ organization imagines itself as a state agency too much. But it is not. It is an organization like any other corporate body which constitutes itself and has no more and no fewer rights than any other.” Pausing to amplify the impact of his words, the minister continued: “About the concentration of all invalid affairs in one building, for the record, the Ministry of Social Welfare has for a long time tried to find a suitable house. But one cannot perform miracles.”¹²⁰ The activists had underestimated the readiness of Hanusch, an experienced trade union leader who had a reputation for consensus building, to confront his supposed political allies and uphold the principles of administrative legality.¹²¹

The showdown between the political partners seemed to have relaxed when the conversation veered to the future of the Invalid Schools, the original purpose of the meeting. After some amicable discussion on that topic, Hanusch suddenly and “emphatically asked” the Zentralverband representatives “if they agree to the creation of the interministerial commission according to the proposal.” He “expressly demands consent from the invalid representatives” on the spot.¹²² Stunned by the ambush, and probably not fully recovered from the earlier tongue-lashing, Strommer gave in, reluctantly noting that this was only an emergency measure before the upcoming broader reform.¹²³ Despite the government’s need to keep the Zentralverband on board, Hanusch did not concede more power to his partner than he had to.

In the resulting interministerial Standing Commission for Invalid Welfare, the Zentralverband was the only nonministerial voting member. As proposed by Hanusch, the technically “advisory” body was in reality a consensus-generating mechanism set to deliberate and vote on “a) all matters related to the fundamental questions of war victim welfare; b) war victim welfare legislation; and c) all war victim welfare matters requiring multiple ministries’ cooperation to process.” Composed of representatives from thirteen different ministries (one from each) and the Zentralverband, all motions and proposals on substantive issues had to be agreed upon unanimously. The Zentralverband had not only

voting rights but also de facto veto power.¹²⁴ Hanusch had chided its leaders for imagining themselves to be running a state agency, but in the end he did allow them a parastatal role. Entering a partnership with the state in exchange for real influence and tangible material benefits, the Zentralverband had to accept the perimeters set by Hanusch. By working with the Zentralverband, Hanusch co-opted the war victims' radical-revolutionary potential.

The Partnership of the Weak

In the eyes of its demanding citizens, the parliamentary democratic experiment did not automatically guarantee a free pass for the Republic.¹²⁵ Facing a hungry, disoriented, and restless population, the republican state—especially the battered administrative apparatus it had inherited from the Monarchy—was a relatively weak actor in the postwar political arena. It had only a small and improvised Volkswehr to defend itself against internal threats from the radicals (especially the Communists) and external threats from other successor states claiming various parts of what the Republic considered its “natural” territories.¹²⁶ The relationship between Vienna and the provinces was not clear, and in the western provinces of Tyrol and Vorarlberg separatist sentiments were brewing. The disastrous war and the association with the hated imperial house had undercut the legitimacy of the state administration; even the manhood and authority of career officials were questioned.¹²⁷ Soldiers and Workers Councils threatened to become an alternative public authority.¹²⁸ The subsistence crisis and the food riots that came with it persisted in the cities, while some soldiers of the collapsed Habsburg armed forces roamed the countryside in search of food on their way home; incidents of plunder prompted some locals to form armed “self-defense” groups that later morphed into right-wing militias.¹²⁹ To survive the multiple crises and the general atmosphere of desperation, the new regime had to generate goodwill among the population and, with very limited resources, reestablish the state's institutional credibility.

Addressing an issue where the previous regime's failure could easily be contrasted with the Republic's commitment was an obvious approach to build trust and support. War victim welfare was one such issue, and its political weight was especially amplified by the victims' undeniable and very visible suffering.¹³⁰ In a February 1919 public meeting of Viennese war victims, Deputy Interior Minister Otto Glöckel made clear that welfare provision would prove the Republic's moral superiority and competence: “As the Monarchy has placed the burden of sacrifice, especially surrendering health, on your shoulders, the free Republic

will see to it that your sacrifices will be made up for to the fullest extent. It will make sure that these sacrifices will not have been in vain.”¹³¹

War victims seized the initiative at the right moment. With enterprising leaders who possessed organizational talents, “the poorest of the poor” (their favorite public self-description) turned disadvantage and disability into a huge advantage; they made the point about state welfare as moral imperative when the state was seeking a supportive constituency. These physically weaker members of society aggressively made their claims, usually in words, sometimes with deeds, but seldom with violence.¹³² Besides moral arguments, their leaders deftly used a mixture of appeals to sympathy—though they preferred to characterize the cause as a pure matter of right and obligation—and threats of radicalization—for example, working with the Communists¹³³—to force their agenda on the state. They elbowed out other competitors and claimed a larger share of public resources; according to a Zentralverband leader’s public announcement, one-sixth of the annual national budget for the 1919/1920 fiscal year would be devoted to war victim welfare-related expenses.¹³⁴

The moral claims of organized war victims met no strong public challenge. Criticisms were usually based on the perception of comparative deprivation, or the possible overburdening of state finances by certain war victim welfare practices. No one challenged the idea that war victims should be given long-term public aid and a certain degree of power over the administration of that aid.¹³⁵ Thanks in part to this advantageous position, war victims were able to achieve extensive codetermination power as the state’s partner.

In January 1919, a Zentralverband leader publicly suggested the potential use of violence to boycott or overturn the hated military invalid superarbitration procedure, after war victims discovered that the commission members who decided their degree of disability and hence the amount of pension benefits were the same people who had “overzealously” sent them to war in the first place.¹³⁶ They especially resented the presence and influence of Ministry of Finance representatives who, they believed, were determined to pay war victims as little as possible.¹³⁷ Not long after this threat, the procedure and composition of the commissions were changed. As of mid-February 1919, representatives and doctors sent by the war victim organization sat on all Military Invalid Superarbitration Commissions in equal numbers with the officials, and they enjoyed the tiebreaker in voting.¹³⁸ On the policy level, the Zentralverband representatives joined the interministerial commission with de facto veto power. Through this commission, the Zentralverband participated in drafting what would become

the Invalid Compensation Law of 1919, the cornerstone of the Republic's new war victim welfare system.¹³⁹

The organized war victims' success in turning physical weakness into political strength depended to a large extent on both the state's weakness and its willingness to especially favor them. Beyond political incentive, some government leaders also believed that the Republic's viability was tied to all its citizens having the opportunity to contribute with what creative and working power they had—in other words, their economic productivity and political freedom.¹⁴⁰ Social Minister Hanusch argued that “hiring war-disabled employees is not only a result of humane considerations for broken lives, but also a social obligation. This is because the society would lose all their productive power—their capabilities may be reduced but still are serviceable and able to contribute.”¹⁴¹ In terms of why war victims should receive extra attention from the state, Hanusch's thinking was geared more toward building the future, while the war victims' moral arguments emphasized rectifying the past. No wonder he was criticized by some war victim leaders, for his rationale could potentially undermine their claim to special status by equating them, at least functionally and medically, to other disabled workers.¹⁴²

Nevertheless, Hanusch's thinking neither contravened nor veered far from the enlightened-interventionist ethos of the Austrian state administration. And it echoed war victims' belief in the state's intrinsic responsibility for ensuring or even enhancing its citizens' welfare. Preserving or restoring war victims' productive power was the Austrian state doing what was expected of it. Hanusch's language was one war victims understood. The state leaders and war victims may have had different reasons for entering into their partnership. But sharing strong democratic aspirations in a revolution, the two sides had enough common ground, on matters of both principle and material interest, to work with one another.

In a sense, state officials helped create their partner in the partnership they needed. The Republic's officials were eager to have war victims, united and organized, on their side. If they became allies or at least remained friendly neutrals, strengthening these organized war victims would mean helping the Republic to survive the early postwar chaos. When Hanusch sent the Finance Ministry the war victim welfare expenditure estimates for the 1919/1920 fiscal year, he added an unusual item to the budget: subsidies to war victim organizations totaling 300,000 kronen. The subsidies were to help war victim organizations cover their general expenses and, significantly, came with no prescribed uses. Compared to the amount needed to pay for inflation-adjusted pensions and other benefits

under the new Invalid Compensation Law, 351.21 million kronen, it was only a small sum. But Hanusch felt compelled to justify it. State welfare provision, he explained, had to be complemented by the work of war victim organizations. Otherwise war victims would be led astray: "Only with the support of the will of the greatest majority of invalids will it be possible to effectively counter the unjustified wishes of individuals and representatives of small groups. The existence of a strong organization is even more important when individual invalids are all too easily exploited by a malcontent element."¹⁴³ Hanusch and his colleagues saw a strong and well-organized war victim movement as a necessity to counter radicals. The state-centered mainstream war victims certainly gave credence to this political calculation.

Sponsoring the war victim movement was not a brand-new policy, however. The Social Ministry first subsidized the Zentralverband and its publication *Der Invalide* with an immediate payment of 10,000 kronen in November 1918, shortly after the organization's founding.¹⁴⁴ State officials urged disabled war veterans to join the Zentralverband to make it strong, explaining that the organization would help war victims receive public assistance in a timely fashion or just help them survive.¹⁴⁵ And the state was willing to provide the Zentralverband with resources for these purposes, making the latter practically its agent. On 4 January 1919 the Zentralverband requested an immediate subsidy of 60,000 to 80,000 kronen, to be distributed to needy war victims who came to the organization for help. The Social Ministry approved a subsidy of 50,000 kronen, made available to the Zentralverband before 13 January.¹⁴⁶ During the 24 March meeting of the interministerial commission, the Social Ministry authorized a same-day 5,000-kronen subsidy after the Zentralverband's representatives asked for funding to facilitate its upcoming national conference, which was scheduled to discuss the bill that would later become the Invalid Compensation Law.¹⁴⁷ When the Zentralverband faced disintegration in spring and summer 1919, Hanusch and Interior Ministry officials personally intervened and tried to broker a compromise that would lead to the re-creation of a united and all-inclusive war victim group.¹⁴⁸ The state desperately needed to attract this particular constituency and was willing to create and foster it with multiple forms of investment.

Cooperating with organized war victims brought another key benefit to the state: locating and reconnecting with this segment of the citizenry. The Republic, like the Monarchy, had no reliable information about who and where the war victims were. On 23 April 1919, the Social Ministry stated that it "believes that a fair distribution of the aid would be best carried out by the organized invalids themselves."¹⁴⁹ Therefore, before war victims actually began to receive

their newly designed pension benefits under the Invalid Compensation Law, for which they could apply only after 1 July 1919, the state deputized the Zentralverband to administer a 2-million-kronen stopgap program (Lebensmittelaktion) to distribute living necessities to war victims.¹⁵⁰

Many war victims were mobilized, registered, and organized through this program, with the powerful incentive of food packages paid for by the state and distributed through “their own people” in the Zentralverband. The state, at the same time, got a chance to know this significant constituency because it closely monitored the Zentralverband’s operations and required the latter to submit detailed reports. This deputization of state power thus prepared war victims for future welfare measures without the state overtly giving away its authority. A few telling numbers reinforce this point: during the first installment of the Lebensmittelaktion in May 1919, 20,263 people received assistance in Vienna, with nearly 17,000 Zentralverband members participating.¹⁵¹ The second installment immediately followed. This time the number of Zentralverband members receiving packages jumped to 40,000 in just one month,¹⁵² translating into another 20,000-plus constituents—and potential supporters of the new Republic—being identified and becoming beneficiaries of the state (and the Zentralverband, of course).

Through the enabling agent of the Zentralverband, the state could reestablish a semidirect, positive connection to individual war victims. The state was delivering, in the form of foodstuffs, at times of severe food shortages.¹⁵³ The Lebensmittelaktion also worked symbolically among the general population, as this program could substantiate the claim of crucial differences that distinguished the new Republic—a “social” one—from the previous regime. Having a comparatively moderate war victim organization carry out the program also helped cover the state’s left flank, as people would flock to join the Zentralverband instead of the Communists or other far-left radicals.

For war victims, the “partnership of the weak” ensured their status as privileged clients of the state. War victim representatives sat on almost all state committees and commissions that dealt with invalid affairs.¹⁵⁴ Being part of the decision-making processes up and down the welfare structure, the Zentralverband made sure its members would be considered for employment in public welfare agencies, such as the newly established Invalid Offices.¹⁵⁵ Activists saw the nondisabled veteran Pöggstall (Lower Austria) Invalid Office director as “stealing one disabled veteran’s bread.”¹⁵⁶ A war victim demanded that if the official Pension Offices had to hire women clerks, they should hire fallen soldiers’ widows or daughters and not, as had been the case, former imperial officers’

or bureaucrats' daughters.¹⁵⁷ The Invalid Office in Braunau am Inn (Upper Austria) ended up with an all-disabled veteran staff and embodied a new, client-friendly administrative culture.¹⁵⁸ Organized war victims even successfully put some of their leaders on state payrolls, arguing that as resident interest-group representatives in government offices, they assisted officials by advising war victims and thus contributing to more efficient operations.¹⁵⁹

In sum, allowing organized war victims to share power was the state's successful strategy to "buy" support from a key group of citizens. In a passionate plea to Linz war victims, a Social Democrat parliamentarian emphasized that the passage of the Invalid Compensation Law in spite of deep fiscal crisis was the proof that the Republic would fulfill "one of its primary duties"—taking care of war victims.¹⁶⁰ Making concessions to organized war victims was at once a partial solution to the pressing subsistence crisis, a symbolic exercise to (re)gain legitimacy and hence popular support from the electorate, and a political move to fend off competing appeals from those who envisioned a very different socio-political order. It was telling that a war victim leader bitterly complained in late 1919, "During the time of Communism the Zentralverband was an important prop for the government. . . . This government would not have survived had the Zentralverband declared itself communist. We thought we could [as a result] get the thanks of the government."¹⁶¹ As the threat from the Communists had receded, some wondered if the state would honor all its promises.

A critical voice from within the war victim movement confirmed the success of the partnership in creating understanding, if not enthusiastic support, for the Republic and its government. In the Pottendorf (Lower Austria) local chapter's 10 August 1919 meeting, the Zentralverband representative Weissteiner observed that many war victims thought "the government has tried to fulfill its duties towards widows and orphans as much as possible, or at least well enough to offer them the minimum of what people had been promised during the national election campaigns." The visitor from Vienna added that the Ministry of Social Administration was indeed trying to do its best, but other ministries were not. He wanted an intensified mobilization of war victims so that more pressure could be put on the authorities.¹⁶² If war victim leaders thought their members needed to be more confrontational, then the partnership did fulfill its intended role for both partners.

A Participatory Revolution

War victims were the most concrete symbol of the old regime's failed war. They were highly visible and vocal. Author Joseph Roth remarked in 1919 that it was

“an exception that today there was not a single demonstration held by war widows on the Ring,” the famed circular boulevard in central Vienna.¹⁶³ As “the poorest of the poor” in an exhausted postwar society, they had the potential to become either the showcase of the Republic’s superiority and *raison d’être* or the radicals’ pawns in a Bolshevik-style revolution. Different political forces did indeed try to tap that potential.¹⁶⁴ Due to their undisputed suffering, war victims became a group that, at least for a while, enjoyed societal sympathy, which in turn enabled them to leverage public attention and resources.

The war victims’ political potential was a self-fulfilling prophecy. The more different political forces believed in it, and the more they tried to realize it, the more formidable the war victims’ perceived and real power became. This bidding for the war victims’ support only reified and reinforced their political weight. For their putsches, the Communists tried to capitalize on the war victims’ frustration and took advantage of others’ unwillingness to confront war victims. The mainstream, established parties in the Constituent National Assembly competed to show their solidarity with war victims. They all agreed on a collective duty towards the welfare of war victims as well as the imperative of its immediate fulfillment. Both Social Democrats and Christian Socials sent their delegates to the Zentralverband’s first national congress on 20 and 21 April 1919. After all, in a country of 6 million, a movement claiming to have 180,000 members in spring 1919, with the potential to expand to well over 300,000, was not a constituency any political force could afford to neglect.¹⁶⁵

But the war victims’ special status would not be sustainable without more or less coherent voice and representation. The Zentralverband was where their weight really crystallized. Crucially, it could appeal to the largest possible number of potential members and different political forces. Organized war victims were undeniably closer to the Social Democrats in political orientation, but their eruption onto the political scene in November 1918 made it possible to operate as an independent force.

This episode serves as a reminder that the sociopolitical milieu parties—the Social Democrats, Christian Socials, and German Nationalists—did not monopolize Austrian public life for the entire duration of the First Republic. The thesis of all-powerful milieus may sum up the polarized political landscape of the late 1920s and early 1930s. But it was not adequate for the early postwar years. The Zentralverband proved that there was room for sociopolitical movements to carve out their niches without being absorbed into the milieu structures. Frustrated and aggressive Viennese women of lesser means, under the desperate wartime circumstances, showed that it was possible for previously disenfranchised or marginalized people to enter the political realm and make themselves heard

(or feared).¹⁶⁶ The war victim movement's emergence followed a similar politicization process: war-induced miseries generated new political activism to assert one's rights and protect one's interests. The democratic and national Austrian Revolution of 1918 was an expression of this new form of popular politics.

The popular, direct-participation energy did not dissipate after the proclamation of a democratic republic, and this energy was presumably not only channeled through or solidified from within the existing milieu structures. Milieu-party politics was just one among several forms of public engagement through which people identified themselves or competed for resources. They all had to work hard to establish themselves as not only legitimate but also the most effective means for political participation. The once-active workers' and soldiers' councils (modeled after the soviets in the Russian Revolution) were but the most noticeable alternative to a political culture dominated by the milieu parties. The war victim movement showed that, even without comprehensive political programs or elaborate, all-encompassing ideologies, other social groups also successfully influenced public policies in this window. Established milieu parties, in fact, had to adjust to the new landscape. The master organizer Social Democratic Party was outorganized by disabled veterans, because it did not realize early enough how revolutionary the Revolution of 1918 was.

The partnership between the state and organized war victims was an important but overlooked aspect of the Revolution of 1918. Seen from a structural perspective, however, the mutually beneficial relationship between organized war victims and the republican state was both a postimperial revolution and a continuation of pre-1918 developments. What was fundamentally revolutionary was formerly invisible client-citizens organizing themselves to become an assertive welfare actor. And it was not with the people who gave (donors, philanthropists, volunteers) but with the people who received that the state went into partnership.¹⁶⁷ With savvy organization, an administrative and colloquial category—people who previously were mostly the objects of others' actions—turned into a movement with its own agency, actively reshaping the meaning and practice of citizenship. It showed that the degree of postwar democratization went far beyond the consolidation and affirmation of the constitutional principles of parliamentary government based on universal and equal suffrage.

On the other hand, the partnership was the continuation of state authorities' reliance on nonstate actors, especially organized citizens, to provide care and welfare to war victims.¹⁶⁸ The Zentralverband's role in helping the state locate, register, and serve future clients was the latest iteration of this general pattern. Furthermore, the formation of the partnership and the officials' willing

contribution to the growth and appeal of the Zentralverband were reminiscent of what the same officials (with the important exception of Hanusch) had undertaken since early 1918: integrating nonstate actors into the state's expanding welfare infrastructure. The Zentralverband was not part of the state, and state officials certainly did not want it to become so, as Hanusch's outburst illustrates. But it was acting simultaneously as an interest group advocating for its members and an agent deputized to carry out the state's welfare interventions. The Republic opened the door for nonelite clients to become its partners, but the *modus operandi* was the same as in the last years of the Monarchy: identifying and deputizing friendlier social forces that could help shore up the state.

The partnership was born of necessity on both sides, and the exact power dynamic within the relationship was not predefined. It was definitely not a covert strategy to control civil society and manufacture agreeable public opinion, as some authoritarian and Communist regimes did later in the twentieth century. When the war victims pushed officials to abandon strict legality to elevate their parastatal status further, they were immediately rebuffed by none other than Hanusch, a long-term champion of the downtrodden and the working classes. Hanusch's criticism of the overreach made it clear that organized war victims were already a force to contend with, and that officials had to protect the integrity of the state apparatus from their own partner, the Zentralverband. In return for tangible benefits, the war victims realized they had to pay the price of being locked into a framework that presumed the continued existence and legitimacy of the current government and its apparatus. A moderate revolution in the form of participatory policy making was welcomed; a takeover by the clients was not.

A Republic with “the Correct National and Social Sensibilities”

THE INVALID COMPENSATION LAW of 25 April 1919 (*StGBL* 245/1919) was the cornerstone of post-World War I war victim welfare in Austria. It was also one of the first major social legislations of the Austrian Republic. State officials hoped it would “create a permanent order” in the midst of “world-shattering political upheavals and deepest turmoil among the peoples.”¹ Others wanted the new law to legally establish the social duty of providing for war victims so as to “win back those war-damaged persons as well as widows and orphans who have lost faith in humanity; to help those who, despite untold bitterness and suffering, still keep their last drop [of faith in humanity] cling to it.”² High hopes were placed in the Invalid Compensation Law, as the Monarchy failed to replace the outdated 1870s and 1880s military welfare laws until the bitter end. The new law’s potential beneficiaries were expected to be numerous and its costs very high. Of German-Austria’s approximately 6 million inhabitants, welfare officials estimated that more than a half million, including 100,000 disabled soldiers and their 80,000 dependent children, plus 125,000 widows and 225,000 orphans, could be eligible for the new law’s benefits. In a country whose very future was so uncertain, 374 million kronen, around one-sixth of the central state’s annual total revenues, would be needed to fund the provisions in the first year alone.³

This chapter looks at how the revolutionary environment reshaped existing state welfare institutions, reset the terms of debate, and reoriented legislative politics. It focuses on the interaction and negotiations between the more “regular” political actors—established political parties, career state officials, and parliamentarians (often representing new constituencies)—in the transition from the war-battered Monarchy to the revolutionary early Republic. It examines how they confronted the intertwined crises of subsistence and legitimacy in an atmosphere of heightened uncertainty and anxiety.

The debate over a new war welfare law began in earnest in 1917. By early 1919, welfare politics in general and war victim welfare in particular had been

catapulted to the forefront of the Republic's fight for legitimacy and survival. While the Revolution of 1918 and the perceived threat of another, Communist-led revolution injected new emphases and urgency into welfare state expansion, they also strengthened or made possible tendencies, such as demilitarization and nationalization, already begun during the Monarchy's failed social offensive. The revolutionary environment and structural trends combined to create a potent entitlement citizenship embodied in the Invalid Compensation Law. From a longer-term perspective, the October-November 1918 caesura in welfare politics was less a break than the accentuation of existing trends and the realization of long-standing policy ambitions.

Demilitarizing and Nationalizing War Welfare

On 11 November 1918, the day Emperor Karl formally renounced his participation in government affairs (but not outright abdication), the Council of State, as the Executive Committee of the German-Austrian Provisional National Assembly,⁴ approved the agenda of the next day's historic Provisional National Assembly session. The latter would swiftly—without committee deliberation—complete all three readings of the draft provisional constitutional law concerning the “forms of the state and of the government of German-Austria.” A democratic republic would be proclaimed,⁵ and its territories and boundaries defined.⁶

At this Republic-creating moment, the Council of State also adopted several urgent motions proposed by the minister of Social Welfare, Social Democrat Ferdinand Hanusch. A sum of 10 million kronen was given to the Social Welfare Ministry to find emergency accommodation for demobilized soldiers and another 1 million kronen for urgent youth welfare uses.⁷ Among the emergency authorizations, the most significant was to let the ministry take over the agendas of the Joint War Ministry's War Welfare Office. Even better for the Social Welfare officials, the new Ministry for Military Affairs would continue to pay essential War Welfare Office personnel until a further decision was made.⁸ This jurisdictional transfer marked the end of the military's control over most of the resources and programs dedicated to war welfare. The Austrian civil administration's desire to demilitarize war welfare finally became state policy.

The groundwork for the civilian takeover had been laid earlier. On 4 November, the Council of State already authorized the Social Welfare Ministry to provide material support to soldiers returning from the front and workers losing jobs in the wake of war industries' closings. The ministry was also instructed to produce and distribute flyers to publicize its emergency assistance measures

to calm the people. To finance these actions, the Council of State ordered that all established funds for war welfare—like the Emperor and King Karl Welfare Fund—that remained under the military's direct control or indirect influence be made available to the social minister.⁹ A similar process for military medical services followed on 7 November, when the Council of State instructed the Ministry of National Health to take over all relevant personnel, hospitals, institutions, and materials.¹⁰

Concerns over the political consequences of welfare services' nonfunctioning prompted the swift demilitarization of war welfare. The collapse of the Monarchy resulted in a temporary suspension of military invalid superarbitration commission proceedings.¹¹ In a 19 November meeting, Social Ministry's division chief Gasteiger told his colleagues from the Finance, Military Affairs, and Health Ministries that disabled soldiers' welfare was closely linked to "the maintenance of public calm and order," hence its urgency. The suspension of superarbitration proceedings, his deputy Friedrich Hock added, "has created an untenable situation and resulted in the rise of a general bitterness among those participating [in the process]." Hock insisted that "we have to change [the situation] without even the shortest delay. The only question is to choose between reactivating the old superarbitration commissions and creating new ones with a different composition and administrative affiliation."¹²

The gathered officials decided to reform the superarbitration process by reducing but not eliminating the military presence in the interests of speedier resumption of proceedings.¹³ The superarbitration commissions would be constituted anew. An officer would chair the panel, with two other physicians as members: one from the military, the other a civilian doctor nominated by the provincial government and preferably an examining physician from the regional accident insurance or health insurance fund.¹⁴ The emphasis on the expertise of physicians from accident insurance carriers came from the common contemporary view that war-induced disabilities were analogous to those resulting from industrial accidents, and disabled soldiers were comparable to disabled workers. Though disabled soldiers themselves resisted this analogy, it remained influential for welfare policy makers.

In addition to and reinforcing the demilitarization drive, the final member of the reconstituted superarbitration commission embodied the participatory decision-making ethos of the republican welfare service. In April 1918, Gasteiger already argued that the commission was originally asked to examine a soldier's suitability for military tasks, not how much he had suffered in terms of civilian earning power. If "even experienced physicians from the accident insurance fund

have great difficulty passing judgment on this problem," it would be necessary to change the superarbitration commission's composition accordingly. At the time, he considered involving representatives from organized labor to fill the role on an interim basis.¹⁵ But with the Republic, a more thorough change could be made: appointing a representative of local disabled soldiers as the fourth member of the panel, following the recommendation from the Provincial Commission for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers. The interministerial resolution added that it would be preferable if the representative was elected by local disabled soldiers themselves.¹⁶ On the same day of the meeting, the health minister asked the provincial governments to immediately nominate civilian doctors to the superarbitration commissions.¹⁷

The initiative and preparation of career officials such as Gasteiger and Hock made this particular reform possible. Less than a month earlier, all the participants at the 19 November meeting were career Habsburg bureaucrats. Now these same officials were spearheading the democratization and demilitarization of the welfare system. Their palpable sense of urgency was evidence of an easy transfer of loyalty from the Habsburg Monarchy to the national Republic, of the continuity of certain policy directions (such as demilitarization) preferred by some officials, and of the deepening fear of a second revolution on the Soviet model.¹⁸ Gasteiger and Hock's justification for a swift reform showed that demilitarized welfare was seen as a key weapon against political radicalization. A more thorough reform of the superarbitration process, nevertheless, was not finalized until February 1919.¹⁹

The demilitarization of war welfare was accompanied by an aggressive nationalization—in both the senses of being taken over by the state and of becoming nationalistic—of welfare institutions. The 4 November 1918 Council of State decision allowed the social minister to tap into previously military-controlled welfare funds. But Hanusch did not stop there. The Social Welfare Ministry took over the Emperor and King Karl War Welfare Fund the next day and appointed one of Gasteiger's assistants as the commissioner in charge. The fund's eight-person executive committee, whose membership included the Joint War Minister, his leading official for disabled affairs, and two other high-ranking officers, was dissolved. Only two of the eight members, both civilians, were retained to work with the new commissioner. Together the three represented the fund to sign off on financial transactions.²⁰ Direct civilian state control replaced the semiofficial status and military influence that had defined the wartime fund governance.

Nationalizing welfare resources and institutions by decree was still controversial, even in a revolutionary context. On 18 November, the Social Welfare

Ministry convened a meeting to discuss the future of the War Blind Fund (Kriegsblindenfonds). Gasteiger, who chaired the meeting, suggested that the “changed political situation” required a reorganization of the fund, which had operated semi-independently within the military-controlled public war welfare and charity complex. Baron Joseph von Wolf, a retired high official and a trustee of the fund, hesitated. He pointed out that the fund was an independent legal entity and only its board of trustees could amend its statutes and effect any desired change. Under existing statutes, moreover, the fund had to continue granting assistance “to all the war-blinded soldiers of the former Austrian state” regardless of these men’s nationality or current citizenship. The editor of the *Neue Freie Presse*, Ernst Benedikt, objected to this imperial perspective and claimed that private contributions collected through his newspaper’s donation drives came exclusively from German Austrians. Only after getting Benedikt’s input did Hanusch reveal his own position: the 4 November authorization had given him the power to control the fund and, at least tentatively, the fund should serve only applicants who had legal domicile in German-Austria.²¹

The Austrian state’s top in-house attorney and a member of the original board of trustees, Finance Procurator President Hermann Mayr von Linegg, supplied the legal justification Hanusch and Gasteiger needed to nationalize (in both meanings of the word) the War Blind Fund. Because the trustees were not re-nominated after “new state-founding,” Mayr argued, “the Council of State, and therefore the Ministry of Social Welfare, takes over from the defunct board as the [new] trustees of the fund and issue all relevant decisions in the board’s place.” It would be prudent, though, for the Social Welfare Ministry, as the fund’s administrator, to take into account the diverse sources of the fund in making grant decisions. Mayr added that the ministry should appoint an advisory committee and invite a representative from organized disabled soldiers to sit on it.²²

The War Blind Fund consequently underwent a drastic change in its leadership and character. Previously, its twenty-six-member board of trustees was a mixture of the cream of the professions, aristocratic philanthropy, academic expertise, officialdom, and religious establishments, typical of major semipublic wartime welfare initiatives and organizations. Half of the trustees carried noble titles.²³ After Hanusch’s takeover, the Social Welfare Ministry built a “small committee” to “examine grant applications and give the Ministry of Social Welfare a cover vis-à-vis the public.” Only five original trustees were retained. On 22 November, four new members were invited, to represent (1) the disabled soldiers’ organization; (2) employers, to be nominated by the Association of German-Austrian Industries in Vienna; (3) employees, to be nominated

by the Austrian Trade Union Commission; and (4) agricultural interests, to be nominated by the Agricultural Ministry. Among the few select former trustees attending the 18 November meeting, Baron von Wolf was the only one who was not asked to continue on the reformed committee.²⁴

Nominating representatives from the employers' association, organized labor, and farming interests reflected exactly the "bourgeoisie, farmers, and workers" revolutionary tripod to which the Provisional National Assembly explicitly appealed when proclaiming the Republic on 12 November 1918.²⁵ The nationalized War Blind Fund's new leadership thus embodied the official doctrine of—and probably the hope some leaders had for—the Republic; Social Democrat Otto Bauer's formula of the balance of class power comes to mind.²⁶ Including interest group representatives in welfare agencies' operation—in place of the old social elite—foreshadowed the participatory model of the Republic's welfare administration in particular and the new rules of the political game in general.

Old military welfare institutions had to become national in a hurry. On Christmas Day 1918, the Vienna Invalid House commander Lieutenant Colonel Zerbs and the Lerchenfeld Branch Invalid House commander Major Allgayer were relieved of their duties, because they "do not understand they are here to serve the interests of invalids, and they are not German-Austrian citizens." Major Eugen von Rehn, with legal domicile in Troppau/Opava in Silesia, a region claimed by both German-Austria and Czechoslovakia, was appointed acting commander to "safeguard the German-Austrian interests." Lieutenant Colonel von Eberle, with legal domicile in Vienna, would take over after the reorganization of the Vienna Military Invalid House. In the future, the liquidating Vienna Military Command declared, only disabled young general staff officers would be chosen to lead these institutions, alleging only they would serve the residents with full dedication and understanding.²⁷ Only two months after the end of the multinational Monarchy, the essentialist understanding of each person's national identity had quickly become the indicator of an officer's ability to fulfill his assignment. Not being a German-Austrian citizen was equated with a lack of understanding of the true interests of the disabled soldiers under his command.²⁸

Nationalizing war welfare resources and services in post-Habsburg Central Europe inevitably led to international complications. Soldiers had become disabled serving a multinational polity in the nonnational Habsburg armed forces, and where they resided was often not their putative national homeland.²⁹ After the Monarchy's dissolution, many war victims found themselves in the "wrong" national homelands and encountered difficulties in claiming or collecting welfare benefits. After all, the supposedly national successor states had not sent the

soldiers to war. Even if the Monarchy's war welfare measures were still in effect, the successor states preferred to pay "their own" living outside the national homelands rather than "foreign nationals" at home. This was the case between the new Czechoslovakian state and the Austrian Republic.

Otto Bauer, as the Republic's foreign minister, admitted that his government had suspended payments of military pensions and wartime living allowances (continuing until six months after the war's end, as decreed in 1915) to Czechoslovakian citizens living in German-Austria because there were simply too many of them. On 9 December 1918, however, he recommended the resumption of payments after the Czechoslovakian government's protest. Prague stated that it had been paying benefits to German-Austrian citizens living in its territory, and it expected reciprocity.³⁰ The impulse to nationalize existing welfare services had temporary limits, after all, thanks to the former zone of free movement created by Imperial Austria over the nineteenth century.³¹

The double process of demilitarizing and nationalizing welfare services was closely intertwined with the thorny issues of legality and continuity in the ongoing Austrian Revolution. As the new rulers of Austria, the leaders of the major parliamentary parties agreed on the necessity of intensifying direct state social intervention to stave off the subsistence crisis and to defuse political radicalization, as foodstuff delivery from the new successor states stopped almost entirely, and the Communist-influenced Red Guards and the Soviet-style council movement were expanding rapidly. In the hectic days of late October and November, the Council of State's deliberations focused as much on providing for the population as on organizing the new Republic, maintaining order, and securing borders and disputed territories in the German-speaking parts of Bohemia and Moravia. How and where to find food supplies and fuel were unsurprisingly often on the Council of State agenda.³² So were clothing supplies. On 16 November, a 100-million-kronen credit to the Lower Austrian Public Clothing Office from a consortium of Viennese banks and savings banks, with the Finance Ministry as guarantor,³³ was approved, presumably to procure material to dress returning soldiers and other civilians in desperate situations. At the urging of the Social Democrats, the Council of State also moved aggressively on symbolically significant social issues, such as the eight-hour workday and the possible expansion of social insurance.³⁴

High-level career civil servants had little trouble supporting and elaborating the Council of State's general policy of using welfare to protect the new Republic and establish its legitimacy. Gasteiger and his colleagues' active pursuit of demilitarization and nationalization was a good example. They did not seem

to have any qualms about serving the revolutionary regime; the fatherland was the same, whether it was a monarchy or a republic. This seamless transition was closely linked to their professional ambition: the leading welfare officials had been pushing for welfare expansion since the failed social offensive. In the politically murky days of October and November 1918, they continued to use welfare provision and welfare expansion to maintain "calm and order" in society and tackle the subsistence crisis at hand.³⁵ As the case of the War Blind Fund nationalization shows, the revolution was even a convenient pretext for steamrolling legal objections to what the state officials had wanted to accomplish all along. When to adhere to the principle of legality or what even constituted legality in times of "new state-founding" were understood very flexibly by state officials.

In fact, the revolution allowed state welfare officials to revisit one unsolved problem: clothing disabled soldiers. On 6 December, the Economy Ministry promised to release 10,000 suits at the price of 90–96 kronen each, 10,000 short winter coats at the price of 120 kronen each, and 10,000 pairs of military shoes at an estimated price of 40 kronen per pair to the Social Welfare Ministry and the Provincial Commissions for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers. The Lower Austrian Public Clothing Office would foot the bill, with the 100-million-kronen credit it recently received. The Economy Ministry also urged the Interior Ministry to stop hoarding clothing reserves, a policy that greatly frustrated Social Welfare officials in the spring and summer months, and make them available to disabled veterans. Finally, the Economy Ministry authorized the Provincial Commissions to help themselves "if there were state clothing depots (POW or refugee camps) near the Commission seats . . . and debit the agreed amount of 10,000 sets."³⁶ This sudden generosity—thanks to the revolution—may have been a response to the emerging separatism in Tyrol and Vorarlberg, with a small but concrete gesture of goodwill. Whatever the motive, the new clothing policy showed how the revolution drastically changed the horizon of possibility. To the same set of welfare officials, what was impregnable and impossible a few months before was suddenly feasible and happening.

The war welfare decisions made by the Council of State and ministerial officials may seem to have been reactions to short-term crises. But collectively, these reforms achieved what the leading welfare officials had been seeking since early 1918: demilitarizing and centralizing the war victim welfare system. Even the newly added participatory mechanisms, which integrated interest-group representation in decision making, were not an entirely new invention. The revolution, in other words, cleared the political, legal, or bureaucratic roadblocks to welfare initiatives already on the table.

A Law for “Today’s Social Conscience”

On 2 April 1919, Ferdinand Hanusch went before the German-Austrian Constituent National Assembly to introduce the provisional government’s bill “regarding the compensation claims based on military services.” Speaking to the delegates who were for the first time in Austrian history elected on the principle of universal and equal suffrage for both men and women and tasked with drafting the constitution, Hanusch’s passionate but calculated speech was in effect a state-defining moment: the welfare provision for disabled veterans and surviving dependents was no less than an act of legitimation for the new Austrian Republic.

Hanusch underlined the democratic nature of the bill. It was drafted “after long discussions and negotiations among ministries and with the invalids.” Neither accrued service years nor military rank would play any role in determining benefits eligibility and amount. Rather, “the harm [the military service did] to an invalid’s prospect of earnings” would be the sole determinant. The new law’s pension provision would be similar to that of the existing compulsory accident insurance and based on the claimant’s income before the war.³⁷ The Republic’s war welfare was meant for working citizens, not a special military caste. The pension was not to reward loyal service to a ruling house but to compensate for what citizens had lost economically in serving their country. The bill was democratically drafted for equal citizens.

The difference between the Republic and the Monarchy was emphasized at every turn. Like its predecessor, the new superarbitration commission would determine the actual benefit amount for individual beneficiaries. But representatives of the beneficiaries—disabled soldiers, widows, and orphans—would participate as voting members in any decision making. “Much hinges on the commission,” declared Hanusch, “as the best law could come to naught if the commission was too bureaucratic or petty minded. I would like to say here and now that the commission will not function like its predecessor, whose *modus operandi* was to be as bureaucratic as possible and inflict as much pain on war invalids as possible. Rather, [the new commission] will proceed in the most generous manner.” As the assembly broke into cheers, Hanusch added that any “financial effect” of squeezing deserving beneficiaries was absolutely disproportionate to the discontent it would provoke and therefore not the goal of the new commission.³⁸

Lofty ideas about the Republic had to be reconciled with the bleak postwar fiscal reality. The 1915 level of salaries and wages was adopted as the baseline

civilian income, in order to avoid wartime inflation's amplifying effect on the state's pension commitments. As this decision would result in real income loss for many families, the first year's pension would be boosted by an additional 50 percent supplement.³⁹ The bill was thus a compromise between "humane sensitivity" and the funding constraints. "In spite of some 'ifs' and 'buts' the invalids themselves have declared their readiness to accept this bill," Hanusch claimed.⁴⁰ By shrewdly invoking the consent of the proposed legislation's intended beneficiaries, he moved his audience's focus from the unfulfilled hopes to the affirmation of the democratic ways of the new Republic.

Reminding his audience that "we need to give the poorest of the poor a hand immediately,"⁴¹ the social minister admitted that the proposed legislation would be expensive. An amount between 360 and 380 million kronen was needed annually. This was the price to pay to carry the "sad legacy of the war. But today . . . we can't possibly give war invalids hurdy-gurdies (*Leierkasten*) and send them away [to beg on the street], as people did after previous wars." According to the Constituent National Assembly minutes, the house reacted to this Republic-affirming statement with a burst of loud approval. Hanusch continued: "It is against today's social conscience and something we simply couldn't do . . . so the healthy and those who are fit for work should make their share of sacrifice for the benefit of those who suffer because of the war. When we can't return fathers to their sons, husbands to their wives, and sons to their parents, we must at least take care of the unfortunate people financially, so that they do not have to panhandle, as was the case in the past."⁴²

The social minister ended his speech with another plea for speedy legislation. "Don't forget that we have hundreds of thousands of invalids, hundreds of thousands of orphans, and many, many widows in German-Austria that come into question; they are in a precarious financial situation, and really have no idea where they can turn for help." The proposed legislation was "an urgent matter." The assembly again responded to this mixture of admonition and pleading with cheers and applause and quickly sent the proposed legislation to the Committee for Social Administration for deliberation.⁴³

Hanusch "sold" the expensive new legislation not only with appeal to compassion, social solidarity, and the moral sensibility of the new era. He also enlisted an economic argument that had been deployed during the Monarchy's social offensive.⁴⁴ The in-kind benefits, such as free prosthetics and job training for disabled veterans, were aiming to rehabilitate disabled men's productivity. As a result of these services, "the invalid can return to his previous occupation or enter another one, thereby making him useful for the national economy."⁴⁵ In

other words, Hanusch intended the expanding welfare state to salvage disabled men's productive power just like his imperial predecessors: more for the collective good than for the individual's well-being.⁴⁶ The difference was that the discourse of productive power had a new nation-state/nationalist accent.

More importantly, the talk of the "sad legacy" was where the leaders of the early Republic sought to define the new state and its missions. The Republic was cast by Hanusch as an entity separated from and legally unconnected to the Habsburg Monarchy. His repeated condemnations of the Monarchy's treatment of war victims, whether fair or not, were part of a larger campaign to portray the Monarchy as the thoroughly guilty party, which culminated in the so-called Habsburg Law of 3 April 1919 (*StGBL.* 209/1919) that confiscated the properties of the House of Habsburg.⁴⁷ The Republic intervened as a compassionate caregiver and comforter out of a sense of social responsibility and solidarity (as well as economic awareness), not because it bore any guilt. Facing the mess left by the Monarchy, it would take action where the previous regime dithered. The Republic was thus defined against the failed Monarchy.

Having affirmed the revolution through the February 1919 Constituent National Assembly election and the Law on the State Form of 12 March 1919 (*StGBL.* 174/1919), Hanusch and the delegates of the assembly were very aware that they still had to create for the Republic a more tangible *raison d'être*. After years of deprivations, citizens needed more than grand declarations and elections to be won over, especially when the rising Communist challenge at home and in neighboring Hungary and Bavaria added fuel to the postimperial Central European chaos.⁴⁸ The welfare provision for war victims became a public stage on which the values and virtues of the Republic could be articulated, if not instantly delivered. Hanusch's speech on 2 April was exactly such a political theater of aspirations. Lacking real martyrs or founding mythologies, the not-too-dramatic Republic embraced the welfare state as the way to fortify itself.

The 2 April 1919 military welfare bill combined elements of both the familiar and the new. Despite the official insistence on the new system's groundbreaking nature, it foresaw a central state welfare apparatus that shared many features with the one the imperial regime had been building in its last months. The Provincial Commissions for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers would be succeeded by new Military Welfare Commissions in the provinces, provincial governors would continue to chair the new commissions, and various interests and constituencies would still be represented in these agencies. The Social Ministry would continue to build client-facing Invalid Offices in each district and plan to fund the operation of eighty offices.⁴⁹ The main difference was to explicitly designate the new




FIGURE 6.1. Ferdinand Hanusch, the former child laborer and Social Democratic activist who became the first social minister of the Austrian Republic. An unjustifiably neglected figure, he played a key role in stabilizing the Republic and shaping the modern Austrian social citizenship. ÖNB/Vienna P 5423/1.

commission, through its specialized committees and a professional staff, as the main state agency handling applications for war victim benefits. Another new feature was the regular, built-in appeal procedure. The full commission would serve as the first instance of review, while a new Military Welfare Court—in reality a special panel within the Administrative Court—would be the second and final instance to ensure the decisions about benefits were impeccably made.⁵⁰

The Social Ministry officials, mostly the same who spearheaded the 1917–1918 welfare administrative reforms, highlighted the proposed system’s “unified apparatus” that was fundamentally different from its imperial predecessor’s “autonomous entities, not integrated into the overall organization of the public authorities and not uniformly constructed.”⁵¹ But the proposed new system was in fact a further, more systematic, and more resolute step forward along the path already taken in 1918: replacing private or volunteer personnel and offices with

ones that would be within the regular official chain of command. From a structural point of view, the 2 April 1919 bill announced an aggressive project that had already commenced before the Revolution of 1918.

There were certainly revolutionary changes in the 2 April bill. The thorough demilitarization was an obvious example. The new Military Welfare Commissions would take over in the provinces all welfare agendas, not only from the old Provincial Commissions for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers but also all military and other civilian authorities. The Social Ministry officials even added more rhetorical fuel to the demilitarizing drive: "The horrible losses of health and human lives overwhelmingly punish those people called from civilian occupations, [but] only a slimmest fraction of professional soldiers."⁵² The 2 April bill's text, sixty-three articles in all, did not consider anything pertaining specifically to professional soldiers. Whether the proposed legislation would be applied to them was not even discussed.

The (future) beneficiaries' participation in devising the draft was perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of the 2 April bill. Through the permanent Inter-Ministerial Commission on Invalid Welfare, representatives from the Zentralverband had offered very extensive comments on a rough draft in February.⁵³ The 2 April bill was itself the first result as well as the initiator of the brand-new participatory mechanisms. It stipulated extensive client participation in the proposed new system. The Military Welfare Commissions would consist of: "1. Representatives from organized invalids and war widows as well as youth welfare organizations; 2. Representatives from the state financial administration; 3. Physicians from public health services, physicians appointed by organized invalids, and physicians familiar with war disability issues or from the workers' insurance funds; 4. Occupational training experts from the relevant fields; 5. Experts from workers' health insurance." Moreover, the committees of the proposed commissions, which would make decisions about important or disputed individual claims, would draw their voting members from among the "unsalaried" commissioners and in principle deliberate in public. These designs would ensure that in all key aspects and phases, the law's application would proceed with the participation and consent of clients' representatives.⁵⁴ The Republic's war victim welfare became an experiment in creating state agencies embodying both democratic governance and impartial public administration.⁵⁵

This experiment in creating a "new kind of authority" would obligate the welfare agencies to be helpers and guides for welfare applicants and beneficiaries, rather than their antagonists. On the other hand, the draft prescribed to the state finance administration an adversary role vis-à-vis the claimant in the application

process; it would be given the same right of appeal on any benefit decision. With the state finance administration cast as the villain, the institutional design of the new system suggested it would side more often with clients in its rulings because of the heavy presence of client representatives and the consensus-driven procedures. In some district-level Invalid Offices, this vision of a "service-oriented, collaborative," and "sympathetic" administrative culture was realized.⁵⁶

The 2 April bill's provisions also contained many egalitarian—revolutionary given the context—elements envisioned in the Social Democrats' 1917 proposal for the future war welfare. The first was in eligibility for and the design of disability pensions. As Hanusch declared, the disability pension would be based mainly on the degree of the decrease in the disabled veteran's civilian earning power. This principle eliminated military rank as a criterion in benefit decisions and made eligible all those who had performed nonmilitary war service (munition workers, for example) or volunteered in war programs controlled by the military, including women volunteers serving various military functions and in the Red Cross/Red Crescent.⁵⁷ With one stroke, the old military welfare laws as well as the Christian Socials' and German nationalists' 1917 proposals became obsolete.

A disabled veteran would be entitled to receive a pension if he lost at least 15 percent of the full earning power in his old occupation. A seven-class pension scale followed:

- Over 15 percent but under 25 percent: 20 percent of the full pension;
- Over 25 percent but under 35 percent: 30 percent of the full pension;
- Over 35 percent but under 45 percent: 40 percent of the full pension;
- Over 45 percent but under 55 percent: 50 percent of the full pension;
- Over 55 percent but under 65 percent: 60 percent of the full pension;
- Over 65 percent but under 75 percent: 75 percent of the full pension;
- Above 75 percent: full pension.

Any pension for below-15 percent beneficiaries would be too low to make a real difference and might even discourage "the will to work."⁵⁸ This concern reflected the goal of protecting national productive power that Hanusch also revealed in his speech.

The full pension in each case, meanwhile, was not a fixed amount. It was determined by a second key determinant: the prewar annual earned income of the disabled veteran in question. There were seventeen earned income brackets and seventeen corresponding levels of full pension based on the average annual earned income between 1 January 1913 and 31 December 1915. The actual

TABLE 6.1. War Disability Pension Schedule according to the 2 April 1919 Bill

Earned Income Bracket	Annual Earned Income Range (in kronen)	Median Annual Earned Income (in kronen)	Full Annual Pension (in kronen)	Degree of Income Replacement (in percentage)
1	up to 1200		1200	100.0 and above
2	over 1200 to 1440	1320	1320	110.0 to 91.7
3	over 1440 to 1680	1560	1440	100.0 to 85.7
4	over 1680 to 1920	1800	1560	92.9 to 81.3
5	over 1920 to 2160	2040	1680	87.5 to 77.8
6	over 2160 to 2400	2280	1800	83.3 to 75.0
7	over 2400 to 2640	2520	1920	80.0 to 72.7
8	over 2640 to 3120	2880	2160	81.8 to 69.2
9	over 3120 to 3600	3360	2400	76.9 to 66.7
10	over 3600 to 4080	3840	2640	73.3 to 64.7
11	over 4080 to 4560	4320	2880	70.6 to 63.2
12	over 4560 to 5040	4800	3120	68.4 to 61.9
13	over 5040 to 5520	5280	3360	66.7 to 60.9
14	over 5520 to 6000	5760	3600	65.2 to 60.0
15	over 6000 to 6480	6240	3840	64.0 to 59.3
16	over 6480 to 6960	6720	4080	63.0 to 58.6
17	over 6960		4320	62.1

SOURCE: Adapted from "Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden-und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetzes," Table 5, 49.

pension would be calculated by combining the seventeen-bracket pension schedule (see Table 6.1) and the seven-class scale. A 50 percent-disabled veteran who earned 900 kronen per year (the first income bracket) before 1915 would be entitled to an annual base pension of 600 kronen, because being in the fourth disability class (45–55 percent loss) entitled him to 50 percent of the full pension for his income bracket, which would be 1,200 kronen.

Correlating the prewar income and the pension level represented another victory for the Social Democrats, as theirs was the only wartime proposal that

used proportional income replacement and degree of disability as the paramount principles to calculate the base pension. However, a system that relied solely on prewar-service annual earned income would discriminate against a large number of disabled men (and women) who had not formally entered the labor market or were underemployed before war service. A minimum alternative pension scheme was stipulated for them. It used the applicant's educational attainment (four levels), place of residence (five levels), plus the degree of his/her loss of earning power to determine the annual pension.⁵⁹ The minimum full pension in this scheme, again 1,200 kronen per year, was for those who had a minimal formal education or training and lived in a community of fewer than 5,000 residents. The highest pension in this alternative scheme would be 3,360 kronen per year, awarded to a person who had finished secondary school or comparable occupational training and resided in Vienna. Both the earned income replacement schedule and the minimum alternative scheme would add an additional 10 percent of the beneficiary's actual pension (not the full pension for his income bracket) to his payment for each child he had to provide for.

The "completely helpless" (fully blind or paralyzed) disabled men who needed a dedicated caregiver would receive an annual supplement between 800 and 1,600 kronen per year, according to place of residence. This, explained the Social Ministry officials, was to match the benefits these seriously wounded men would have received—with injury supplements—under the older system. The new system added an additional 50 percent to the pension benefit in the first year of the entitlement for other "very needy" clients, so that the sum of the new benefits for them would not be lower than that under the Monarchy's patchwork program. The Republic simply could not leave the impression that its landmark welfare program offered less than what the failed Monarchy had.

Although the Christian Socials were in a governing coalition with the Social Democrats at this time, the new state welfare system did not enforce the supremacy of formal marriage as they had wished, nor a particular beneficiary's code of conduct as prescribed in the September bill. The pension benefits for survivors largely followed, again, the Social Democrats' preference. Not only was the gender equality of orphans secured, but the cut-off age for eligibility was raised to eighteen (or in some cases twenty-four). Unlike the condition-and caveat-laden September bill, the 2 April bill made no distinction between illegitimate and legitimate children if paternity could be demonstrated; the orphan pension would be a fixed portion of the full pension linked to the dead father's income bracket.

The same disregard for the older distinction between in-and out-of-wedlock relationships extended to the female cohabitant (*Lebensgefährtin*) of the dead soldier or veteran. As long as she had shared the same household with the man for at least two years before he was called to serve or died, she would enjoy the same entitlement as a legal wife, at 30 or 50 percent of the full pension depending on her age and ability to work. The Social Welfare officials had adopted the Social Democratic position that did not see a “marriage-like relationship . . . without the bond of the marriage vow” or illegitimacy as a matter of choice. They accepted that the old distinction penalized those whose nonnormative families were the result of unfavorable material circumstances in the first place and who, for that very reason, needed the benefits the most.⁶⁰

Likewise, the warrior homestead colony, a favorite solution of the German nationalists, was absent in the 2 April bill. There was an article allowing for lump-sum conversion of pension payments, but facilitating “settlement (*Ansiedlung*)” was only one of the acceptable reasons to activate the option. Instead of the more colonialist wartime term “homestead,” the more general term “settlement” was used. It also referred to urban, working-class housing and had more prosaic or even different ideological and class affinities. In the context of rapid nationalization, and especially with armed border conflicts flaring up with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in Carinthia and southern Styria,⁶¹ the colonizing fantasy was not totally delusional. However, with the German nationalists losing their primary power base in Bohemia and southern Moravia and hence parliamentary influence, the warrior colony homestead idea lost its main sponsor.

The 2 April bill envisioned a rehabilitation-and pension-centered system, taking workers’ accident insurance as the main model of reference. In a table designed for side-by-side comparisons, the government’s legislative note showed that for similar categories of beneficiaries, the new war victim pension scheme would yield more generous payments than those provided by the Workers’ Accident Insurance in all seventeen annual pension classes (income brackets).⁶² This underlined the two systems’ comparability in the minds of the leading officials, in addition to the anticipated involvement of the Workers’ Accident Insurance expertise. Contrary to the earlier wishes of organized disabled soldiers, Hanusch and his officials saw war victims as the equivalents to peacetime industrial accident victims in social policy making. That war victim welfare should be a stepping-stone toward a comprehensive social insurance-based welfare state, a policy direction espoused by the Social Democrats in 1917, had become the guiding principle for the Republic.

"We Cannot Allow Party Politics to Rule the Day"

On 11 April 1919, the Social Committee of Constituent National Assembly completed its examination of the 2 April bill.⁶³ The committee report, penned by trained carpenter and experienced health insurance administrator, Social Democrat delegate Laurenz Widholz, shows how parliamentarians' input further amplified the political significance of the very expensive welfare legislation.

The nationalization of welfare services and institutions received special attention from the Social Committee. The 2 April bill originally limited eligibility to those who had acquired the new German-Austrian citizenship by 1 March 1919. The early deadline was to discourage those former Imperial Austrian citizens who did not have a legal domicile in the current German-Austrian territory—most specifically Galician war refugees in Vienna⁶⁴—from applying for the new benefits by way of acquiring the new Austrian citizenship. The committee deemed this rule too strict, as many returning and not-yet-returned POWs would be excluded. It recommended 31 March 1919 as the new cut-off date. An exception was also made for POWs, many of them still in camps or in transit, but a high threshold was set: if they were not back in German-Austria by 1 March 1919, they had to show at least five years of regular residence (not necessarily legal domicile) within the German-Austrian territory before the war to be eligible for the new benefits.⁶⁵

Ostensibly concerned with the possible abuse of the Republic's generosity, the committee effectively made the new war victim legislation a means to enforce the ongoing nationalization. The new citizenship law of 5 December 1918 allowed former Imperial Austrian citizens with a legal domicile outside of the German-Austrian territory, except those originating from Dalmatia, Istria, and Galicia, to become republican Austrian citizens even if they established regular residence within the German-Austrian territories only after 1 August 1914.⁶⁶ The five-year eligibility rule for the new welfare benefits was much more stringent than the citizenship law in deciding who deserved a share of the state's resources. It represented a strong desire to discourage further inflow of people from the non-German-speaking crownlands of the former Monarchy.⁶⁷

The Social Committee wanted revisions that better calibrated the new law's political message. Adding "female citizens (*Staatsbürgerinnen*)" to Article 1 was to forcefully mark the gender equality of entitlement and, by extension, the gender-blind suffering and thus a broader view of who bore the war's grim burdens. Inserting "through no fault of one's own" to the same article had a

similar effect beyond legal clarification, in that it would affirm all beneficiaries to be technically innocent, and thus deserving, victims of war.⁶⁸ The law would be more explicit in constructing an official discourse of victimhood for war-affected people who suffered because of others' fault.

The title of the proposed legislation and the names of the agencies tasked with implementing it had to be changed, too. The original title of the 2 April bill, Law Regarding the Claims to Provision Based on Military Services (Law for the Provision to Invalids and Survivors), was "too narrow," asserted the Social Committee. It did not reflect the full range of prescribed benefits, because the term "provision" (*Versorgung*) often referred more specifically to pensions and other sustaining payments in the contemporary terminology.⁶⁹ The committee believed that the entitlement was "not due exclusively to [beneficiaries'] military service." The new title would be the Law Regarding the State's Compensation to War Invalids, Widows, and Orphans (Invalid Compensation Law), and the name of the provincial commissions set to carry out the implementation would become "Invalid Compensation Commissions," instead of "Military Provision Commissions."⁷⁰

Why this effort to shift the emphasis from the beneficiaries' action (claiming) and the basis of the action (military service) to the specific nature of that state action (compensation)? Laurenz Widholz, in his 24 April presentation of the committee report to the full assembly, argued that "the idiom of the law should be based more on the content and the essence of the law itself, rather than on the cause, the war and the belligerent events."⁷¹ But more importantly, the new title would shape the public's reception of the new law, and by extension the Republic, in two ways.

First, shunning the word "military" echoed the antiwar and antimilitary sentiment widely shared in immediate postwar Austria and helped avoid negative association with the unpopular Habsburg Army.⁷² Second, using "compensation" instead of the indistinct term "provision" had a subtle yet more important goal: the "essence of the law itself" was a new conception of entitlement. The old military welfare laws always used the term "provision." As a result "provision" was often associated with either rewards for service to the now-defunct ruling house or old charity-like military payments to destitute soldiers. By using "state's compensation" to refer to benefits, the new title made it unequivocally clear that they were neither a top-down bestowal of (imperial) largess nor an act of public poor relief. The welfare provision would be strictly a matter of rights, and the new title acknowledged both the state's social obligation and the sacrifices made by citizens.⁷³ These two changes would once more underline the difference

between the Republic and the Monarchy and endow the law with a political significance beyond meeting the war victims' pressing needs.

The Social Committee did revise the core of the new legislation, the disability pension. The alternative minimum pension, originally the second-line calculation model in the 2 April bill, should be the primary pension system of the legislation in the committee's view. The proportionate prewar earned income replacement schedule would thereby be relegated to the alternative, second-line status. As the new primary system, the minimum pension scheme was also simplified. With the educational attainment levels reduced from four to three and the first (highest) level raised from having completed secondary education to actually having begun tertiary education, most beneficiaries who had some formal education or occupational training beyond the minimum would be classified in the second level. More generous eligibility criteria were also recommended: fallen soldiers' grandparents and parentless siblings were added to potential beneficiaries; cohabitants needed only to prove one year of a common household, rather than two, to qualify as the spouse of the fallen; and income from any continuous one-year period before 31 December 1915 could be used as the baseline to calculate prewar earned income, so that applicants would not be disadvantaged by income fluctuation before the war service.⁷⁴

The simplification of educational attainment levels would put skilled workers and trained artisans on an equal footing with those who were fortunate to have attained secondary education,⁷⁵ and it thus reinforced the new law's egalitarian principle. Broadening the circles of beneficiaries would no doubt help many who would otherwise fall through the cracks. But reversing the order of presenting the two pension calculation models in the text of the law would not change how much each beneficiary should receive. Why this seemingly cosmetic change? Again, calibrating the new law's broader political message was the most logical explanation.

The Social Committee was deliberating in the volatile April days of 1919, as demonstrations over food and jobs became frequent occurrences in major Austrian cities. The news of Hungary becoming a Soviet republic on 21 March encouraged the Communists and radical soldiers to intensify their agitation. The large number of frustrated returning soldiers, unemployed workers, and disabled veterans presented them with perfect potential recruits. The declaration of a Soviet republic in Bavaria on 7 April and the large demonstrations, first on 23 March in support of Soviet Hungary and then on 12 April by the unemployed in Vienna, were followed by the Holy Thursday Putsch on 17 April, which resulted in deaths and injuries among demonstrators, police, and the Volkswehr.⁷⁶

This crescendo of events suggested that a Soviet-style Communist takeover was imminent. Given the additional bad news that the leaders of the victorious Entente Powers had affirmed their intention not only to award South Tyrol to Italy but also to explicitly ban any form of Anschluss with Germany, the threat of a radical revolution was more menacing than ever.

In these volatile weeks, Social Democratic leaders had to outmaneuver the Communists and contain radicals within the ranks of workers and soldiers. The Bolshevik-influenced Red Guards,⁷⁷ for example, operated only blocks away from the Parliament Building. The Social Democrats tried to control the Red Guards by incorporating them into the Volkswehr as the 41st Battalion, but they were unpredictable. Other Volkswehr and police units were needed to defend the Constituent National Assembly and the provisional government, and potentially against an assault by the Red Guards, in the turbulent spring and summer months of 1919. Social legislation could help the Republic gain trust from the restless population, but many bills were still on the drawing board or did not directly address the demands of the demonstrating crowd of returning soldiers, unemployed workers, and disabled veterans.⁷⁸ At this moment of utmost urgency, the new war victim welfare legislation was the most concrete social legislation available. It would show that the Republic was delivering results to the suffering population.

Declaring the minimum pension scheme as the norm and making the wording changes were quick ways to emphasize the Republic's commitment to egalitarianism. These changes did not alter the basic design of the law; they would not jeopardize the consensus reached with the state's new partner, organized war victims, because higher-earning beneficiaries would still be compensated based on their prewar earned income, and lower-income beneficiaries' pension levels would remain more or less the same. But publicly, restoring prewar social and economic differences—proportional earned income replacement—ceased to be the leading principle of compensation. Designating the minimum pension scheme as the primary model, the law appeared to be more egalitarian in spirit: comparable physical impairment would be compensated similarly. Another kind of restoration, always underlined by Hanusch and other welfare officials, could then receive more attention: the regeneration of the productive power of individual disabled men and the nation as a whole through therapeutic, rehabilitative, and job training services the law also prescribed.

With the new emphasis on equality, retaining the "corrective" earned income replacement scheme then became a way to prevent the injustice that the new law might do to the previously higher-income beneficiaries. The reversal of the

two pension-calculating models was a balancing act—though more symbolic than substantial—between the justice of compensating for losses and the justice of equality, the extent and nature of which were being debated not only in the corridors of power but also in the streets.

The Constituent National Assembly's 24–25 April debate and vote on the new war victim bill was conducted literally under revolutionary pressure from the street. To protest and to commemorate the dead of the Holy Thursday Putsch, the Communists called a demonstration of demobilized soldiers and disabled veterans on the afternoon of 25 April 1919. Around 2,000 demonstrators gathered in front of the Vienna City Hall (Rathaus) and marched down the Ringstrasse, passing the Parliament Building while the Constituent National Assembly was in session. Some 200 Volkswehr soldiers, with six machine guns, were stationed in the portico of the Parliament Building to protect the assembly. Other police and Volkswehr personnel were deployed in nearby streets and buildings. Violent confrontations between the demonstrators and the security forces broke out later in the afternoon, when an estimated 600 demonstrators tried to storm the Parliament Building. The clashes ended with injuries and arrests.⁷⁹ Faced with the real possibility of war victims turning to the radicals, the parliamentary parties had a strong motivation to pass the law and announce the beginning of a new era as soon as possible.

The debate inside the Parliament Building was marked by a surprisingly high degree of consensus, though traces of reluctance could be detected. Rhetorical fireworks were not in short supply, but disagreements were mostly muted. The Christian Socials and the German nationalists obviously tried to graft some of their own ideological points onto the bill: for the former, provisions in accordance with their Catholic faith;⁸⁰ for the latter, the centrality of warrior/invalid homestead colonies for the German nation.⁸¹ The Social Democrats, on the other hand, assumed the persona of responsible statesmen who worked to rein in the unrealistic demands. In the end, almost every speaker made a point of urging the assembly to pass the legislation immediately, even though they all had something in the bill with which they were not satisfied.

Social Democrat Laurenz Widholz, in his 24 April presentation of the Social Committee report, emphatically repeated the same main points that Social Minister Hanusch had made on 2 April. He reiterated the difference the Republic represented: the Monarchy, despite parliamentary urgings dating back to 1912, had failed to come up with new war victim welfare legislation until the bitter end; in contrast, the parliamentary parties were moving quickly to do what should be done. Widholz then added that by accelerating the bill to

the plenary debate—something that “would give the unfortunate among us at least enough so that they would not have to wander the streets, starving and begging”—Austria was “the first state that dares, at this moment of uncertainties, to adopt measures that would satisfy our invalids, widows, and orphans.”⁸² Responding to the criticism of insufficient benefits, he was even blunter the next day: “The first speaker has said that the law does not go far enough. If you will, I can say the same, and I believe so can my Party as a whole. I am convinced that even among the members of the Government, the thought that we should do more than what is done [in the bill] is quite alive. At the same time, I want to say that in my personal opinion this House has never voted on a law with such extensive provisions.”⁸³ By repeatedly underlining the foresight, generosity, and sense of responsibility of his colleagues (and especially his own party) in a time of crisis, Widholz was speaking as much to the people outside the Parliamentary Building as to his colleagues inside. Instead of complaining, the assembly should pass the bill into law, and citizens should be proud of the courageous Republic and not listening to the radicals.

The Christian Social delegate Josef Aigner said that he had “mixed feelings about the bill,” as it was on the one hand a quick response to the pressing needs, yet on the other insufficient in actual provision. “The majority of invalids are not satisfied with [the law],” he declared, but “the state is today a war invalid itself, with both internal and external organs in disarray,” and “this is all we can offer” as the “material thanks” to war victims. Helping war victims get what was rightfully theirs was one reason that his party decided to work with the Social Democrats “despite significant damage [the coalition] brought to us.” Speaking on behalf of his party, Aigner declared that the Christian Socials would support the current bill but hoped to improve it in the near future.⁸⁴

The German nationalist delegate Josef Ursin, a physician who had worked in a military hospital during the war, declared his party’s full support for the law for reasons of “humanity” for “the poorest of the poor.” Echoing the Social Democrats’ favorite comparison, he accused Emperor Karl of turning his back on those who bled for the dynasty and claimed that the Monarchy had been planning to procure 50,000 hurdy-gurdies for disabled veterans— that is, repeating the old trick of abandoning disabled veterans. “We are living in a different time. In the past it was often said in this House that social oil should be applied to the state machine, but now that is not enough. Our modern German-Austria has to rectify the old mistakes by not only greasing the state machine with social oil, but also imbuing us all with the correct national and social sensibilities.” The Republic, therefore, would commit close to 400 million kronen in the first year

alone to the proposed legislation from its less than 2.4 billion kronen annual revenue and on top of a running deficit of more than 5 billion kronen. It was an expensive proposition, Ursin argued, but it was also necessary for both "humanitarian" and (German) "nationalist" reasons. "Now we cannot allow party politics to rule the day."⁸⁵

Amid calls for unity and quick resolution, only two issues sparked real debate: the meaning of the sacrifice war victims had made and treating fallen soldiers' cohabitants and lawful wives equally. Both points of disagreement were raised by the Christian Socials. Josef Aigner criticized his coalition partner's characterization of war victims as "not heroes, but martyrs and only martyrs." To him it was disrespectful to say that disabled and dead soldiers were thoughtless victims of "dynastic and imperialistic interests," and it was wrong to treat the war as a mistake. Speaking as a veteran and as the brother of three disabled soldiers, Aigner declared, "One can think of the war anyway he wants . . . our men did not fight for a phantom, but for ideals. He knows that he fights for house and hearth, wife and children, and his homeland." The new law and its benefits, therefore, would be purely "material thanks" for the selfless sacrifices, not compensation for meaningless and futile victimhood. Demeaning soldiers' heroism and the old adage "*dulce est, pro patria mori* (it is sweet to die for the fatherland)," he warned his Social Democratic and pacifist-leaning audience, would be a disaster for the new country.⁸⁶

By laying out a discourse of disabled or fallen soldiers' tragic heroism, Aigner may have fired the first shot in a memory war that sought to define what the lost war meant for the new rump Austria and its citizens.⁸⁷ But the fundamental reality remained: his intervention would not bring any change to the bill's provision. Nor was that his intention. Aigner's disagreement was about the meaning of the lost war and the meaning of the very act—confronting human and material losses—that the new law was to authorize. He wanted to insert a specific reading of the bill, not a different version of it, into the public discourse and show his party's core constituents, especially those outside of Vienna,⁸⁸ that the Christian Socials held their ground even when they had to work with the Social Democrats.

The Christian Social objection to treating cohabitants equally was presented by Michael Mayr.⁸⁹ He questioned the justification that economic conditions caused the common urban practice of "marriage-like" cohabitation arrangements. Condemning the practice as "concubinage," Mayr claimed that the cost of having a formal religious wedding was not a real obstacle and that the practice was not economically motivated. On "worldview" grounds, his party could

not support “reward[ing] ‘marriage-like’ relationship,” no matter how many years of keeping a common household were set as the qualifying minimum. But Mayr did not favor discriminating against orphans born out of wedlock on the same ground.⁹⁰

The Social Democrats quickly rose to defend the bill as it was. Anton Hölzl reiterated his party’s view of war victims as victims of “dynastic and imperialist interests.” Reminding the assembly of the organized war victims’ insistence on welfare provision based on “rights, not alms,” Hölzl justified the innocent-victim discourse—as opposed to Aigner’s tragic-heroism discourse—by invoking, again, the contrast between the foot-dragging Monarchy and the quick-reacting Republic. The former relied on private contributions that sometimes “degenerated into treating war victims almost as an object to vainly display [one’s] charity,” while the latter used democratic means to fulfill a social obligation.⁹¹ Gabriele Proft, one of the first Austrian women parliamentarians,⁹² defended the equal treatment of cohabitants by arguing that it would be ridiculous to decide someone’s status as a war victim only by looking at whether she was formally married. Additionally, it would be “mean-spirited and loveless” to use the term “concubinage.” Proft pointed out that many pairs would have been married “if society had allowed them” and if the war had not happened.⁹³ Widholz added that before and especially during the war, various programs “have made concessions” to cohabitants. It would be counterproductive and unthinkable to be harsh at “the social moment” the assembly was now facing.⁹⁴ Without openly saying so, Widholz was reminding his Christian Social colleagues not to rock the boat. Their posturing was politically irresponsible, as the Republic could not retreat from any social commitments already made.

In the end, the assembly members knew what they needed to do. After a last-minute Hanusch speech on the “calming” effect the new law would have,⁹⁵ the 2 April bill as revised by the Social Committee was adopted. There were only two substantive revisions, both making the law more generous: lowering the age from 60 to 55 for women to receive the higher class of widow’s pension and lessening the rule about immediate stoppage of a widow’s pension if she married a pension-receiving disabled veteran. Both resulted from cross-party demands, as the former was first moved by the Christian Social Michael Paulitsch and seconded by Widholz, and the latter was the idea of the German nationalist Karl Kittinger that drew immediate support from Proft.⁹⁶ There was a high degree of consensus over the rest of the bill. Even the potentially controversial codetermination mechanisms and the aggressive central state welfare expansion met with no reservation or objection.⁹⁷ The bill became the Law Regarding the State

Compensation of War Invalids, Widows, and Orphans of 25 April 1919 (Invalid Compensation Law), set to take effect on 15 June, or 1 July 1919 at the latest.⁹⁸ Austria became the first former belligerent in Central and Eastern Europe to have a brand-new postwar war victim welfare law.

Revolution, Continuity, and the *Étatist* Entitlement Citizenship

The threat of another revolution—Austria's equivalent of Russia's October Revolution—motivated the Constituent National Assembly to quickly adopt the Invalid Compensation Law on 25 April. The assembly's debate and vote were conducted under the protection of soldiers and machine guns and with the knowledge that some war victims planned to demonstrate that day. If the delegates quarreled too much, the intended beneficiaries could easily become the vanguard of the anticipated Communist revolution that very afternoon. The extraordinary circumstances of April 1919 compelled the political parties to appease the war victims who could, and seemed to be willing to, become a core constituency for the Republic.

Two revolutions thus made possible the new war victim welfare legislation and catapulted war victims to the status of the Republic's favored clients. The first revolution, in autumn 1918, toppled the paralyzed (and self-destructing) Monarchy; it enabled the nationalization and demilitarization of the existing war welfare institutions and the creation of new ones. The much feared and anticipated second revolution pushed the first revolutionaries to bid high and fast for the support of the symbolically important war victims.⁹⁹ The Republic needed legitimacy; war victims gave the parliamentary parties—the first revolutionaries—an opportunity, which the parties seized to preempt the second revolution.

But the revolutionary occasion of the Invalid Compensation Law's emergence should not overshadow what was a winding path starting with the Monarchy's social offensive and the reassertion of parliamentary politics since mid-1917. In the first half of 1918, Division Chief Gasteiger and his deputies had begun to create a more standardized welfare infrastructure. They wanted to place the haphazard patchwork of public, semipublic, and private welfare actors and programs under direct state supervision or even make it part of the state's administrative apparatus. Many factors—the Imperial Army most prominently—inhibited their preferred policies then. The Revolution of 1918 removed these obstacles. Following the nationalization of welfare institutions and resources, the new Invalid Compensation Law introduced a purely *étatist* program. Civil society participation and private welfare actors, which had been central to wartime care

and welfare provision, disappeared almost entirely from the new system, except for their possible participation as experts in the codetermination mechanisms.¹⁰⁰ The Invalid Compensation Law of 1919 was the culmination of the centralist and étatist welfare expansion initiated by the imperial social offensive.

The continuing centralization process met with practically no resistance in the Constituent National Assembly. A proposal to install decentralized, autonomous War Invalid Chambers in the provinces to implement the new war victim welfare law, an expression of some Christian Socials' suspicion of Viennese centralism, was made in March 1919.¹⁰¹ But the idea quickly died. Laurenz Widholz, speaking for the Social Committee, declared the proposal irrelevant.¹⁰² During the plenary debate on 24 and 25 April, even the Christian Socials abandoned it. This reflected how broadly war victim welfare was accepted as the central state's responsibility. The political parties did not hesitate to accelerate the central state's welfare expansion.

More broadly, using welfare expansion to shore up political legitimacy was already a policy preference for many during the imperial social offensive. The Republic relied on the welfare officials and agencies the Monarchy had assembled. The Invalid Compensation Law, a real breakthrough, was not a sudden innovation, either. The Social Democrats' 1917 proposal had laid out what became the parameters of debate and the major building blocks for the postimperial legislation. By 1918, the parliamentary parties and many in the welfare field also had begun to think with a new premise for future welfare provision: the needs of rights-bearing citizens and their dependents. The volatile environment of 1919 then influenced the way the elements were put together or, more accurately, how they were adjusted—mostly by the tactically adroit Social Democrats—to appeal to the intended audience without losing sight of the law's projected long-term function.

The adoption of the Invalid Compensation Law in April 1919 ushered in a revolution in state-citizen relations in Austria: a legal commitment by the central state to directly ensure a minimum level of welfare for individual citizens. The law was limited in terms of its beneficiaries and could reasonably even be seen as one-time disaster relief, because it was difficult to imagine then that there would be new beneficiaries after a generation—unlike accident, health, or old-age insurance systems.¹⁰³ But it was clear that the legislators agreed to the principle of "social duty" to provide for those who were affected by the war, even if the Republic did not see itself as the same entity that had sent the men to war in the first place. To the politicians, there was no question that the new

Republic had to provide for all war victims. The republican state would not only be democratic, but it would also be "social."¹⁰⁴

Moreover, entitlement to the new war welfare benefits was based on citizenship, not on the extension of the "state servant" status that underpinned the 1875 Military Welfare Law or the September 1918 bill. Citizenship entailed the duty to perform war service or becoming a dependent of one who was liable to do so. And citizenship entitled one to claim equitable compensation for the losses caused by such service. Tellingly, citizens who did not perform war service but were caught in the fighting and suffered from similar losses, the so-called civilian war-damaged persons (*Zivilkriegsbeschädigte*), were also covered by the Invalid Compensation Law and received comparable benefits.¹⁰⁵ The law was later applied to professional soldiers and members of the Volkswehr.¹⁰⁶ The Invalid Compensation Law, then, looks very much like a state's accident compensation system covering livelihood-threatening war damages for all. Unlike most of the existing (or even planned) social insurance programs, it was not based on occupational affiliation or prior contributions. Citizenship-based war participation, directly or indirectly, led to the formalization of an entitlement citizenship.

Indeed, the Invalid Compensation Law was intended as part of a welfare state expansion that would redefine relations between the state and citizens. After expressing pride in the advances in war victim welfare, Laurenz Widholz said,

Admittedly a drop of bitterness falls into our cup of joy when we come to think that [with this law] we only can help a small part [of the population], the war-damaged people, while the insurance for disability, old age, etc., which would affect the great masses of the working population, has still not materialized. Nevertheless, we hope these chapters will be completed in the not-so-distant future. Then we can show the Austrian people and especially the working classes that they finally can hope to live in a state that is their own and that they have a stake in it.¹⁰⁷

Welfare legislation would create a different, "social" state that would be of, by, and for the people. By solidifying an entitlement citizenship, the Invalid Compensation Law was therefore a real harbinger of the welfare state in Austria.¹⁰⁸

“The Public’s Interest in Invalids Has Waned”

THE INVALID COMPENSATION LAW of 25 April 1919 established not only the principle of systematic provision for war victims as rights-bearing citizens but also the concrete ways in which democratic codetermination should be exercised in the day-to-day administration of welfare. After it went into effect in July, the law had a profound impact on the entire war victim welfare field. All actors in the field shaped their thoughts and acts within the parameters it set up. The Invalid Compensation Law enabled a normalization process to begin amid the confusing but heady changes of the early Republic.

The normalization of war victim politics, however, also had a key unintended consequence. The organized war victims, one of the pillars of the Republic’s early strategy of survival and legitimation, began to fragment and provincialize. An extraordinary social movement transformed into mundane and competing interest groups fighting for resources and political influence within the framework established by the Invalid Compensation Law. The momentum of a once-formidable sociopolitical force seemed spent as soon as the general revolutionary tide began to ebb.

When the broader political context stabilized after 1920, the participatory war victim welfare system even became the target of reforms dictated by other priorities. The conditions that had once made possible the partnership of the weak disappeared. Waning public interest in war victim issues amid widespread privation, deteriorating state finances, and a much less sympathetic government led to a crisis in the immediate postwar war victim welfare system. Politically, war victims were no longer an indispensable and therefore privileged partner but a fiscal burden that needed to be lessened. This chapter examines how the war victim movement lost coherence at the very moment that was supposed to be its triumph and how normalized war victim politics became a bellwether for the broader Austrian political culture, which was about to move beyond the postwar and the revolutionary phase.

Turmoil behind the Façade of Success

Within a very short period of time, the Zentralverband grew from a spontaneous Viennese organization of disabled soldiers into a national spokesperson for all war victims. After securing seats in the interministerial Standing Commission for Invalid Welfare in late 1918 and early 1919, it enjoyed both a steady stream of state subsidies and a share of power in policy making. Actively contributing to the shaping the Invalid Compensation Law on 25 April 1919, the rapidly expanding Zentralverband had become a primary force in the Republic’s welfare politics. The war victim movement might even become a permanent fixture in postwar politics and society more generally, like its counterpart in France.¹

Ironically, as the power derived from joining forces with other comrades-in-suffering became a reality, disagreements and internal conflicts in the Zentralverband leadership also peaked. Since January 1919, the leadership had been embroiled in a power struggle between one group of activists gathered around the president, Hans Hollitscher, and another supporting two other executive committee members, Rudolf Weissteiner and the editor of *Der Invaliden*, Karl Burger. According to the Social Democratic parliamentarian Anton Hölzl, the factions formed after Weissteiner and Burger accused Hollitscher of incompetence and morally questionable dealings during the war. Even though the Zentralverband was expanding successfully, the leadership became more dysfunctional. Hollitscher did not “sufficiently inform the executive committee about various developments and planned activities.” Individual executive committee members often did the same, because meetings often devolved into personal quarrels.² The discord soon spilled out. Activist Walter Kaspar publicly called members to flood a 9 February meeting and defeat the plot to overthrow Hollitscher.³ The meeting looked very much like a coup, because the Weissteiner-Burger faction attempted to create an all-Vienna chapter that would encompass every current and future Vienna-based member.⁴ After all, the relationship between the national leadership and its provincial affiliates was more of an alliance than a hierarchy. If the Viennese members congregated in their own organization, its leadership would effectively hollow out the current Zentralverband leadership’s power base.

The struggle between the two factions, however, was about more than personal animosity or power. It represented two diverging views on the future of the movement. The Weissteiner-Burger group’s vision for the Zentralverband was for it to be more of a classic pressure group, advocating for and defending the interests of war victims in the public realm, especially vis-à-vis the state,

with lobbying and public demonstrations as the main tools. The organization also administered material assistance programs for its members, but that was more out of necessity and mainly for recruitment and retention purposes.⁵ This vision was reflected in the duo's activities reported in *Der Invalide*: urging war victims to build a dense network of local chapters within a single movement and working with the government for legally defined benefits.

But in the Hollitscher group's view, the two men were too eager to cultivate close relations with government officials; the pair "betray[ed] invalids' interests in the most despicable manner for purely personal reasons" by being too accommodating in shaping the Invalid Compensation Law.⁶ Hollitscherites wanted the Zentralverband to be an organization with stronger economic, employment-creating functions. They spent a great deal of energy negotiating with the authorities specifically for privileged access to or even control over material resources. The Zentralverband first demanded that the war materiel demobilization program should offer discounts to disabled veterans when they purchased surplus items.⁷ Then it demanded that the government not only add a 5 percent war victim welfare surcharge to any war materiel demobilization transaction (2 percent was agreed) but also hire Zentralverband activists to manage the process to prevent "something the public cannot even dream of" from happening in secrecy.⁸ Conveniently, Hollitscher himself received a position in the "automobile liquidation group" and another follower a seat in the cashier's department, "in a position to monitor the business," soon afterwards.⁹

Another aspect of Hollitscher's goal of making the Zentralverband an active economic player was his push to turn the Invalid Schools, which were occupational training programs attached to military hospitals, into Zentralverband-sponsored profit-driven cooperatives that would sell the goods their disabled veteran-craftsmen produced to the public.¹⁰ This project had a promising start, as the Social Ministry allowed the Viennese Invalid School in Favoriten (the 10th district), which in February 1919 had 400 trainees, to become a self-governing institution with the Zentralverband's representatives on the governing board. The Zentralverband partially funded the school's operations, and one of its functionaries also served as the school's director of social services.¹¹ However, the organization's deep involvement in this project was not authorized by its own executive committee. The Hollitscher people simply went ahead in the name of the Zentralverband.¹² Unsurprisingly, the school was the Hollitscher group's most reliable backer in the factional struggle.

The Hollitscher group's initial success in making the Zentralverband a hub of business ventures caught the Social Democrats' attention. The latter became

concerned after Hollitscher's key ally Kaspar joined an "agitation committee" of leading "businessmen and capitalists" who strongly opposed the Social Democrats' plan to socialize key economic sectors.¹³ Then there were allegations that Hollitscher was too close to banking and big business circles.¹⁴ Even so, Hölzl, the Social Democratic liaison to organized war victims, was not exactly sympathetic to the Weissteiner-Burger camp. The Weissteiner-Burger group continued its confrontational course after a special committee more or less cleared Hollitscher's name. Against a warning from Hölzl, the duo also led their followers to crash a 23 March rally in Vienna's 10th district.¹⁵ Hölzl blamed the Weissteiner-Burger group for the failure of repeated reconciliation attempts.

The Zentralverband's internal struggle came to a head on the cusp of achieving its most important goal: the new comprehensive welfare legislation for war victims. Hollitscher resigned during the Zentralverband executive committee's acrimonious 27 March meeting. His resignation was quickly accepted, and the Ministries of Social Welfare and the Interior were notified on 1 April,¹⁶ the day before the government presented its bill to the Constituent National Assembly. Hollitscher's resignation was probably a bluff, because his followers did not give up immediately. Hölzl, on his part, tried to prevent the formal split of the Zentralverband by leading a neutral committee to clarify the disputes. The report his committee presented explicitly recommended a new national leadership be elected without the leading figures from either camp. But against the expressed wish of Hölzl and the Social Democratic parliamentarian Laurenz Widholz, who chaired the sessions of the national convention on 19 and 20 April, Weissteiner and Burger were reelected to their old positions. The Hollitscher group took their nemeses' election as the final affront and declared their departure from the Zentralverband.¹⁷ The organized war victims' first national convention became the occasion on which the united front cracked.

The timing of the Hollitscher group's formal departure from the Zentralverband was no coincidence. Hollitscher and his followers, including Josef Löweschek, Johann Schiller, and Julius Strommer, had been shut out of the Zentralverband's decision making as well as its official publication since at least mid-March.¹⁸ They could have left to form their own organization earlier. But they waited until the new war victim welfare bill was about to become law (25 April), which would empower organized claimants to participate in administering the system. Importantly, which organizations would be entitled to send their representatives to the system was not specified in the bill or the law it soon became.¹⁹ A window thus opened for non-Zentralverband organizations to claim real influence that came with the codetermination principle,²⁰ and Hollitscher

and his followers no longer needed to fight within the Zentralverband. They founded the Social-Economic League of German-Austrian War Invalids (Sozial-Wirtschaftlicher Reichsbund der Kriegsinvaliden Deutschösterreichs; hereafter the Reichsbund) immediately after the Zentralverband's national convention and drew their core supporters from defecting Viennese local chapters, an organization of the war blind, and the Invalid School in Vienna's 10th district.

Hollitscher's splinter organization went on the offensive immediately to make sure that the Zentralverband would not monopolize the legally stipulated influence and administratively decided favors. On 24 April 1919, the day the Constituent National Assembly began its plenary debate on the new war victim welfare law, the Reichsbund told the Social Welfare Ministry that it wanted to "participate in all the state's legislative and administrative actions on invalid welfare through adequate representation." It especially intended to participate in various aspects of the materiel demobilization program, an old Hollitscherite interest, and in the interministerial Standing Commission for Invalid Welfare "with an adequate number of seats," as well as seats on the boards or committees of various invalid welfare funds inherited from the Monarchy. The Reichsbund demanded to be treated as an equal to the Zentralverband in the state-organized war victim partnership.²¹

The Reichsbund was initially ignored by the state officials. Frustrated, Hollitscher's men accused the officials of having chosen "the side of injustice" led by Weissteiner and Burger, who "pretend[ed] to be Social Democrats but verifiably worked with reprehensible political fervor against the interests of urban, industrial war invalids in the provinces."²² But their 9 May protest did highlight a key character, or weakness, of the immediate postwar partnership between the Republic and organized war victims: there was no legal basis for the state's recognition of the Zentralverband as the representative for all or even just a majority of war victims. The Reichsbund employed the exact same argument that Social Minister Ferdinand Hanusch had used in December 1918 to fend off what he then saw as the Zentralverband's overreach: "The Zentralverband . . . is only one private institution, just as the [Reichsbund] itself is, and the [Reichsbund] under no circumstances is ready to cede its right to represent the justified demands of war victims against the Zentralverband as well as the authorities with the utmost determination."²³

By virtue of its generous but vague formulation of participatory mechanisms, the new Invalid Compensation Law raised the stakes in the competition for client representation. The Zentralverband's current monopoly was at best a political expediency in the chaotic early revolutionary days, and at worst it was a favor arbitrarily handed out by state officials for questionable reasons, charged

the Reichsbund. Once the new war victim welfare law established the parameters for relations between the state and war victim welfare clients, the Zentralverband and the Social Ministry could no longer deny new organizations a place in the sun.

The Reichsbund had the potential to undermine the current political partnership for stabilization. Since November 1918, the Republic’s war victim policy had been predicated on the existence of a single, stable war victim organization that was willing to collaborate with the state officials. The preferred organization would defend its members’ interests within the framework of parliamentary democracy as well as the existing legal and administrative structure. In an uncertain time, the speed of policy formulation and implementation was as important as the policy itself. To craft a consensus with multiple organizations would, unfortunately, demand many more incentives and much more time—none of which the state welfare officials had in abundance. More threatening would be the loss of the moderating effect a single, strong, but state-friendly organization would have on the greatest possible number of war victims. Competition among different organizations could encourage the feared radicalization of war victims.

This explains the deep engagement of Hölzl and Widholz in mediating among the warring factions. Social Minister Hanusch’s party colleagues tried frantically to prevent the dissolution of a coherent war victim movement in the first half of 1919. The Zentralverband was never the only organization in existence, but its own exponential growth and generally state-friendly attitude had encouraged state officials to enter into an exclusive partnership with it, endowing it with both material resources and influence in policy making, and thereby assisting its further growth. The Zentralverband was therefore as much a product of spontaneous social mobilization as a project cultivated by the Austrian state. The Reichsbund’s emergence threatened to nullify it all. Furthermore, the Zentralverband’s internal struggle and final split came at an inopportune time. Another alarming challenge to single-interest representation and the single-partner policy was on the horizon.

The Fragmentation of the War Victim Movement

On 12 May 1919, Oskar Weinert and Anton Pechtl, both from War Hospital No. 4 in Schönbrunn Palace, founded the Central Council of Austrian War-Damaged Persons (*Zentralrat der Österreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten*; hereafter the *Zentralrat*). Their followers were mostly disabled veterans released from the Meidling War Hospital who then proceeded to occupy parts of

Schönbrunn Palace in mid-April.²⁴ The organization first supported itself by delivering posters, fliers, and other publications, but state officials believed that it also received subsidies from the Austrian Communist Party.²⁵ Seen by others as a straight Communist group, the Zentralrat also joined the Zentralverband fray, first anti-Hollitscher but changing to pro-Hollitscher.²⁶ On 25 May, the Zentralrat staged a publicity blitz in the heart of the Republic's political center: putting up posters and distributing fliers at many locations along the Ringstrasse. Claiming that its leaders "represent[ed] the rights of invalids with all their strength and radically vis-à-vis any others," the Zentralrat urged war victims to leave the Zentralverband (see Figure 7.1).²⁷

The Zentralrat was the second organization, after Hollitscher's Reichsbund, to spoil the state officials' policy of working with a single war victim organization. And it was the first entirely new group to emerge in the wake of the Invalid Compensation Law. Hollitscher and his men were known quantities. The Zentralrat, on the other hand, was a Communist-leaning (or straight Communist) organization set up specifically to demand a share of the public resources and influence that came with institutionalized interest representation. Allegedly, the Zentralrat explored the possibility of uniting with Hollitscher's Reichsbund to form a real rival to the Zentralverband.²⁸ What it sought first and foremost, however, was recognition from the state authorities and access to public resources. Later reports indicate that it did receive foodstuff deliveries, office and workshop space, furniture, and office equipment.²⁹ It was a party in the officially encouraged initiatives to unite all Viennese war victim organizations.

Many war victim welfare measures had the unstated goal of countering Communist agitation, but the passage of the Invalid Compensation Law resulted in an unexpected dilemma for state officials. On the one hand, the new law offered the most concrete incentives for war victims to ignore the Communists. The fact that the law attracted Communist-leaning war victims to the Republic was a positive development. On the other hand, these men sought to claim the benefits of the new welfare system without giving up their political agitation and affiliation.³⁰ The Communist-leaning disabled soldiers intended to take advantage of the new law's power-sharing mechanisms and organized themselves as an interest group as the law required. Thus any potential "domesticating" effect on Communist-leaning war victims entailed a trade-off: further weakening the single-interest representation policy already endangered by the Hollitscher group.

To Social Minister Hanusch and his lieutenants, the two new challengers added more urgency to re-create a unified war victim movement as the state's working partner. The Austrian chancellor Karl Renner's office even appointed

Zentralrat der Kriegsbeschädigten Deutschösterreichs

Invalide! Kriegsbeschädigte!

Unsere Gesundheit, unsere geraden Glieder haben wir im Kriege eingebüßt. Wir haben auch wirtschaftlich Unmenschliches gelitten, viele von uns sind wirtschaftlich zu Grunde gegangen. Bei und Blind sind unter den Invaliden am größten. Des Hosenbäckers, des Staatsbeamten, des Strassenkehrers und anderer hat man ihre Forderungen bewilligen müssen.

auf die Invaliden hat man vergessen!

Wollt ihre angebliche Vertretung, der Zentralverband nicht die Kraft und nicht den Willen hat, gerechte Forderungen energisch durchzusetzen. Statt im Interesse der Invaliden zu arbeiten, reiben sich die beiden Parteien Weissteiner und Hollitscher gegenseitig, wie zwei Mühlsteine, zwischen denen die Interessen der Invaliden vermahmt werden. Hollitscher will uns an das Grosskapital anklammern, Weissteiner und sein Anhang vergessen, dass sie Invaliden vertreten, sie sind zu einer Regierungsbehörde geworden.

Ihr fordert:

800 K Anschaffungsbeitrag

4 „ tägliche Spitalslöhnung

Erhöhung der Rente auf 5, 10 und 15 K täglich

und andere Verbesserungen unserer elenden Lage. Der Zentralverband mit Weissteiner an der Spitze, erklärte bei den Verhandlungen mit der Regierung:

diese Forderungen seien **himmelblau und übertrieben!**

Er beruhigte die Regierung und sagte, er sehe ein, dass diese Forderungen nicht bewilligt werden können, weil sich sonst unsere Valuta verschlechtern würde. Wenn so eine Vertretung zur Regierung kommt, wird natürlich kein Heiler bewilligt.

INVALIDE!

Wollt Ihr Euch noch weiter zum Narren halten lassen!

Wollt Ihr noch weiter diesem verbrecherischen Treiben zusehen?

Die Regierung muss Geld für die Invaliden haben, muss uns das geben, was unser gutes Recht ist.

Vom Zentralverband haben wir Invalide nichts mehr zu erwarten.

Invalide! Ihr seid vergessen, verkauft und verraten worden.

Es gibt nur mehr eine Hilfe: Schliesst Euch nur denen an, die Euer Recht mit ganzer Kraft und radikal gegen jedermann vertreten.

Kameraden! Invalide! Kriegsbeschädigte!

Schliesst Euch daher an, dem

Zentralrat der Kriegsbeschädigten

Deutschösterreichs.

Holy — Pechtl — Volfmüller — Karitas

FIGURE 7.1. "Nothing more can be expected from the Zentralverband. Invalids! You are forgotten, sold, and betrayed." The Zentralrat poster attacked the Zentralverband for "lacking both the strength and will to energetically push through [invalids'] just demands." The Zentralrat also alleged that the Hollitscher group served the interests of big business, the Weissteiner group forgot for which side they should represent and acted like a government agency, and the struggle between the two rival factions "crush[ed] the interests of invalids like two pieces of millstone." ÖNB/Vienna PLA16341474.

an official, Dr. Ferneböck, to lead the negotiations between the Zentralverband and the Reichsbund.³¹ For a short while there was a glimmer of hope. On 21 June, the sparring war victim organizations agreed to stop attacking one another.³² A series of talks to form an all-inclusive association took place in July. Hanusch also invited the leaders of the rival organizations to further merger talks that he planned to chair personally.³³ Negotiations, however, broke down due to persistent mutual distrust.

The last of these negotiations took place in late July in a Salzburg hotel, when the issue of who could represent the others to give assent to any proposal scuttled any chance of unification. On 28 July, the Reichsbund presented its “federalist” proposal—consisting of a national executive and provincial organizations—to the Provincial Associations present at the Salzburg conference as if it were a done deal. Hollitscher’s group demanded that the provincial leaders immediately vote on it, make the financial commitments the plan required, and elect their representatives for the upcoming national conference of the new umbrella organization. More than a tactic to define the debate, the Reichsbund wanted to create the perception that the provincials were behind its proposal before a consensus actually emerged on the negotiating table. This bluff was called. The Zentralverband condemned it as dishonesty. The inevitable end finally came when the Zentralverband men accused the Reichsbund representatives of lying about representing the Carinthian organized war victims. When the representatives from the Upper Austrian group produced a document to show that they were authorized to speak for the Carinthians, thus exposing the Reichsbund’s deceit, the Reichsbund representatives broke off negotiations and left.³⁴ A quick reconciliation proved impossible.

As the state officials continued to hope for a single-interest representation, after the passage of the Invalid Compensation Law there were in fact added incentives to contend for the status of the national representation of war victims. The Zentralverband and the Reichsbund were essentially Viennese organizations. They both needed the backing of provincial war victims to justify the claim of being the sole national spokesperson. The proposed solution in Salzburg—merging the competing groupings into a new umbrella national association—exacerbated the tension, because the Zentralverband and the Reichsbund fought over the question of who really spoke for the provincial organizations on this matter. The supposed solution ultimately stumbled over what it was meant to solve: Who represented the interests of Austrian war victims?

The tension among organized war victims escalated after the failed merger negotiations. The Zentralverband devoted a special issue of *Der Invalide* in

August 1919 to responding to myriad accusations leveled against it: anti-labor union, antisocialist, irregular bookkeeping, financial mismanagement, profiting from the state-delegated living necessities distribution *Lebensmittelaktion*, being too friendly with the authorities and the old military. The *Zentralverband* counteraccused the *Reichsbund* of megalomaniacal exaggerations and pathological lying, black-market profiteering, unabashed self-serving activities, espionage, political opportunism ("red-faced, reluctant republicans . . . once Zionists, then Communists, then again Social Democrats, then anarcho-socialists"), suspicious mingling with the Communists, local chapter-poaching (specifically the chapter of Vienna's 16th district), and dishonest dealings.³⁵

The war of words revealed a new landscape where the mirage of single representation finally lost its grip on state officials. While the *Zentralverband* continued as the state's deputized partner in administering the *Lebensmittelaktion*, by midsummer 1919 the *Reichsbund* had begun to enjoy some patronage benefits. For the staff members fired by the *Zentralverband* on suspicion of spying for the *Reichsbund*, Hollitscher immediately found employment in the official materiel demobilization agency on whose board he sat.³⁶ Hollitscher's favorite project, establishing business ventures for war victims, also drew attention from some state officials in the summer of 1919. The Social Ministry promised a 100,000-kronen subsidy to the manufacturing cooperative WIG, which had close ties with the *Reichsbund*. WIG also procured goods on advantageous terms from the materiel demobilization agency because of Hollitscher's influence there. WIG's successes, in fact, gave the *Zentralverband* concrete evidence to repudiate the allegation that it had an unfair monopoly on state subsidies. But the anxiety among *Zentralverband* leaders was palpable, as they discussed whether to participate in WIG in August.³⁷ If state officials began to extend substantial favors to its avowed rivals, how long could the *Zentralverband* remain *the* partner of the Republic? How long could it retain the loyalty of the Provincial Associations or even that of the local chapters in Vienna?

Using its still privileged access to public resources, the *Zentralverband* sought to ensure war victims' loyalty. The Vienna 18th district chapter, founded on 3 February 1919, declared its independence from the *Zentralverband* on 18 August. Its executive committee members, Alois Benko and Franz Heindl, announced that the 18th district chapter had joined the *Reichsbund*, allegedly without informing their members first. The membership became aware of the switch only when food distributions from the *Zentralverband* stopped. Then the *Zentralverband* engineered, or at least acquiesced to, a counterattack. During the local chapter's special meeting on 9 September, a fight broke out between

Zentralverband loyalists and Benko and Heindl's supporters, many of whom were allegedly outside helpers from the Zentralrat. Only the timely intervention of the 18th district mayor and a local municipal councilor, who declared their willingness to preside over a neutral arbitration panel, prevented the meeting from descending into total chaos. On 25 September the arbitration panel submitted its report, and on the next day a vote of no confidence was taken to force out the anti-Zentralverband executive committee. A newly elected leadership immediately declared the local chapter's intention to rejoin the Zentralverband. An observer commented that war victims in the 18th district knew well the "benefits of being part of a large organization" and made the "right" decision.³⁸

The heated battle for influence and affiliation exposed the hastily created structure of the early postwar war victim movement. Enterprising leaders, having gotten friendly assistance from state authorities, were able to offer incentives to build alliances with existing organizations or to found new local chapters. Once the Invalid Compensation Law opened the door for resource and power sharing to non-Zentralverband groups, the already quite autonomous local chapters suddenly had the option of changing affiliation. Even in the Zentralverband's power base in Vienna and Lower Austria, the bond that tied local groups to it often hinged on how much it could help deliver tangible goods.

To confront this weakness, the tone and emphasis of the Zentralverband leadership's public talks shifted significantly after July 1919. Gone was the celebratory declaration of the founding or new affiliation of local war victim organizations. Instead, the Zentralverband leaders focused on preaching the need to shore up the organization's strength and internal discipline. For the former, they targeted widows. For the latter, a tighter organization was the ideal.

Recruiting war widows became a key strategy. Statutes were revised to explicitly announce war widows and war orphans as core constituents, too. Around July 1919 the organization's official name, Zentralverband der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten, was given an explanatory addition—the "War-Damaged Persons Association for Invalids, Widows, and Orphans"—to reflect the new emphasis.³⁹ A dedicated Widows' Protection Service, directed by Anna Stummer, was established in the Zentralverband's headquarters. Widows had always been active in local chapter activities, but this was a major development at the center of the movement.⁴⁰

The new strategy of recruiting widows was a belated recognition that they would be critically important for the Zentralverband. Austrian women were enfranchised as equal citizens in November 1918 and voted in the 16 February 1919 Constituent National Assembly election. After being explicitly named as

equal beneficiaries in Article 1 of the Invalid Compensation Law, women would be counted if membership size was used to determine which organization could participate in the new welfare system's codetermination mechanisms. In a late June 1919 meeting in Hietzing, Vienna's 13th district, Weissteiner declared that embracing war widows was imperative because they were as "psychologically disabled" as disabled veterans after the trauma of "receiving the sad news" of their husbands' deaths. War widows, moreover, had been too "modest" and until then much neglected. Due to their underorganization thus far, Weissteiner identified widows as the untapped reinforcement that the Zentralverband needed going forward. Widows were also the natural conduit to reach war orphans "because it is the duty of the widows to care for their own orphans."⁴¹ The Zentralverband, he suggested, should actively assume the role of benevolent protector and guide for widows and orphans. Using the language of the postwar reconstruction of the domestic gender order, Weissteiner marked the next frontier of expansion in the newly competitive environment.

By then the Zentralverband leadership had begun to use a two-part argument to make the case to current and potential members that a Zentralverband membership was absolutely necessary; and the organization itself needed to be more tightly—meaning hierarchically—structured. In the pseudo-obituary, "The Death of German-Austria" in *Der Invalide* (with the conventional black frame), the Zentralverband lamented the imminent and inevitable acceptance of the resented terms of peace in Paris as "a slow death." That peace was a fait accompli and a wake-up call: it was necessary for all war victims to stick together as the days were getting darker. The Zentralverband would be more durable and reliable in sheltering people from the looming disaster.⁴²

Then, it was necessary to make the war victim organization disciplined, unified, and thereby more powerful. According to activist Kopic, war victims were generally unwilling to think beyond themselves and tended to look for the easy ways. They "always harbored mistrust against their leaders—see especially the provincials during the national convention [in April]—and egotistically expected only the best possible outcomes. But things did not turn out as expected partly because people did not believe in their own leaders. Once the complainers were put in charge, it was clear that they failed at exactly what they had criticized the old leaders for, and in a more spectacular fashion." Kopic then offered a remedy: "Invalids were a newly organized mass. It is therefore only natural that they do not know the strict self-discipline of unionized workers. They must be educated first. Only after the completion of this education will the general mistrust disappear and comrades have full confidence in their own self-selected

leadership.⁴³ In preparation for the coming hard times, war victims themselves needed self-reform and to be ready to follow their (Vienna) leaders as part of a disciplined group.⁴⁴

The desire to transform organized war victims into a labor union-like collective was in fact a response to the growing centrifugal sentiment among some provincial war victims. In the Invalid Compensation Law, the Provincial Invalid Compensation Commission was the site where individual war victims' benefit applications were decided. This meant that, through the codetermination design of the law, provincial activists would participate in deciding their fellow members' benefits. The provincial war victim leaders thus enjoyed unprecedented institutional power in the official war victim welfare system as well as in the war victim movement. It was therefore not surprising to see the provincial activists' interests in reorganizing the movement based on "disability groups" (i.e., different kinds of disability), "territorial groups," or a combination of both. Letting activists outside of Vienna have more power and independence, especially in funding and use of resources, "federalism" had been the Hollitscherites' main idea in the failed unification talks. Several weeks after rejecting "federalism" in the Salzburg negotiations, the Zentralverband's Vienna leaders repeatedly admonished its members not to heed the "federalist" siren song, which they characterized as "a threat that will weaken the power of the organization."⁴⁵

The Zentralverband functionaries believed a tipping point had been reached. "The ability of the organization to act quickly and resolutely was now in danger." It was necessary to negotiate with provincial activists over the introduction of uniform membership registration and accounting systems, so that the Viennese leadership would have a better grasp of the situation on the ground.⁴⁶ In a way that was reminiscent of what the imperial officials of the Social Ministry had tried to achieve in winter and spring 1918, the activists of the Zentralverband wanted to make the provincial members and organizations more legible,⁴⁷ and thereby easier to control, like subunits rather than allies.

Yet another challenge to a unified war victim representation emerged in summer 1919, when the Christian Socials began their own mobilization of war victims. For the first time, an overtly partisan struggle took place among war victims that mirrored the crystallizing of the milieu party-dominated political culture that the First Republic was later known for. On 7 September, the Association of German-Austrian Christian War Invalids, War Widows and Orphans (Verband christlicher Kriegsinvaliden, Kriegerwitwen und -Waisen Deutschösterreichs), based in Vienna's 4th district, tried to organize a local chapter in the predominantly working-class 17th district, along with the Association of

Christian Veterans (Verband christlicher Heimkehrer). Upon learning of this plan, "the Zentralverband . . . invited its members to go and see for themselves what this association was up to and make their own judgment." The police and the organizers of the meeting correctly predicted that the "invitation" had all the makings of a full-blown brawl and, as a precaution, cordoned off the surrounding streets starting at 6 a.m. for the scheduled 9 a.m. meeting. They only allowed people "with an envelope in addition to the printed invitation" to enter the premises. Even so, the crowd grew larger and larger. Finally, the Christian Social organizers allowed a delegation of Zentralverband members—including a widow—to attend the meeting. A defiant Major Pohanka, the chair of the Christian Social association, unexpectedly emerged from a partly open door and provocatively "salut[ed] in the old officer style." The police and the Zentralverband's own 17th-district local chapter leaders had to restrain the crowd from violent reactions. A lot of antiofficer, antimilitary, and anti-Habsburg shouts and denunciations were hurled at Pohanka, and the district police commanders asked him to return to the meeting.⁴⁸

Pohanka had the backing of high-level Christian Social politicians. Identifying the Zentralverband merely as a leftist organization, Pohanka addressed one of the five Zentralverband delegates, a veteran named Deutsch who had served forty-four months on the front, only as "Jew" and openly remarked that "the Zentralverband had no right to represent all invalids, widows, and orphans." The conspicuous silence on these points of the Christian Social Party leader present at this meeting, Deputy Social Minister Josef Resch (who later became the longest-serving interwar social minister), was duly noted. Nor did Resch contradict Pohanka's belligerent statements in his own speech to the relatively small group. To the chagrin of the Zentralverband delegates, Resch even praised the new Invalid Compensation Law "as a charitable action for the officers." In a much larger "protest meeting" against the Pohanka group immediately afterwards, the Zentralverband representatives vented their anger at the Christian Socials for their role during the war and their behavior during the legislative process of the Invalid Compensation Law. But Resch was obviously the focus of their disgust. The gathered Zentralverband members denounced Resch's "engagement in political propaganda under the cover of Christianity" and called him "a danger to the Republic" as a serving high official.⁴⁹

Major Pohanka's group signaled open fragmentation of the war victim movement along milieu-party divides. The Zentralrat was Communist-leaning, but the Communist Party was very small despite its disproportionate scare effect. The Christian Socials, on the other hand, were a major milieu party in the coalition

government. Even if the Zentralverband supporters gathered in the “protest meeting” insisted that all war victims should support their group irrespective of party affiliation, regional background, or religious belief, the fact of the matter was that some disabled veterans wanted to build a separate organization better aligned with their political loyalty. This grassroots attempt was apparently welcomed and, with the presence of Resch, endorsed by the Christian Socials. There is no evidence suggesting that the party proactively set out to build a war victim wing in the guise of a local group. Despite its claim to represent all, the Zentralverband in this particular case was not willing to accommodate the Christian Social group; the latter’s overture to form a formal relationship with the Zentralverband was rebuffed. Resch was condemned by the Zentralverband for giving his patronage to an event that sought to dismantle the apolitical war victim movement.⁵⁰

With competing organizations emerging, partisan elements, never entirely absent from war victim activism, became an unavoidable issue. The Zentralverband’s Vienna base was Social Democratic leaning, and its successive leadership groups, led by Hollitscher and then by Weisteiner and Burger, emphasized their leftist credentials throughout their rivalry.⁵¹ Its membership, on the other hand, was mixed, with especially the provincial members coming from different socio-political milieus. The Amstetten (Lower Austria) regional group, for example, was led by a “radical leftist”—in the words of the officials—but its members were mostly Christian Social supporters.⁵² On 28 September 1919, to facilitate the upcoming donation drives for the benefit of its members, the Amstetten group sought to dispel “incorrect views and rumors, widely held by the local population, about the character, nature, and purpose of [the organization] once and for all” in front of “all [local] bodies regardless of their political positions.” The first point the Amstetten activists made in this meeting was none other than their mission of nonpartisan interest representation: “The invalid organization has in its mind only the economic interests, not political goals of any kind, of invalids and seeks to work on these, because in its ranks there are members of all political parties, predominantly coming from a farming background.” At the end of the meeting an agreement was struck, based on the organization’s reassurance and promise of the nonpartisan and apolitical nature of its work.⁵³

The relationship between the Viennese organized war victims and the Social Democrats as well as other leftist groupings was not a secret. Outside Vienna, the Zentralverband affiliates therefore had to fight the suspicion of being a socialist force. Even in Vienna, leaders delivered the same message around the same time to their mostly Social Democrat-leaning members, reminding them that in order to unite the now-fragmented war victim movement, local chapters should not take political positions but remain focused on economic issues.⁵⁴

The late September assertions of nonpartisanship made the early September refusal to accommodate the small Christian Social group rather puzzling. If the Pohanka group was such an inconsequential entity, why did the Zentralverband's supporters react so angrily, even accusing the Pohanka group of being "monarchist"? Was it simply to intimidate the new competitor? In addition, disrupting rivals' meetings had long been part of the regular repertoire of local political agitation in Vienna. After the breakaway of the Hollitscher group, the rise of new competing organizations, and the loss of the monopoly over the access to state officials and resources, a challenger like the Pohanka group hit an especially raw nerve if it was fundamentally different, coming from the opposite end of the political spectrum and organizing itself specifically around this distinction. The Reichsbund and the Zentralrat, at least, claimed to be on the political left.

In particular, the endorsement of Deputy Social Minister Resch, not unlike the presence of high officials (cabinet members or senior civil servants) in earlier Zentralverband local branch meetings, showed that the Christian Socials intended to reorient the state's policy on the war victim movement. Instead of searching for or reinforcing a single partner, as the Social Democrats preferred, a partisan "balance" was the Christian Socials' policy moving forward. Once explicitly partisan thinking was introduced, the dynamics of war victim politics began to change.

War victims always brought their political preferences and loyalties to the movement. The war victim identity per se was sufficiently powerful in the immediate postwar months that it could coexist with—and often did override—previous sociopolitical identities. However, with the heightened competition over resources and representation made possible by the Invalid Compensation Law, and after the failure of Communist revolutionary attempts all over Central Europe, older milieu-party political identities reasserted their hold. The war victim identity began to intermingle more with partisan political identities or even be subsumed under them, as in the case of Pohanka's Christian Social association. In late 1919, arguably, this was still not the norm among the majority of war victims. In the long run, however, it had the effect of pushing previously less explicit party-political war victims to express their war victim identity more through their party-political identities than along with or even independently from them.

The Second Founding of the Zentralverband

At its first anniversary in November 1919, the Zentralverband reviewed what it had achieved and what it still wanted to do.⁵⁵ It also named the movement's most "regrettable" and threatening enemies: the separatist "Away from Vienna

(*Los von Wien*)” plotters who had disrupted the Zentralverband’s “smooth” development. Many local affiliates that were led astray by mistaken beliefs “have returned to the mother organization” after coming to their senses: it was the large Zentralverband that had access to resources for distribution, not the much smaller rivals. Still, the Zentralverband leadership was worried and repeated its mantra of late: “Only when all German-Austrian disabled veterans unite in a single organization will it be able to overcome all obstacles along the way and completely fulfill all the demands of disabled veterans and war widows.” At the end of *Der Invalidé*’s anniversary review, the author, Karl Grundei, appealed to his wayward comrades: “Abandon separatism and obstructionism! Unite, if you don’t want to be ruined by your own tactics! Unite, unite, unite!”⁵⁶

The Zentralverband indeed had a plan to reunify and strengthen the movement. The Viennese leadership decided to convene the organization’s second national conference on 30 November and 1 December 1919. Representatives from all provincial organizations were invited to “open dialogues and clarifications” and reach better understanding inside the organization, instead of speaking to outsiders.⁵⁷ Despite the emphasis on dialogue, the intention was unmistakable: a second founding of the war victim movement.

The Zentralverband leaders were convinced that the loose structure connecting the umbrella organization in Vienna to its local affiliates was no longer fit for purpose. To them, it was the result of people “storm[ing] into the Zentralverband hoping to find immediate liberation from their hardships by the simple fact that they had joined the organization”; they could not be fully satisfied, of course, under the difficult circumstances. In the confusing scramble to find allies and resources, the Zentralverband admitted that it did not have a firm grasp on all its members. In the provinces some organizations benefited from the less chaotic circumstances, grew early, and developed tighter connections with individual members. This, the Viennese activists alleged, encouraged some provincial activists to think that they could do without a national organization, hence the “Away from Vienna” sentiment.⁵⁸

The Zentralverband leadership wanted the conference to agree on the proposals to instill “order within the organization and to assign each member his [proper] place.” This, in turn, would generate more orderly but closer bonds between individual members and the Zentralverband, between the provincial organizations and their affiliated district-level associations and local chapters, and between the Zentralverband and the provincial organizations.⁵⁹ The Viennese leadership demanded direct control over money and information that came directly from the local chapters. Bypassing the provincial organizations

would allegedly enable Vienna to better respond to war victims' needs and give it a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the authorities. The second founding would be based on centralization, against the autonomist inclinations of some provincial activists.

This engagement with the organizational relations between Vienna and the provinces within the war victim movement, interestingly, paralleled the broader debate at the time over whether to federalize the Republic in writing a new, post-peace treaty constitution.⁶⁰ The conservative provincial political elite looked with increasing suspicion at the power of Vienna and the Vienna-based Social Democrats' preference for a centralized government—concentrating power in the national parliament—to advance their radical reforms or even peaceful revolution. Federalism became their way to erect a constitutional bulwark against Vienna's socialism. This was indeed a constitutional moment for working out the relations between Vienna and the provinces on various levels, including that of war victim representation.

Money and information were the starting point for the Zentralverband in tightening its organizational discipline. Some local chapters had never sent the membership dues they collected to the Zentralverband. From then on, the Zentralverband declared, it would strictly enforce the existing rule that the dues collected should be sent to Vienna "before the 10th day of the next month." If not, *Der Invalide* would not be sent to that local chapter. Local chapters that failed to send their membership rolls to Vienna were indeed warned in early December.⁶¹

Discontinuing newspaper delivery might seem like a trivial threat. But in the midst of material shortages and persistently confusing developments in and outside of Austria, specialized information was critical for people with specific needs and interests.⁶² Once left out of the Zentralverband information flow, local war victims would have to find an alternative way to stay abreast of the latest developments in the still-evolving war victim welfare system. No other rival organizations had the capacity to edit, produce, and distribute newspapers nationally at this point. With information being a precious commodity, the Zentralverband wielded it as both carrot and stick to facilitate the centralizing reforms.

A new development also raised the level of urgency for reform in late 1919: its two main rivals in Vienna had entered into an alliance. The Hollitscher Reichsbund and the Communist-founded Zentralrat claimed they had formed a new organization, the "Reichsverband." The Christian Socials' Association of Christian Veterans could be brushed off, at least publicly, as too small to warrant serious negotiation, with its meager 2,300 or so members. The new alliance, on the other hand, was much more substantial, with an alleged 10,000-strong

membership (Reichsbund: 3,500; Zentralrat: 6,200). It was a greater threat when competing for working-class war victims, from which the Zentralverband drew its core supporters in Vienna.⁶³ The Zentralverband in its original form was thus under pressure from two mutually reinforcing sides: the increasing call of “Away from Vienna” among some provincial activists allegedly weakened the basis on which the Zentralverband presented itself as the legitimate representative of all war victims and thereby further encouraged its Viennese competitors; the splinter competitors in Vienna decreased the size leverage with which the Zentralverband could sway and harness the provincial affiliates. Changes in the Zentralverband were inevitable after its failure to reconcile with the competing Viennese groups.

A major overhaul was undertaken at the second national convention. But the direction it took was the exact opposite of what the Zentralverband activists had proposed a month earlier. The convention’s 2 December 1919 resolution transferred control of the Zentralverband newspaper, *Der Invalide*, to the recently constituted Lower Austrian Provincial Association and Vienna Local Association (Kreisverband Vienna), becoming their joint periodical starting in 1920. Karl Burger, the editor of the newspaper since its inception, announced, “The Zentralverband will therefore no longer participate in its editing and publishing. The resolution is based on the reason that other Provincial Associations all have their own newspapers. *Der Invalide* should therefore devote itself specifically to Lower Austria and Vienna from this point on.”⁶⁴ Just two weeks earlier, *Der Invalide* had been used as leverage to warn local chapters throughout the country that they had to submit membership lists and dues to Vienna on time. With the resolution to discontinue the national newspaper, the Zentralverband lost one of its few direct ties to local chapters in the provinces. Instead of tightening Viennese control over the entire movement, the Viennese were forced to withdraw and focus on their own base.

The downgrading of the national newspaper to a provincial publication was the signal that provincial leaders demanded an explicitly equal relationship with the Viennese activists. Provincial organizations asserted that they should be the center of organized war victims’ regular activities. As the founding editor of *Der Invalide*, Karl Burger wrote a farewell poem to his readers. It ended defiantly:

I walk down my path
 a second Parsifal
 I laugh at your hatred
 and search for the Holy Grail!
 Proudly disdainful of the mob

straight I hold the shield and sword
And think with a taunting laugh:
the more foes, the more honor!⁶⁵

The battles with the old foes, such as the Hollitscherites, the Zentralrat, and even the Pohanka group, had been going on for a while. Where did the "more foes" come from? Probably they came from within his own group, as his comrades had become the most immediate foes. The anger boiling in these lines stemmed from frustration over the lack of support for his dream of centralizing the movement into a truly unified organization (the "Holy Grail"). So he had to "walk down my path." Indeed, after December 1919 Karl Burger disappeared entirely from the war victim movement.⁶⁶

Another indicator of the provincial "federalist" victory over the centralist proponents was that the Zentralverband's national convention was formally chaired by the "Conference of Provincial Chairmen."⁶⁷ The early December meeting of provincial delegates occasioned yet another push to unite rival Viennese war victim organizations, especially the allied Reichsbund and Zentralrat. Instead of the Viennese leadership taking the initiative and negotiating with the rivals on behalf of the Zentralverband, as in the July talks, it was the Conference of Provincial Chairmen who offered a merger deal to the "Reichsverband." The Social Democrats' *Arbeiter-Zeitung* reprinted a message from the Zentralverband about the negotiation: "Although we completely abandon the centralist concept, the [merger] attempt failed because of the sectarian organizations. The Conference of Provincial Chairmen therefore believes it to be appropriate to declare that it is the one and only legitimate representation for all invalids, war widows, and orphans of the Zentralverband, which is thoroughly apolitical and purely economic, and in which all Provincial Associations (and Vienna Local Association) strongly unite." The Reichsverband side of the story was more detailed. It told the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* that its leaders were summoned to the Conference of Provincial Chairmen and asked to accept unconditionally two merger proposals on the spot. Under pressure, the Reichsverband representatives agreed to both in principle, but requested a day for their executive committee to examine the second proposal, which would entail having the Reichsverband join forces with the Vienna Local Association but not being able to keep its original organization intact as a federated unit in the Zentralverband. The Conference of Provincial Chairmen flatly refused the request and ended this round of merger "talks."⁶⁸

The *Arbeiter-Zeitung* statement from the Conference of Provincial Chairmen revealed that the second national convention of the Zentralverband was

effectively its second, provincialized founding. As the new center of decision making for the Zentralverband, a second Conference of Provincial Chairmen, held from 4 to 12 January 1920, made several important changes to the Zentralverband's bylaws.⁶⁹ The name of the national umbrella organization changed from the original to the Central Association of the Austrian Provincial War Invalid and Surviving Dependent Organizations (Zentralverband der Landesorganisationen der Kriegsinvaliden und-hinterbliebenen Österreichs), in order to accentuate the federated nature of the movement and indicate that the new national organization was "the center of group representation for provincial war invalid organizations." Individual membership in the Zentralverband was premised on membership in one of the provincial organizations and being eligible for benefits prescribed by the Invalid Compensation Law. Under the new structure, the Zentralverband could not collect dues from individual members directly; its funding came from its own enterprises, donations, grants, and contributions from provincial organizations proportionate to their relative size.⁷⁰ The Zentralverband was henceforth a federation of the provincial organizations, not an organization with provincial affiliates or branches.

The new bylaws were adopted at a special national conference held in mid-May in Vienna,⁷¹ attended by Social Minister Hanusch and many leading welfare officials, experts, and parliamentarians. The absence of Christian Social Party representatives, despite the Zentralverband's repeated statements about its non-partisan nature,⁷² was conspicuous. It was a sign that the Christian Socials saw the movement as a partisan one. Before that, the federal structure of the movement had already been confirmed through the way the Zentralverband's eighteen seats, out of the twenty reserved for organized war victims on the Standing Commission for Invalid Welfare of the Social Ministry (the central state's participatory policy-making mechanism), were distributed: six seats for the Viennese organization, three for the Lower Austrians, two for the Upper Austrians, two for the Styrians, and one each for the Salzburgers, Tyroleans, Vorarlbergers, and Carinthians. The Zentralverband executive committee would be given one seat.⁷³ The first meeting of the reconstituted Standing Commission for Invalid Welfare, held on 8 April 1920, was attended by eight officials and seventeen representatives from war victim organizations, of which sixteen belonged to the Zentralverband-Provincial Associations group (the 17th came from the small organization of the war blind). Twelve of these sixteen represented first and foremost the provincial organizations.⁷⁴ The provincial organizations thereafter had robust and unmediated presence at the highest level of the participatory policy-making mechanism.

There was also good news for Zentralverband activists during the provincialization of the movement. According to the Zentralverband's new "no stilted reportage, no polemics, no useless items" newsletter,⁷⁵ having eighteen seats (out of twenty) on the reconstituted Standing Commission for Invalid Welfare meant that "the Social Ministry absolutely recognized the Zentralverband as the only organization that covers the entire country, and is therefore justified to send representatives. The Christian Socials' Association of Christian Veterans had to forgo its participation because it also accepted healthy returning veterans and demobilized soldiers."⁷⁶ At this first open opportunity for other war victim organizations to scale the policy-making summit, the Social Ministry officials stuck to their old partner in spite of the Zentralverband's recent turmoil.

The fact that there were positive developments in uniting the warring Viennese war victim organizations probably helped secure the Zentralverband's continued monopoly over war victim representation. After one more failed attempt in late 1919,⁷⁷ Hollitscher and his Reichsbund "returned" to the mother organization before the end of March 1920.⁷⁸ His group merged with the Zentralverband's Vienna Local Association and created a new Vienna Provincial Association (*Landesverband Wien*). This name signaled that the new Viennese organization had equal status with other provincial organizations in the Zentralverband. The Reichsbund's erstwhile ally, the Zentralrat, was not part of the deal.⁷⁹

Hollitscher quickly returned to prominence and represented the Vienna Provincial Association at the 8 April first meeting of the Standing Commission of the Social Ministry.⁸⁰ Having become the chair of the united Vienna organization, Hollitscher criticized what he saw as the state officials' creeping disregard for the organized war victims. One such example was Deputy Social Minister Josef Resch's public criticism of the Vienna Provincial Association and the Zentralverband during the Christian Social war victim organization's functions. Another was the Social Ministry's recent practice of not sharing drafts of new welfare legislation with organized war victims until the very last moment, such as the bill about the compulsory hiring quota for disabled veterans. This, to him, failed to live up to the principle of true participatory policy making.⁸¹

In the end, the Zentralverband's national character was saved, counterintuitively, by the provincial activists. The federalization of the movement, following the institutional design of the Invalid Compensation Law's province-based administration of welfare programs, gave the provincial activists real influence. But that influence also relied on the movement remaining united in a national structure to continue and to extend to the national level of policy making. The second founding thus fortified the once-vulnerable Zentralverband's claim to

be the sole partner of the state in welfare politics. With around 160,000 members nationwide,⁸² and around 100,000 in Vienna alone (thanks to the return of the Hollitscherites),⁸³ the Zentralverband's renewed numerical strength in 1920 made it easy for the state officials to exclude the Christian Socials and the Zentralrat from the participatory policy-making mechanism.⁸⁴ The Zentralverband's functionaries were finally able to breathe a temporary sigh of relief. After the bitter internecine conflicts, a major drain on activists' time and energy, they could rededicate themselves to the real work of advocating for the interests of their members, especially on the legislative front and in a more aggressive way not seen since passage of the Invalid Compensation Law. It seemed that the Zentralverband, in its federalized version, could continue to shape the Republic's progressive war victim policies in the years to come.

From the Primacy of Politics to the Fiscal Imperative

The world around the organized war victims, however, did not wait for them to regroup and resume their privileged place in the Republic's politics of scarcity. Attending the reenergized Zentralverband's May 1920 special national convention, Social Minister Hanusch reminded the activists from around the country that things had changed. His ministry had continued to "strive to satisfy invalids' wishes as much as possible," although the reality of being a small, poor country created by the war and the Entente Powers made certain goals particularly difficult to attain. Unfortunately, Hanusch added, "The public's interest in invalids has waned. Moreover, some individuals belonging to the more radical elements have done things that are received very badly by the public." Hanusch asked his audience to adjust their expectations to the circumstances, just as the public needed to show patience and understanding to disabled men. The high unemployment rate, for example, made it difficult to immediately pass the new bill requiring employers to hire disabled men.⁸⁵ The waning of public interest in war victims, though, was especially alarming. Without public interest and sympathy, there would be no national consensus that war victims were a priority for the Republic or that they were entitled to preferential treatment as a matter of course.

Thanks to the participatory mechanisms, the Zentralverband saw the passage of several additional war victim laws and regulations following the Invalid Compensation Law. But they were all demands that had been raised in early 1919, when the Zentralverband had both momentum for expansion and a favorable environment for extracting concessions from the state. The Law for the War-Damaged Persons Fund (*Gesetz über den Kriegsgeschädigtenfonds*,

StGBL. 573/1919) was adopted on 18 December 1919. It was a highly symbolic punishment of the Habsburgs for the former ruling house’s role in starting and continuing the war. The law authorized the central government to create an independent fund for the benefit of war victims from properties confiscated from the House of Habsburg and the family trust.⁸⁶

The key complement to the Invalid Compensation Law, the Invalid Employment Law of 1 October 1920 (*Invalidenbeschäftigungsgesetz, StGBL.* 459/1920), was finally realized after a long gestation period stretching back to at least the final year of the war.⁸⁷ The law made it a legal obligation of “all private businesses, mines, state monopoly enterprises, agricultural and forestry operations, and any other for-profit undertakings to hire at least one disabled veteran among its first 20 employees, and at least one more war-damaged person for every additional 25 employees.” For those businesses that were, by their very nature, unable to employ disabled men (or to hire the number required by law) without being disproportionately disadvantaged if they did so, or those having only jobs that would expose disabled men to enhanced risks of accidents or health issues, an “equalization tax” was allowed as the substitute. Disabled veterans eligible for Invalid Compensation Law benefits and with a degree of disability above 45 percent were eligible for the preferential employment prescribed in this law. They would be paid a wage or salary proportionate to their work ability for the specific jobs to which they were assigned. By August 1924, 7,962 disabled men were employed because of this law, and 9,038 employment preference certificates had been issued.⁸⁸ Notably, the Invalid Employment Law was the first law ever to establish employers’ legal obligation to employ disabled people in Austria.

There were also successes in helping war victims who became central state employees. Many disabled veterans were hired after the war, and their employment—as state employees (*Staatsangestellte*)—was both a welfare measure (employment as welfare provision) and a way to handle the skyrocketing workload resulting from the expansion of the welfare state. Many were specifically hired, after consultation with organized war victims, to staff the new agencies responsible for administering the Invalid Compensation Law’s provisions.⁸⁹ The War-Disabled Federal Employees’ Terms of Service Law (*BGBL.* 90/1921) granted most of these disabled state employees tenured (*pragmatisiert*) status, if they were in state service before 1 May 1920, and allowed for double-counting of their war service years for the purpose of a favorable calculation of their future salary and benefits. In essence, the central state agreed to formalize the previously temporary arrangements and gave war-disabled state workers the same job security enjoyed by regular state officials.

Even before state employment became an institutionalized form of welfare provision, tobacconist kiosks had been a familiar—and for many the most desirable—state-granted business for a disabled veteran or war widow. Several regulations were issued between 1919 and 1923 that helped war victims acquire tobacconist licenses, including one allowing the state finance administration to terminate current licenses early in order to create vacancies for war victim applicants.⁹⁰ Understandably, the tobacconist interest group was upset. It claimed that, by March 1925, 2,500 licenses had been granted to war victims at their members' expense, and another 2,000 kiosks were made available to war victims through the death of previous operators or simple additions by the authorities—hence more competition in a shaky economy.⁹¹

These advances, however, could not override developments that increasingly threatened war victims' favored status. In fact, the old political elite's opposition to the policy of privileging war victims had become more vocal by the second half of 1919. Finance Ministry officials complained in August 1919—less than two months after the introduction of the Invalid Compensation Law system—that there were too many private physicians sitting on the examination panels as “invalid doctors.” The finance officials believed that they tended to be overgenerous in determining the examinees' degree of disability, thereby putting an unjustified heavy burden on state finances. A state doctor, in contrast, would be more “objective” in preventing the abuses. Even though applications were flooding the welfare offices—in Vienna alone there were more than 40,000 already—at the time, state welfare officials, the finance officials warned, should not bend the rules about the composition of these panels to expedite processing.⁹² The financial interests of the state came before the administrative expediency of satisfying the state's constituents. To the finance officials, the fiscal logic should take precedence over the political one.

In another instance from September 1919, the district commissioner in Amstetten defended himself by indirectly challenging the practice of tolerating or even favoring organized war victims' demands. He argued that, in the Republic, law and order still existed, even if he was expected to work with activists like Leopold Scholz, who simultaneously was the head of the local organized war victims and the director of the official Amstetten Invalid Office. He believed that Scholz and the local Workers' Council should not be allowed to take whatever public resources they wanted simply because they claimed to be working for a good cause. The interests of the state and the principle of law and order could not be sacrificed to placate assertive war victims, especially when facing the task of postwar reconstruction. In October 1920, Friedrich Hock of the Social

Ministry agreed with the district commissioner, saying that the chairmanship of a local war victim organization was incompatible with leading an official war victim welfare office.⁹³ If even the usually war victim-friendly Hock—the top war victim welfare official in the ministry after the departure of Division Chief Gasteiger in June 1919—had begun to think that the revolutionary practice of extralegal favoring of war victim activists needed to be checked, rules had to be followed, and the public-private distinction had to be maintained, the postrevolutionary normalization indeed had set in.

On 1 January 1922, the Zentralverband's membership reached 198,698, organized in ten provincial organizations and 730 local chapters (including the local chapters and their members in Bavaria). There were an additional 193,417 dependent children and orphans associated with the Zentralverband through their family members. This was the peak of the organized war victims' numeric strength.⁹⁴ But 1922 also proved to be a turning point for war victim politics in the Republic, one that even their large numbers could not overcome.

The Austrian Republic survived its first four years financially on loans, foreign charitable aid, and the printing press (producing banknotes). It never was able to cover even half of its own budgets (1919/1920: 16.87 billion kronen projected expenditure versus 6.29 billion kronen projected revenues; 1920/1921: 70.6 billion versus 29.48 billion).⁹⁵ As hyperinflation set in late in 1921, most state assets had already been collateralized, and other means of raising funds were quickly exhausted. By summer 1922, Austria teetered on the brink of total financial collapse.⁹⁶ The Christian Social-German nationalist coalition government had to seek massive international assistance to keep the country afloat.

Before Federal Chancellor Ignaz Seipel went to the League of Nations in September to appeal for help, which led to the Geneva Protocols of 4 October 1922 and the League of Nations-backed bailout, his government had begun to identify where significant savings could be achieved.⁹⁷ Using this opportunity, Social Minister Richard Schmitz, a Christian Social, proposed to chip away at the recently legislated preferential treatment of war-disabled state employees. During the 14 July 1922 cabinet meeting, he took aim at the War-Disabled Federal Employees' Terms of Service Law, arguing it was too vague to implement and too generous. His opposition to this specific welfare policy, moreover, was not solely on financial grounds: automatic tenure for war victim employees ignored the duty of the state civil service to hire the most suitable people for the vacant positions. It was against the principle of a rational, purpose-driven, efficient bureaucracy, and it allegedly created injustice and confusion that should be rectified.⁹⁸ Schmitz's speech signaled a total role reversal: the social minister

aggressively assumed the position that usually belonged to the finance minister; the person who had to date been the official advocate for war victims became the one who defended the state against them.

This was not an isolated incident. The codetermination mechanism at the central state level, the Standing Commission for Invalid Welfare in the Social Ministry, was already under attack from none other than the Social Ministry itself in late spring 1922. Around the time Richard Schmitz became the social minister on 31 May, the officials there began to interpret the Standing Commission as only a “consultative body” and its conclusions not binding. In other words, the ministerial officials distanced themselves from the understanding and the practice, dating back to the founding of the Standing Commission’s previous incarnation in late 1918, that important war victim welfare policy would first be agreed upon in the commission before being sent to the cabinet and the parliament.

The vulnerability of the Standing Commission as a participatory decision-making mechanism was being exploited by a less friendly government. The legal basis for the Standing Commission was an executive directive from 20 December 1919 (*StGBL.* 591/1919) that talked only about “expert consultation,” and the votes were by no means legally binding.⁹⁹ State officials’ respect for and adherence to the Standing Commission resolutions thus far were based on the extralegal understanding and precedence originating in the revolutionary environment of 1918–1919, for which there were compelling political reasons at the time. There had been no need and, probably benefiting the *Zentralverband*, no will to formalize the understanding. Under the changed circumstances, the officials moved to a literal reading of the executive directive and unilaterally ended the practice. Without any effective legal or political means to defend this pillar of their postwar partnership, the *Zentralverband* could only appeal directly to Chancellor Seipel to do the right thing by introducing their desired improvements in the upcoming Seventh Revision of the Invalid Compensation Law.¹⁰⁰

The Seventh Revision of the Invalid Compensation Law (VII. Novelle zum Invalidenentschädigungsgesetz, *BGBL.* 430/1922) of 7 July 1922 turned out to be a major defeat for organized war victims. The process of revision began somewhat routinely on 8 February 1922, when the *Zentralverband* presented its report on the needed improvements. The most important, but by now routine, demand was raising the amount of benefits to offset the effect of hyperinflation since the last major revision (in November 1921).¹⁰¹ After all, inflation adjustment was at the heart of the previous revisions. The Social Ministry estimated

that following the Zentralverband's 8 February proposals, the annual cost of the Invalid Compensation Law benefits would be 61,883 million kronen; simply adjusting current benefits to the rate of inflation since the last revision, it would be 23,829 million kronen; while the current provisions, based on the November 1921 Sixth Revision numbers, cost 4,647 million kronen annually.¹⁰² Based on these figures, the Finance Ministry declared that the benefits must be adjusted, but that the costs would be prohibitively high even if benefits were only raised strictly at the rate of inflation and without adding the improvements requested by the Zentralverband.¹⁰³

The finalized Seventh Revision brought some significant but ultimately nominal raises. The measure to offset the added state financial commitments, however, would come at the expense of a significant segment of war victims: the lowest two categories of pension-eligible disabled veterans, whose disability was between 15 and 24 percent and between 25 and 34 percent, respectively. These two categories of beneficiaries would be paid a lump-sum buyout worth ten times the amount of their annual total pension payments, plus any inflation-adjustment supplements (calculated based on the pension rate valid on the day of severance), and thereafter would no longer be eligible for pension benefits.¹⁰⁴ Inflation adjustment as a principle was finally incorporated into the law, but the price was that a large number of war victims lost their pension eligibility.

Given the ongoing hyperinflation, these war victims' involuntary buyout lump sums would not be worth much in a few months. By 1924, the first year the relevant statistics were available, one official source showed that 154,200 veterans had been deemed "disabled"—a loss of earning power over 15 percent. Of these, 68,432 had had their pension benefits involuntarily terminated (3,216 were voluntarily bought out); 43,533 were still receiving payments and other benefits.¹⁰⁵ Reasons for involuntary benefit payment stoppage were not limited to the Seventh Revision's lump-sum buyout, but that was clearly the primary reason. The only other important reason, invoked infrequently but often provoking protest from organized war victims, was a medical reevaluation that lowered the degree of disability to below 15 percent before 1922 and thereafter to below 35 percent. Thus, at least 23.4 percent of the original beneficiaries (61.1 percent of all original pension-eligible disabled veterans) were bought out because of the Seventh Revision.¹⁰⁶

After the involuntary buyouts of the Seventh Revision of the Invalid Compensation Law, there was a new statistical breakdown of war victim welfare beneficiaries, as of 31 December 1924, according to a Zentralverband-Provincial Associations source (Table 7.1):

TABLE 7.1. Statistical Breakdown of War Victim Welfare Beneficiaries as of 31 December 1924

Disabled Persons Receiving Blindness Supplement	275
Disabled Persons Receiving "Helpless" Supplement	624
Over 75% Disabled	3,499
65 to 75% Disabled	4,344
55 to 65% Disabled	6,311
45 to 55% Disabled	11,279
35 to 45% Disabled	17,201
25 to 35% Disabled, involuntarily bought out	32,109
15 to 25% Disabled, involuntarily bought out	36,470
Total Number of War-Disabled Persons	112,193
Widows Unable to Work, with two or more children	1,041
Widows Unable to Work, with fewer than two children	15,260
Widows Able to Work, with fewer than two children	15,251
Total Number of Widows	31,552
Orphans Losing One Parent	73,903
Parentless Orphans	6,408
Total Number of Orphans	80,311
Other Surviving Dependents	25,648
Children of Disabled Men Eligible for Child Supplement	43,129
Total Number of Benefit-Eligible War Victims	292,833
Total Number of Processed Cases for Disability Pension	221,477
Total Number of Processed Cases for Dependents' Pension	231,680
Application for Benefits Still Undecided	ca. 2500
Total Population of Austria	ca. 6,535,000

SOURCE: Brandeis and Zobel, *Gesetzgebung für Kriegsgeschädigten*, 10–11.

The Zentralverband did not gain any real ground in the Seventh Revision. On the contrary, many of its members were bought out of the system. With the Christian Socials and the German nationalists controlling the parliamentary majority, there was no way to stop the government's program of retrenchment in the name of improvement.

Richard Schmitz's late spring–early summer 1922 moves—before the obligatory cuts required by the Geneva Protocols—to shrink state commitments and reduce war victims' influence had domino effects beyond the state–war victim interaction. The muted response from business and industrial circles to war victim welfare expansion in 1919 had already been replaced by vocal criticism of and resistance to the existing and proposed war victim welfare legislation. The Invalid Employment Law of 1920, for example, invited many complaints or requests to lower the equalization tax.¹⁰⁷ In his drive to save money by closing the long-standing institution of Invalid Houses, Schmitz proposed a new law in June 1922 that would “farm out” disabled soldiers to private sanatoriums and resorts. The Salzburg Chamber of Commerce produced a long memorandum opposing it, arguing that the cost of war victim welfare should be covered by everyone, paid for by public money raised for general purposes. “It is the view of this Chamber that [the proposed law] would be an entirely new invention and an infringement on the constitutionally guaranteed right.”¹⁰⁸ To the Salzburg Chamber, either everyone paid or no one should. This was a fundamental challenge not only to the proposed law but also to the Invalid Employment Law itself. With the Vienna Chamber of Commerce concurring,¹⁰⁹ an articulate discourse was publicly formulated in opposition to both the old and the new measures. Both the state and the private sectors openly sought to avoid contributing to war victim welfare as much as possible. It was no longer a political taboo to do so.

To secure the foreign credit that was necessary to keep the national economy afloat, the Austrian state was obligated to rapidly and drastically shrink the civil service after signing the Geneva Protocols.¹¹⁰ To balance the budget within two years, the Seipel government planned to cut around 100,000 of the state's employees—nearly a third of the total. By December 1925, the “civil servant reduction” program had cut 96,613 employees from the central administration, the state monopoly operations, and the state railways.¹¹¹

This drastic reduction significantly undercut the major welfare measure of employing disabled veterans to serve in the war victim welfare agencies. The practice was politically convenient in 1919, because doing so placated organized war victims who asserted that only their comrades understood their needs, not to mention creating patronage employment for war victim group members to

maintain the critically important partnership. Practically, it also met the need to handle in a short period of time the huge amount of work involved in implementing the Invalid Compensation Law, given staffing shortages in the Invalid Compensation Commissions in 1919 and early 1920.¹¹² Organized war victims participated in the hiring process of the Lower Austrian Invalid Compensation Commission, specifically to recommend their members as candidates. The disabled veteran staff members of the Lower Austrian Invalid Compensation Commission were even allowed to join the Lower Austrian Provincial Association as a group, so that they had a say in choosing the candidates in the first place.¹¹³ In Carinthia, an October 1919 petition for better job security from the employees of the local Invalid Offices pointed out that “most officials and other employees of the Provincial Invalid Compensation Commission, with some inevitable exceptions, are disabled veterans.”¹¹⁴ District-level Invalid Offices as well as welfare institutions also employed disabled veterans in leadership positions. Disabled veteran Beno Innerhofer, who was a junior untenured accountant official before the war service, was chosen in late July 1920 as the new director of the Salzburg Invalid Home because he “seems to enjoy the full trust of invalids.”¹¹⁵ The fact that he was also a representative of the local war victim group certainly helped.¹¹⁶ The decision to appoint a leader of the local disabled veterans as the leader of a public welfare institution for disabled veterans, the Salzburg officials later claimed, was a correct one, and they even asked Vienna to give him a pay raise.¹¹⁷

The War-Disabled Federal Employees’ Terms of Service Law of 1921 was, then, the high point of this practice, as it granted employment security to many of the war-disabled state personnel hired in this manner. As part of his attack on the policy of privileging war victims in state employment, Richard Schmitz ordered an investigation in September 1922 into how many war victims benefited from this law and the related executive directives.¹¹⁸ Not counting the staff of the Social and Interior Ministries, 8,347 (or 5.5 percent of the total 151,623) officials and permanent employees in other federal agencies, offices, and enterprises were disabled veterans or their equivalents, and 7,945 of them (over 95 percent of the 8,347) had benefited from the law as of October 1922.¹¹⁹ The Social Ministry certainly had a much higher percentage of its staff who were war victims.

In fact, even under the unquestionably pro-war victim Ferdinand Hanusch, Social Ministry officials were concerned that the practice of hiring as many disabled men as possible in the public administration might have gone too far. The Vienna Invalid Compensation Commission had a staff of 520, but according to the budget plan for the fiscal year 1920/1921 it should have been 288.¹²⁰ In

August 1920, when the Klagenfurt local war victim group put immense pressure on the Carinthian Invalid Compensation Commission about the latter's hiring decisions, a ministerial official was sent there to investigate.¹²¹ A second official was sent there soon after, because Hanusch worried that continuing to give in to war victims' demands would jeopardize the integrity of the welfare administration. A report from late September 1920 showed that the ministry finally prevailed and stopped what it saw as the privatization of a state agency. The ministerial officials concluded that "As a matter of principle it was unacceptable to make appointments under the pressure of war victims and simply follow their wishes."¹²²

The "civil servant reduction," as part of the general restructuring of the state administration required by the Geneva Protocols, forced a rollback of the practice of employing welfare clients. It is not easy to generate precise numbers about how many disabled veterans-turned-welfare officials lost their jobs as a result. But between 1 October 1922 and 14 March 1925, the number of the Social Ministry's officials shrank from 4,697 to 2,174, and its staff in non-central administrative operations (welfare and social insurance institutions, for example), dropped from 6,511 to 5,203.¹²³ It is reasonable to assume that a significant number of those laid off were the disabled postwar hires. Then, in February 1923, the specially appointed "savings czar" (Ersparungskommissär) of the government ordered the Social Ministry to find a way to abolish the War-Disabled Federal Employees' Terms of Service Law, because it was both too expensive for the state and perceived to be unfair to those who were not war victims.¹²⁴

The "savings czar" set his sights on multiple aspects of war victim welfare to reduce the state's financial commitments. He first singled out the (procedural) root of the state's commitment to war victims—determining eligibility— and criticized the welfare agencies' examination panels for being too indulgent in deciding and reclassifying applicants' degree of disability. He urged them to exercise "the most rigorous objectivity."¹²⁵ Then the "savings czar" sought a thorough break from the practice of hiring disabled veterans to administer war victim welfare. In the name of efficiency, he succeeded in abolishing all Invalid Offices on 1 January 1923, transferring only their tenured staff members to the provincial Invalid Compensation Commissions.¹²⁶

The 190,000-member-strong Zentralverband was powerless to stop this relentless frontal assault. In theory, it spoke for most if not all of the 153,553 benefit-eligible (before the Seventh Revision) disabled veterans and 140,383 surviving dependents (of whom 42,194 disabled veterans, 35,266 widows, 67,000 orphans, and 26,694 other dependents were still receiving pension benefits in

1923).¹²⁷ They made up a sizable group in a country with a total population of less than 6.5 million. But the Zentralverband could not find effective means to resist the cuts that fundamentally undermined the partnership forged in 1919. Their national petition campaign, sending preprinted resolutions that only required local chapters to fill in their names to condemn the government for turning its back on the legally sanctioned codetermination right of organized war victims, fell on deaf ears.¹²⁸ So did the protests and petitions from welfare agencies' disabled employees and the formal opposition from the Invalid Compensation Commissions.¹²⁹ By this point, the Social Democrats had long been in the opposition. Without parliamentary backing, petitions were merely documents to be filed away.

The Eighth Revision of the Invalid Compensation Law of 1924 (*BGBL* 256/1924, effective 1 January 1925) went further in dismantling the remaining codetermination mechanisms.¹³⁰ The revision and its executive directive initiated an extensive reorganization of the Invalid Compensation Commissions, turning these provincial (and primary) war victim welfare agencies from codetermining institutions into more straightforward administrative departments staffed mostly by career bureaucrats. In the pre-1925 system, the specialized decision-making committees had review power to overrule decisions proposed by the commission's standing staff, thereby guaranteeing war victim representatives an almost equal say in any benefit decision with the officials and medical experts not appointed by clients. In 1925, the specialized committees were replaced by court-like panels in which war victim appointees had only a third of the seats and non-war victim career judges presided over the proceedings. In the meantime, the medical examination results and pension decisions of these panels were declared legally binding. The only recourse against them was to go the route of an administrative legal review, since all Invalid Compensation Law-related matters were considered part of the regular civil administration's operation. Even this last remedy came with a caveat. The legal review considered only possible deficiencies in the procedure by which the case was decided but not the substantive content of the decision or the evidence used in making it.¹³¹

The potentially "political" give-and-take process on the old committees was thereby eliminated.¹³² In its place were the supposed rule-based objectivity and neutral "expertise" of a semilegal proceeding conducted by career civil servants. Institutionally speaking, this move to an ostensibly expert-oriented system, as opposed to a codetermination system, was a turn toward bureaucratic domination over participatory administration and interest group politics. This time,

however, the civil administration itself was battered and politicized in the aftermath of state restructuring and retrenchment—and not in a way that would be beneficial to war victims.¹³³ The partnership of the weak between the state and organized war victims as well as its codetermination mechanisms fell victim to the economic crisis and the subsequent austerity reforms. By the time the country’s fiscal and financial stability was somewhat restored in 1925, the dynamics of war victim politics had completely changed. A weakened war victim movement, still holding onto the social citizenship established in 1918 and 1919, was no match for the logic of fiscal priorities and an unfriendly political culture marked by increasingly polarized partisan politics. The microcosm of war victim politics revealed that the postwar era in Austria had come to end.

Conclusion

AFTER MORE THAN TWO years of relying on a patchwork of antiquated laws, improvised institutions, voluntary contributors, and piecemeal reform-by-decree, 1917 became the watershed for Austrian war victim welfare. The Imperial Austrian state decided to salvage its legitimacy by expanding the welfare state. Until the First World War, war victim welfare in Austria was conceived of as a means to preempt street panhandling by veterans, reward loyal servants of the dynasty, and incentivize enlistment to replenish the strength of the armed forces. The implications of a universal service-based citizen army from the 1868 reform mostly failed to register. The social offensive on the home front represented a full break with this past. Older pillars of the war victim welfare field, such as philanthropic care, public charity funds, imperial paternalism, and improvised service providers, were seen as vastly inadequate for the task. If the Habsburg Monarchy was to survive, imperial officials knew that they needed radical reforms. The founding of the Social Welfare Ministry was an institutional embodiment of their new thinking. What happened after 1917 in welfare politics was to a significant degree a debate over the direction and control of the state's welfare intervention.

The social offensive failed, and the Monarchy collapsed. When the military's political influence evaporated in October 1918, the door to drastic reforms was finally wide open. The Revolution of 1918 ushered in a new political order as well as a new concept of state-citizen relations. Citizenship was thought of as inherently "social." The state's legitimacy originated not only in its democratic institutions, which embodied popular sovereignty, but also in the fulfilment of its social mission to ensure the economic security (to some, even economic equality) of its citizens. The state existed to express the will of these citizens and guarantee their rights, including those involving their living standards, through its services. In war victim welfare, the most important measure taken to realize this new conception was the Invalid Compensation Law of 1919. However, many of its elements were already in the Social Democrats' 1917 proposal. The quick succession of administrative and institutional reforms undertaken in the first months of the Republic also reveals that the leading welfare officials, transitioning smoothly from the Monarchy to

the Austrian Republic, eagerly pursued what they had intended since 1917: the demilitarization, *étatization*, and expansion of welfare provision.

Analyzing war victim welfare over the 1917–1919/1921 continuum, it is not surprising that the first social minister of the Republic, Ferdinand Hanusch, boasted (incorrectly) of Austria being the first and most innovative among the major belligerents and successor states to furnish a new welfare system based on new conceptions of the state and entitlement citizenship.¹ Postwar Austria had a group of welfare actors that had been ready to finally bring their ideas to fruition. The Revolution of 1918 not only brought a new force—war victims themselves—to the war victim welfare field, it also opened the door for the frustrated 1917/1918 reformers.

The Social Democrats and the Communists played critical roles in Austria's speedy commitment to war victim welfare expansion after October 1918. The Social Democrats had the most comprehensive and democratic vision for war victim welfare. They also found welfare officials in the state apparatus ready to collaborate. This revolutionary alliance seized the moment—unquestionably out of necessity in the desperate early postwar months—to initiate swift and sweeping reforms. Legislating for a new and comprehensive war victim welfare system was what the Habsburg military did not accomplish, in spite of its express intention and extraordinary wartime power, and even with draft laws in existence both before and during the war. Where the military had failed, the alliance of the Social Democrats and the reform-minded ex-Habsburg officials succeeded in less than six months.

This was an unexpected success for the Austrian Social Democrats. In a revolution largely not of their own making, they were still in the proverbial driver's seat to shape the overall new political order and the framework for social policy. They achieved some important social policies they had long desired and championed.² A strong sense of mission and direction was definitely an important factor in their success. But so was their timely alliance making, not only with willing Social Ministry officials but also with the intended targets of the new policies. After learning that the party's own efforts to attract war victims had been easily outpaced by war victims' enthusiastic self-organization, the Social Democrats cultivated organized war victims as partners for the new Republic. This strategy, undertaken by Hanusch, his parliamentary colleagues, and his ministerial officials, secured a potentially volatile clientele for the Republic. It helped make war victim welfare a consensus issue in 1919 and facilitated the unanimous support for the Invalid Compensation Law.³

The Social Democrats and organized war victims also had an unwitting and unwilling helper in their push for welfare state expansion: the Communists. Following the putsch attempts in Vienna and the real (albeit temporary) takeovers in Hungary and Bavaria in spring 1919, the threat of a Communist revolution seemed to be cresting. The Communists' highly visible recruiting efforts targeting war victims only reinforced the impression best expressed by the powerful Viennese police president, Johannes Schober, in July 1919: unemployed people, invalids, and returning soldiers were "the groups especially susceptible to subversive influence because of their unfortunate material conditions."⁴ War victims' perceived susceptibility to Communist messages created the pressure of competitive bidding. Hanusch and his colleagues took advantage of this pressure, presenting the very expensive Invalid Compensation Law as both necessary and urgent. The Communist threat, real or perceived,⁵ became the strongest incentive for all who had a stake in the survival of the parliamentary democracy to support a policy that catapulted war victims to the status of the *de facto* and clear favorite wards—consuming more than 90 percent of the Social Ministry's 1919/1920 budget—of the Republic, which in its first year was basically a relief organization.⁶ The Communists achieved only inconsequential success in recruiting war victims.⁷ But in doing so they unwittingly created compelling leverage both for war victims who were willing to work within the parliamentary democratic framework and for the Social Democrats and their allies who wanted to fortify that very same framework.

A unique set of circumstances enabled the Republic to realize the aspiration for massive welfare expansion of the 1917/1918 imperial social offensive. Unlike in Weimar Germany, the thorough collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Imperial Army cleared the way for a complete rearrangement of the priorities of the state as well as the power constellation within it. State officials had been planning and implementing ambitious welfare state expansion since early 1918, and they had been waiting for the opportunity for even more aggressive reforms. The provinces were preoccupied with their own future and more than happy to let the Viennese worry about the policies and the funding for war victim welfare.⁸ The emergence of state-friendly organized war victims made it possible to quickly connect with and cultivate citizen-clients for the new Republic. Both elements of continuity (since 1917) and changes arising from the Revolution of 1918 supplied impetus, momentum, and urgency. With perfect timing, the key Invalid Compensation Law of 1919 emerged from the confluence of these factors.

The law formally redefined social citizenship in Austria. The Austrian state directly guaranteed all its citizens' welfare in regards to war's most direct

damages: death and disability. Through the Invalid Employment Law of 1920, the new entitlement citizenship took a step further: certain categories of war-disabled citizens would be favored in the labor market as part of that broader guarantee. Although the austerity policies of 1922 and after forced many beneficiaries out of the system, the basic principles of the entitlement citizenship were never seriously under threat until the Anschluss of 1938 brought with it Nazi Germany's racial welfare laws. When Austria was again on the losing side of the next world war, the two laws were revived after 1945 to serve the (Second) Republic's state-defining moment a second time in a generation. The Invalid Compensation Law became the model for the War Victim Provision Law of 14 July 1949 (*BGBL*. 197/1949), which covered everyone from surviving war victims of the First World War to those who fought for Nazi Germany. It was a perfect welfare instrument to force Austrians of all stripes to see themselves as members of the same community of victims, substantiating the Allied-sanctioned official self-identification of Austria as the first victim of "Hitlerite aggression."⁹ The basic structure and principles of the Invalid Employment Law, the first Austrian law to establish employers' obligation to hire disabled men (veterans in this case), were adapted into the Invalid Placement Law of 1946 (*BGBL*. 163/1946), which extended the right to preferential employment to other disabled Austrian citizens certified mainly by the industrial accident insurance system. Through the 1946 Law, the 1920 Invalid Employment Law evolved into the basis for today's comprehensive legal requirement to employ disabled persons and the latter's claim to preferential treatment in the labor market.¹⁰ The Austrian response to the First World War, in this way, continues to shape welfare intervention and social citizenship in the twenty-first century.

From a long-term perspective, war victim welfare between 1868 and 1925 shows that war was a major and independent factor in the rise of the welfare state in Austria, rather than just magnifying the dynamics of class-based labor politics or gendered population politics. The introduction of universal military service for male citizens did not change the essentially conservative views about military disability or the provision for the disabled. The 1875 law was to incentivize citizens to become career servicemen and offered a guarantee, in the name of rewarding loyal service to the monarch and the state, for those who chose to serve. It was not a structural "grand bargain" between the citizenry and their war-waging state, with the former offering their militarily useful bodies in exchange for the latter's expanded programs to guarantee or even promote their general welfare. Various social-legal reforms and especially occupation-based social insurance were introduced in the 1880s for some workers, out of both antisocialist and

party-political motives as well as genuine social reform impulses.¹¹ While some see these as marking the beginning of social policy as a distinct and “necessary” field of central state responsibility,¹² it took the confluence of post-1914 factors, all of them contingent consequences of war, to finally jump-start a second wave of major welfare state expansion during and after the First World War—not only for specific occupations, but for all citizens. Without underestimating the insights of biopolitical or labor-political perspectives,¹³ *Victims’ State* shows the need to confront war’s direct damage in the age of mass citizen armies, and specifically the devastation of the First World War, as a main motor driving a robust “thickening” of social citizenship and the long-term development of the welfare state in Austria. To appropriate Charles Tilly’s famous formula, the Austrian state made war, and war made the modern Austrian welfare state.

After charting the social turn of the Austrian state as a result of the Great War, why the immediate postwar reform dynamics in welfare politics petered out between 1922 and 1925 demands explanation. The most straightforward answer is that many of the elements in the confluence that made the welfare-political dynamics possible in the first place had been weakened or lost by 1922. The war victim-friendly Social Democrats no longer controlled the central government after mid-1920 and were in the parliamentary minority until the demise of democracy in 1933. The immediate threat of a Communist revolution subsided significantly after 1920.¹⁴ The political parties had become more confident and hardened their respective ideological positions. Then the fiscal obligations Austria assumed in exchange for international bailout bore down with such overwhelming force—endorsed by the League of Nations—that they altered the overall dynamics and course of domestic politics.¹⁵ It is more fitting, however, for a book about war victim welfare to end with a closer look at war victims themselves—and specifically, at their rise and decline as an independent welfare and political actor to be reckoned with.

“With their healthy brethren, invalids helped build the Republic,” declared the president of the Vienna Provincial Association since the early 1920s, Maximilian Brandeisz, on the tenth anniversary of the Zentralverband’s founding.¹⁶ He did not exaggerate. War victims were the poster children for the old regime’s failed war and misrule and therefore had the potential to become either the showcase of the Republic’s superiority and *raison d’être* or the pawns in a Bolshevik-style radical takeover. Due to their undisputed suffering, their visible losses, and various political forces’ reifying attempts to draw on their political potential, war victims became, at least for a period of time, a social group with significant political weight.

To some extent, their leverage was a self-fulfilling prophecy: the more a political force believed that war victims would be a powerful aid to its opponents, the more powerful the war victims indeed became. The majority of war victims chose to align themselves firmly with the Republic and contribute to its stabilization. The Communists did not attract many war victims, even if war victims were very visible in two attempted putsches in spring 1919.¹⁷ Police president Schober's concern notwithstanding, leading war victim activists from the Zentralverband, for their part, advocated a moderate, sober, and pragmatic approach to defending war victims' interests. They came out hard against what they saw as irresponsible and immoral Communist actions.¹⁸ They also chose to blame local communities or district officials for alleged mismanagement or suspicious decisions, accusing those officials of engaging in treasonous behavior by privileging "bigwigs"; but they spared the Republic *per se* and its central government when the radical Left's recruiting efforts went into high gear.¹⁹ They preached solidarity and hard work on the part of war victims ("rallying to the organization!") despite obvious disappointment and frustration.²⁰

War victims complained about the ungrateful state and society and repeatedly threatened to withdraw their support for the government. Ultimately, though, they remained loyal to the parliamentary democratic Republic. Discontent and frustration with the new welfare system, especially with the pace of its rollout and the less than satisfying benefits, did not explode into mass disillusionment. War victims sometimes protested. But more often they stoically accepted what they were offered. In forging a partnership with the state, they had become stakeholders in the new system. Rocking the boat too much was no longer a real option for them.

Given the fact that war victims had successfully inserted themselves into general policy making and individual benefits decision-making processes in 1919, what happened to the assertive and confident war victim movement in 1922? Why were they powerless to stop the government's relentless new policy to reduce their presence in these processes, cut their benefits, or even push them out of the welfare system and into the harsh world of "independence"?

The Invalid Compensation Law not only set benefits for war victims but also established new rules of the game, which had significant intended and unintended consequences. It was a law that organized war victims wanted. They contributed to its drafting and passage. It did have the intended effect of ensuring a minimum of support for war victims and their right to participate in decision making. Most war victims accepted, perhaps grudgingly, the law's prescribed benefits and roles, which were more effective as a gesture of responsibility and

solidarity from the new Austrian polity than they were in providing sufficient material support. After the Invalid Compensation Law became a reality, as the organized war victims had demanded, the drive and sense of purpose that had sustained their initial activism and assertiveness began to wane.

This led to an unintended consequence: the routinization and bureaucratization of welfare politics. Once in place, the law prescribed a framework and a set of rules that all welfare actors had to follow. What emerged was a rather technical field whose nuances only a few experts, whether working for the state or for the large war victim groups, could grasp. The ardor of the revolutionary months and the passionate politicking on behalf of a just and “social” democracy were replaced by a complicated, tedious, and exhausting process conducted in impenetrable legal and administrative languages. It would be much harder to annually mobilize regular war victims for actions in support of an inflation adjustment of the benefits than it had been to demand the law’s very creation in the midst of an “anything is possible” mixture of revolutionary excitement and postwar desperation.

A second unintended consequence was the fragmentation of the war victim movement. The first major internal struggle in the Zentralverband took place exactly when the new war victim welfare bill, for which the Zentralverband had struggled since its founding, was about to be formally presented to the Constituent National Assembly for debate and a vote. And then the passage of the law prompted the founding of several rival organizations. The Invalid Compensation Law’s articles were sufficiently neutral (or vague) to leave room for them to imagine their own place in the codetermination mechanisms. Indeed, war victims’ initial united front was a product of desperation, necessity, and some leading activists’ enterprising efforts. Internal differences among war victims remained. The new law opened the door for those who were not or no longer wanted to be part of the Zentralverband to strike their own paths and compete for a share of influence and resources. Whether these new or splinter organizations had the numeric strength to substantiate their power-sharing claims was another matter.

The provincialization of the Zentralverband movement and the end of the dramatic, Viennese activist-led fight on the national stage for rights and provisions should be understood in the same light. The Invalid Compensation Law had stipulated that the primary welfare agency for the actual day-to-day operations would be the Provincial Invalid Compensation Commissions, well before the broader debate over whether the Austrian Republic should become a federal state or a centralized one heated up in drafting a new constitution that would

align with the terms of the Saint-Germain Peace Treaty with the Entente Powers. The system and its procedures prescribed by the Invalid Compensation Law conditioned how client groups behaved. When benefit claims were decided by the Invalid Compensation Commissions' panels in the province, thereby locating the most immediate codetermination process in these commissions, provincial war victim organizations became the most important and relevant everyday welfare actors for both individual war victims and the public authorities. Relying on the emboldened and institutionally empowered provincial organizations (Provincial Associations) to serve its members, the Zentralverband's own provincialization was probably inevitable, especially when the larger constitutional debate in the background was also moving in favor of the federalist side. Provincial and smaller actors took the place of a central organization in representing war victims in day-to-day welfare politics, and welfare politics after the Invalid Compensation Law was nothing but routinized and day-to-day.

The second major factor in the decline of war victims' power was the state leaders' attitudes. It was obvious that the initial success of organized war victims had had much to do with the war victim-friendly social minister Ferdinand Hanusch and his generally collaboration-willing career officials. The Zentralverband as an organization lived on state subsidies from the very beginning. Its ability to attract many followers in the early postwar months was, to a large extent, due to its privileged access to resources that war victims desperately needed: food, cash, and information. This privileged access to resources, however, was a political decision made by state officials. The growth of the Zentralverband and the continuation of a single and moderate war victim movement, the state officials believed, would help defuse the volatile political situation. The investment paid off, and it explained why Hanusch and his officials worked so hard to mediate among the sparring war victim organizations in mid-1919.

However, when the function of organized war victims in the political system or, to put it more bluntly, their usefulness to the government, was viewed differently, organized war victims had difficulty maintaining their privileged position. The stalling of further war victim welfare legislation after the Invalid Employment Law of 1920 is a prime example. After the Social Democrats left the governing coalition in mid-1920, the Christian Social-controlled government was not enthusiastic about maintaining the state-organized war victim partnership. What was once welcomed in welfare politics became less so, as testified by Friedrich Hock's changed attitude on certain extralegal practices in late 1920. When Richard Schmitz, who was less friendly toward war victims than his pragmatist Christian Social party colleague and predecessor Josef Resch,²¹

became the social minister in the midst of a financial crisis, organized war victims not only lost their partner status but also became a burden and potentially an adversary for the government. Once the state leaders considered courting organized war victims unnecessary and ceased to extend the favor that contributed to their power, the activists had to find other allies and avenues to it.

Their search for alternatives points to the third factor: the broader society and general political context after 1921. As early as 1920, Hanusch had warned that times had changed for the worse for war victims. By 1922, it was clear that postwar societal sympathy for war victims had worn thin. The impoverishment and hunger suffered by the great majority of war victims had helped them convince themselves that they were “the poorest of the poor” in postwar Austria.²² In the eyes of other suffering citizens, however, they were the state’s demanding and complaining favorite wards. With indifference or jealousy replacing sympathy, it was hard for organized war victims to build enough social support to defend against the infringement of what they held as rights, not to mention advance new reforms in their favor. The Christian Socials’ austerity reforms between 1922 and 1925 were probably both a reflection of this wider shift in attitude and a policy intervention taking advantage of it. The financial crisis in 1922, which required an international bailout, brought in an outside force that compelled everyone in Austria to follow the command of imposed fiscal rationality and discipline. A League of Nations high commissioner, Dutchman Alfred Zimmermann, was sent to Vienna, and he had extraordinary power to force the Austrians to quickly balance the budget through drastic retrenchment. What war victims faced after 1922 were not only unfriendly Christian Social politicians, unsympathetic fellow citizens, and unwilling employers, but also foes beyond reach in the League of Nations and the international lenders.

Where, then, did war victims turn for support and allies? The major milieu parties became the most logical places for both organized and unorganized war victims to find reliably strong protectors, especially as the milieu parties were more than eager to appeal to the numerically important war victim voters. After the passage of the Invalid Compensation Law, the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials—and not the government or other private welfare organizations—quickly produced accessible pamphlets about the newly inaugurated entitlements and rules for applicants and beneficiaries.²³ As the major milieu parties asserted their power throughout the Republic’s political structure, it was only a matter of time before their outreach found the receptive (or desperate) war victims. Relatively independent war victims ceased to be politically relevant because they could not find enough allies; they had to choose the alignment most

congenial to their own political-social values for effective representation and protection. The Zentralverband, or at least the always left-leaning Vienna Provincial Association, became rather explicitly and unabashedly partisan, taking aim at the “cold-hearted” Christian Social government whenever possible. *Der Invalide*, the Vienna Provincial Association’s periodical, returned from irregular to monthly publication in the mid-1920s. The reenergized newspaper had a strong anti-Christian Social position, openly government-critical coverage, a confrontational tone, and obviously much better funding that enabled it to have more pages in each issue than during the days of peak Zentralverband influence back in 1919.

The Christian Socials, despite their miniscule presence in the 1919/1920 war victim field, developed their own war victim organization by building on the smaller, more local efforts. The National Association of Christian War Invalids, War Widows, Orphans, and Returnees (Reichsverband christlicher Kriegsinvalider, Kriegerwitwen, Waisen und Heimkehrer) was an example. In 1920, even with the infusion of non-war victim members (“returnees”), it had at most 3,000 members. Gradual growth in both Vienna and the provinces finally led to a reorganization under the leadership of the Christian Social parliamentarian Prelate Karl Drexel and the launch of a national organization in the National League of War Victims (Reichsbund der Kriegsoffer Österreichs) in June 1924. Aiming to rival the by now openly prosocialist Zentralverband-Provincial Associations group, in 1925 it had an initial membership close to 23,000 (with 11,000 in Vienna) and a newspaper, *Oesterreichs Kriegsoffer*.²⁴ Decidedly partisan, this newspaper supported the government with melancholic, semipacifist essays and relied on the personal appeal of Drexel, who was famous for serving Austrian POWs in Siberian camps, to lend it an air of sincerity and Christian comradeship.²⁵ But its mission was clear: fighting a running war of words with *Der Invalide* and denying the Zentralverband-Provincial Associations group the monopoly of the war victim sector in the public sphere.

Although Christian Social leaders occasionally complained about Drexel trying to outbid the Zentralverband in his public demands,²⁶ his organization was seen as safely and squarely “our invalid association.”²⁷ Drexel, for his part, toed the party line. For instance, he proactively criticized regional health insurance carriers for being too generous and letting war victims report illness so as to receive full pensions. To him, this practice turned medical treatment for disabled veterans into a hidden pension and was surely an abuse.²⁸ The social citizenship of the early Republic survived, at least in principle, the austerity onslaught. But the leading war victim organizations had become more or less specialized wings

of the major parties after the mid-1920s. The warring milieu parties finally completed the colonization of the war victim welfare field.

War victims' loss of independence and institutional influence notwithstanding, the dynamic war victim politics makes a strong case to bring new, less fatalistic perspectives on the history of the Austrian First Republic. The vibrant revisionist historiography of late Imperial Austria has liberated research and debates on Habsburg Central Europe from the gloom-and-doom, successor state-serving narratives. *Victims' State* demonstrates that the conventional teleological framing that emphasizes interwar Austria's endless and allegedly insurmountable crises is too partial and too limiting.²⁹ Both in long-term developments and short-term revolutionary innovations, a history from the perspective of social citizenship shows that people were active creators of a different, democratic political culture in the wake of the First World War. Without denying the profound challenges the small Republic faced and the political elite's doubts about its viability, it is notable that rump Austria enjoyed the "loser's advantage": there was no explicit need to wrangle over preferential provision for those who were supposed to have contributed more to the national cause as in the "victorious" successor states, Czechoslovakia and Poland, for example, in introducing bold and comprehensive welfare programs. The Austrian Republic was even ahead of economically more robust Weimar Germany in finding its domestic political, if not economic, footing; Weimar Germany suffered more frequent and more serious open challenges to its constitutional order and its very legitimacy in the first half of the 1920s. Having created the infrastructure of both democratic-political and social citizenships—the plumbing and wirings of a stable modern democratic polity—that in some ways lasts into the twentieth-first century despite severe interruptions in the 1930s and 1940s, the Revolution of 1918 and the First Republic, and even the wartime reforms under the Monarchy, are too significant and too rich to be forced into the gloom-and-doom straightjacket.³⁰ War victim welfare shows that the First Republic was, after all, not "a state that no one wanted."³¹

The Austrian administrative state, the milieu-based political parties, and organized war victims converging to create a participatory welfare system in a time of crisis was not a one-off experiment. The emergence of a more participatory war victim welfare system in Austria was part of an interwar European phenomenon of simultaneous welfare state expansion and corporatist stabilization through the sometimes contentious coordination among the state and competing class-based interest groups.³² Organized Austrian war victims may not fit the class-based interest mobilization mold, but they were a symbolically

as well as numerically significant interest group that the newborn Republic successfully turned into its constituency. This model of coordination and consensus building among the state and interest groups, moreover, foreshadowed the fully institutionalized “social partnership” of the Austrian Second Republic, in which the state and the legally defined umbrella organizations of employers’ and employees’ interest groups consulted one another and negotiated key economic and social policy issues. All of this contributed to the social stability and economic prosperity of post-1945 Austria.³³ War victim welfare in Austria heralded not only a more robust welfare state but also a path for postcatastrophe recovery. It is a reminder that the dual thickening of political and social citizenship, as manifested in the democratization of political culture and welfare state expansion, often happened in times of crisis, not in times of plenty.

NOTES

Introduction

1. Carroll, *The Last Prodigy*, 401; Duchon, *Erich Wolfgang Korngold*, 70.
2. Korngold, "Österreichischer Soldatenabschied (1915)." My translation. See the editor's foreword for the song's origins. It was first performed on 11 March 1917.
3. Korngold, "Gefasster Abschied." This is Lionel Salter's English translation and is in the booklet accompanying Korngold, *Rendezvous with Korngold*, 35–36.
4. The Korngold biographer Brendan G. Carroll is sure that it is about death. See his liner notes, "Songs and Chamber Music of Erich Wolfgang Korngold," in the booklet of *Rendezvous with Korngold*, 7. The first song of the cycle is "Sterbelied" (Requiem), set to the German translation of English poet Christina Rossetti's "When I Am Dead, My Dearest" (1862).
5. Glaise-Horstenau, ed., *Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg . . . Das Kriegsjahr 1916*, vol. 1, 87.
6. Carroll, *The Last Prodigy*, 114.
7. "Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden-und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetzes," in Staatsamt für soziale Verwaltung, ed., *Das Gesetz vom 25. April 1919*, 77–80. Originally in *SPKN*, Beilage 114, 47–50.
8. Winkler, *Die Totenverluste der öst.-ung. Monarchie*, 3. A recent estimate suggests even more: 1.46 million out of the nearly 9 million mobilized service members, plus 400,000 civilians, died as a result of the war. Overmans, "Kriegsverluste," 664–665.
9. Glaise von Horstenau and Kizling, eds., *Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg . . . Das Kriegsjahr 1918*, 46–48.
10. Women served both noncombatant and combatant roles in the Habsburg armed forces. But the laws and regulations about provision effective during the war presumed only men would be mobilized. Whether servicewomen's families received any such payments before 1919, for example, is a question yet to be answered. On women combatants for the Monarchy, see Leszczawski-Schwerk, "'Töchter des Volkes' und 'Stille Heldinnen.'"
11. Whalen, *Bitter Wounds*; Cohen, *The War Come Home*; Kienitz, *Beschädigte Helden*; most recently, Pironi, *Kriegsopfer und Staat*. On German war victims' relations with the Weimar and Nazi regimes, see Diehl, "Change and Continuity," and his

insightful “Victors or Victims?” On the politics of medical, psychiatric, and rehabilitative interventions, Lerner, *Hysterical Men*; Crouthamel, *The Great War and German Memory*; Perry, *Recycling the Disabled*. Kuhlman’s *Of Little Comfort* focuses on the cultural constructions of German and American victimhood and widowhood and is in a way a follow-up to Mosse’s classic *Fallen Soldiers*. The United States, which mobilized half as many men and had one-twelfth as many killed in comparison to the Habsburg Monarchy, has already received at least three full-length studies on welfare for disabled soldiers and dependents: Hickel, “Entitling Citizens”; Linker, *War’s Waste*; and Kinder, *Paying with Their Bodies*.

12. Bartsch, “Government Organization for Social Aid in Austria”; Fahringer, Büsch, and Liebl, *Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge*; Fahringer, “Über die Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge.” The exception was a self-congratulatory official history commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the Austrian state’s war victim welfare: Bundesministerium für soziale Verwaltung and Zentralorganisation der Kriegsoffverbände, eds., *60 Jahre Kriegsofferversorgung*. The essay by Johann Kubat in it, “Die Invalidenentschädigung von 1919 bis 1938,” was for many years the only readily available general narrative on interwar Austrian war victim welfare. Similarly, for years there was only a commemorative history in Fornwagner, *Leid lindern*, on the Tyrolean regional experience.

13. Pawlowsky and Wendelin’s *Die Wunden des Staates* was published in 2015. My doctoral dissertation, “War, Welfare, and Social Citizenship: The Politics of War Victim Welfare in Austria, 1914–1925,” on which this book is based, was completed and made publicly available in 2013. We carried out archival research around the same time. And we use the same sources and reach similar conclusions in several places. But our works have different time frames, different thematic focuses and historiographical engagement, and different modes of argumentation and organization. I emphasize the agency and motivations of different actors in contingent situations as well as longer-term developments and seek to contextualize them in an integrated narrative. My colleagues are more interested in detailed technical (and sometimes Foucauldian-tinged) analysis of programs and structures large and small. Interested readers can compare our books and see how historians approach the same topic differently.

14. Pawlowsky and Wendelin, “Die normative Konstruktion des Opfers.” For wartime military medical services, see Biwald, *Von Helden und Krüppeln*. On the war’s impact on (and advancement of) psychiatry in Austria, see Hofer, *Nervenschwäche und Krieg*. Hoffmann, *Kriegsblinde in Österreich*, focuses on the ca. 300 “war-blinded persons.” Healy’s insightful essay, “Civilizing the Soldier in Postwar Austria,” includes disabled veterans on the issue of reintegrating former soldiers. Rohringer’s “Trust and National Belonging” examines some wartime Bohemian welfare officials’ belief in the importance of nationally defined trust in facilitating their work. My colleague Maria Bucur’s book, *The Nation’s Gratitude*, discusses some former Hungarian war victims’ interwar experiences in Romania and fills a big gap in the historiography.

15. See two important case studies of Czechoslovakia and Poland, which do not separate war victims from “healthy” veterans and see the former as part of a larger

phenomenon: Stegmann, *Kriegsdeutungen, Staatsgründungen, Sozialpolitik*, 63–191; Eichenberg, *Kämpfen für Frieden und Fürsorge*, 101–169.

16. Zahra's *Kidnapped Souls* demonstrates the compelling advantage of crossing the 1918 divide. Wartime conditions enabled already existing nationalist movements to advance their influence in welfare and education during and after the war.

17. A good example of the recent efforts to highlight the Monarchy's broader legacies and continuities in the successor states is Miller and Morelon, eds., *Embers of Empire*. Morelon's chapter on early postwar Prague, "State Legitimacy and Continuity," shows the contemporaries' acute awareness of continuities and the resulting political discontent.

18. See Judson, "Afterword" and "'Where Our Commonality Is Necessary....'"

19. See, for example, Cohen, "Neither Absolutism nor Anarchy" and "Nationalist Politics." For a strongly revisionist history of the late Monarchy, see Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*. Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, is a new synthesis showing someone who has come around to many but not all of the revisionist insights.

20. For example, child welfare in the Bohemian lands. Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*.

21. On the relevant literature, see, for example, Rettenwander, *Stilles Heldentum?*, 194–296; Sieder, "Behind the Lines"; Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 163–210, 262–279; Healy's findings complement the "fragmentation and disintegration (*Entsolidarisierung*)" thesis about the wartime Tyrolean society stated in Heiss, "Andere Fronten"; Plaschka, Haselsteiner, and Suppan, *Innere Front*. Since 1995, the Innsbruck-based or -trained historians' publications in the "Tirol im Ersten Weltkrieg" series from the Verlag Wagner offer in-depth examination of the war's impact on a largely rural region close to the battlefield. For the latest surveys of the regional war experiences, see Kuprian and Überegger, eds., *Katastrophenjahre* (Tyrol); Moll, *Die Steiermark im Ersten Weltkrieg*; Pfoser and Weigl, eds., *Im Epizentrum des Zusammenbruchs* (Vienna).

22. Cohen, "Neither Absolutism nor Anarchy," 61. Cohen argues that the successful penetration into all levels of public administration by "popular political formations" had a "growing *implication* in the functioning of parts of the state administration" in his "Nationalist Politics," 259. On the public sphere and civil society in the late Monarchy years, see the chapters in Rumpler and Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918. VIII. Politische Öffentlichkeit und Zivilgesellschaft*.

23. The term is from Boyer, *Culture and Political Crisis*, 379. Mark Cornwall's formulation, "bureaucratic-military dictatorship," may have underemphasized the fact that the Habsburg military saw imperial and provincial civil administrations as opponents to subjugate. Cornwall, "Disintegration and Defeat," 181–182.

24. On the desire for depoliticization, see Gumz, *The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire*, 13–16, 30–34. The military's domestic domination and war against the home front are discussed in Pircher, *Militär, Verwaltung und Politik*; Überegger, *Der andere Krieg*; and Holzer, *Das Lächeln der Henker*. Specifically on the military's assault on the rule of law, see Deak and Gumz, "How to Break a State." Two older accounts are still

invaluable: Führ, *Das k.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando*; Redlich, *Österreichische Regierung und Verwaltung*, 82–95, 113–146. The Habsburg military's war against its own civilians was not waged evenly across the Monarchy; speakers of Czech, Ukrainian, and Italian were more often singled out for persecution, for example.

25. Hsia, "Who Provided Care for Wounded and Disabled Soldiers?"

26. In the second half of 1917 and early 1918, most French people "refused to throw up their hands, though they found it increasingly difficult to tell how victory might be achieved." Becker, *The Great War*, 248.

27. In these two, welfare state building "became an integral part of the broader post-1918 elite consensus on the larger task of state and nation building." They also adopted a strong étatist approach by having the state assume the role of the guarantor and protector of "the day-to-day functioning and long-term expansion of all major welfare programs." Ingot, *Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919–2004*, 54–118; here 98.

28. Gerber, "Disabled Veterans," 477–480, 488–490.

29. The Czechoslovakian disabled soldiers had more complex meanings in the nation building discourses and practices, due partly to the existence and symbolic centrality of the Czechoslovak Legionnaires and partly to its "victor" status. See the Stegmann book mentioned earlier and the more recent analysis of veteran activism in Šustrová, "The Struggle for Respect."

30. Gerber, "Disabled Veterans," 489. The interwar Austrian experiences may be fruitfully compared with those of Western African disabled veterans who fought for the French Empire.

31. Comparatively privileged Austrian war victims did not fit the narratives of marginalization and discrimination common in disability history. But looking at the ideas about military and civilian uses of human bodies embedded in the discussions and debates over the provision for disabled soldiers and veterans, this book suggests new perspectives on the social and political construction of disability (and ability) from the Central European experiences and demonstrates the relevance of the category of disability for studying the history of the state and citizenship. On disability history as a field of inquiry, see Kudlick, "Disability History," and Rembis, Kudlick, and Nielsen, "Introduction."

32. For example, Briggs's pioneer work of historicizing the welfare state: "The Welfare State in Historical Perspective"; and the major comparative study by Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity*. Esping-Andersen's much-cited *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* similarly looks at class mobilization and class politics to explain the causes of his famous "three regimes."

33. For example, Bock and Thane, eds., *Maternity and Gender Politics*; Cohen and Hanagan, "The Politics of Gender and the Making of the Welfare State"; Koven and Michel, eds., *Mothers of a New World*; Pedersen, *Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State*.

34. The First World War's impact on citizenship and the role of women in society and politics is discussed, for example, in Roberts, *Civilization without Sexes*; Grayzel,

Women's Identities at War; Gullace, "The Blood of Our Sons"; Healy, "Becoming Austrian"; Sharp and Stibbe, eds., *Aftermaths of War*.

35. On the warfare-welfare nexus of the Second World War, see De Maria, "Combat and Concern"; Klausen, *War and Welfare*; Edele, "Veterans and the Welfare State."

36. The most prominent examples are Pedersen, "Gender, Welfare, and Citizenship"; Pedersen, *Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State*; Hong, "Gender, Citizenship, and the Welfare State"; Eifert and Selwyn, "Coming to Terms with the State"; Davis, *Home Fires Burning*; Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*. See also two pathbreaking studies on the Weimar welfare state: Crew, *Germans on Welfare*; Hong, *Welfare, Modernity, and the Weimar State*.

37. Geyer, "Ein Vorbote des Wohlfahrtsstaates." On the U.S. case, see Skocpol's classic *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*.

38. Chapter 6 also shows how ingrained the male breadwinner model had become among Austrians of different political and ideological stripes (except for some Social Democrats) in their designs for war victim welfare after 1918, even though female war victimhood had fundamentally destabilized the model itself. On the French male breadwinner model, see Frader, *Breadwinners and Citizens*.

39. Briggs, "The Welfare State in Historical Perspective," 228–229.

40. On social insurance, see Hofmeister, "Austria." On the emergence of public labor protection and inspection, see Ebert, *Die Anfänge der modernen Sozialpolitik*, and Grandner, *Kooperative Gewerkschaftspolitik*.

41. The classic analysis from this perspective is Tálos, *Staatliche Sozialpolitik*.

42. Grandner, "Conservative Social Politics."

43. In terms of the total population, it covered only 6.48, 9.60, and 12.14 percent in 1890, 1900, and 1910, respectively. Gerhard Melinz, "Vom 'Almosen' zum 'Richtsatz,'" 847, 860 note 7.

44. Melinz and Zimmermann, *Über die Grenzen der Armenhilfe*; Fejtová et al. eds., *Poverty, Charity and Social Welfare*.

45. Melinz and Zimmermann, *Über die Grenzen der Armenhilfe*, 103–110. On the longer history of legal domicile in Austria, see Heindl and Saurer, eds., *Grenze und Staat*.

46. Göhring and Pellar, *Ferdinand Hanusch*, 204, has a list of main social legislation under Social Minister Hanusch's leadership (November 1918 to October 1920). See also the list in Bruckmüller, "Sozialstruktur und Sozialpolitik," vol. 1, 422–423.

47. On deploying the Foucauldian concepts of the governmental state and biopolitics in historical research, see Dickinson, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy"; and Holquist, "Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work."

48. See the discussion on the étatization of welfare provision through a "parastatal complex" in Tsarist Russia in Hoffmann, *Cultivating the Masses*, 36–48. Hoffmann explicitly argues that this was a local version of the governmental state's pan-European rise.

49. Drobesh, "Ideologische Konzepte zur Lösung der 'sozialen Frage,'" 1435–1442; Pellar, *Mit sozialpolitischen Erwägungen*, 146–209, 304–365.

50. Hoffmann, *Cultivating the Masses*.

51. There was a strong wartime drive to rationalize and optimize both work and everyday activities. Some of the already existing ideas, such as calorie counting, were acted on only because of wartime necessity. Kučera, *Rationed Life*, 12–93.

52. The most recent comparative study of the (mostly) European warfare-welfare nexus, *Warfare and Welfare* (eds. Obinger, Petersen, and Starke), uses this tripartite design to structure its case studies. It includes Obinger, “War Preparation, Warfare, and the Welfare State in Austria.”

53. Tilly, “Reflection on the History of European State-Making,” 42. He later makes the adage even pithier: “War Made States and Vice Versa.” Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 67.

54. Even Social Democrats became committed agents of nationalist mobilization in Bohemia; they saw no contradiction between national liberation and social democracy. Beňes, *Workers and Nationalism*.

55. Deak, *Forging a Multinational State*, is a good example of focusing on one of “the other sides” of late Imperial Austrian history.

56. Hsia, “War Victims,” 246–248.

57. There were women who were eligible for the Republic’s welfare benefits for disabled veterans. But women as potential disabled beneficiaries in their own right were absent in the wartime discussions. See chapter 6.

58. Based on a contemporary Chamber of Labor (*Arbeiterkammer*) source, the indexed price of basic foodstuff and fuel rose from 100 in July 1914 to 2,671 on 1 December 1919, 5,374 on 31 July 1920, 7,991 on 31 January 1921, and 10,241 on 30 June 1921. Fritz Rager, “Indexzahl und Lohnpolitik,” *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (*Morgenblatt*), 25 December 1921, 3.

59. Klemperer, *Ignaz Seipel*, 274–292; Wasserman, *Black Vienna*, 45–46, 69–72, 192–197.

60. Korngold, *Die tote Stadt: Vocal Score*, 206–209, 234. Emphasis in the original. I modernize the spelling of the Dover edition’s English libretto, which was first published in the 1921 *Metropolitan Opera House Grand Opera Libretto-Die tote Stadt*. Korngold and his father Julius Korngold cowrote the original German libretto based on Georges Rodenbach’s novel *Bruges-la-Morte* (1892).

61. For a recent, more positive reassessment of early interwar Germany, see Gerwarth, *November 1918*.

Chapter 1

1. Roth, *The Radetzky March*, 3, 12.

2. On the complex relationship between poor relief and social control in Central Europe, see Frohman, *Poor Relief and Welfare*.

3. Before 1750, it was private endowments that provided for disabled officers in need, and this was only in some individual crownlands. The 1750 fund was set up for those at the rank of *Oberstleutnant* (lieutenant colonel) or lower, and some of the older private endowments merged with it. "Bericht des von dem hohen Hause der Abgeordneten eingesetzten Ausschusses zur Berathung des von der hohen Regierung vorgelegten Gesetzentwurfes, betreffend die Militärversorgung der Personen des k. k. Heeres, der k. k. Kriegsmarine und der k. k. Landwehr," *SPHA*, VIII. Session, 1874, Beilage 166, 1550–1551.

4. *GKKOH*, 84. This compendium, edited with commentary by Wenzel Pokorny, collects or summarizes the edicts, instructions, and regulations that were in effect or serving as the basis of those rules in effect as of 1843.

5. K. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular D. 1924, 6. 6. 1819, and k. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular D. 1948, 14. 5. 1828, in *GKKOH*, 84–85. For the concept and practices of legal domicile, see Wendelin, "Schub und Heimatwesen," 195–216.

6. K. k. hofkriegsräthliche Normale D. 3379, 30. 6. 1817, in *GKKOH*, 106.

7. K. k. hofkriegsräthliche Verordnung D. 5680, 16. 12. 1820, in *GKKOH*, 127–128. The former suburbs of Hernals and Neulerchenfeld were absorbed by Vienna in 1892. On the Officers' Daughters Institutes, see also Danzer, Bancalari, and Rieger, *Unter den Fahnen*, 442–448. There were also two schools for soldiers' daughters, founded in 1830 and 1843 respectively, which common soldiers' daughters could enter between the age of five and nine. They started to train for a career as domestic workers at fourteen and were expected to find good employment when they left the schools at eighteen. *Ibid.*, 448–449.

8. For the definitions from the 15 April 1772 edict and its subsequent elaborations in 1777, specifically for "real invalids," see *GKKOH*, 86–87.

9. *Ibid.*, 89–90.

10. *Ibid.*, 90.

11. Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, xii. For an account of the course of fighting and wartime military reforms, see Bassett, *For God and Kaiser*, 185–290.

12. Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph*, 6–7.

13. "Bericht . . . betreffend die Militärversorgung," 1551.

14. K. k. hofkriegsräthliche Normale D. 3379, 30. 6. 1817, in *GKKOH*, 101–102.

15. *Ibid.*, 102–103.

16. *Ibid.*, 102.

17. K. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular D. 5867, 21. 11. 1829, in *GKKOH*, 90.

18. *Ibid.*, 91.

19. K. k. hofkriegsräthliche Normale D. 3379, 30. 6. 1817, in *GKKOH*, 102.

20. K. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular D. 5867, 21. 11. 1829, in *GKKOH*, 91.

21. *Ibid.*, 90; k. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular D. 3366, 18.8.1818, in *GKKOH*, 99.

22. Rumpler, *1804–1914: Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa*, 148–153. From 1820 to 1907, military spending grew an average of 2.44 percent per year (from 70 million to 500 million kronen). In normal years the annual military spending was around 2

percent of GDP. But in the early 1830s, 1848–1866, 1878, and 1908, military spending increased enormously, reaching 5 to 6 percent of GDP. See Pammer, “Public Finance in Austria-Hungary,” 140–142.

23. From 50 percent in 1817 to 20 percent in 1848. Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph*, 10.

24. K. k. hofkriegsräthliche Normale 29. 3. 1777, cited in *GKKOH*, 87.

25. *Ibid.*, 87–88.

26. Cirkular-Reskript D. 3657, 23. 8. 1824, cited in *GKKOH*, 88–89.

27. *GKKOH*, 91, summarizing k. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular D. 5214, 24. 10. 1829.

28. K. k. hofkriegsräthliche Cirkular-Verordnung K. 3708, 28. 12. 1823, in *GKKOH*, 93.

29. K. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular-Reskript D. 3660, 20. 9. 1835, in *GKKOH*, 98.

30. *Ibid.*, 99.

31. K. k. hofkriegsräthliche Normale D. 3379, 30. 6. 1817, in *GKKOH*, 106.

32. K. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular D. 1948, 14. 5. 1828, in *GKKOH*, 117, 119.

33. K. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular-Reskript D. 3660, 20. 9. 1835, in *GKKOH*, 98–99.

34. *Ibid.*, 96–97.

35. Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph*, 14.

36. Since 1552, local communities had been responsible for assisting their indigenous, “deserving” poor. In the nineteenth century, an Austrian citizen’s established domicile, an exclusive membership in a specific community, entitled him or her to public poor relief there. Wendelin, “Schub und Heimatwesen,” 181–191. This entitlement to local poor relief became the reason why local communities often resisted letting the poor establish domicile there and acquire *Heimatrecht*. Burger, “Passwesen und Staatsbürgerschaft,” 164.

37. Sandgruber, *Ökonomie und Politik*, 133–135, 143–144; Wendelin, “Schub und Heimatwesen,” 181–191.

38. On the rising trend of persecuting vagrants and punishing beggars across Europe since the late fifteenth century, see Jütte, *Poverty and Deviance*, 146–150, 169–177.

39. The higher echelons of the officer corps were very international. Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph*, 11. It is more difficult to say whether it was the same in the lower ranks.

40. K. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular D. 3366, 18. 8. 1818, in *GKKOH*, 97.

41. K. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular D. 1948, 14. 5. 1828, in *GKKOH*, 118.

42. K. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular H. 862, 3. 9. 1825, in *GKKOH*, 129–130.

43. On controlling internal and cross-border movements through passports in the Habsburg Monarchy, see Burger, “Passwesen und Staatsbürgerschaft,” 3–87, especially 63–76. Only in December 1867, with the new Basic Law on the General Rights of State Citizens, *RGBl.* 142/1867, were Austrian citizens guaranteed the full freedom of movement and residence (§6) and the right to emigrate (§4). On the racialized anxiety over mobile populations in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Austria, see Zahra, “‘Condemned to Rootlessness and Unable to Budge.’”

44. Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph*, 14.

45. *GKKOH*, 119.

46. *Ibid.*, 120. On the rationale and consequences of the marriage bond requirement for “healthy” officers, see Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 148–151.

47. *GKKOH*, 120.

48. *Ibid.*, 120.

49. K. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular-Reskript L. 3232, 27. 6. 1803, in *GKKOH*, 120, and k. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular H. 862, 3. 9. 1825, in *GKKOH*, 129.

50. K. k. hofkriegsräthliches Cirkular J. 3320, 7. 10. 1833, in *GKKOH*, 121.

51. Mitterauer and Sieder, *The European Family*, 122–124. In 1800, some lower-income civil servants were implicitly banned from marriage with the threat that their widows and orphans would not be eligible for pensions. Heindl, *Gehorsame Rebellen*, 49–50.

52. Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 149, 157–158. Higher-ranked civil servants were expected to marry women of suitable background, too. Adding to it the unwritten rule that their families should have sufficient income or wealth to maintain a status-appropriate lifestyle, many officials remained single into their forties because they (their small salaries, to be exact) did not enable them to find good matches (dowries) to fulfill such requirements. Heindl, *Gehorsame Rebellen*, 268–272.

53. On making the population legible, see Scott, *Seeing Like a State*. On Habsburg officials’ later attempts to limit the mobility of citizens in the name of protecting their freedom and rights, see Zahra, *The Great Departure*, 3–63.

54. Thus the need to found new charities after major armed conflicts. See the effort to benefit loyal South Slav disabled soldiers and surviving dependents after 1848–1849 in Newman and Scheer, “The Ban Jelačić Trust.”

55. This series of Basic Laws from 21 December 1867 includes *RGBl.* 141/1867 (on the Reichsrat), 142/1867 (on the rights of citizens), 143/1867 (on the Reichsgericht, the Supreme Court), 144/1867 (on judicial power), 145/1867 (on executive power), and 146/1867 (on joint affairs with Hungary and the Delegations).

56. The same phenomenon of “imitating Prussia” happened in France after 1871. See Mitchell, *The German Influence in France* and *Victors and Vanquished*.

57. Two failed attempts to introduce (theoretically) universal military service preceded the legislation: an imperial edict of 28 December 1866 and a bicameral Reichsrat resolution of 10 December 1867. The imperial edict was resisted by the Hungarian leaders. *SPHA*, IV. Session, 144. Sitzung, 10 November 1868, 4412–4414. See also Allmayer-Beck, “Die Bewaffnete Macht,” 61–62.

58. The initial recruitment classes consisted of 95,400 men for the Joint Army (56,000 from Austria and less than 40,000 from Hungary) and 20,000 for the National Guards annually. The annual numbers were raised in the subsequent years, but the total number of annual recruits never went beyond 125,500, making the Habsburg standing army proportionally the smallest among the European great powers. Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 57.

59. The 1868 law did not specify how the twelve-year service would be fulfilled by those drafted directly into it. Due partly to Hungarian pressure, the Landwehr and Honvéd gradually shed their original second-line character and became more like

additional units of the standing army. Active service in them lasted two years, followed by a ten-year reserve period. *Ibid.*, 56.

60. According to Alfons Danzer and his coauthors, the men assigned to the Ersatzsreserve underwent an eight-week training and then a multiweek training every other or third year. Danzer, Bancalari, and Rieger, *Unter den Fahnen*, 12. It is somewhat different from Deák's account in *Beyond Nationalism*, 56.

61. *SPHA*, IV. Session, 144. Sitzung, 10 November 1868, 4413–4414. Based on this government projection, under the 1868 system the Habsburg forces would have a total wartime strength of 1,053,000 men (800,000 in the Joint Army, 53,000 Military Border guardsmen/*Grenzer*, and 200,000 National Guards) in comparison with the combined Prussian/North German and South German forces of 1,229,117, the French forces of 1,350,000, the Russian forces of 1,467,000, and the Italian forces of 480,461.

62. *Ibid.*, 4413, 4416.

63. *Ibid.*, 4418–4420. The quotes are from 4418 and 4420.

64. *Ibid.*, 4412–4455; 145. Sitzung, 11 November 1868, 4458–4486; 146. Sitzung, 11 November 1868, 4487–4514; 147. Sitzung, 12 November 1868, 4516–4545; 148. Sitzung, 12 November 1868, 4547–4570; 149. Sitzung, 13 November 1868, 4571–4607; 150. Sitzung, 13 November 1868, 4609–4641. The Ignaz Karl Figuly quote is from 144. Sitzung, 10 November 1868, 4427.

65. Hämmerle, “. . . dort wurden wir dressiert und sekiert und geschlagen . . .”; and Leidinger, “Suizid und Militär.”

66. The quote is from Hämmerle, “Die k. (u.) k. Armee als ‘Schule des Volkes?’” 196.

67. For the military's internal debates (and struggle) to find its place in the new liberal order, see Allmayer-Beck, “Die Bewaffnete Macht,” 56–88.

68. Hämmerle, “Die k. (u.) k. Armee als ‘Schule des Volkes?’” 186–196, 200–201; Hämmerle, “Back to the Monarchy's Glorified Past?” 161–162.

69. Universal military service in the Habsburg Monarchy was unique in not being tied to a nation-building project, unlike in other European countries. See Hämmerle, “Die k. (u.) k. Armee als ‘Schule des Volkes?’” 179–183.

70. Hämmerle, “Back to the Monarchy's Glorified Past?” 158, 160.

71. Hämmerle, “Die k. (u.) k. Armee als ‘Schule des Volkes?’” 200–201; Hämmerle, “Ein gescheitertes Experiment?” 225.

72. Hämmerle, “Ein gescheitertes Experiment?” 233–241. Rok Stergar's study of the Slovene-speaking population's reaction to conscription mostly confirms Hämmerle's German speakers–based thesis. Stergar, “Die Bevölkerung der slowenischen Länder.” On the very low rate of military fitness, see Tálos, *Staatliche Sozialpolitik*, 24–29.

73. Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism*, 310–311. See also Stergar, “National Indifference.” On conscription being mediated by local notables and communal power dynamics, see Hämmerle, “Verhandelt und bestätigt—oder eben nicht?”

74. On how conscription shaped the relations between the military and German citizens, see Ute Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks*, especially 149–235.

75. “Bericht . . . betreffend die Militärversorgung,” 1548.

76. Wagner, "Die k. (u.) k. Armee," 592.
77. *SPHA*, VIII. Session, 24. Sitzung, 28 February 1874, 749; 25. Sitzung, 4 March 1874.
787. The original government bill is in *SPHA*, VIII. Session, Beilage 108, 1061–1091.
78. "Bericht . . . betreffend die Militärversorgung," 1548–1549.
79. The attempt to lower military expenses as much as possible had already begun in the years before the Austro-Prussian War. Wagner, "Die k. (u.) k. Armee," 307, 592.
80. "Bericht . . . betreffend die Militärversorgung," 1549, 1557. § II.
81. The second reading debate in the Lower House is in *SPHA*, VIII. Session, 65. Sitzung, 22 October 1874, 2412–2419; 66. Sitzung, 24 October 1874, 2425–2447; 67. Sitzung, 27 October 1874, 2454–2478.
82. *SPHA*, VIII. Session, 65. Sitzung, 22 October 1874, 2417.
83. "Bericht . . . betreffend die Militärversorgung," 1549.
84. Colonels' and lieutenant colonels' salaries were raised in 1872. On the multiple attempts by Joint War Minister Franz von Kuhn to improve military pay between 1868 and 1875, see Wagner, "Die k. (u.) k. Armee," 591–594.
85. Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 149–151. Service years (*Dienstjahre*), rather than the actual time served, were usually counted because, as a way to recognize hardship and enhanced level of risk, wartime service was counted double.
86. For the evolving idea of old age, see Thane, ed., *A History of Old Age*.
87. Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 115–116, 119. Sandgruber, *Die Anfänge der Konsumgesellschaft*, 115, Tabelle 20; 465–466. After 1858, 1 gulden (fl.) equaled 100 kreuzer (kr.) in Österreichische Währung (Ö.W.). The monetary reform in 1892 introduced krone and heller, with 1 krone equaling 100 heller, replacing gulden and kreuzer in the Habsburg realm. 1 gulden Ö.W. was worth 2 kronen or 200 heller.
88. Danzer, Bancalari, and Rieger, *Unter den Fabnen*, 13–16. Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 87–88.
89. "Bericht . . . betreffend die Militärversorgung," 1549.
90. *RGBL*. 158/1875, Beilage I. Schema über die Jährliche Gebühr an Invalidenpension der invaliden Mannschaft des k. k. Heeres.
91. "Bericht . . . betreffend die Militärversorgung," 1549.
92. *Ibid.*, 1549.
93. Wagner, "Die k. (u.) k. Armee," 593.
94. *Ibid.*, 307.
95. *SPHA*, VIII. Session, 65. Sitzung, 22 October 1874, 2415.
96. *Ibid.*, 2418.
97. *Ibid.*, 2417–2418.
98. *SPHA*, VIII. Session, 67. Sitzung, 27 October 1874, 2475.
99. *Ibid.*, 2476. Forcing mentally ill officers to stay in military or state institutions, as a money-saving measure, was criticized in the debate but accepted by the majority. *Ibid.*, 2456–2457.
100. *Ibid.*, 2462.
101. *Ibid.*, 2467, 2470.

102. Beyond legally treating military officials and civil servants as different from private employees, Max Weber's classic argument that modern officeholding is not "a usual exchange of services for equivalents, as in the case with free labor contracts" captures the essence of this phenomenon. See Weber, "Bureaucracy." The quote is from 199.

103. Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 114–123.

104. *SPHA*, VIII. Session, 67. Sitzung, 27 October 1874, 2472–2473.

105. *Ibid.*, 2466.

106. *Ibid.*, 2467.

107. On Austrian political liberalism, see Höbelt, *Kornblume und Kaiseradler*; Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries*; and Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy*.

108. *SPHA*, IV. Session, 144. Sitzung, 10 November 1868, 4419.

109. Christa Hämmerle argues that the Austrian liberals made compromise on their original ideal of a citizen militia in order to gain the cooperation of the military elite. To her this partially accounted for the military reform's backward-looking character. Hämmerle, "Die k. (u.) k. Armee als 'Schule des Volkes?'" 196.

110. This old practice was the reason why the 1875 law set rules for pension-eligible disabled/retired soldiers who entered civil service: §§28–30 for officers, §§87–88 for the enlisted ranks. The scale of this kind of unsystematic charity measure for disabled veterans through case-by-case employment in public or imperial household service remains to be researched.

111. Trost, *Rauchen für Österreich*, 116–118. The quote is from 118. Of the more than 80,000 tobacconist concessions in Imperial Austria in 1900, it is unknown how many were operated by military invalids or soldiers' widows. For the statistics of concessions, see K. k. Statistische Zentralkommission, ed., *Österreichisches Statistisches Handbuch für . . . 1901*, 204. Back in 1875, there were more than 56,000 (excluding Bukovina), K. k. Statistische Central-Commission, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Jahr 1875*, Heft VII., 40.

112. Roth, *The Radetzky March*, 6.

Chapter 2

1. *SPHH*, VIII. Session, 25. Sitzung, 19 December 1874, 424.

2. On *Heiratskaution*, see Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 139–142.

3. On the corporate culture of the professional soldiers, see Allmayer-Beck, "Die Bewaffnete Macht," 1–141, esp. 75ff.

4. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, esp. chap. 7.

5. For the Habsburg decision to invade Serbia, see the classic Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, and Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*.

6. *RGBL*. 41/1887, 27 April 1887, Law Regarding Military Pensions for Widows and Orphans of Officers and Enlisted Men in the Joint Army, the Joint Navy, the National Guards and the Landsturm.

7. *RGBL*. 237/1912, 26 December 1912, Law Regarding Living Allowances for the Mobilized Persons' Dependents.

8. A classic discussion of the dualist politics of annual recruit intake is Stone, "Army and Society," 103–107. See also Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 56–59, 67–77.

9. Between 1870 and 1882, the number of twenty- to twenty-two-year-old men the authorities declared perfectly fit for active military service declined from 263 to 147 per 1,000 examined in Imperial Austria and from 340 to 163 per 1,000 in Hungary. For the Monarchy as a whole, the annual "fit for service" rate never rose above 30.6 percent during this thirteen-year period. For the period 1883 to 1893, the "fit for service" rate in both halves of the Monarchy was usually under 20 percent. The fuller statistics, collected and published by Isidor Singer in 1885, are reproduced in Táló, *Staatliche Sozialpolitik*, 24–29. The dismal numbers were attributed to the population's declining health as a result of industrialization and urbanization, generating debates over the health of future generations similar to those taking place in other European countries. But the standards for "fit" themselves must have been set relatively high. The Habsburg Monarchy certainly had a smaller army in proportion to its total population and a smaller annual military budget per capita (in 1879 it was 2.92 fl.; compare the German Reich's 5.34 fl., Russia's 3.8 fl., France's 8.46 fl., and Italy's 3.88 fl.). Wagner, "Die k. (u.) k. Armee," 492. See also Stone, "Army and Society," 107.

10. Karl Denk, "Fürsorgewesen: Unterhaltsbeiträge. Fürsorge für die Kriegsofoper und deren Hinterbliebene," ÖStA KA Ms Ca 28 Allgemeines II "Fürsorgewesen," 8–9.

11. *RGBL*. 41/1887, I, §5.

12. *Ibid.*, 10–12.

13. Cohen, "Neither Absolutism nor Anarchy," and "Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society." Also Rumpel and Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, vols. 7 and 8.

14. For the example, of nationalists of various stripes, see Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*.

15. Denk, "Fürsorgewesen," 14–16. The Austrian legislation was adopted almost immediately after the Russian law of 25 June 1912, which replaced the poor-relief-like, need-based wartime aid to soldiers' wives defined in the 1877 rules. The new law obligated the Russian state to pay food allowances to every soldier's wife and children younger than seventeen regardless of their economic situation. As in Austria, it was a mixture of inadequacies exposed by war mobilization (the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War) and pressure from the national representative institution (the Third State Duma) that prompted the reform. Pyle, "Village Social Relations," 3–6, 124–154. See also Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation*. The Balkan War also prompted the Ottoman Empire to decree a monthly allowance for soldiers' dependents in 1912. Hoffmann, *Cultivating the Masses*, 39.

16. *Kriegsvorschriften . . . Sonderabdruck der "Arbeiter-Zeitung"*, 2–9. The Commerce Ministry reported that one kilogram of normal mixed-grain bread (*Gemischtes Brot*) cost on average 0.32 kronen in Vienna during the period of 15 June to 15 July 1914. Loewenfeld-Russ, *Die Regelung der Volksernährung*, 106.

17. On the practical implications of this image, see Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, esp. ch. 6. See also Cole and Unowsky, eds., *The Limits of Loyalty*.

18. *RGBL*. 237/1912, §6.

19. Denk, "Fürsorgewesen," 16.

20. *Ibid.*, 27. For more recent general accounts of the Monarchy's last war, see Herwig, *The First World War*; Rauchensteiner, *Der Erste Weltkrieg*; Watson, *Ring of Steel*.

21. On the battles for Przemyśl, see Watson, *The Fortress*.

22. Herwig, *The First World War*, 91–92, 94. Austria's official war history cited lower numbers from a Russian report: 250,000 dead or wounded and 100,000 taken prisoner. Glaise-Horstenau, ed., *Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg . . . Das Kriegsjahr 1914*, 319.

23. Rauchensteiner, *Der Tod des Doppeladlers*, 187.

24. Glaise-Horstenau, ed., *Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg . . . Das Kriegsjahr 1916*, Beilage 4, Tabelle 2. The Austrian-Hungarian armed forces' peacetime strength was 415,000. The 1914 mobilization allowed it to reach 3,350,000, but 1,270,000 of them were rear-echelon support forces. Herwig, *The First World War*, 77.

25. Tunstall, *Blood on the Snow*, 12, 99.

26. Rauchensteiner, *Der Tod des Doppeladlers*, 205.

27. The total casualties of the Carpathian Winter War surpassed those of the notoriously bloody battle of Verdun. Tunstall, *Blood on the Snow*, 1.

28. Glaise-Horstenau, ed., *Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg . . . Das Kriegsjahr 1916*, vol. 1, 87.

29. *Ibid.*, Beilage 4, Tabelle 2. The official history lists casualties for the duration of the war, in twelve-month intervals, as follows: August 1914–July 1915: 271,839 fallen, 905,796 wounded, 838,873 taken prisoner, 722,000 sick (the illness statistics count those who were evacuated from the battlefield); August 1915–July 1916: 106,901 fallen, 456,846 wounded, 474,907 taken prisoner, 881,600 sick; August 1916–July 1917: 71,086 fallen, 291,774 wounded, 285,833 taken prisoner, 878,700 sick; August 1917–end of the war: 69,539 fallen, 259,305 wounded, 128,870 taken prisoner, and until the end of July 1918, 1,000,000 sick. Glaise von Horstenau and Kiszling, eds., *Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg . . . Das Kriegsjahr 1918*, 46–48.

30. Herwig, *The First World War*, 137, 209.

31. *Ibid.*, 213–215. Rauchensteiner, *Der Tod des Doppeladlers*, 362–370.

32. At the end of 1914, the casualties suffered by the Austro-Hungarian armed forces had reached 200,000 deaths and 500,000 wounded. Herwig, *The First World War*, 120.

33. Denk, "Fürsorgewesen," 27.

34. "Das neue Militärversorgungsgesetz," *Zeitschrift für Invalidenschutz*, June 1918, 66.

35. Denk, "Fürsorgewesen," 27–28.

36. The officially recorded average bread price between 15 September 1915 and 10 August 1918 was 0.57 kronen per kilo. This price does not reflect the shortage and lowered quality of bread by 1917 and 1918. Loewenfeld-Russ, *Die Regelung der Volksernährung*, 106.

37. Denk, "Fürsorgewesen," 27–28.

38. *RGBl.* 313/1917, 27 July 1917, Law Regarding New Regulations on Living Allowances for the Duration of the Current War.

39. The provisions of the Austrian and Russian living allowance laws of 1912, at least in terms of eligibility criteria, were more generous than those of other belligerents. In France and Germany, only “needy” wives and children were eligible. See Pyle, “Village Social Relations,” 154–156.

40. *RGBl.* 237/1912, §9. On the rise of the dual-track system (the state/political administration and the crownland autonomous administration), see Deak, *Forging a Multinational State*, 149–160.

41. *RGBl.* 313/1917, §7.

42. This development paralleled organized labor’s participation in labor dispute arbitration starting in March 1917. Grandner, *Kooperative Gewerkschaftspolitik*, ch. 6.

43. See also Denk, “Fürsorgewesen,” 33–35.

44. Herwig, *The First World War*, 493.

45. Kirchenberger, “Beiträge zur Sanitätsstatistik der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee,” vol. 1, 74–75, tables 7 and 8.

46. Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 279–299.

47. *RGBl.* 119/1918, 28 March 1918, Law Regarding Granting Subsidies to Enlisted Men, Their Dependants, and Their Survivors.

48. *SPHH*, XXII. Session, 32. Sitzung, 22 March 1918, 958.

49. Denk, “Fürsorgewesen,” 46.

50. “Der Kongreß für Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge in Wien,” *Zeitschrift für Invalidenschutz*, October 1918, 113.

51. *Kriegsvorschriften . . . Sonderabdruck der “Arbeiter-Zeitung”*, the cover, 2, 8–9.

52. Fahringer, Büsch, and Liebl, *Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge*, 11–14.

53. For a concise description, see Egger and Bürgschwentner, “Kriegsfürsorge,” 154–156.

54. *RGBl.* 237/1912, §§8–11, §14; *Kriegsvorschriften . . . Sonderabdruck der “Arbeiter-Zeitung”*, 8–9.

55. Hauptmann, “Frauenprotest und Beamtenwillkür”; Hauptmann, “Unterhaltsbeiträge für Soldatenfamilien.”

56. Hornek, *Militärversorgung und Invalidenfürsorge*.

57. Hornek, *Staatlicher Unterhaltsbeitrag und Staatliche Unterstützung*.

58. For example, Kraetzig, *Erläuterungen zum Gesetz vom 28. März 1918, R.-G.-Bl. Nr. 119*.

59. For the evolution of wartime military medicine, see Biwald, *Von Helden und Krüppeln*, esp. vol. 1, chs. 4 and 6, and vol. 2, ch. 7.

60. Rauchensteiner, *Der Tod des Doppeladlers*, 152; Biwald, *Von Helden und Krüppeln*, 204–220.

61. Denk, “Fürsorgewesen,” 6–7.

62. Fahringer, Büsch, and Liebl, *Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge*, 25–26.

63. Denk, “Fürsorgewesen,” 22. See also Fahringer, Büsch, and Liebl, *Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge*, 26.

64. Pressereferat der Österreichischen Gesellschaft vom Roten Kreuze, ed., *Bericht über die Kriegstätigkeit*, 19–20, 33.

65. Some crownland governments began to set up their own coordinating offices before it became the policy of the Interior Ministry. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 1300/1918.

66. Steiermärkische Landeskommission, *Die Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge in Steiermark*, 2; Denk, “Fürsorgewesen,” 22–23.

67. For a list of the members of the Provincial Commission, see Steiermärkische Landeskommission, *Die Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge in Steiermark*, 108–111.

68. “Jahresbericht der tirolischen Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger in Innsbruck für das Jahr 1916,” in Überegger, ed., *Heimatfronten*, vol. 1, 409.

69. *Ibid.*, 410–413.

70. *Ibid.*, 411–412.

71. *Ibid.*, 413–414.

72. *Ibid.*, 413–415.

73. Fahringer, Büsch, and Liebl, *Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge*, 25, 27–28.

74. *Ibid.*, 26–36, *passim*.

75. The Lower Austrian Commission coordinated 987 orthopedic, tuberculosis, and other internal illness cases for medical treatment in 1915. The number of cases it handled jumped to 3,620 in 1916 and remained high with 3,462 in 1917. The job (re) training courses it organized saw similar growth, with 423 soldiers participating in 1915, 1,389 in 1916, and 1,373 in 1917. Fahringer, Büsch, and Liebl, *Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge*, 28–31, 33–35, 42–43.

76. Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger, Innsbruck, an das k. k. Ministerium des Innern, Betreff: Unterstützung für Kriegsbeschädigte, N763/1, 5 April 1917, ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1362 17583/1918.

77. “Jahresbericht der tirolischen Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger in Innsbruck für das Jahr 1916,” 409–410, 415.

78. Kriegsministerialerlass Pr. Nr. 10942, “Grundsätze der Invalidenfürsorge und Abgrenzung der Obliegenheiten der Militär-und-Zivilstaatsverwaltung,” 8 June 1915, cited from ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 385/1918.

79. *Ibid.*

80. Denk, “Fürsorgewesen,” 29–30.

81. *Ibid.*, 23, 31.

82. *Ibid.*, 32.

83. K.k. Arbeitsvermittlung an Kriegsinvalide Bezirksstelle Karlsbad, “Jahresrundschau 1917,” ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1358 4518/1918. The AOK struggled to find frontline-duty manpower after 1915. Herwig, *The First World War*, 233–235.

84. *Merkblatt für die Anmeldung bei der k. k. Arbeitsvermittlung an Kriegsinvalide in Ober-Österreich*, 1, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1358 6480/1918. Hence the need in 1916 to send traveling speaker Rudolf Peerz to large and small towns in Upper Austria and Salzburg to give lectures and help local notables organize. “K. K. Arbeitsvermittlung

an Kriegsinvalide,” 1–3. ÖStA BMfsV KBF K1358 4821/1918. See also Peerz, *Unsere Sorge um die Kriegsinvaliden*.

85. “Sitzungsprotokoll” from the 7 February 1918 meeting at the Ministry of Social Welfare, *passim*, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1358 4471/1918.

86. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 1542/1918.

87. ÖStA KA ZSt KM HR 1915 Abt. 9/IF K945 1915 IF. 112–127 Vertreter des Arbeitsvermittlungsamtes; Teilnahme an der Superarbitrierung, Einsichtsakt des k.k.M.f.L.V 21.11.1915.

88. The Joint War Ministry’s Oberintendant Lanzendörfer made this characterization in an interministerial meeting held on 3 April 1918. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1359 9055/1918.

89. Cited from Herwig, *The First World War*, 78.

90. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1357 2053/1918 K.u.k. Armeecoberkommando an k.k. Minister des Inneren, 1–2. The memorandum and other ministries’ first responses can also be found in ÖStA KA ZSt KM HR 1917 Abt. 9/IF K14171917 IF 4-2/9.

91. *Ibid.*, 6–7.

92. Rauchberg was famous for his demographic study of the “language frontiers” in Bohemia. Iris Nachum recently argues that Vienna-born Rauchberg, a Jewish adult convert to Protestantism, was both liberal-moderate and an ardent German nationalist, but not antisemitic. Nachum, “Heinrich Rauchberg (1860–1938),” 78–98 (here 83, 97). The original 1916 Rauchberg pamphlet is *Kriegerheimstätten*.

93. Some versions included more fantasies than others. For a statement of the general principles of the wartime efforts as well as the common denominators of different versions, see “Leitsätze für die Schaffung von Kriegerheimstätten. Auf Grund der Beschlüsse der vierten österreichischen Wohnungskonferenz,” “Aufruf des Reichsverbandes für Kriegerheimstätten,” and “Satzungen des Reichsverbandes für Kriegerheimstätten in Österreich,” in Breuer, *Die Kriegerheimstätten-und Wohnungsfürsorgebewegung*, 58–64. For a more fantastic version, see the German nationalist organization Südmark’s intervention: Adam-Kappert, *Schafft Kriegerheimstätten!*; Hoyer, *Kriegerheimstätten*; and Jesser, *Kriegerheimstätten*. Some German nationalists had been promoting warrior homesteads for disabled veterans since 1915. See *Denkschrift der Deutschen Arbeiterpartei Österreichs*.

94. A more suburban version was promoted to address chronic housing shortages and unhygienic living conditions in cities. See the Viennese City Council’s November 1915 resolution about warrior homesteads in the 21st District in “Die Errichtung von Kriegerheimstätten, allgemeine Grundsätze und Genehmigung der Siedlung I im XXI. Bezirke in Wien,” Stadtratsbeschuß von 4. November 1915, Pr.-Z. 11702, M.-Abt. IIIa-1077/15, in WBR, Konvolut: Kriegssammlung aus den Jahren 1914–1919. See also Sagmeister, *Kriegerheimstätten*.

95. For example, Verein “Die Bereitschaft,” ed., *Die Versorgung der Kriegsbeschädigten*.

96. Later pamphlets offered more technical details. For example, *Schafft Kriegerheimstätten!* comes with architects’ renderings of different farmhouse designs. Drawings

for a more urban version can be found in Goldemund, *Die Kaiser Karl-Kriegerheimstätte in Aspern*. See also Vogel, *Innere Kolonisation und Landarbeiterfrage in Österreich*.

97. ÖStA KA ZSt KM HR 1915 Abt. 9/IF K945 1915 IF. 112–163/1, the quotes are from Zl. 5321/M.P. Abschrift einer Note des k.u.k. 2. Armeekommandos, 27.8.1915 Op. Nr. 5781/1915, 24.10.1915, an das k.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando, Teschen; and k.k.M.f.L.V. Präs. Nr. 19746 Zuweisung beschlagnahmter Bauerngüter an verdiente Kriegsinvalide, KM Einsichtsakt 2.12.1915. The proposal was originated from the 18th Corps.

98. ÖStA KA ZSt KM HR 1915 Abt. 9/IF K945 1915 IF. 112–163/1, especially k.k.M.f.L.V. Präs. Nr. 19746 Zuweisung; 22876/M.I. K.k. Minister des Innern an den Herrn k.k. Justizminister 4.11.1915 and an den Herrn k.k. Finanzminister 4.11.1915.

99. Führ, *Das k.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando*, 150–151.

100. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1357 2053/1918 K.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando an k.k. Minister des Inneren, memorandum on Kriegsinvalidenversorgung, 5–6. For a brief overview of the early development of the Military Border, see Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 83–92, 240–243, 318–326. For later developments, see Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia*; and Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat*.

101. Führ, *Das k.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando*, 151–155.

102. ÖStA KA ZSt KM Intern K132 KFA Gruppe XIII Nr. 1967 12.1916, Gegenstand: Kriegerheimstätten; Anregung des H.G.K. Gen.O. Erz. Eugen. Especially Res. Nr. 49658 k.u.k. Heeresgruppenkommando GO Erzherzog Eugen an den Generalinspektor der freiwilligen Sanitätspflege, General der Kavallerie Erzherzog Franz Salvador, 2.11.1916.

103. TLA Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger in Tirol K1 Folder K.k. Statthaltereie für Tirol und Vorarlberg, Kanzlei-Abteilung; Abschnittstitel: Invalidenfürsorge Allgemeines Zl. 8/22 v. 27.1.1916.

104. “Bericht über die IV. Österr. Wohnungskonferenz abgehalten in Wien am 5. und 6. Februar 1916,” *Mitteilungen der Zentralstelle für Wohnungsreform in Oesterreich* 43/44 (April 1916): 5–32, 39–44, “Die gründende Versammlung des Reichsverbandes für Kriegerheimstätte in Österreich,” *Mitteilungen der Zentralstelle für Wohnungsreform in Oesterreich* 45/46 (June 1916): 1–6.

105. See, for example, Jesser, *Innere Kolonisation in den Sudetenländern*. Jesser did not miss the opportunity in 1916 to promote his old ideas under the banner of warrior homesteads; see his *Kriegerheimstätten*.

106. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1357 2053/1918 K.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando an k.k. Minister des Inneren, Auszug aus der Schrift “Kriegerheimstätten” von Dr. Heinrich Rauchberg, 1, 3, 6.

107. *Ibid.*, 2–3. Sondhaus argues that the Austrian Army chief of staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, had long harbored a Social Darwinist view of the world. See his *Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf*, 15–16. Rauchberg’s idea shows the developing racial hygiene discourses at the time. For the latter, see Proctor, *Racial Hygiene*, 10–30.

108. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1357 2053/1918 K.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando an k.k. Minister des Inneren, Auszug aus der Schrift “Kriegerheimstätten” von Dr. Heinrich Rauchberg, 3.

109. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 30, 100–112, 123–124.

110. Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph*, 148, 170, 183–185, 196. For a meticulous debunking of the myth of unreliable or even disloyal Czech-speaking soldiers, see Lein, *Pflichterfüllung oder Hochverrat?* An excellent account of Czech-speaking soldiers’ experiences beyond the loyal/disloyal dichotomy is Hutečka, *Men under Fire*.

111. Sondhaus, *Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf*, 82.

112. Gumz, *The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire*, 13–16, 30–34.

113. *RGBl.* Nr. 156/1914, Imperial Decree Regarding Subjecting Civilians to Temporary Military Jurisdiction. See the succinct analysis in Führ, *Das k.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando*, 18–19.

114. Überegger, *Der andere Krieg*; Führ, *Das k.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando*, 91–122.

115. *RGBl.* Nr. 186/1914, Imperial Decree Regarding the Transfer of the Political Administration’s Authority.

116. Führ, *Das k.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando*, 17–24. On War Surveillance Office (Kriegsüberwachungsamt), see also Scheer, *Die Ringstraßenfront*.

117. Gumz, *The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire*, 12–15. On the military’s historical lack of enthusiasm for the civil administration and civilian government, see Allmayer-Beck, “Die Bewaffnete Macht,” *passim*.

118. *Kriegsvorschriften . . . Sonderabdruck der “Arbeiter-Zeitung”*, 12–16. On the military’s hoarding of foodstuffs in spite of repeated pleas from the home front, see Gumz, *The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire*, 176–192.

119. This thesis has recently been developed to interpret the entire war experience of the Monarchy in Deak and Gumz, “How to Break a State.” See also Führ, *Das k.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando*; Redlich, *Österreichische Regierung und Verwaltung*, 82–95, 113–146; Scheer, *Zwischen Front und Heimat*.

120. Zahra, “Each nation only cares for its own,” and *Kidnapped Souls*, 79–105.

121. Herwig, *The First World War*, 233–235.

122. *Ibid.*, 213–217. See also Rauchensteiner, *Der Tod des Doppeladlers*, 362–370. On the tense relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and the German Reich during the war, see Shanafelt, *The Secret Enemy*.

123. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1357 2053/1918 K.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando an k.k. Minister des Inneren, memorandum on Kriegsinvalidenversorgung, 5–6.

124. Kronenbitter, “*Krieg im Frieden*”; Fried, *Austro-Hungarian War Aims*.

125. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1357 2053/1918 K.u.k. Armeeeoberkommando an k.k. Minister des Inneren, memorandum on Kriegsinvalidenversorgung, 6.

126. An October 1917 report listed eight projects that were planned or already underway. The number of already completed homesteads was paltry: thirty by the Association for the Founding of War Blind Homesteads (Verein für die Errichtung von

Kriegsblindenheimstätten), thirty-five by Freiherr von Liebig's project in Reichenberg, and ten by the Salzburg "Warrior Homes" Association (Verein "Kriegerheim"). ÖStA KA ZSt KM Intern K132 Gruppe XIII 7358/1917 Gegenstand: E.A. (a.m.) des KM. Präs Nr. 25802/I.F. ex 1917. Referat über die Kriegerheimstätten.

127. ÖStA KA ZSt KM Intern K132 KFA Gruppe XIII 2622 30.12.1915, KFA an das Innenministerium, 15.1.1916.

128. TLA Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger in Tirol K1 Folder K. k. Statthalterei für Tirol und Vorarlberg Kanzlei; Stammzahl 119 Gegenstand: Kriegerheimstätten.

129. TLA Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger in Tirol K1 Folder Protokolle u. andere Beilagen zum Akte Kriegerheimstätten 119/213; K.k. Statthalterei für Tirol und Vorarlberg (Kriegshilfsabteilung), Entwurf der Mustersatzungen für Kriegerheimstätten in Tirol.

130. ÖStA HHStA Nachlass Joseph Maria Baernreither K21 Max Lederer an Josef Maria Baernreither, 8.3.1917, fol. 271.

131. For more on this, see Hsia, "Disability and 'Internal Colonization' in WWI Austria."

132. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1357 2053/1918 K.u.k. Armeecoberkommando an k.k. Minister des Inneren, memorandum on Kriegsinvalidenversorgung, 8. The comment is dated 30 July 1918.

133. Enderle-Burcel and Follner, eds., *Diener vieler Herren*, 186–187.

134. See chapter 3 for the discussion of the new Social Ministry's agenda. Except for the military's obsession with disciplining other welfare actors, the main goals were quite similar.

135. See the pamphlet by the officers from the 18th Infantry Division, "Reichs-Fürsorge-Anstalt f. Kriegsbeschädigte und Armee Angehörige. Ein Denkmal der Stärke und Größe Österreich-Ungarns 1914–1917," in ÖStA KA MKSM 1917 69-8/1.

136. Artifacts such as flyers, posters, instructions, and organization bylaws stemming from wartime philanthropic initiatives and several public-private joint donation drives can be found in WBR, Konvolut: Kriegssammlung aus den Jahren 1914–1919.

137. See Antonius, "Kriegsfürsorge," 251–256, on their division of labor. The overlapping agendas of the War Welfare Office (Kriegsfürsorgeamt), the War Assistance Bureau (Kriegshilfsbureau des k. k. Ministerium des Innern), and the War Assistance Fund (Kriegshilfsfonds) created problems from the very beginning. Bürgschwentner, "Zwischen materieller und mentaler Kriegsfürsorge," 31–56.

138. On female Austrian nurses and volunteers, see Zettelbauer, "Krankenschwestern im Ersten Weltkrieg" and "Mit blutendem Herzen . . . für Kaiser und Vaterland;" Hämmerle, *Heimat/Front*, 26–53. On their German counterparts, see Schönberger, "Motherly Heroines and Adventurous Girls." Zettelbauer argues that discursive policing of Austrian women nurses and soldiers led to their marginalization in war memories in her "Das fragile Geschlecht der Kriegsheldin."

139. Pressereferat der Österreichischen Gesellschaft vom Roten Kreuze, ed., *Bericht über die Kriegstätigkeit*. Many national Red Cross movements became recognized

auxiliaries of the military medical establishment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Hutchinson, *Champions of Charity*, 202–276, 350–355.

140. K. k. Ministerium des Innern 7228/1916, 1–2, 5, in ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1356 93/1918. The quotation is from 2.

141. *Ibid.*, 4.

142. Hämmerle discusses women's self-mobilization for various war efforts in *Heimat/Front*, 85–159. See also Densford, "The Wehrmann in Eisen" for officials' and civic leaders' efforts to promote patriotic contributions.

143. Nuanced analysis of pre-1914 dynastic loyalism and state patriotism can be found in Cole and Unowsky, eds., *The Limits of Loyalty*. On conservative-nationalist patriotic women, see Zettelbauer, "Mit blutendem Herzen . . . für Kaiser und Vaterland."

144. For a more detailed account on how the welfare field became a realm of alternative politics, see Hsia, "Who Provided Care for Wounded and Disabled Soldiers?"

145. Denk, "Fürsorgewesen," 44–45.

Chapter 3

1. Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 43–44.

2. Rettenwander, *Stilles Heldentum?*, 194–225.

3. Loewenfeld-Russ, *Die Regelung der Volksernährung*, 335.

4. Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 31–86, 279–299.

5. The perceived crisis in family, youth, and gender relations, for example, is discussed in Sieder, "Behind the Lines," 109–138.

6. The First World War does not receive dedicated discussion in Táló's *Staatliche Sozialpolitik*. Táló treats the period only as a continuation of the stagnant social policy making begun in the 1890s. Weidenholzer's *Der sorgende Staat* ends its discussion before the outbreak of the war. Healy's *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire* focuses more on the state authorities' inability to respond to the material crisis and crisis of authority. Zahra highlights how, in the Bohemian Lands, the state's youth welfare reform was entrusted to competing private nationalist associations in "Each nation only cares for its own."

7. For a more recent account of the establishment of the Ministry of Social Welfare, see Heise, "Vom k.k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge," 28–90.

8. ÖStA HHStA Nachlass Baernreither K21, "Vorschlaege betreffend die Errichtung eines Ministeriums der sozialen Fürsorge," fol. 60–61.

9. "Amtlicher Teil," *Wiener Zeitung*, 3 June 1917, 1. The emperor's note can also be found in full in ÖStA HHStA Nachlass Baernreither K15, "Memoria 10.7.1917 über bisherige Arbeit zu Errichtung des Ministeriums für Soziale Fürsorge—weitere Planung erfordert," fol. 665–666. The "Memoria," fol. 664–671, records Baernreither's role in campaigning and planning for the new ministry. See also "Errichtung und weitere Entwicklung des Ministeriums für soziale Verwaltung," in Bundesministerium für soziale Verwaltung, ed., *50 Jahre Ministerium für soziale Verwaltung*, 16.

10. "Amtlicher Teil," *Wiener Zeitung*, 3 June 1917, 1.

11. "Vorschlaege betreffend die Errichtung eines Ministeriums der sozialen Fürsorge," fol. 64–65.

12. Goldinger, "Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien," 160–163, esp. 160–161. The imperial note and the attached elaboration on the new ministry's jurisdictions are in *SPAH*, XXII. Session, 1917, Beilage 792, Anhang. "Allerhöchstes Handschreiben wegen Errichtung des Ministeriums für Soziale Fürsorge," 11–13.

13. Goldinger, "Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien," 158–160. This fact was first pointed out by members of the Reichsrat's Constitution Committee in "Bericht des Verfassungsausschusses über die Regierungsvorlage, womit anlässlich der Errichtung des Ministeriums für soziale Fürsorge gesetzliche Bestimmungen über den Wirkungsbereich einzelner Ministerien abgeändert werden," in *SPAH*, XXII. Session, 1917, Beilage 792, 1.

14. Some German nationalists had hoped for a top-down legislation-by-decree to "solve" the German-Czech conflicts in their favor. Baernreither himself was involved in the so-called *Octroi* machinations. Boyer, *Culture and Political Crisis*, 387–408.

15. *SPAH*, XXII. Session, 1917, Beilage 680, "Erläuterungen." The five main areas were first laid out in the attachment, entitled "Wirkungsbereich des Ministeriums für soziale Fürsorge," to the 7 October 1917 imperial note mentioned earlier. The "Wirkungsbereich" document actually listed a sixth area of jurisdiction, "Job Placement, Unemployment Welfare, and Emigrant Protection." The six-area jurisdiction was also official; see "Wirkungsbereich des Ministeriums für soziale Fürsorge," *Mitteilungen des k. k. Ministeriums für soziale Fürsorge über Fürsorge für Kriegsbeschädigte* 1918, no. 1-5, May 1918, 5. Why the later (16 October) "Explanations" did not include the sixth area mentioned by the emperor on 7 October is difficult to answer.

16. On the perceived or real crisis of the family and the much talked about youth delinquencies during (and after) the war, see Sieder, "Behind the Lines," 109–138; Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 211–235, 247–257; Auer, *Kriegskinder*, 264–268. The wartime panic over the alleged rise of "youth crimes" in Austria was not new; see Wegs, "Youth Delinquency & 'Crime.'"

17. *SPAH*, XXII. Session, 1917, Beilage 680, "Erläuterungen," 5.

18. *Ibid.*, 4, 6.

19. *Ibid.*, 6–7.

20. Parliamentarians criticized the minimal public assistance to disabled soldiers in housing and income replacement. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 120/1918, 121/1918.

21. Goldinger, "Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien," 162. In January 1917, Baernreither had proposed a Central Invalid Office that could "organically" coordinate private initiatives. This idea was not welcomed by the government. See Redlich, *Schicksalsjahre Österreichs*, vol. 2, 188 (entry Monday, 29 January 1917). For more concrete thoughts about this new kind of administrative apparatus, see Wilhelm Loebell, "Organisation des Dienstes des Ministerium für Soziale Fürsorge und Aufbau der ihm unterstehenden Behörden, Wien, Juni 1917" in ÖStA HHStA Nachlass Baernreither K21, esp. fol. 834–836.

22. Maschl, "Von der Fürsorge zur Sozialgesetzgebung," 175–188.
23. Höbel, "Late Imperial Paradoxes," 207–216, especially 209.
24. Redlich, *Schicksalsjahre Österreichs*, vol. 2, 225 (entry Wednesday, 1 August 1918).
25. In addition to drafting the necessary laws and regulations for the ministry's founding, he had been meeting with parliamentarians from different parties and collecting applications for potential ministerial posts. See "Memoria 10.7.1917," fol. 667 ff.
26. Goldinger, "Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien," 162. Mataja was the founding director of the Commerce Ministry's Labor Statistics Office (*Arbeitsstatistisches Amt*) in 1898 and then the founding head of the Commerce Ministry's Social Policy Division (*Sozialpolitische Sektion*) in 1908. These two offices were the center of social policy research and coordination in the prewar Austrian central administration. See Pellar, "Arbeitsstatistik" and *Mit sozialpolitischen Erwägungen*.
27. "Erläuterungen," 4–5. I translate *Arbeitskraft* as "ability to work" because in this context it referred less to the workers (the "workforce") than to their productive capacity.
28. *Ibid.*, 7.
29. For example, Reichsrat deputies were mostly dissatisfied with the planned splitting of the public health agenda from the Social Welfare Ministry. But "no one would be willing to take the responsibility for . . . endanger[ing] the much desired speedy establishment of the Ministry of Social Welfare" in the Constitution Committee's debate over the two-article law. In "Bericht des Verfassungsausschusses," 3.
30. *RGBl.* 499/1917, 22 December 1917.
31. "Erläuterungen," 4.
32. The living allowances for soldiers' dependents were administered through District Living Allowance Commissions (*Unterhaltsbezirkskommissionen*) and Provincial Living Allowance Commissions (*Unterhaltslandeskommissionen*); both functioned as subordinate agencies of the Austrian Ministry of Defense. *RGBl.* 313/1917, 27 July 1917, Law Regarding New Regulations of Living Allowances for the Duration of the Current War, §7.
33. "Wirkungskreis des Ministeriums für soziale Fürsorge," *Mitteilungen des k. k. Ministeriums für soziale Fürsorge über Fürsorge für Kriegsbeschädigte* 1918, no. 1-5, May 1918, 4. The conceptual and administrative divide between dead or disabled soldiers on the one side and dependents and survivors of these dead or disabled soldiers on the other was not bridged by the new Social Ministry. Formal unification of the two categories of beneficiaries under the same administrative and legal roof came only after the war. See chapters 5 and 6 of this book.
34. "Erläuterungen," 4–5.
35. *Ibid.*, 4.
36. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1356 178/1918. The replies from the commissions, mostly dated from mid-January to February, can be found in K1356 616/1918 (Styria), 1090/1918 (Lower Austria), 2128/1918 (Upper Austria), K1358 3661/1918 and 5656/1918 (Tyrol), 4941/1918 (Salzburg).
37. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1356 1542/1918.

38. In spring 1916, Tyrolean officials had already suggested the creation of a single welfare office for disabled soldiers in each district by building on the job placement district-level committees. See “Jahresbericht der tirolischen Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger in Innsbruck für das Jahr 1916,” in Überegger, ed., *Heimatfronten*, vol. 1, 409–410, 415.

39. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 1542/1918.

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*

43. The Seidler government did officially declare its interest in warrior homestead colonies. “Erläuterungen,” 4.

44. Though the top Social Welfare officials were not enthusiastic about them, such projects did receive public or semipublic funding. For example, the military-controlled (later transferred to the Social Welfare Ministry) Emperor and King Karl Welfare Fund (Kaiser u. König Karl Fürsorgefonds), with the Social Welfare Ministry’s cooperation, ran a program that offered married and seriously disabled soldiers (75 percent loss of work ability) grants to buy land and start their own farms, workshops, or shops. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1359 7680/1918. See also ÖStA AVA Inneres MdI KFF K1, Protokolle Kuratorim Sitzungen KFF, 3. Sitzung 19. January 1918, when the board approved this program. Individual applications and the difficulties of carrying out homestead projects can be found in ÖStA AVA Inneres MdI KFF K2.

45. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1357 3385/1918. The quote is from both the ministerial officials’ comments in the memo and the letter “An alle Landeschefs (mit Ausnahme Niederösterreich, Böhmen, Galizien, Dalmatien und Triest)” of 29 January 1918. Both used the same argument and the same “last link in the chain” trope to justify the proposed unification.

46. Landesstelle Graz der k. k. Arbeitsvermittlung an Kriegsimvalide, “Memorandum über die Vereinigung der Invalidenvermittlung mit der allgemeinen Arbeitsvermittlung,” 17 March 1917. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1358 4825/1918.

47. *Ibid.*, 3.

48. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1359 6544/1918, Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge an alle Landeskommissionen zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger und an die Staatliche Landeszentrale für das Königreich Böhmen zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger, “Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge; organisatorische Massnahmen,” 5 March 1918, 4.

49. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 1542/1918.

50. See the comments in “Einladung der Büroleiter der k.k. Arbeitsvermittlungen an Kriegsinvalide zu einer Besprechung” in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1357 3385/1918.

51. “Sitzungsprotokoll” from the 7 February 1918 meeting at the Ministry of Social Welfare, 1–3, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1358 4471/1918.

52. *Ibid.*, 2–3, 8–9.

53. *Ibid.*, 3–4.

54. *Ibid.*, 4.

55. The Lower Austrian results were even stronger. The Vienna Bureau scored a 56.3 percent success rate by placing 6,939 applicants (against 25,947 available positions) successfully in the same period. *Ibid.*, 8. But the Moravians' performance was indeed impressive when compared with that of neighboring Bohemia, where the placement rate dropped from 35.5 percent (1,325 placements for 3,733 applicants and 3,368 available positions) in 1916 to 23.9 percent (991 placements for 4,146 applicants and 5,014 available positions) in the first half of 1917. The Bohemian Job Placement Authority said that the Imperial German authorities and the Austrian Galician Labor Exchange consistently reported a success rate between 50 and 70 percent. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1356 93/1918.

56. "Sitzungsprotokoll" from the 7 February 1918 meeting at the Ministry of Social Welfare, 5.

57. "Bericht erstattet bei der am 7. Februar 1918, 10h vormittags, im k.k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge, Wien, I Hoher Markt 5, von dem Amtsleiter der k.k. Arbeitsvermittlung an Kriegsinvaliden, Landesstelle Klagenfurt, Professor Alois Königstorfer," 2, in AdR BMfSV KBF K1358 4471/1918.

58. The directors from Bohemia and Galicia met separately with the Second Division officials a few days before 7 February. The directors from Tyrol and Vorarlberg and from Carniola excused themselves because the invitation arrived too late.

59. "Sitzungsprotokoll" from the 7 February 1918 meeting at the Ministry of Social Welfare, 10.

60. Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger bei der k.k. Statthalterei in Linz an die k.k. Arbeitsvermittlungs- und Bezirksfürsorgestelle in Braunau a. I., etc., 2. In ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1358 6480/1918.

61. This was the situation as of 21 January 1918, when the Provincial Commission in Linz presented its survey of crownland war victim welfare providers in response to the Social Welfare Ministry's January 1918 directive (K1356 178/1918) discussed earlier. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1356 2128/1918.

62. Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger bei der k.k. Statthalterei in Linz an die k.k. Arbeitsvermittlungs- und Bezirksfürsorgestelle in Braunau a. I., etc., 2–3.

63. *Ibid.*, 3.

64. "Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge; organisatorische Massnahmen," 5 March 1918.

65. *Ibid.*, 1.

66. *Ibid.*

67. *Ibid.*, 2.

68. *Ibid.*, 2–3, 12.

69. *Ibid.*, 3–4.

70. *Ibid.*, 4–6.

71. *Ibid.*, 7.

72. *Ibid.*, 8.

73. *Ibid.*, 10.

74. The temporary case form (*Personalblatt*) is Appendix I of the instructions; see “Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge; organisatorische Massnahmen,” 5 March 1918.

75. *Ibid.*, 9–10.

76. *Ibid.*, 9.

77. *Ibid.*, 10–11. The model notice is the instructions’ Appendix II.

78. See the model notice in “Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge; organisatorische Massnahmen,” 5 March 1918, Appendix II.

79. Collecting and structuring complex information to facilitate the expanding state’s rule-based decision making had been the original “conveyor belt” function of the form since the eighteenth century, according to Peter Becker. As soon as the state saw itself as a major welfare service provider (for Becker mostly after 1945), the form also became an interface, an interview-like communication between citizens and officials. See his “Formulare als ‘Fließband’ der Verwaltung?” The 5 March 1918 reform’s detailed instructions about the forms and the procedures for using them were an early example of this duality of the form as an administrative technology.

80. “Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge; organisatorische Massnahmen,” 5 March 1918, 7.

81. *Ibid.*, 7–8.

82. On prewar veteran associations, see Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism*. The compatibility of being loyal to the crown with being a nationalist activist is discussed in Cole and Unowsky, eds., *The Limits of Loyalty*.

83. Tálos, *Staatliche Sozialpolitik*, 58–71, esp. 63 and 69; Hofmeister, “Austria,” 294–306.

84. Of the 2 million Austrian-Hungarian POWs in Russian captivity, approximately 500,000–700,000 were German speakers, 200,000–300,000 were Czech and Slovak speakers, 500,000–600,000 were Magyar speakers, and 200,000 were South Slavs. Rachamimov, *POWs and the Great War*, 34–44. Their return after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk—380,000 by the end of April and 517,000 by the end of May in 1918—caused huge logistical problems. See Herwig, *The First World War*, 358–360, 367–368.

85. “Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge; organisatorische Massnahmen,” 5 March 1918, 11.

86. *Ibid.*

87. *Ibid.*, 12.

88. *Ibid.*, 11.

89. “Bericht des Invalidenamtes Wien über seine Tätigkeit in der Zeit vom 20. Juni 1918 bis 31. Dezember 1918,” in ÖStA AdR BMfSv KBF K1365 7529/1919 in 9085/1919. See also Fahringer, Büsch, and Liebl, *Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge*, 50–51.

90. ÖStA AdR BMfSv KBF K1359 7404/1918, 9055/1918, 9947/1918.

91. ÖStA AdR BMfSv KBF K1365 15855/1918.

92. ÖStA AdR BMfSv KBF K1363 23579/1918.

93. ÖStA AdR BMfSv KBF K1364 20743/1918.

94. ÖStA AdR BMfSv KBF K1365 22177/1918.

95. Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger bei der k.k. Statthalterei in Linz an die k.k. Arbeitsvermittlungs- und Bezirksfürsorgestelle in Braunau a. I., etc., 2.

96. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1365 22177/1918.

97. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1362 19115/1918.

98. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1364 1825/1918.

99. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1365 9345/1919.

100. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1365 8817/1919 in 9345/1919.

101. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1365 10367/1919 in 9345/1919.

102. For a similar process of étatization of welfare through a “parastatal” complex that combined both state and societal resources, see the Russian case in Hoffmann, *Cultivating the Masses*, 34–48.

103. *SPHA*, XXII. Session, 1917, Beilage 207, Antrag der Abgeordneten Hauser und Genossen betreffend die Kriegerfürsorge, 1.

104. *SPHA*, XXII. Session, 1917, Beilage 209, Antrag der Abgeordneten Hauser und Genossen betreffend die Militärversorgung, 1–3.

105. For example, a private with a prewar annual income under 1,200 kronen (income class I) would receive at most 1,080 kronen if he lost all his earning power in the old job due to war service. If the private had an annual income over 6,000 kronen (income class V), his highest possible pension would only be 1,320 kronen.

106. Before the First World War, working-class families in Vienna often did not encourage—or were even hostile to—girls pursuing formal schooling beyond the minimum five-year *Volksschule*. Among bourgeois families, girls attending secondary schools were also rare. Wegs, *Growing Up Working Class*, 93–97, 104–106.

107. The pension for the hypothetical orphan is tabulated based on the principles and the pension table, Antrag der Abgeordneten Hauser und Genossen, 3–4.

108. *SPHA*, XXII. Session, 1917, Beilage 416, Antrag der Abgeordneten Skaret, Leuthner, Dötsch, Sever, David, Resel und Genossen, betreffend die Versorgung der Militärinvaliden, Witwen und Waisen, 1. On workers in the designated war industries, see Kučera, *Rationed Life*, 69–75. On the laws enabling military supervision of war industries, see Grandner, *Kooperative Gewerkschaftspolitik*, 38–55; and Pogány, “War Requirement Acts.”

109. A more generalized standard to measure each man’s degree of loss of earning power (i.e., not specific to the man’s prior civilian occupation) was what interwar Germany and France settled on. See Geyer, “Ein Vorbote des Wohlfahrtsstaates,” 275.

110. Antrag der Abgeordneten Skaret und Genossen, 1.

111. *Ibid.* The quote is from 1.

112. *Ibid.*, 2.

113. *SPHA*, XXII. Session, 1917, Beilage 388, Antrag der Abgeordneten Knirsch, Fahrner und Genossen, betreffend Kriegerheimstätten; Entwurf eines Gesetzes über Kriegerheimstätten. See esp. §6 about the eligible dependents. On the lengths German nationalists would go to strengthen the German nation, see Zahra, “Reclaiming the Children.”

114. *SPHA*, XXII. Session, 1917, Beilage 498, Antrag der Abgeordneten Hartl, Dr. V. Langenhan, Knirsch, Dr. Schürff und Genossen, betreffend Erlassung eines neuen Gesetzes über die Militärversorgung für Personen des Mannschaftsstandes, 2–3.

115. *Ibid.*, 3–4. Of the twenty-one points in the German nationalist plan, eight were devoted to this “capitalization” option.

116. The Czech and the Croatian-Slovenian factions also had proposals urging the Austrian state to present a new military welfare law for discussion, on 14 July 1917 and on 10 November 1917, respectively. Only the Croatian-Slovenian motion proposed something different: the obligation of both public entities and private employers to hire disabled men and pay them a minimal wage. *SPHA*, XXII. Session, 1917, Beilage 530, Antrag der Abgeordneten Antonín Kalina, Dr. Velich und Genossen, betreffend die Verbesserung der Versorgung der Witwen und Waisen nach den im Kriege gefallenen Soldaten; and Beilage 782, Antrag der Abgeordneten Dr. Korošec, Dr. L. Pogačnik, Dr. Janković und Genossen betreffend die Invaliden.

117. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 13704/1918.

118. According to the Joint War Ministry’s Oberintendant Lanzendörfer, the military administration started discussing a comprehensive military welfare reform in 1901. A draft law was prepared in 1907, but no further deliberation followed. In 1913 a new draft was circulated, but the outbreak of the war effectively suspended that discussion. Protokoll über die im Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge abgehaltene Besprechung vom 5. April 1918, betreffend die vom Gemeinderate der Reichshaupt- und Residenzstadt Wien am 6. Februar 1918 beschlossene Resolution, 4, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1359 9947/1918. There were indeed printed draft laws from 1916 and 1917 in the Joint War Ministry files, in the form of the two bound *Militär-Versorgungsgesetz* in ÖStA KA ZSt KM Präs SR K21.

119. “Das neue Militärversorgungsgesetz,” *Zeitschrift für Invalidenschutz*, June 1918, 65, 67.

120. *Ibid.*, 66–67.

121. *Ibid.*, 67.

122. *SPHA*, XXII. Session, 84. Sitzung, 1 October 1918, 4293–4294. The draft law was titled “Law Regarding Military Welfare for the Personnel of the Joint Armed Forces, the Imperial-Royal Austrian Army, the Imperial-Royal Austrian Militia (Land-sturm) as well as Survivors of the Said Persons.”

123. *SPHA*, XXII. Session, 1918, Beilage 1184, “Erläuterungen zum Entwurfe eines Militärversorgungsgesetzes,” 91–92. The legislative explanatory note included a table comparing benefits for different categories of beneficiaries according to the “currently valid laws and regulations” and the proposed military welfare law. The 300 to 500 percent raises in some cases seemed to be significant, but they had already been proposed in the ur-draft. Even the military admitted that these raises seemed drastic only because some benefits had never been raised since 1875.

124. *SPHA*, XXII. Session, 1918, Beilage 1185, “Regierungsvorlage: Gesetz vom ___ betreffend die Gewährung von staatlichen Zuschüssen (Zusatzrenten) zu den Militärversorgungsgebühren,” 15, “Tabelle zum § 4 des Zusatzrentengesetz”; according

to this accompanying law, a disabled man would receive extra payments to make his total annual benefits equal to one-third, half, two-thirds, or 100 percent of his qualified prewar annual earned income, respectively, depending on whether he had lost 20–50, 51–75, 76–99, or 100 percent of his earning power; there was a cap of 6,000 kronen a year (the same as in the Social Democratic plan in 1917). Widows' and orphans' pensions would be proportionate to the prewar earned income of the dead husband/father.

125. "Erläuterungen zum Entwurfe eines Militärversorgungsgesetzes," 89–90. Officers in the prewar Habsburg armed forces were compensated modestly in comparison with "their high social standing and the requirements of their lifestyle." Their "life in retirement could be even harder." Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 125, 149.

126. "Erläuterungen zum Entwurfe eines Militärversorgungsgesetzes," 90.

127. The explicitly pronatalist origin of policies and practices in interwar France is discussed in Pedersen, *Family, Dependence, and the Origins*, 130–132, 227–236, 358–411; Huss, "Pronatalism in the Inter-War Period in France"; and Schneider, *Quality and Quantity*, 116–145. See also Koven and Michel, "Womanly Duties," and Koven and Michel, eds., *Mothers of a New World*.

128. "Erläuterungen zum Entwurfe eines Militärversorgungsgesetzes," 90.

129. These are: "Regierungsvorlage: Gesetz vom ___ betreffend die Gewährung von staatlichen Zuschüssen (Zusatzrenten) zu den Militärversorgungsgebühren," §5 (reserve officers), §43 ("non-long-serving enlisted men"), §65 section 6 (widows of reserve officers), §87 section 6 (widows of noncareer enlisted men), and §138 (noncareer members of the Austrian Army [Landwehr] and Landsturm to be treated the same as comparably ranked noncommissioned personnel in the Joint Army).

130. On the transformation of the Habsburg Army into a militia by 1915 and led in many cases by civilians in uniform, see Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 193.

131. Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 247–255.

132. "Erläuterungen zum Entwurfe eines Militärversorgungsgesetzes," 91.

133. *Ibid.*

134. Deák and Gunz, "How to Break a State," 1105–1136. The quote is from 1118.

135. On legibility as the central issue of modern statecraft, see Scott, *Seeing Like a State*. Scott's idea is especially pertinent here, because the new ministry and its officials were entering a territory for which they had no full picture—or, to use Scott's favorite trope, map—but nevertheless planned to reshape it.

136. Zahra, "Each nation only cares for its own," 1396–1400. The quote is from 1396.

137. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 426–428; the quote is from 428. Charitable groups organized along national and confessional lines also played an important role in the state refugee assistance programs. Thorpe, "Displacing Empire," 114.

138. On private welfare organizations being openly critical of public authorities, see Hsia, "Who Provided Care for Wounded and Disabled Soldiers?" 319–326.

139. Grandner, *Kooperative Gewerkschaftspolitik*.

Chapter 4

1. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1360 10878/1918. A detailed payment record exists from 7 May 1918 to the end of November 1918. Some 110 payments of 10 to 50 kronen each were made, totaling 1985 kronen. The November spike (54 payments) probably resulted from an increasing number of disabled men returning home or being released from the hospitals.

2. Franz Kafka and other literary luminaries from Habsburg Central Europe are partly responsible for these stereotypes. Deak, *Forging a Multinational State*, and Heindl, *Josephinische Mandarine*, should help qualify them.

3. Many private sector employers and voluntary organizations sent unsolicited job offers and training opportunities for disabled soldiers to the Interior Ministry in 1916 and 1917. The officials there simply stamped and filed them. For example, in February 1916 a masonry firm, “Gebr. Zeidler, Königliche Hofsteinmetzmeister,” asked the Interior Ministry if it could hire up to 100 disabled soldiers who were able to work as stonemason or quarryman. In February 1918, a Social Welfare official reviewing the transferred Interior Ministry files remarked disappointedly that “until today this case has not been processed.” ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1356 2056/1918. See also ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1357 4800/1918. The Interior Ministry even ignored other central agencies. See the Public Works Ministry’s complaint of 6 March 1918. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBfK1357 2084/1918.

4. From a Cheka circular of 1920–1921, cited in Holquist, “Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work,” 415.

5. For a useful synthesis of the reasons for the Monarchy’s collapse, see Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary*, and his “Disintegration and Defeat.” The latest reflections are Deak and Gumz, “How to Break a State,” and Rauchensteiner, *Der Erste Weltkrieg*, esp. 683ff.

6. The unnecessary detour was no small problem, because state officials had to follow specific rules and procedures to process any incoming communication. For an analytical breakdown of the tedious procedures, see Hochedlinger, *Aktenkunde*, 64–96.

7. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1359 7091/1918.

8. See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion.

9. “Bericht des Verfassungsausschusses,” 1.

10. Their excuse: the form and the information regime were for the Austrian half only, but the War Ministry was a joint institution and should not pay for an Austria-only initiative. ÖStA KA ZSt KM HR 1918/19 Abt. 9/IF K1703 1918 I.F. 4-2/4/6, Gegenstand: Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge-organisatorische Massnahmen.

11. In the Welfare for the War-Disabled (*Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge*) document group from the archives of the Social Welfare Ministry (later Federal Ministry of Social Administration), the files before 1918 were primarily those received or generated by the Interior Ministry.

12. Unwillingness to share information was longstanding and endemic in the Austrian state bureaucracy. In early 1919, a leading official of the Statistical Central Commission complained that even under the new Republic, many state authorities were still reluctant to share statistics they had gathered. See Zeller, "Geschichte der zentralen amtlichen Statistik," 106.

13. "Zusammenstellung. Statistik der kriegsbeschädigten Militärpersonen österreichischer Staatsangehörigkeit (Ergebnis der Bearbeitung der bis 31. März 1918 beim k.k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge eingelangten Zählkarten)," in ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1362 18268/1918.

14. The statistics in this and the following paragraphs are taken or tabulated from Tabelle I, "Heimatzuständigkeit und gegenwärtiger Aufenthalt," Tabelle II, "Militärisches Verhältnis," Tabelle III, "Alter der Kriegsbeschädigten," and Tabelle IV, "Berufsstellung," in "Zusammenstellung. Statistik der kriegsbeschädigten Militärpersonen österreichischer Staatsangehörigkeit."

15. The Leitmeritz/Litoměřice Military Command was proud of its own system of care provision, client education, and public-private cooperation. It actively promoted its model to Vienna. See ÖStA KA ZSt KM HR 1917 Abt. 9/IF K1417 1917 IF 4-2/4, 4-2/4/2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9.

16. Captain Eger had prepared a detailed report on the Leitmeritz/Litoměřice experience and proposed comprehensive recommendations for the upcoming reform. His 1 February 1918 report impressed Social Welfare officials, and they even considered hiring him as an "Invalid Welfare Inspector." ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1358 3848/1918. See also ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1360 12196/1918. For an insightful analysis of Eger in the context of welfare politics in a nationally contested region, see Rohringer, "Trust and National Belonging."

17. In 1910, the Austrian portion of the total population of the Monarchy was 55.3 percent. Assuming a relatively even rate of mobilization across the three constituent parts of the Monarchy (Austria, Hungary, and Bosnia-Herzegovina), there would have been approximately 4,400,000 Austrian male citizens called to serve during the course of the war. The war death statistics compiled by the Joint War Ministry (based on information available at the end of 1917) corroborate this estimate, as 56.7 percent of the Monarchy's war dead and 56.5 percent of those captured by the enemy were Imperial Austrian citizens. Winkler, *Die Totenverluste der öst.-ung. Monarchie*, 1, 4, 6. For a critique of Winkler's work, see Schmied-Kowarzik, "War Losses (Austria-Hungary)."

18. According to the official end-of-1917 statistics, of the over 4 million mobilized Austrian men, 649,889 had perished. That is a death rate of 23.3 percent of the total prewar Austrian population, somewhat lower than that of Hungary (25.0 percent). See Winkler, *Die Totenverluste der öst.-ung. Monarchie*, 37.

19. Aeußerung der Sektion II . . . betreffend die Vorbereitung der Volkszählung 1920, in ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1363 24071/1918.

20. In May 1918, the Joint War Ministry reminded the Social Welfare Ministry that the civilian welfare authorities' main task was to find jobs for the disabled men as they left the military. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 385/1918.

21. See, for example, Joint War Minister Colonel General Baron von Stöger-Steiner's speech in the mid-September Congress for War-Damaged Persons' Welfare, in "Der Kongreß für Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge in Wien," *Zeitschrift für Invalidenschutz* 3.10, October 1918, 113.

22. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 15593/1918. An early sign that Czech officials were ready to go their separate way was their self-initiated unification of two major Bohemian war victim welfare agencies—one civilian and one military—on 15 October 1918. See ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1363 26456/1918.

23. The politicization (and nationalization) of welfare services in the Bohemian Lands is analyzed by Zahra in *Kidnapped Souls*, 65–105.

24. Ultimately, the desire to include war disability in the 1920 census was not fulfilled. The census was urgently conducted to clarify the situation on the ground for the Republic's government, and only the most essential information was collected. It did not cover territories that were still in dispute (i.e., southern Carinthia, southern Styria, and the future Burgenland). Neither did it include many POWs who were still waiting to be repatriated. Zeller, "Geschichte der zentralen amtlichen Statistik," 107–108. For a sample census questionnaire, see Statistische Zentralkommission, *Ergebnisse der ausserordentlichen Volkszählung vom 31. Jänner 1920*, 7. The published results of the 1920 census never mentioned war disability or any kind of public welfare information. See Statistische Zentralkommission, *Vorläufige Ergebnisse der ausserordentlichen Volkszählung vom 31. Jänner 1920*; Statistische Zentralkommission, *Ergebnisse der ausserordentlichen Volkszählung vom 31. Jänner 1920: Endgültige Ergebnisse*.

25. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 178/1918. The replies from the commissions, mostly dated from mid-January to February, can be found in K1356 616/1918 (Styria), 1090/1918 (Lower Austria), 2128/1918 (Upper Austria), K1358 3661/1918 and 5656/1918 (Tyrol), and 4941/1918 (Salzburg).

26. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 16573/1918. The Austrian Silver Cross was a major charitable organization serving disabled reservists. It had more than 200 local chapters. About its bold proposal to station its own personnel inside a public welfare office because they were allegedly more capable than officials, see Hsia, "Who Provided Care for Wounded and Disabled Soldiers?" 324–326.

27. On the wartime censorship authorities being the military's instrument for power grab, see Rachamimov, "Arbiters of Allegiance."

28. K.k. Ackerbauministerium to k.k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge, "Kredithilfe für die aus dem Felde heimkehrenden Krieger und sonstigen Kriegsbeschädigten," 27 June 1918, Z.31040/1918, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 16909/1918.

29. "Wirkungskreis des Ministeriums für soziale Fürsorge," 4.

30. On the official jurisdiction of the Social Welfare Ministry in war victim welfare, see *ibid.*

31. Protokoll über die am 7. Februar 1918 stattgefundene Sitzung, betreffend die Entlassung und Übergabe tuberkulöser Heeresangehöriger an ihre Angehörigen, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1359 7398/1918.

32. K. u. k. Kriegsministerium to k. k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge, Entlassung tuberkulöser Militärpersonen aus den Spitälern, 5 March 1918, Abt. 14 Nr. 5731, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1359/1918.

33. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1360 11314/1918.

34. Denk, "Fürsorgewesen," 23, 31.

35. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1359 6868/1918.

36. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 13205/1918.

37. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1358 4475/1918.

38. Herwig, *The First World War*, 359–360.

39. The manpower crisis also opened the door for women to serve in military functions beyond the medical services (as military doctors or nurses). Men in support functions could then be freed up for front service. See Healy's discussion of the Women's Auxiliary Labor Force in the Field (weibliche Hilfskräfte im Felde) in her *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 204–209.

40. Bezirks-Zentral-Anstalt für unentgeltliche Arbeits- u. Dienstvermittlung in Karlsbad/Bezirksstelle der k. k. Arbeitsvermittlung an Kriegsinvalide, Karlsbad, "Jahres-Ausweis 1917," in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1358 4518/1918.

41. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1359 9848/1918.

42. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 13304/1918.

43. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 13429/1918.

44. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1362 18556/1918.

45. The Chief of Replacement Services (Chef des Ersatzwesens) was in charge of mobilization and supplies, hence the second-most important officer in the Austro-Hungarian armed forces. Baron Samuel Hazai (Samu Hazai in Hungarian) was the highest-ranking soldier of Jewish origin in the Habsburg armed forces. Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 178.

46. Chef des Ersatzwesens, "Anstellung von Kriegsinvaliden Mannschaften in mil. Anstalten u. Betrieben," Res. Nr.2-18-403/Pers. In ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1362 19273/1918.

47. On the accelerating pace of desertion and mutiny, see Plaschka, Haselsteiner, and Suppan, *Innere Front*, vol. 1, 291–420.

48. Herwig, *The First World War*, 369, 373. The Habsburg Army's strength on the Italian front was reduced by almost half between early spring and the end of the Piave offensive.

49. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 385/1918.

50. K. u. k. Kriegsministerium an das k. k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge, "Unterbringung von Kriegsinvaliden in staatlichen Betrieben," 9 May 1918, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 12197/1918 in 385/1918.

51. K. u. K. Kriegsministerium, Abt. 18, Nr. 7102/18, 2 May 1918, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 12960.

52. Internal Memo of 6 July, 1918, ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 15498/1918.
53. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 13582/1918.
54. It is worth noting that because of the paper shortage, the ministerial monthly bulletins on “war-damaged persons,” *Mitteilungen des k. k. Ministeriums für soziale Fürsorge über Fürsorge für Kriegsbeschädigte*, were not published until May 1918. The guidelines therefore might not have been available to all crownland agencies until early May.
55. Healy analyzes the wartime practice of direct petition to the emperors in *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 282–298.
56. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1362 16633.
57. Unfortunately, the paper trail stops here. There is no indication as to how her case was resolved.
58. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 14661/1918.
59. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1362 17075/1918.
60. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1362 18956/1918.
61. *Ibid.*
62. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1362 19598.
63. The war blinded was a category of disabled soldiers who received special attention from the authorities—both before and after 1918—despite their relatively small number, as one estimate put the war blinded as constituting around 1.2 percent of all First World War disabled men from all belligerent countries. In post-1918 Austria there were about 300 war-blinded persons from over 100,000 certified disabled veterans. According to Barbara Hoffmann, the war blinded were considered by many during and after the war as especially sympathy worthy. See her *Kriegsblinde in Österreich*.
64. Steiermärkische Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für Heimkehrende Krieger to Kriegsblindenfonds im k.k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge, Nr. 1674, 5 June, 1918, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 15850/1918. Karl Troop Crosses (*Karl Truppenkreuz*) were awarded to soldiers who saw combat on the front lines. It distinguished them from those serving in the safer rear-echelon units or hinterland posts, who increasingly became objects of popular scorn on the home front. Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 262–279.
65. Steiermärkische Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für Heimkehrende Krieger to Kriegsblindenfonds im k.k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge, Nr. 1674, 5 June, 1918. The Styrians added that Klampfer’s motive for committing suicide had not been unrequited love, as initially reported, but rather mistreatment and harassment at the hands of his superior, who had allegedly thwarted his request to be transferred back to a combat unit.
66. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 15850/1918. It is worth repeating that the specific military task Klampfer was fulfilling was meat grinding.
67. Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger, Innsbruck, an das k. k. Ministerium des Innern, Betreff: Unterstützung für Kriegsbeschädigte, N763/1, 5 April 1917, ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1362 17583/1918.

68. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1362 15579/1918.

69. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1363 26223/1918.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. *SPHA*, XXII. Session, 1918, Beilage 1206, Antrag der Abgeordneten Filipinský, Swoboda und Genossen auf Reorganisierung der über den Grad der Invaldität bei Militärinvaliden entscheidenden Superarbitrierungskommissionen durch Zuziehung von Spezialärzten sowie die Errichtung einer Berufungsinstanz.

73. K. k. Finanzprokuratur an das k. k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorgung, 38914/18/II, 20 September 1918, in ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1363 24574/1918.

74. See, for example, the disabled soldier Johann Tivitanzl's case in ÖStA KA ZSt KM HR 1917 Abt. 9/IF K1417 1917 IF 4-1/34, 4-1/34/2-4. Despite the Joint War Ministry's wish to resolve the case quickly, Austrian Defense Ministry officials insisted that he had to prove (for instance by producing a witness) that he had indeed deposited the said clothes with the military. Only then would they be willing to discuss compensation or replacement. Tivitanzl first petitioned the Joint War Ministry on 5 March 1917, but the unaccommodating decision came only on 12 July.

75. "Das Schicksal eines Kriegskrüppels," *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (Morgenblatt), 1 February 1918, 6. Rechter's attending physician was a woman. On women physicians' war service in the Habsburg Monarchy, see Stadler, "Ärztinnen im Krieg."

76. "Das Schicksal eines Kriegskrüppels," 6-7.

77. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1358 5788/1918. "Brainless (*kopflös*)" was the *Arbeiter-Zeitung's* characterization.

78. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1359 8947/1918.

79. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1358 5788/1918.

80. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1360 10457/1918.

81. In the same month, the Joint War Ministry demanded that the Social Ministry, along with the entire civil administration, take a firmer stand to stop "work-shy" disabled veterans' panhandling, especially when they "abused" the military uniforms to arouse the public's sympathy. ÖStA KA ZSt KM HR 1918/19 Abt. 9/IF K1703 I.F. 4-2/9 Gegenstand: Invalidenfürsorge (Unfug des Bettelns durch KI), I.F. Nr. 550 An das k.k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge, 19 April 1918.

82. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1360 10457/1918.

83. Kriegsministerium Erlass Abt. 13 Nr. 3635, 14 March 1918, Präs. Nr. 3137, 19 March 1918, in ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1361 13597/1918.

84. Kriegsministerium Abt. 13 Nr. 13502, 29 May 1918, in ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1361 13597/1918.

85. Ibid.

86. Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger Salzburg an das k.k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge, Z. 404, 2 May 1918, in ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1360 11964/1918.

87. Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger Salzburg an das k.k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge, Z. 413, 4 May 1918, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1360 11964/1918.

88. According to the Ministry of Social Welfare, as of 31 March 1918 there were 476 soldiers still in different kinds of medical facilities scattered all over Austria. Another 745 disabled soldiers had been discharged and were “in the local authority’s file,” meaning that they were out of the military’s jurisdiction. “Zusammenstellung. Statistik der kriegsbeschädigten Militärpersonen österreichischer Staatsangehörigkeit,” 2, Tabelle 1.

89. Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger Salzburg an das k.k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge, Z. 404, 2 May 1918.

90. Ibid.

91. Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger Salzburg an das k.k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge, Z. 413, 4 May 1918.

92. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1360 11964.

93. The Assistance Campaign was formerly known as Kälteschutz (Keep Warm). As the war continued, the authorities became more insistent on central control of the donated clothes and fabrics. Donation drives were initiated by central agencies, such as the War Welfare Office, and contributions became less voluntary. Hämmerle, *Heimat/Front*, 127–135.

94. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 14175/1918.

95. The original Social Welfare Ministry draft memorandum repeated Salzburg’s request for 500 pairs, but a Social Welfare official reviewing the draft crossed out the number 5 and wrote 2 instead.

96. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1360 11964.

97. Landeskommission zur Fürsorge für heimkehrende Krieger in Kärnten an das k. k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge, Z.950/F.K., 5 June 1918, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 14340/1918. The original underlining was done by the Social Welfare officials.

98. Ibid. The original underlining was done by the Social Welfare officials.

99. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 14340/1918.

100. Ibid. The crossed-out text is in the original; parentheses signify original word substitutions or additions made by the Social Welfare officials.

101. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1362 21108/1918.

102. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 14175/1918. The Emperor and King Karl Welfare Fund was a major military charity in the second half of the war.

103. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1362 21108/1918.

104. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1363 24964/1918.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. The Monarchy disintegrated before the Cisleithania-wide information regime became a reality. We will never know if it would have evolved, as in the Bolshevik case, into a key component of what historian Peter Holquist called the “national security

state” in its Habsburg variation. Holquist, “Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work,” 443–450.

108. Boyer, *Culture and Political Crisis*, 378.

109. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1364 3119/1918.

110. There were many similarly desperate requests. For example, on 26 December 1918, the Lower Austrian Commission asked for 3,500 sets of suits, coats, and the same number of pairs of shoes. ÖStA AdR BMdsV KBF K1358 4252/1918.

Chapter 5

1. Oberleutnant H. Kauders, “Aufklärungen über die ‘Zuwendung an Kriegsbeschädigte,’” *DI*, 15 January 1919, 5.

2. Initially the movement targeted mainly disabled soldiers, following the Monarchy’s legal and administrative traditions that saw soldiers and war widows and orphans as two distinct groups. Therefore I often refer to the movement and the activists as “organized disabled veterans” and “disabled men” in the first two sections of this chapter. But many women were active in the movement from its early days. After the passage of the all-inclusive Invalid Compensation Law in April 1919, the Zentralverband formally changed its name to reflect the broad constituencies. The term “war victim” (*Kriegsopfer*), though, became more widely used only after the mid-1920s. On the changing nomenclature for these people, see Hsia, “War Victims.”

3. On the Austrian Revolution of 1918 being the moment when liberal democratic institutions were founded, see Boyer, “Silent War and Bitter Peace,” 52–56.

4. K. R., “Der Länderkonferenz zum Geleit!,” *DI*, 1 December 1919, 2.

5. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1364 572/18 Verein der Kriegsinvaliden an das Präsidium des Deutsch-Österreichischen Staatsrates am 5. Nov. 1918. Between 30 October 1918 and 14 March 1919, the Council of the State discharged the constitutional duties of the head of the state as the executive committee of the Provisional National Assembly, itself formed by the German-speaking deputies of the Reichsrat on 21 October 1918.

6. Anton Hölzl, “Bericht des Abg. Hölzl über die Organisation der Kriegsbeschädigten, 28. Mai 1919,” 1. VGA Wien SD Parteistellen Parlamentsklub K96 M131/1 folder 1919/2. Hölzl did not mention this organization’s exact time of founding. This organization was headed by a certain Franz Klement.

7. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1364 572/18 Verein der Kriegsinvaliden an das Präsidium des Deutsch-Österreichischen Staatsrates am 5. Nov. 1918.

8. “Der Ausschuß und seine bisherige Tätigkeit.” *DI*, 15 January 1919, 2.

9. It was the only national war victim publication between 1918 and 1920. Later it became the newspaper of the Viennese provincial organization of the Zentralverband, the largest one of all such organizations, and still had the widest circulation. First published monthly in 1918, it became a biweekly starting in January 1919. The first number, from November 1918, had a circulation of 3,000. After a year, circulation had grown to over

50,000 copies per issue. "Das erste Jahr unserer Zeitung." *DI*, 15 November 1919, 1. The newspaper survived into 1934.

10. "Denkschrift der Forderungen der Kriegsbeschädigten," *DI*, November 1918, 3–4. The twenty-three points could be grouped in the following: (1) concentrating, nationalizing, and centralizing war victim welfare authorities and resources, public and private, in a "Central Invalid Office"; (2) including the Zentralverband representatives in all superarbitration cases; (3) free and improved medical, job training, prosthetic, and clothing provision; (4) raising the wages or benefits and ensuring equal pay for disabled men of different status; (5) using confiscated Habsburg house properties to fund war victim welfare; (6) facilitating disabled men's return to economic life with grants, easier entry into skilled trades and the professions, preferential employment in the public sector, and the assignment of tobacconist licenses; (7) jobs in and discounts from the war materiel demobilization process; (8) annual subsidy and free furnished offices for the Zentralverband.

11. The building on Hernalser Gürtel 12 still stands today. The Otto Wagner–designed Stadtbahn Gürtel-line connected several transportation hubs and made traveling to the Zentralverband easier. The present-day Wiener Linien U6 line uses most of the original elevated tracks and stations of the Gürtel-line.

12. "Der Ausschuß und seine bisherige Tätigkeit," 2. The Zentralverband asked for a 5 percent surcharge on all surplus item transactions to fund welfare measures for disabled veterans, but only a 2 percent surcharge was approved. See "Versammlung im Verbandsheim," *DI*, 15 December 1918, 3.

13. *Ibid.*, 2.

14. *Ibid.*

15. For more on the Bruck an der Leitha case, see Hsia, "A Partnership of the Weak," 194–199.

16. In Vienna, an average of 300 people showed up every day at the Zentralverband for its morning office hours (9 to noon daily). "Der Ausschuß und seine bisherige Tätigkeit," 2.

17. A. K., "Einige Worte an die Kameraden," *DI*, 15 December 1918, 1.

18. K. R., "Der Länderkonferenz zum Geleit!," 1–2.

19. "Kleine Mitteilungen: Unterstützungen." *DI*, 1 March 1919, 5. The note that confirms the existence of such cash incentives was, ironically, the note announcing its temporary suspension because the fund was exhausted. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the money for these cash handouts came from the Social Ministry.

20. Karl Burger, "Der Invalide," *DI*, November 1918, 1.

21. Between December 1918 and March 1919, he was present at the following meetings: at Feuerbrunn (Lower Austria) on 5 December 1918, *DI*, December 1918, 3; at Bruck a. d. Leitha (Lower Austria) on 31 December 1918, *DI*, 15 January 1919, 8; at Feuerbrunn (Lower Austria) on 2 February 1919, *DI*, 15 February 1919, 7; at Baden (Lower Austria) on 22 February 1919, *DI*, 1 March 1919, 6; at Wiener Neustadt (Lower Austria) on 16 March 1919, *DI*, 15 April 1919, 7; at Graz (Styria) on 30 March 1919, *DI*, 1 May 1919, 3.

22. "Aus den Ortsgruppen," *DI*, 15 March 1919, 5.
23. See "Ortsgruppen-Verzeichnis" section in *DI*, 1 January 1919, 4 (25); 15 January 1919, 8 (40); 1 February 1919, 8 (55); 15 February 1919, 8 (65); 1 March 1919, 6–7 (70); 15 March 1919, 6 (83); 15 April 1919, 9–10 (102); 15 May 1919, 3–4 (102+33).
24. "Denkschrift der Forderungen der Kriegsbeschädigten," 3–4.
25. A. v. Sch. "Der Zentralverband der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten. Werden, Aufgabe und Organisation," *DI*, 1 January 1919, 2.
26. See the later discussion of the Zentralverband's membership size.
27. "Der Ausschuß und seine bisherige Tätigkeit," 2.
28. Their local roots and network, sometimes established before the collapse of the Monarchy, enabled a more independent course of action even after joining the Zentralverband. See K. R., "Der Länderkonferenz zum Geleit!," 2.
29. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K 364 828/1918. The ministry issued a 2-page clarification on 28 November 1918.
30. "Aus den Ortsgruppen," *DI*, 15 December 1918, 3.
31. *Ibid.*
32. "Aus den Ortsgruppen," *DI*, 15 February 1919, 7.
33. "Aus den Ortsgruppen: Erster Verbandstag des Landesverbandes Oberösterreichs," *DI*, 15 June 1919, 5–6. See also Landesverband Oberösterreich des Zentralverband der Landesorganisationen der Kriegsinvaliden und Kriegerhinterbliebenen Österreichs, *Bericht über die Tätigkeit in der Zeit vom 1. Juli 1927 bis 30. Juni 1928*, 3–4.
34. Bator, "Die ersten Tage," in his *Tiroler Kriegsoffer, 1918–1928*, 41–46.
35. *Ibid.*, 42.
36. *Ibid.*, 44–46, 64. In 1928 the association's membership reached 7,416.
37. The main demands were: (1) transferring all disabled veteran welfare activities to civilian authorities; (2) raising invalid benefits through legislation; (3) free medical treatment and prostheses and prioritizing disabled veterans in public employment; (4) consolidating the invalid-related funds; (5) a payment office (*Liquidatur*) of invalid benefits in Innsbruck and a new superarbitration commission. "Aus den Ortsgruppen: Landes-Vollversammlung des Vereines der Kriegsinvaliden Deutsch-Tirols," *DI*, 15 March 1919, 4.
38. *Ibid.*
39. "Aus den Ortsgruppen: Generalversammlung der Ortsgruppe Wien am 9. Februar 1919," *DI*, 15 February 1919, 6–7.
40. Riedmann, *Geschichte des Landes Tirol. Band 4/II*, 777–785.
41. "Aus den Ortsgruppe: Landes-Vollversammlung des Vereines der Kriegsinvaliden Deutsch-Tirols (Fortsetzung)," *DI*, 1 April 1919, 5.
42. "Aus den Ortsgruppe: Landes-Vollversammlung des Vereines der Kriegsinvaliden Deutsch-Tirols," 4–5; "Aus den Ortsgruppe: Landes-Vollversammlung des Vereines der Kriegsinvaliden Deutsch-Tirols (Fortsetzung)," 5–6; "Aus den Ortsgruppe: Landes-Vollversammlung des Vereines der Kriegsinvaliden Deutsch-Tirols (Schluß)," *DI*, 15 April 1919, 6–7. For the resolution, see *DI*, 15 April 1919, 7.
43. Burger, "Der Invalide," 1.

44. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1377 2081/1919 in 29603/1920.
45. "Kreiskonferenz des Zentralverbandes der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten," *DI*, 1 November 1919, 3–4.
46. On Austrian milieu (*Lager*) politics, see Wandruszka, "Österreichs politische Struktur," 289–485. A more recent formulation is Lehnert, "Politisch-kulturelle Integrationsmilieus," 431–443. For classic case studies, see Boyer, *Political Radicalism*; Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries*. For Imperial German milieu politics, see Lepsius, "Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur," 56–80.
47. Beneš offers a stimulating perspective on the culture of the prewar socialist milieu in *Workers and Nationalism*. For a critical account of the interwar social democracy, see Gruber, *Red Vienna*.
48. VGA Wien Partei-Archiv vor 1934 M2 Sitzungsprotokolle Parteivorstand, Sitzung des deutschen Parteivorstand am 4. April 1918.
49. VGA Wien Partei-Archiv vor 1934 M2 Sitzungsprotokolle Parteivorstand, Sitzung der Reichsparteivertretung am 20. September 1918. Glöckel was famous for being the main architect of the interwar Austrian education reform.
50. VGA Wien Partei-Archiv vor 1934 M2 Sitzungsprotokolle Parteivorstand, Sitzung des Parteivorsand am 16. Jänner 1919.
51. VGA Wien Partei-Archiv vor 1934 M2 Sitzungsprotokolle Parteivorstand, Sitzung am 5. Mai 1919.
52. Hölzl, "Bericht des Abg. Hölzl," 1.
53. Beneš argues that many rank-and-file Social Democrats (both German speakers and Czech speakers) were increasingly alienated by the party leadership's cooperation with the government. They were especially disappointed by the leadership's opposition to the January 1918 strikes. *Workers and Nationalism*, 219–238.
54. Boyer, *Culture and Political Crisis*, 422–423; Rauchensteiner, *Der Erste Weltkrieg*, 905–910.
55. One of the main "agitation experts," Weissteiner, was a low-level party member before the war, and the early leadership "was taken up by several comrades" according to Hölzl. "Bericht des Abg. Hölzl," 1–2.
56. Groups of disabled veterans, some in wheelchairs, campaigned for the Social Democrats in Viennese districts. ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K5066 6108/1919, Polizeidirektion Wien an Staatsamt für Inneres, "Wahlen in die konstituierende Nationalversammlung; Vorgänge am 16. Feb. 1919."
57. Hölzl, "Bericht des Abg. Hölzl," 1–2.
58. "Kleine Mitteilungen," *DI*, 1 February 1919, 7.
59. "Offizielle Mitteilungen der Kriegsbeschädigten-Sektion für Gagisten des Zentralverbandes der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten und des Zentralverband der deutschösterreichischen Militärgagisten," *DI*, 1 February 1919, 6. The *Militär-Soziale Rundschau/Österreichische Wehrzeitung* began before the First World War; it became *Österreichische Wehrzeitung, Zeitschrift für Wehrfragen, Politik, und Wirtschaft* in 1920, and was a generally conservative former officers' paper until 1938.

60. See Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*.

61. A. v. Sch., “Der Zentralverband der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten,” 2. In “Der Ausschuß und seine bisherige Tätigkeit,” published on 15 January, the membership number was pushed up to 172,000.

62. K. Sch., “Der Kriegsbeschädigte Arbeiter,” *DI*, 15 February 1919, 4; “Generalversammlung der Kriegsinvalid in Wr. Neustadt,” *DI*, 15 April 1919, 7.

63. Such as “almost 200,000” cited by Dr. Adolf Deutsch, “Merkblatt für Invalide: Zur Wiedereinführung ins Erwerbsleben,” *DI*, 1 February 1919, 1; or 160,000 according to Deputy Hölzl and his party colleagues in *SPNR*, III. Session, 1921, Beilage 289.

64. *DI*, 15 February 1919, 7; the same appeal appeared also in *DI*, 1 March 1919, 5, and *DI*, 15 March 1919, 6.

65. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1395 5098/1922.

66. *Ibid.*

67. For 1924 membership see AdR BMfsV KBF K1428 73525/1924, “VI. Zentralverband Verbandstag Tätigkeitsbericht vom 3.1923 bis 10.1924,” 33b: April 1923, 176,880; Oct. 1924, 169,897 (including the Bavarian chapter members, numbering 649 and 648 respectively on those two dates).

68. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1368 29149/1919. Of the listed eight organizations, only the Zentralverband had an estimated membership over 7,000. All seven other organizations in the estimate combined had only about 16,000 members.

69. Karl Grundei, “Ein Jahr!” *DI*, 15 November 1919, 2.

70. AdR BMfsV KBF K1374 18075/1920.

71. *SPKN*, Beilage 114, Vorlage der Staatsregierung, Gesetz vom . . . über Versorgungsansprüche aus Anlaß militärischer Dienstleistungen (Invaliden- und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetz). Anhang II, “Die Statistischen Unterlagen zur Schätzung der Militärversorgungskosten,” 24. The statistical report was part of the government’s 2 April 1919 bill for a new military welfare law.

72. “Aus den Ortsgruppen: Generalversammlung der Ortsgruppe Wien am 9. February 1919,” 6.

73. *Ibid.*, 7.

74. The Christian Socials also tried to appeal to war victims with the idea of “War Invalid Chambers (Kriegsinvalidenkämmern),” autonomous provincial agencies funded by the state but run by organized war victims. *SPKN*, Beilage 70. See chapter 6.

75. ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K5066 13456/1919. There were accusations of Communists paying disabled veterans to go to their demonstrations, ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K5067 29614/1919.

76. The quote is from Zentralverband, “Unser I. Verbandstag,” *DI*, 1 May 1919, 1–2. See also Hunod, “Invalide als Mittel zum Zweck,” *DI*, 15 May 1919, 1–2.

77. ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K5066 14190/1919.

78. ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K5066 15202/1919, K5067 23892/1919, 29402/1919.

79. ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K5067 25248/1919.

80. For the Austrian Communists as part of a Europe-wide network, see McLoughlin, Leidinger, and Moritz, *Kommunismus in Österreich*.

81. Against the early estimate of around 300,000 war victims, the total population of the Austrian Republic was 6,067,430 as of 31 January 1920. Statistische Zentralkommission, ed., *Statistisches Handbuch für die Republik Österreich*, 8.

82. "Denkschrift der Forderungen der Kriegsbeschädigten," 3.

83. Burger, "Der Invalide," 1–2.

84. A. K., "Einige Worte an die Kameraden," 1.

85. Mitzi Schwarz, "Witwenlos," *DI*, 15 July 1919, 2–3.

86. From the seasoned war victim organizer Weissteiner's talk in a Hietzing local branch meeting, "Aus den Ortsgruppen," *DI*, 1 August 1919, 8.

87. "Beschlagnahme oder Besteuerung der Kriegsgewinne?" *DI*, 1 October 1919, 1–2.

88. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBFK13644580/1918, K1366 13136/1919, K1367 21310/1919.

89. Dr. H. H., "Neujahr, wir und die Gesellschaft," *DI*, 1 January 1919, 1–2. On organized war victims' opposition to begging, see, for example, "Die Kriegsbeschädigten und der Straßenbettel," *DI*, 1 October 1919, 4.

90. "Aus den Ortsgruppen: Landes-Vollversammlung des Vereines der 'Kriegsinvaliden Deutsch-Tirols,'" 5.

91. For example, "Ein Tag in der Schutzstelle für Kriegerwitwen und-Waisen," *DI*, 1 October 1919, 2–3. See also Die Schutzstelle für Kriegerwitwen und-Waisen, "Beschäftigungsraum für Kriegerwaisen," *DI*, 1 October 1919, 3, on a new initiative for orphans funded by an anonymous benefactress; Lithoblanc, "Nachahmenswertes Beispiel," *DI*, 15 October 1919, 3, on a local cinema's charity screening for war victims' benefit. In "Kreiskonferenz des Zentralverband der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten" (November 1919), local war victim leaders reassured representatives from civic groups and politicians of the organized war victims' nonpartisan, "economic" nature, in the hope that these local notables would help their upcoming donation drive.

92. The complaint of being forgotten or simply ignored after the war was over was ubiquitous, especially in *DI*'s coverage of local war victim organizational meetings. For more articulate complaints, see, for example, Dr. H. H., "Neujahr, wir und die Gesellschaft," 1–2.

93. Bessel, *Germany after the First World War*, 251–253, 263–284.

94. This understanding of the state's responsibility was very much the creation of Alexander Bach's 1850s neoabsolutism (and further back, Emperor Joseph II's ideal of state administration). Deak, *Forging a Multinational State*, 99–135, esp. 131–135. See also Seiderer, *Oesterreichs Neugestaltung*, 137–252.

95. A. v. Sch., "Der Zentralverband der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten," 2–3.

96. Dr. H. H., "Neujahr, wir und die Gesellschaft," 1. Emphasis in the quote is original.

97. See, for example, Eric J. Leed's discussion in *No Man's Land*, 73–97, 120–123. For a historical reflection of the comparability of war fighting and industrial work, see Lüdtke, "Aspects of Soldiering," 127–151.

98. K. Sch., “Die Superarbitrierungskommissionen und wir Invaliden,” *DI*, 1 February 1919, 5–6.

99. Dr. H. H., “Neujahr, wir und die Gesellschaft,” 1.

100. *Ibid.*

101. Hunold, “Volk in Not!” *DI*, 1 June 1919, 1.

102. For example, “Aus den Ortsgruppen: Wien III,” *DI*, 1 October 1919, 8; Walter Rentmeister, “Zur Invalidenfrage,” *DI*, 15 December 1919, 1–2.

103. Hans Kelsen, one of the architects of the Austrian Constitution of 1920, emphasized the constitutional dissociation and discontinuity of the Republic from the Monarchy in his “Die Verfassung Deutschösterreichs,” 247–249. This view was made official in §1 of the First Republic’s constitutional Law on the State Form of 21 October 1919 (*StGBI* 484/1919).

104. “Denkschrift der Forderungen der Kriegbeschädigten,” 3.

105. For example, B., “Die Pensionsliquidatur,” *DI*, 15 August 1919, 9–10. “Ein Tag in der Schutzstelle für Kriegerwitwen und-Waisen,” 2–3.

106. Robert B., “Zeit ist Geld,” *DI*, 1 July 1919, 3–4.

107. See for example, the already mentioned twenty-three demands in “Denkschrift der Forderungen der Kriegsbeschädigten,” 3–4. These demands, unsurprisingly, were presented to the Ministry of Social Welfare.

108. Vague threats: Oberleutnant H. Kauders, “Aufklärungen über die ‘Zuwendung an Kriegsbeschädigte,’” 5; “Aus den Ortsgruppen: Generalversammlung der Ortsgruppe Wien am 9. Februar 1919,” 6; more concrete: “Aus den Ortsgruppen,” *DI*, 15 December 1919, 4–6.

109. A. v. Sch., “Der Zentralverband der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten,” 4.

110. On soldiers’ and workers’ councils, see Hautmann, *Geschichte der Rätebewegung*.

111. Protokoll über die am 16. Dezember 1918 in den InvSchulen des Res. Spit. Nr. 11 unter dem Vorsitz des Prof. Dr. SPITZY von den Delegierten der in dem Spt. Untergebrachten Inv., den Delegierten des Zentralverbandes der Deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten, den Delegierten der Staatsämter für soziale Fürsorge und für Justiz abgehaltenen Sitzung, in *ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1364 4580/1918*.

112. *Ibid.*

113. Protokoll über die am 27. Dezember 1918, vormittags im Sitzungssaale des Staatsamtes für soziale Fürsorge unter dem Vorsitze des Herrn Staatssekretär Ferdinand Hanusch abgehaltene Sitzung im Gegenstande der Zusammenfassung der Kompetenzen für den gesamten Umfang der Invalidenfürsorge, in *ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1364 4580/1918*, 1–2.

114. *Ibid.*, 2–3.

115. *Ibid.*, 3

116. *Ibid.*, 3–4.

117. *Ibid.*, 5.

118. *Ibid.*, 6.

119. *Ibid.*, 7. The emphasis is original.

120. *Ibid.*

121. Hanusch's unlikely career from Silesian child laborer to Austrian social minister is portrayed in Göhring and Pellar, *Ferdinand Hanusch*. For his key role in creating consensus for social legislation, see 191–231.

122. Protokoll über die am 27. Dezember 1918 . . . abgehaltene Sitzung im Gegenstande der Zusammenfassung der Kompetenzen für den gesamten Umfang der Invalidenfürsorge, 10.

123. *Ibid.*, 10–11.

124. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1365 988/1919, "Geschäftsordnung für die ständige Invalidenfürsorgekommission im deutschösterreichischen Staatsamt für soziale Fürsorge," §1 and §7. Interestingly, §7 also says, "The resolutions of the Commission [are] of advisory character (*beratender Charakter*)."

125. Polizeidirektion Wien an Staatsamt für Inneres, 17 November 1919, ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K4860 42409/1919.

126. The Czechoslovakian Army easily occupied former majority German-speaking parts of Bohemia, Austrian Silesia, and South Moravia, which the Austrian Republic had claimed as its territories on the basis of national self-determination. The new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes sent troops to occupy parts of Styria and Carinthia, leading to local armed conflicts. On the Volkswehr as the Austrian Republic's first official armed forces, see Etschmann, "Theorie, Praxis und Probleme der Demobilisierung," 79–150. On the border conflicts, see Révész, "For the 'Freedom and Unity.'"

127. Many officials were "homefront men" who did not fit the front-soldier type of martial masculinity that urban dwellers used to measure an authority figure's manhood. Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 267–279.

128. Hautmann, *Geschichte der Rätebewegung*.

129. Gieler, "Die Wehrverbände"; Edmondson, *The Heimwehr*.

130. Sometimes they embodied the whole postwar Austria. As one Christian Social deputy said in the Constituent National Assembly, "The state is today a war invalid itself, with both internal and external organs in disarray." *SPKN*, 10. Sitzung, 24 April 1919, 264. See chapter 6 for more discussion.

131. "Aus den Ortsgruppen: Generalversammlung der Ortsgruppe Wien am 9. Februar 1919," 7.

132. On war victims' demonstrations, see, for example, ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem.-Inneres 15/3 K2435 2104/1919, and AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K5099 18369/1920 incident in Linz.

133. An example is the already-discussed Hollitscher 9 February warning. "Aus den Ortsgruppen: Generalversammlung der Ortsgruppe Wien am 9. Februar 1919," 6. In "Zur Invalidenfrage" (*DI*, 15 December 1919, 1–2), a disabled veteran wrote that state welfare payments should come as soon as possible to prevent war victims from falling into the hands of the "Bolsheviks." For a show of threats that forced ministerial officials to adopt a more apologetic and even pleading tone in a public meeting, see "Aus den

Ortsgruppen: Wien, Protokoll der Sitzung des Landesverbandes Niederösterreich . . .” *DI*, 15 December 1919, 4–6.

134. “Generalversammlung der Ortsgruppe und Bezirkstelle Gmunden,” *DI*, 15 June 1919, 6–7. For an example of successfully forcing their way onto other interest groups’ turfs, see H., “Kleine Mitteilungen: Trafikantenversammlung,” *DI*, 15 June 1919, 4. See also ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K5067 23892/1919 and 25248/1919 on the aforementioned case about disabled men occupying space in Schönbrunn Palace that was already designated for other uses.

135. On overburdening state finances, see the Finance Ministry’s criticism in ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1367 22894/1919. The Tobacconists’ Association fought hard to prevent its members’ concessions from being revoked to make way for war victim applicants. Burger, “Trafiken!” *DI*, 15 February 1919, 2. The Zentralverband demanded and received in May 1919 (*StGBL* 101/1919) four seats out of ten on the State Finance Administration’s new concession committee (Besetzungsausschuss) that was tasked with awarding retail concessions for the state-monopolized commodities tobacco and salt. See B., “Besetzung und Kündigung der Tabakverschleißgeschäfte,” and H., “Kleine Mitteilungen: Trafikantenversammlung,” *DI*, 15 June 1919, 1–3, 4; “Aus den Ortsgruppen: Wien III,” *DI*, 1 October 1919, 8. See also ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1366 15500/1919, K1370 34/1920, 1250/1920, 3867/1920. There was also opposition from business circles and the press, presumably over the proposed compulsory hiring quota reserved for disabled veterans. Grundei, “Ein Jahr!” 3.

136. K. Sch., “Die Superarbitrierungskommissionen und wir Invaliden,” 5–6.

137. *Ibid.*, 5. When the Military Invalid Superarbitration Commissions were reactivated after 19 November 1918, two nonmilitary members were added to each commission. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1364 1290/1918.

138. Dr. Hollitscher, “Vollzugsanweisung des deutschösterreichischen Staates vom 12. Februar, betreffend Abänderungen und Ergänzungen der Superarbitrierungsvorschriften,” *DI*, 15 March 1919, 1–2. Before the public threat, the Ministry of Military Affairs already suggested on 13 January 1919 that the Zentralverband should be involved. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1365 593/1919, 1469/1919. The public warning was to pressure the authorities into accelerating the process.

139. Representatives from the Zentralverband were present at both the 30 December 1918 preparatory meeting and the first formal meeting of this interministerial Standing Commission on 10 January 1919. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1364 4580/1918, K1365 988/1919, K1367 7603/1919.

140. For example, Hanusch, “Ein Geleitwort,” viii.

141. “Entlassung von Kriegsbeschädigten Staatsangestellten: Staatssekretär Hanusch an den Zentralverband der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten am 30. Jänner 1919,” *DI*, 15 February 1919, 5. On Hanusch’s tenure as the Republic’s first social minister, see Göhring and Pellar, *Ferdinand Hanusch*, 191–231.

142. Dr. H. H., “Neujahr, wir und die Gesellschaft,” 1.

143. ÖStA AdR BMfsv KBF K1366 12415/1919.

144. “Der Ausschuß und seine bisherige Tätigkeit,” 3. The money to subsidize the very publication and subsequent growth of *DI* originally came from the Economic Ministry. *DI*'s circulation grew substantially, from 3,000 copies per issue at its inception to 50,000 copies per issue near the end of 1919; see Die Redaktion, “Das erste Jahr unserer Zeitung,” 1.

145. For example, Dr. A. Deutsch, “Merkblatt für Invalide: Zur Wiedereinführung ins Erwerbsleben,” 1–3; and Otto Glöckel's speech at the 9 February 1919 Viennese war victim rally, “Aus den Ortsgruppen: Generalversammlung der Ortsgruppe Wien am 9. Februar 1919,” 7. To prevent the depletion of several government-controlled war charity funds, state officials also wanted war victim organizations to recommend deserving war victims, instead of publicly inviting a huge wave of applications. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1365 8867/1919.

146. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1365 672/1919, 1245/1919.

147. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1365 8533/1919.

148. “Die Invalidenbewegung,” *DI*, 1 August 1919, 4.

149. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1366 11174/1919.

150. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1366 10675/1919 and K1554 folders on the Lebensmittelaktion.

151. “Unsere Lebensmittelaktion,” *DI*, 15 June 1919, 3. A few smaller organizations and institutions received assistance through the Zentralverband, too. The Zentralverband distributed packages to these smaller groups after submitting a request based on their membership registration.

152. “Aus den Ortsgruppen: Ortsgruppe Wien XVII. Protokoll,” *DI*, 15 September 1919, 8.

153. On the immediate postwar hunger, see Adlgasser, “The Roots of Communist Containment.”

154. Below the central decision making, see, for example, the composition of subcommittees of the Upper Austria Invalid Compensation Commission in ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1367 21114/1919.

155. “Der Ausschuß und seine bisherige Tätigkeit,” 2; J. Vietoris, “Bericht über die Tätigkeit des Staatsangestelltenausschusses bis 15. März 1919,” *DI*, 15 April 1919, 5. See also the Zentralverband's intervention in Invalid Office personnel issues in Upper Styria on 4 March 1919, ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1365 6081/1919.

156. They claimed he was quadruple dipping, and he was not even a veteran at all. Das Agitationsreferat des Zentralverbandes, “Aemterkummulierung,” *DI*, 15 September 1919, 4–5.

157. B., “Die Pensionsliquidatur,” 9. War victims resented female office workers in public employment. See, for example, “Aus den Ortsgruppen: Hietzing,” *DI*, 1 August 1919, 8; Ortsgruppe Gmunden, “Ernste Mahnung,” *DI*, 1 September 1919, 2–3.

158. Becker, “Die ‘kameradschaftlichste Unterstützung,’” 195–196.

159. See, for example, the Styrian case in ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1366 18098/1919.

160. "Aus den Ortsgruppen: Erster Verbandstag des Landesverbandes Oberösterreichs," 6.
161. "Aus den Ortsgruppen: Wien, Protokoll der Sitzung des Landesverbandes Niederösterreich . . .," 5.
162. "Aus den Ortsgruppen: Ortsgruppe Pottendorf," *DI*, 1 September 1919, 8–9.
163. Josephus [Joseph Roth], "Eine Kaffeehausterrasse und noch eine," 26.
164. Der Zentralverband, "Unser I. Verbandstag," 2.
165. Karl Burger claimed the membership of 180,000 in his 16 March 1919 talk. "Generalversammlung der Kriegsinvaliden in Wr.-Neustadt," 7.
166. Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, chapters 1 and 4.
167. For a deeper history of the European state's expanding circle of alliance partners, see Grew, "The Nineteenth Century European State."
168. Hsia, "Who Provided Care for Wounded and Disabled Soldiers?"

Chapter 6

1. "Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden- und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetzes," in Staatsamt für soziale Verwaltung, ed., *Das Gesetz vom 25. April 1919*, 32. Originally in *SPKN*, Beilage 114, 2.
2. *SPKN*, 11. Sitzung, 25 April 1919, 274.
3. The Peace Conference in Paris was just underway at this point, and most political leaders of the rump Austria preferred some form of Anschluss with Germany. For beneficiary and costs estimates, see *Das Gesetz vom 25. April 1919*, 77–80. The numbers were originally presented in an appendix to the government's bill in *SPKN*, Beilage 114, 47–50. The ratio of one-sixth is calculated based on the numbers referred to during the Constituent National Assembly debate in *SPKN*, 11. Sitzung, 25 April 1919, 277.
4. The Provisional National Assembly of German-Austria Resolution of 30 October 1918, regarding the Fundamental Institutions of State Power, *StGBL*. 1/1918, §3.
5. This became §1 of the Law Regarding the Forms of State and Government of German-Austria, 12 November 1918 (*StGBL*. 5/1918).
6. ÖStA AdR BKA StRP K1, 30. Sitzung, 11 November 1918.
7. Before the 1920 Constitution was adopted, the First Republic's ministers were called state secretaries (*Staatssekretäre*) and ministries were called State Offices (*Staatsämter*). To avoid confusion and to emphasize the institutional continuity, I refer to these officials and offices as "ministers" and "ministries."
8. ÖStA AdR BKA StRP K1, 30. Sitzung, 11 November 1918. See also ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1367 20930/1918.
9. ÖStA AdR BKA StRP K1, 17. Sitzung, 4 November 1918.
10. ÖStA AdR BKA StRP K1, 22. Sitzung, 7 November 1918.

11. The revolution also resulted in other temporary problems. For example, the governor of Styria resigned and thereby deprived the Styrian Provincial Commission for the Care of Homecoming Soldiers of its president. The leadership vacuum delayed the ongoing efforts to build Invalid Offices across the province. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1364 1825/1918.

12. Protokoll über die am 19. November 1918 beim Staatsamt für soziale Fürsorge abgehaltene von Vertretern der beteiligten Staatsämter angehaltenen Besprechung in Angelegenheit der Invalidengebühren. Vorsitzender Sektionschef Otto Gasteiger von und zu Raabenstein und Kobach des Staatsamtes für soziale Fürsorge. In ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1364 1290/1918.

13. This was not a new idea. See chapter 4. Also, ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1365 22927/1918, 25045/1918, 25623/1918.

14. Protokoll über die am 19. November 1918 . . . angehaltenen Besprechung in Angelegenheit der Invalidengebühren.

15. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1359 9055/1918.

16. Protokoll über die am 19. November 1918 . . . angehaltenen Besprechung in Angelegenheit der Invalidengebühren.

17. Deutsch-Österreichisches Staatsamt für Volksgesundheit an die Landesregierungen, "Superarbitrierung von Kriegsbeschädigten, Zusammensetzung der Kommissionen," in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1364 1290/1918.

18. The newly independent Czechoslovakia, despite having its liberation-revolution in October 1918 as a "winner" of the war, experienced very similar challenges. The continuities of official personnel and practices dismayed many and heightened the crisis of state legitimacy. Morelon, "State Legitimacy and Continuity," 44–49, 54–57.

19. After multiple interministerial meetings and involving the Zentralverband, the reform was finalized on 3 February 1919 and became a Council of State executive order on 12 February (*StGBL*. Nr. 144/1919). ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1365 593/1919, 1469/1919, 2042/1919, 2942/1919, 3170/1919.

20. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1364 1829/1918.

21. Protokoll aufgenommen am 18. November 1918, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 1460/1918.

22. *Ibid.*

23. Verzeichnis der Mitglieder des Kuratoriums für die Österreichischen Staatsangehörigen der gesamten bewaffneten Macht, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 1460/1918. A membership list of the War Blind Fund's board of trustees, prepared earlier in 1918, shows handwritten names of additional participants from the military and government, in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1361 13824/1918.

24. Dr. Benedikt of *Neue Freie Presse*, Dr. von Mayr, Baron Wolfgang von Ferstel, a civil engineer, Dr. Hans Ritter von Mauthner, an attorney, and Alexander Mell, the director of Vienna's School for the Blind (Blindenerziehungsinstitut) were retained. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1356 1460.

25. Die Provisorische Nationalversammlung, "Aufruf. An das deutschösterreichische Volk." *StGBL*. 6/1918, 12 November 1918.

26. Bauer, *The Austrian Revolution*.

27. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1364 4437/1918.

28. Franz Theodor Csokor's play, *November 3, 1918* (1936), captures that moment of sudden burst of fratricidal nationalism among former Habsburg soldiers.

29. Vienna alone had 100,000 Czech-speaking residents. They were underrepresented in the census but attracted plenty of political attention and ethnic riots. Boyer, *Culture and Political Crisis*, 212–224; Beneš, *Workers and Nationalism*, 61–64, 207–209.

30. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1357 2529/1918.

31. For the historical evolution of a zone of relatively free movement in Habsburg Central Europe and the related development of an Austrian state citizenship, see Burger, "Passwesen und Staatsbürgerschaft." Ulrike von Hirschhausen emphasizes the transition from a more inclusive, state-centered understanding of Austrian citizenship to an exclusionary, race-(and antisemitism-)tinged one between 1918 and 1923. Hirschhausen, "From Imperial Inclusion."

32. ÖStA AdR BKA StRP K1-3, Beschlussprotokolle, 21 October 1918 to 31 January 1919, *passim*.

33. ÖStA AdR BKA StRP K1, 34. Sitzung, 16 November 1918.

34. See Hanusch's introductory speech on the eight-hour workday legislation in the Provisional National Assembly, in *SPPN*, 5. Sitzung, 22 November 1918, 123–125. The law was passed on 19 December 1918, but its application was initially limited to factory workers.

35. On the Social Welfare ministerial officials' smooth transition, see Heise, "Vom k.k. Ministerium für soziale Fürsorge," 91–102.

36. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1357 2244/1918.

37. *SPKN*, 7. Sitzung, 2 April 1919, 140.

38. *Ibid.*, 140–141.

39. *Ibid.*, 140.

40. *Ibid.*, 141.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.*

44. "Erläuterungen," *SPHA*, XXII. Session, 1917, Beilage 680. Also discussed in chapter 4.

45. *SPKN*, 7. Sitzung, 2 April 1919, 140.

46. Hanusch had expressed similar ideas two months earlier. "Entlassung von Kriegsbeschädigten Staatsangestellten: Staatssekretär Hanusch an den Zentralverband der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten am 30. Jänner 1919," *DI*, 15 February 1919, 5.

47. The Habsburg Law also banished ex-Emperor Karl from Austria forever; and other Habsburgs, in order to stay, had to renounce any claims associated with the crown or the hereditary rights of the ruling house. For the run-up to the Habsburg Law, see Böhmer and Faber, *Die Erben des Kaisers*, 24–35.

48. On the revolutionary wave of the radical left and its radical right reactions in Central Europe, see Gerwarth, *The Vanquished*, 118–167.

49. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1366 12415/1919.

50. "Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden-und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetzes," 41–42. The Administrative Court is one of the supreme courts of Austria and has been the highest instance for determining the legality of administrative rulings since the mid-nineteenth century.

51. *Ibid.*, 40–41.

52. "Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden-und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetzes," 31.

53. For example, see the discussion taking place on 18 March 1919 in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1367 7603/1918.

54. The reformed superarbitration process, as discussed earlier, had already incorporated client representatives following the Council of State executive order of 12 February 1919 (*StGBL*. 144/1919). Disabled men who wanted to contest prereform superarbitration rulings could request new medical examinations. "Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden-und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetzes," 41.

55. See "Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden-und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetzes," 40–42, as well as the 2 April 1919 bill's §39–§58 for more details on how the "new kind of authority" should function.

56. Becker, "Die 'kameradschaftlichste Unterstützung.'"

57. See "Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden-und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetzes," 33 about this particular beneficiary group. The most prominent women volunteers, besides the ubiquitous Red Cross nurses, were those in the Women's Auxiliary Labor Force discussed in Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 204–209; and the numerous female physicians working in the wartime military medical services, see Stadler, "Ärztinnen im Krieg."

58. "Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden-und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetzes," 34.

59. *Ibid.*, 34–36 contains a detailed discussion of the levels of and rationale for these classifications.

60. *Ibid.*, 36–37.

61. Steinböck, "Kärnten," vol. 2, 801–810. On the border disputes more generally, see Pfoser and Weigl, *Die erste Stunde Null*, 56–72. On Vienna's attempt to ensure provincial forces' loyalty, see Glaubauf, *Die Volkswehr*, 104–119.

62. "Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden-und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetzes," Table 6, 50.

63. In the Austrian Parliamentary Archives (Archiv des Parlaments), the only available record of the committee's discussion of the 2 April bill is a single sheet of paper with the meeting agenda jotted down in cursive. There are some other short, illegible remarks written in pencil. It is safe to assume that there is no detailed official record of the committee's deliberation.

64. See Klein-Pejšová, "Beyond the 'Infamous Concentration Camps of the Old Monarchy.'" Burger, "Heimat-und Staatenlos," discusses the conscious exclusion of Eastern European Jewish refugees from the Austrian citizenship after both world wars.

65. "Bericht des Ausschusses für soziale Verwaltung über das Gesetz (Beilage 114), betreffend die staatliche Entschädigung der Kriegsinvaliden,-Witwen und-Waisen (Invalidenentschädigungsgesetz)," in *Das Gesetz vom 25. April 1919*, 81, 85.

66. Law Regarding the Right to German-Austrian Citizenship of 5 December 1918 (*StGBL* 91/1918). See the discussion in Hirschhausen, "From Imperial Inclusion," 559–562; Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution;" and Timms, "Citizenship and 'Heimatrecht.'" "

67. On the nationally exclusive citizenship after 1918 and Jewish refugees, see Grandner, "Staatsbürger und Ausländer." More broadly, on the relevance of pre-1918 domicile in determining postwar citizenship issues, see Timms, "Citizenship and 'Heimatrecht.'" "

68. "Bericht des Ausschusses für soziale Verwaltung über das Gesetz (Beilage 114), betreffend . . . (Invalidenentschädigungsgesetz)," 81.

69. The distinction between *Versorgung*, referring specifically to pension and other sustenance payments, and *Fürsorge*, referring more to in-kind medical, therapeutic, and rehabilitative services, was already made in the Social Ministry's explanatory note to the 2 April 1919 bill. "Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden-und Hinterbliebenen-versorgungsgesetzes," 33–34.

70. "Bericht des Ausschusses für soziale Verwaltung über das Gesetz (Beilage 114), betreffend . . . (Invalidenentschädigungsgesetz)," 83.

71. *SPKN*, 10. Sitzung, 24 April 1919, 261.

72. Doppelbauer, *Zum Elend noch die Schande*, 17–73, 102–116.

73. For example, Anton Hölzl alluded to this commonly held point in "Kriegsbeschädigtenhilfe, eine soziale Pflicht!" *DI*, November 1918, 2.

74. "Bericht des Ausschusses für soziale Verwaltung über das Gesetz (Beilage 114), betreffend . . . (Invalidenentschädigungsgesetz)," 82–83, 86–88.

75. *Ibid.*, and *SPKN*, 10. Sitzung, 24 April 1919, 260.

76. For the security forces' account of the putsch, see the reports in ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K5066 "Übertretungen u. Excesse, NÖ, Wien 1918–1919," 15495/1919. The Viennese police reported that in the second half of April 1919, overtly Communist meetings could attract only a few hundred, but the unemployed people's demonstrations could attract up to 4,000. The police suspected that the Communists were cynically trying to turn the unemployed people's demonstrations into putsches.

77. The Red Guards were a 700-strong force when the Republic was declared on 12 November 1918. Glaubauf, *Die Volkswehr 1918–1920*, 65–81, and Etschmann, "Theorie, Praxis und Probleme der Demobilisierung," 130–138.

78. The eight-hour workday, adopted by the Provisional National Assembly on 19 December 1918, was only applied to factorylike workplaces until the passage of the Eight-Hour Workday Law of December 1919. Emergency unemployment assistance, adopted in November 1918, was made into an unemployment insurance law only in March 1920. According to Ernst Bruckmüller, the Invalid Compensation Law was one of the first brand-new pieces of social legislation under the Republic, preceding the banning of nighttime work by women and children in May 1919, the Work Council Law of May 1919, Workers' Vacation Law of July 1919, Collective Bargaining Law of December 1919, the Chamber of Labor Law of February 1920, and various pieces of health and

accident insurance expansion legislation in the 1920s. Bruckmüller, "Sozialstruktur und Sozialpolitik," 422–423.

79. "Große Straßenausbreitungen als Nachspiel der heutigen Rathausversammlung," *Neue Freie Presse (Morgenblatt)*, 26 April 1919, 6–9. Hans Hautmann sees this day's incident as part of the rising militancy among workers and the poor in early 1919 and not necessarily the Communists' doing. Hautmann, *Geschichte der Rätebewegung*, 304–339.

80. *SPKN*, 11. Sitzung, 25 April 1919, 287 (Michael Mayr opposing equal treatment of cohabitants), and 289–290 (Michael Paulitsch on encouraging war widows to remarry).

81. See *ibid.*, 279 (Josef Ursin) and 289 (Leopold Stocker).

82. *SPKN*, 10. Sitzung, 24 April 1919, 259.

83. *SPKN*, 11. Sitzung, 25 April 1919, 280.

84. *SPKN*, 10. Sitzung, 24 April 1919, 264–265.

85. *SPKN*, 11. Sitzung, 25 April 1919, 276–278.

86. *SPKN*, 10. Sitzung, 24 April 1919, 264. "Dynastic and imperialistic interests" are the words of the Social Democrat delegate Anton Hölzl, who presented his party's response to Aigner by reasserting the party's view, in *ibid.*, 11. Sitzung, 25 April 1919, 274–275. The Roman poet Horace's line, "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori," was famously quoted by Wilfred Owen in his antiwar poem, "Dulce et Decorum est."

87. On the memorialization of war and sacrifice, see Hanisch, "Politische Symbole und Gedächtnisorte," and Edgecombe and Healy, "Competing Interpretations of Sacrifice." A survey of the interwar monuments to soldiers and the fallen can be found in Giller, Mader, and Seidl, *Wo sind sie geblieben?* 71–111.

88. He conspicuously omitted Lower Austrians, which encompassed the Viennese at the time, when praising the bravery of soldiers from different provinces. *SPKN*, 10. Sitzung, 24 April 1919, 264.

89. This was the Christian Socials' second attempt. The first attempt was defeated by a majority vote in the Social Committee. "Bericht des Ausschusses für soziale Verwaltung über das Gesetz (Beilage 114), betreffend . . . (Invalidenentschädigungsgesetz)," 83.

90. *SPKN*, 11. Sitzung, 25 April 1919, 286–287.

91. *Ibid.*, 274–276. On the construction of the Austrian *Opfermythos* through war victims in the interwar period, see Hsia, "War Victims."

92. On Proft, see Hauch, *Vom Frauenstandpunkt aus*, 294–298. On women's active political role in immediate postwar Austria, see Hauch, "Sisters and Comrades."

93. *SPKN*, 11. Sitzung, 25 April 1919, 290–291.

94. *Ibid.*, 292.

95. *Ibid.*, 297.

96. *Ibid.*, 288–289 (Kittinger's argument); 291 (Proft's support of Kittinger); 290 (Paulitsch proposing to lower the threshold from 60 to 50); and 292–293 (Widholz willing to move the eligibility age from 60 to 55).

97. *SPKN*, 11. Sitzung, 25 April 1919, 297. Only a Tyrolean Christian Social, Franz Schumacher, protested against §59, the Anschluss clause. He did not think his

“fatherland Tyrol” was obligated to agree to any post-Anschluss action before it assented to Anschluss itself.

98. This was Hanusch’s promise near the end of the debate on 25 April. *Ibid.*, 296–297.

99. For an overview of social policy making amid revolutionary threats, see Pfoser and Weigl, *Die Erste Stunde Null*, 174–188.

100. This focused the Austrian organized war victims’ attention almost exclusively on state authorities, unlike their British, French, and German counterparts who had to deal with active private welfare actors. See Geyer, “Ein Vorbote des Wohlfahrtsstaates,” 232. Of course, there was significant international—mostly American, but also Swiss and Swedish—welfare intervention in Austria. See, for example, Adlgasser, “The Roots of Communist Containment.”

101. *SPKN*, Beilage 70. Antrag der Abgeordneten Dr. Ramek, Lackner, Huber und Genossen betreffend die Dezentralisierung der Pensionsliquidatur in Wien und Schaffung von Kriegsinvalidenkammern in den einzelnen Ländern der deutschösterreichischen Republik.

102. *SPKN*, 10. Sitzung, 24 April 1919, 262.

103. See this book’s conclusion for a short discussion of the Invalid Compensation Law’s post-1945 relevance.

104. Social welfare in general and welfare services for war victims in particular were also essential in creating legitimacy for the new Czechoslovak state. Stegmann, *Kriegsdeutungen, Staatsgründungen, Sozialpolitik*.

105. “Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden- und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetzes,” 33.

106. The Law Authorizing the Government to Issue Provisional Rules on Applying the Invalid Compensation Law to Professional Military Personnel and Their Survivors, 3 July 1919 (*StGBI.* 851/1919). The Social Democratic military minister, Julius Deutsch, said the bill was a key step towards eradicating the special status of the military and ensuring “equal rights for everyone” in case of disability. *SPKN*, 19. Sitzung, 30 May 1919, 429–430. The bill was passed with no real debate, *SPKN*, 23. Sitzung, 3 July 1919, 603–604.

107. *SPKN*, 10. Sitzung, 24 April 1919, 259.

108. Michael Geyer’s pioneering study of the British, French, and German war victim welfare laws and their political context is not sufficiently explicit as to why and how interwar war victim welfare systems heralded the more fully fledged welfare states. See his “Ein Vorbote des Wohlfahrtsstaates.”

Chapter 7

1. Prost, *In the Wake of War*.

2. Hölzl, “Bericht des Abg. Hölzl,” 2–3. In different sources, Weissteiner was sometimes spelled as Weißsteiner or Weißsteiner.

3. *Ibid.*, 3; and Hölzl report's Beilage 1, flyer "Kameraden" signed Kaspar.
4. Hölzl, "Bericht des Abg. Hölzl," 2.
5. See, for example, Burger, "Der Invalide," 1–2, and especially "Der Ausschuß und seine bisherige Tätigkeit," 1–3. Being the editor of the *DI* meant Burger could present himself in the light he preferred, and the reports about him and Weissteiner concentrate on organization building and recruitment.
6. Note from Sozialwirtschaftlicher Reichsbund der Kriegsinvaliden Deutschösterreichs, signed by Flaschenträger, Kada, and Ott, dated 9 May 1919, as Beilage 3 of Hölzl, "Bericht des Abg. Hölzl."
7. "Denkschrift der Forderungen der Kriegsbeschädigten," 4.
8. "Versammlung im Verbandsheim," 3.
9. "Der Ausschuß und seine bisherige Tätigkeit," 1.
10. *Ibid.*, 1–2.
11. Prof. Grath, "Die deutschösterreichischen Invalidenschulen," *DI*, 1 March 1919, 1.
12. Hölzl, "Bericht des Abg. Hölzl," 3.
13. *Ibid.*, 3. On the Social Democrats' socialization project, see Gerlich, *Die gescheiterte Alternative*.
14. Hölzl, "Bericht des Abg. Hölzl," Beilage 2, "Bericht!" by Die Untersuchungskommission.
15. Hölzl, "Bericht des Abg. Hölzl," 4–5.
16. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1365 9573/1919.
17. Hölzl, "Bericht des Abg. Hölzl," 5–6.
18. These men were not mentioned at all in *DI*'s "I. Verbandstag des Zentralverband der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten" (15 April 1919) that announced the agenda, organizers, and speakers of the upcoming national convention. Hollitscher last appeared as the author of a piece published on 15 March ("Verbandstag," *DI*, 15 March 1919, 1), then his name was mentioned only once, when a medical adviser of the Zentralverband, Dr. Julius Schütz, denied his association with Hollitscher ("Erklärung," *DI*, 1 April 1919, 3). Schütz's short notice was also the only (indirect) public admission of the organization's internal struggle in its newspaper up to that point.
19. *SPKN*, Beilage 114, "Vorlage der Staatsregierung: Gesetz vom ____ über Versorgungsansprüche aus Anlaß militärischer Dienstleistungen (Invaliden- und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetz)," 15. See also "Begründung zur Vorlage eines Invaliden- und Hinterbliebenenversorgungsgesetz," 11–12.
20. The Constituent National Assembly's Social Committee changed the name of the provincial commission but left the participatory mechanisms intact. See *SPKN*, Beilage 156, "Bericht des Ausschusses für soziale Verwaltung über das Gesetz (Beilage 114), betreffend die staatliche Entschädigung der Kriegsinvaliden, -Witwen, und -Waisen (Invalidenentschädigungsgesetz)," 20–21.
21. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1366 11753/1919.
22. Note from Sozialwirtschaftlicher Reichsbund der Kriegsinvaliden Deutschösterreichs, signed by Flaschenträger, Kada, and Ott. The Reichsbund accused the

Zentralverband of excluding “intellectuals” and war-disabled career soldiers, as well as tolerating antisemitic and antisocialist rhetoric. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1366 11753/1919.

23. Ibid.

24. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1368 13766, 14874, 15222, 32133/1919. On their occupation of Schönbrunn Palace, see K1367 26936/1919 and ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K5066 15202/1919, K5067 23892/1919, 29402/1919. Another date for the organization’s founding, 9 May 1919, was mentioned in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1569 Sammelakten 132, 33245/1920.

25. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1569 Sammelakten 132, 33245/1920.

26. Hölzl, “Bericht des Abg. Hölzl,” 6.

27. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1368 13766, 14874, 15222, 32133/1919.

28. Hölzl, “Bericht des Abg. Hölzl,” 6.

29. For example, ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1374 18697/1920 (office space and equipment).

30. The Communists and Communist-leaning war victims viewed the new law with mixed feelings. There was a report referring to Communist agitators from Vienna trying to rally provincial war victims against the Invalid Compensation Law in summer 1919. Karl Grundei, “Meine Urlaubsreise,” *DI*, 15 August 1919, 7.

31. Hölzl, “Bericht des Abg. Hölzl,” 6.

32. “Die Einigung in der Invalidenschaft,” *DI*, 1 July 1919, 3.

33. “Die Invalidenbewegung,” 4.

34. Julian Berger, “Die Einigungsverhandlungen,” *DI*, Sonderausgabe, August 1919, 4–5. For the Upper Austrians’ timely declaration of allegiance to the Zentralverband and its effort to ensure that its Salzburg counterpart do the same, see Grundei, “Meine Urlaubsreise,” 7. There was no corroborating evidence for the claim that the Upper Austrians were authorized to represent the Carinthians in Salzburg.

35. Der Zentralverband, “Die Antwort des Zentralverbandes,” *DI*, Sonderausgabe, August 1919, 1–4; “Ottakringer Invalidenfürsorge,” *DI*, Sonderausgabe, August 1919, 5–6. The Zentralverband also accused the Zentralrat of using its deceptively similar name to confuse the provincials into conducting charity collection drives. Der Zentralverband and Der Landesverband für Oberösterreich in Linz, “An die Oeffentlichkeit!” *DI*, 1 August 1919, 12.

36. Der Zentralverband, “Die Antwort des Zentralverbandes,” 3.

37. “Aus den Ortsgruppen: Protokoll der ordentlichen Vorstandssitzung des Zentralverbandes vom 22 August 1919,” *DI*, 15 September 1919, 9–10.

38. “Aus den Ortsgruppen: Ortsgruppe Wien XVIII. (Wiederanschluß an den Zentralverband),” *DI*, 15 October 1919, 8–9.

39. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1377 21400/1919 (28 July 1919) in 29603/1920.

40. “Witwen-Schutzstelle,” *DI*, 15 September 1919, 4.

41. “Aus den Ortsgruppen: Ortsgruppe Hietzing,” *DI*, 1 August 1919, 8.

42. “Deutschösterreichs Tod,” *DI*, 1 August 1919, 1.

43. Kopic, Invalidenrat, Wien II, "Was geschieht mit den Waisen der Gefallenen," *DI*, 1 August 1919, 2–3.

44. This included the use of legal means to punish members who insulted or slandered the functionaries. See "Urteil," *DI*, 15 October 1919, 10.

45. "Die Invalidenbewegung (Fortsetzung und Schluß)," *DI*, 15 September 1919, 1–2.

46. "Aus den Ortsgruppen: Protokoll der ordentlichen Vorstandssitzung des Zentralverbandes vom 22 August 1919," 10.

47. I am borrowing James C. Scott's concept of legibility from his *Seeing Like a State*.

48. K. Stockinger, Hauptvertrauensmann und Invalidenrat, "Mißglückter Versuch einer christlichsozialen Ortsgruppengründung Kriegsbeschädigter," *DI*, 15 September 1919, 5–6.

49. *Ibid.*, 6. On Josef Resch, see Steiner, *Sozialversicherung*.

50. "Mißglückter Versuch einer christlichsozialen Ortsgruppengründung Kriegsbeschädigter," 6.

51. For example, Der Zentralverband, "Die Antwort des Zentralverbandes," 3.

52. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1371 26884/1919.

53. "Kreiskonferenz des Zentralverbandes der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten u.," *DI*, 1 November 1919, 3–4. The meeting worked as intended. In a second meeting, the City of Amstetten pledged a 6,000-kronen annual subsidy. Amstetten and some nearby communities also promised to encourage donations to the local chapter. "Aus den Ortsgruppen: Wien," *DI*, 15 December 1919, 6.

54. "Aus den Ortgruppen: Ortsgruppe Wien X.," *DI*, 1 November 1919, 8. This local chapter meeting took place on 20 September.

55. Karl Grundei, "Ein Jahr!" *DI*, 15 November 1919, 1–3.

56. *Ibid.*, 3.

57. K. R., "Der Länderkonferenz zum Geleit!," 1.

58. *Ibid.*, 1–2.

59. *Ibid.*, 2.

60. On the centralism versus federalism debate in creating the constitution, see Öhlinger, "Die Entstehung des Bundestaates," 41–49; Öhlinger, "Zur Entstehung," 313–329; Ableitinger, "Grundlegung der Verfassung," vol. 1, 149–155, 162–179.

61. Das Agitationsreferat, "An alle Ortsgruppen und Landesverbände!" *DI*, 1 December 1919, 1.

62. Information became a precious good in wartime Austria; see Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 122–159.

63. The numbers are official estimates of Vienna-based organizations in October 1919. They give us an idea of the relative strength of the competing organizations vying for the government's recognition. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K 1368 29149/1919.

64. Karl Burger, "An unsere Leser!" *DI*, 15 December, 1919, 1.

65. Karl Burger, "Zum Abschied," *DI*, 15 December 1919, 1.

66. For example, Burger's name is missing from the lists of functionaries and representatives of all war victim organizations (the Zentralverband, the provincial associations,

and their competitors), all relevant war victim agencies and institutions, and related government offices, in Julius Schmidt on behalf of Landesverband Wien, ed., *Handbuch unentbehrlich*, 5–33.

67. “Die Einigungsversuche der Organisationen der Kriegsbeschädigten,” *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 3 December 1919, Morgenblatt, 5. See also Der Zentralverband, “Geleitwort!,” *NZdK* 1, no.1 (March 1920), 1.

68. “Die Einigungsversuche der Organisationen der Kriegsbeschädigten,” 5.

69. They also decided the Zentralverband’s demands about improving specific benefits and services. “Wissenswertes,” *NZdK* 1, no. 4 (May 1920), 2–4.

70. “Vorschlag des Agitations-und Organisationsreferates (Kainradl, Grundei) über einen Entwurf zu einem neuen Statute des Zentralverbandes: Satzungen des Zentralverbandes der Landesorganisationen der Kriegsinvaliden und –hinterbliebenen Oesterreichs,” *NZdK* 1, no. 3 (May 1920), 1–4.

71. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1377 29603/1920.

72. For a detailed record of the proceedings of the convention, see Rupert Kainradl, “Reichsdelegiertentag,” *NZdK* 1, no. 5–6 (15 July 1920), 1–16.

73. The war-blind persons’ organization, allied with the Zentralverband-Provincial Associations group, had one seat given by the Social Ministry. The Verband der kriegsbeschädigten Intellektuellen (Association of War-Damaged Intellectuals, actually an organization of disabled former military officers and officials) had the twentieth war victim seat. “Wissenswertes: Ständige Fürsorgekommission für Invalide,” *NZdK* 1, no. 4 (May 1920), 3–4.

74. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1372 12079/1920, 11452/1920.

75. Der Zentralverband, “Geleitwort!,” 1. The new Zentralverband decided that it still needed a newsletter to pass on essential information to local chapters. *NZdK* appeared only as needed.

76. “Wissenswertes: Ständige Fürsorgekommission für Invalide,” 3.

77. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1370 4290/1920, K1371 7475/1920.

78. Hollitscher was the first speaker of the Vienna Provincial Association’s 21 March 1920 meeting in the Volkshalle. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1371 8971/1920.

79. It joined the Christian Social organization to protest the renewed monopoly of the Zentralverband-Provincial Associations group on the codetermination mechanisms. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1379 35582/1920.

80. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1372 11452/1920.

81. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1373 13495/1920. The letter to the Social Ministry was dated 24 April 1920.

82. The officially recognized national membership total for 1921 was 160,618. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1395 5098/1922.

83. In spring 1920, when Hollitscher complained about the creeping official disregard, the Vienna Provincial Association counted 67,000 disabled veterans and 22,000 widows in its ranks. Some 82 percent of them were industrial workers or trained craftsmen. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1373 13495/1920. Later in 1920, the Viennese officials

reported the Vienna Provincial Association had 75,627 disabled men as members. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1374 18075/1920. A low estimate from August 1920 said the Vienna Provincial Association membership was 52,632. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1425 20390/1920 in Folder 17948/1924.

84. The size of the Zentralrat in late spring 1920, according to the Lower Austrian Invalid Compensation Commission, was approximately 10,000; 3,500 of them were municipal workers. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1380 14667/1920 in Folder 1836/1921. See also ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1379 35582/1920 for the more precise number of 9,531. The Christian Social organization had only 2,109 disabled men as members in 1920. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1374 18075/1920; it reported that its total membership number (including nondisabled men) reached 4,000 in March 1920, ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1372 9767/1920.

85. Kainradl, "Reichsdelegiertentag," 2.

86. This law provided the basis for establishing and administering the fund that the Habsburg Law (*StGBL*. 209/1919) had promised. On the controversies over the Habsburg Law and the confiscated properties, see Böhmer and Faber, *Die Erben des Kaisers*. The fund was only able to fulfill its mission starting in 1922. For the organizational and political struggle over the constitution of the fund's decision-making (and participatory) board between 1919 and 1921, see ÖStA AdR StK-BKA/alt. Varia Kriegsgeschädigtenfonds, K232, K233, and ÖStA AdR BMfSV/K.G.F. K110.

87. Since September 1918 at the latest, some Austrian officials had seriously contemplated the feasibility of legally requiring employers to hire disabled veterans. A draft law was prepared. A German expert visited Vienna and cautioned about a possible backlash from "healthy" veterans. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1363 24255/1918, 25316/1918. By January 1919 there were some revisions made to the existing draft law. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1363 25708/1918. The documents in ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1572 SA 146 Invalidenbeschäftigungsgesetz shed light on the drafting, negotiation, and early implementation of the law.

88. For the beneficiary numbers, see Brandeis and Zobel, *Gesetzgebung für Kriegsbeschädigte*, 350.

89. At least in Lower Austria, such hiring decisions in the Invalid Compensation Commission were part of the participatory decision-making practice. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1368 30106/1919.

90. See, for example, the regulations about terminating existing licenses to make room for war victims in Brandeis and Zobel, *Gesetzgebung für Kriegsbeschädigte*, 405–419.

91. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1434 Folder 11104/1925, "Tabakverschleißgeschäfte f. Kriegsoffer" 15148/1925.

92. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1367 22894/1919. The Invalid Compensation Commissions replied that they were not bending the rules. Hiring private physicians was necessary, because all available state doctors had been mobilized to examine disabled veterans as required by the new law.

93. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1371 26884/1919, 6977/1920.

94. The largest three Provincial Associations were in Vienna (a membership of 43,782 disabled veterans and 27,771 surviving dependents, with 116,104 associated orphans and children); Lower Austria (29,505 disabled veterans and 17,292 surviving dependents, with 77,313 associated orphans and children), and Styria (20,775 disabled veterans and 9,059 surviving dependents). ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1395 5098/1922.

95. Statistische Zentralkommission, ed., *Statistisches Handbuch für die Republik Österreich I. Jahrgang*, 73; Bundesamt für Statistik, ed., *Statistisches Handbuch für die Republik Österreich II. Jahrgang*, 125.

96. On inflation and hyperinflation in post-World War I Austria, see Suppanz, “Die österreichische Inflation”; März, *Austrian Banking*, 383–514; Marcus, *Austrian Reconstruction*, Part 1.

97. Shrinking the civil administration had been under discussion since 1919. See ÖStA AdR BKA/Inneres Varia Verwaltungsreform Material K8122b Konvolut 2 “Verwaltungsreform”; K8127 Konvolut 18–20, esp. 2. Folder “Beamtenabbau”. On the Geneva protocols, see Swanson, *The Remnants of the Habsburg Monarchy*, 283–309; Marcus, *Austrian Reconstruction*, 78–112.

98. ÖStA AdR BKA MRP 1920–1922 Nr. 211 14 July 1922.

99. The full title of the executive directive is Vollzugsanweisung des Staatsamt für soziale Verwaltung im Einvernehmen mit den beteiligten Staatsämtern vom 20. Dezember 1919, betreffend die Errichtung einer ständigen Invalidenfürsorgekommission im Staatsamte für soziale Verwaltung.

100. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1401 17493/1922.

101. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1403 Folder 19729/1922 2809/1922, 4394/1922.

102. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1403 Folder 19729/1922 5414/1922.

103. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1403 Folder 19729/1922 10413/1922.

104. The full title of the Seventh Revision is Bundesgesetz vom 7. Juli 1922, womit einige Bestimmungen des Gesetzes vom 25. April 1919, StGBI. Nr. 245 (Invalidenentschädigungsgesetz), des Gesetzes vom 23. Juni 1921, B.G.Bl. Nr. 345, und des Gesetzes vom 18. November 1921, BGBl. Nr. 641, abgeändert und ergänzt werden (VII. Novelle zum Invalidenentschädigungsgesetz).

105. Bundesamt für Statistik, ed., *Statistisches Handbuch für den Bundesstaat Österreich XVII. Jahrgang*, 208.

106. The Social Ministry in early 1924 claimed that there were 152,486 veterans over 15 percent disabled, and 74,463 over 35 percent disabled. These numbers suggest that more than half of the eligible men were probably involuntarily bought out after the Seventh Revision. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1420 345/1924.

107. For example, the national construction trades organization petitioned to have its members pay the equalization tax—and at a low rate—instead of hiring disabled veterans. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1378 30032/1920. The leading steel and iron production conglomerate, Österreichisch-Alpine Montangesellschaft, also protested. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1572 SA 146 (Invalidenbeschäftigungsgesetz) 17805/1921.

108. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1401 15677/1922.

109. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1401 16057/1922.

110. For the broader League of Nations–enforced austerity measures, see Marcus, *Austrian Reconstruction*, 143–222.

111. Deak, “Dismantling Empire,” 135–137. Deak found a source claiming that the initial target of reduction (*Beamtenabbau*) was nearly 200,000 (140, note 42). See also Heindl, “Bürokratie und Beamte,” 98–102.

112. The Vienna Commission’s urgent need to handle the applications was met by hiring almost exclusively war victims as extra clerks. Fahringer, Büsch, and Liebl, *Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge*, 61. The request to do so in Styria is in ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1371 7940/1920.

113. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1368 30106/1919.

114. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1368 30618/1919.

115. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1376 22047/1920.

116. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1375 21429/1920.

117. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1378 31481/1920.

118. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1425 26908/1922 in Folder 15215/1924.

119. Unfortunately, the Social Ministry, conceivably the agency with the largest disabled veteran contingents on its staff, did not report its own statistics in this investigation. The Interior Ministry’s original report was returned to the federal chancellor’s office, and the duplicate copy is missing. Not counting these two ministries’ staff, there were 8,347 disabled veterans (or equivalent) officials and employees in federal agencies, offices, and enterprises; 6,391 of them were permanently employed or tenured, 1,554 of them were in the process of becoming so. There were 143,276 non-war victim federal officials and official-aspirants (not including career soldiers) in these agencies, offices, and enterprises as of October 1922. My tabulation is based on ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1425 4912/1923, 31999/1922, 31994/1922, 31448/1922, 30947/1922, 29786/1922, 29144/1922, 29379/1922, 2762/1923, 42865/1922, 39587/1922, 38149/1922, 37968/1922, 37971/1922, 28725/1922, 8181/1923, 14614/1923, 15215/1924, 19071/1924, all in Folder 15215/1924.

120. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1380 1187/1921.

121. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1376 23676/1920.

122. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1376 26007/1920.

123. Kienböck, *Das österreichische Sanierungswerk*, 55.

124. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1411 11363/1923.

125. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1403 19129/1922.

126. ÖStA AdR BMfsV Präs SWR K3 Gr. 32/25 4352/1924.

127. Bundestamt für Statistik, ed., *Statistisches Handbuch für den Bundesstaat Österreich XVII. Jahrgang*, 208. Starting with 1923, beneficiary statistics are quite detailed and sufficiently reliable. In January–February 1924 the Social Ministry was confident enough to share the numbers with the American Embassy in Vienna, which inquired on behalf of the U.S. Bureau of Veterans. ÖStA AdR BMfsV KBF K1420 345/1924. For a table comparing the annual number of war victim welfare beneficiaries in Austria and in Czechoslovakia between 1923 and 1935 (in each of the following categories: disabled

veterans, war widows, orphans, and other dependents), see Grebler and Winkler, *The Cost of the World War*, 136. In Austria the peak year was 1924, with 193,935 total benefit recipients (in terms of disabled veterans alone, the peak year was 1935, with 58,794 recipients); in Czechoslovakia, it was 1923, with 588,280 recipients (the peak year for disabled veterans was also 1923, 155,588).

128. ÖStA AdR BMfSV KBF K1410 130, 135, 341, 1261, 1653, 1654, 1957, 1958, 1960, 2043, 2208, 2222, 2223, 2939, 3265, 4526, 5029, 5037, 5360/1923. See also ÖStA AdR BMfSV Präs SWR K3.

129. See, for example, the Carinthian Invalid Compensation Commission's 1925 opposition to drastic layoffs on workload grounds, ÖStA AdR BMfSV Präs SWR K3 Gr. 2435/25 338/45-1925; and Gr. 52/25 1784/1925, the petition from the Styrian Landesverband. SWR K3 and K4 contain a large number of documents stemming from the continuing "civil servant reduction" program in 1924 and 1925, when the Invalid Compensation Commissions themselves were targeted for personnel cuts and restructuring.

130. Its executive directive was dated 24 December 1924, *BGBL.* 449/1924.

131. Fahringer, Büsch, and Liebl, *Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge*, 60–68. For other major changes introduced by the Eighth Revision as well as the Revisions to the Invalid Compensation Law between 1920 and 1934 (thirteen in total), see the short summary in Kubat, "Die Invalidenentschädigung," 18.

132. Around the same time, German pensioners demanded more codetermination rights in the Weimar welfare system; see Crew, *Germans on Welfare*, 99–104.

133. Austrian judges were career civil servants. Giving them more power to adjudicate benefit disputes was to greatly diminish the codetermination practices. On the larger political implications of the 1922–1925 reforms, especially the politicization (by parties on the right) of the state administration, see Deak, "Dismantling Empire."

Conclusion

1. France was the first major belligerent to adopt a new comprehensive law about war victims' rights and benefits. The law of 31 March 1919 elevated disabled men (and veterans in general) who had served the nation in its emergency to a distinct status group that enjoyed special rights and honor. Disabled men's benefits were not measured by the percentage loss of earning power in their prewar occupations but according to a uniform standard of loss applied to individuals as members of the nation-in-arms. Prewar income and social status were not the determining criteria. This made the French system unique. Geyer, "Ein Vorbote des Wohlfahrtsstaates," 237–241. The Austrian Republic was only the first among the "losers" of the Great War and the successor states in Central Europe to have a new legislation. The Russian Bolsheviks' war victim welfare promises also predated the Austrian law, but provisions existed mostly only on paper. There were even significant cuts to tsarist-era benefits based on the recipient's class status. Hoffmann, *Cultivating the Masses*, 49–63.

2. For a comprehensive list, see Göhring and Pellar, *Ferdinand Hanusch*, 204.
3. The Social Democrats' traditionally close ties to organized labor probably helped. Preferential employment of disabled veterans was always controversial among employers. But it also had the potential to antagonize trade unions, as in the Australian case. Garton, *The Cost of War*, 89–91. Without vocal opposition from organized labor, Austria was able to introduce employment quotas for disabled veterans through the Invalid Employment Law of 1920.
4. ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K4860 23886/1919, Polizeidirektion Wien an das Staatsamt für Inneres, "Ungarische Gesandtschaft; Einflussnahme auf die Gestaltung der innerpolitischen Situation in Deutschösterreich." Schober later served as federal chancellor in three interwar Austrian governments and was the founding president of Interpol.
5. Hans Hautmann argues that it would be "too simplistic" to see the April 1919 incidents only as Communist putsch attempts in his *Geschichte der Rätebewegung*, 317.
6. In the 1919/1920 national budget (with addenda before May 1920), the expenditure for war victim welfare totaled 424.823 million kronen and constituted more than 92 percent of the Social Ministry's 1919/1920 budget. But that was not all that the Austrian Republic paid to or for war victims. The categories listed under "war welfare measures" cost a total of 7,675.833 million kronen and contained subcategories that also benefited war victims: living allowances (continuing payments as a stopgap measure) cost 214.5 million kronen, and "subsistence relief (*Erleichterung der Lebensführung*)" cost an astronomical sum of 3,966.331 million kronen (more than 23 percent of the total state outlay and the most costly budgetary item for the fiscal year 1919/1920). "XIX. Finanzwesen. A. Staatsvoranschlag für das Verwaltungsjahr 1919/20. 1. Hauptübersicht über Erfordernis und Bedeckung," in Statistische Zentralkommission, ed., *Statistisches Handbuch für die Republik Österreich*, 73.
7. On the Communists' recruitment efforts during the first half of 1919, see ÖStA AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 15/3 K2435 14577/1919, 14856/1919, 16820/1919, 19044/1919, 21102/1919, 25243/1919; AdR BKA/allgem. Inneres 22 K5066 7417/1919, 13456/1919.
8. The Constitution of 1920 formalized this attitude and declared war victim welfare to be a "federal matter (*Bundessache*)." *StGBL*.450/1920, Gesetz vom 1. Oktober 1920, womit die Republik Österreich als Bundesstaat eingerichtet wird (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz), §10, section 15.
9. This particular formulation originated from the Allies' Moscow Declaration of 1943. On the broader issue of the victim myth in Austria, see Uhl, "Das 'erste Opfer.'"
10. The Disabled Persons Placement Law (Behinderteneinstellungsgesetz) currently in effect, an updated version of the Invalid Placement Law of 1969 (*BGBL*. 22/1970), retains much of the basic design of the 1920 law.
11. On the wave of social legislation in the 1880s, see Jenks, *Austria under the Iron Ring*, 196–220; Ebert, *Die Anfänge der modernen Sozialpolitik*, 250–256; Tólos, *Staatliche Sozialpolitik*, 41–48; Hofmeister, "Austria," 278–281, 288–294; Grandner, "Conservative Social Politics"; Boyer, *Austria, 1867–1955*, ch. 4.

12. For example, Tálos, *Staatliche Sozialpolitik*, 78.

13. An explicitly biopolitical approach would likely favor certain structural but narrowly focused themes, such as the institutionalization of the influence of specific professions and scientific/medical theories. These are not the most effective way to grasp the contingent nature of the key developments this book highlights.

14. Ignaz Seipel also played up this threat in his quest for an international bailout of Austria in 1922. Klemperer, *Ignaz Seipel*, 179–207; Deak, “Dismantling Empire,” 133–135.

15. For the latest view on the impact of hyperinflation and the ensuing international bailout on Austrian politics, see Marcus, *Austrian Reconstruction*. On the League of Nations’ critical influence on interwar Central Europe, see Becker and Wheatley, eds., *Remaking Central Europe*, and Wheatley, “Central Europe as Ground Zero.”

16. Maximilian Brandeis, “Zehn Jahre Organisation—Zehn Jahre Republik,” *DI*, November 1928, 1.

17. On war victims’ presence in the putsches, see Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik*, 45–70. He reported that of the ca. 3,000 demonstrators on 17 April, there were around 800 disabled veterans and returning soldiers.

18. Der Zentralverband, “Unser I. Verbandstag;” “Generalversammlung der Ortsgruppe und Bezirksstelle Gmunden,” *DI*, 15 June 1919, 6. A sign of success: the Zentralverband had to defend its own cooperative approach. It criticized the radical Left for using war victims only as a means to ulterior ends. Hunold, “Invalide als Mittel zum Zweck,” 1–2.

19. See, for example, the case of Waidhofen a.d. Ybbs in Karl Burger, “Keine Lebensmittel für Kriegsbeschädigte, aber Ueberfluß für Kriegsgewinner und Preistreiber,” *DI*, 1 July 1919, 1–2. Burger’s account portrayed organized war victims in alliance with the republican state fighting against an alliance between local community leaders (and district commissioners) and alleged war profiteers.

20. “Deutschösterreichs Tod,” 1. As discussed in chapter 7, they blamed the Entente Powers for the dim future of the Republic.

21. His tenure as social minister is discussed in Steiner, *Sozialversicherung*.

22. For the “poorest of the poor” self-identification, see for example B., “Das neue Militärversorgungsgesetz,” *DI*, 1 April 1919, 1–2.

23. From the Social Democrat side, *Was bekommen die Kriegsinvaliden und ihre Familien von der Republik Deutschösterreich?*, and *Was bekommen die Kriegerwitwen, die Kriegerwaisen und andere Kriegerhinterbliebenen von der Republik Deutschösterreich?* From the Christian Social side, see Resch, *Die Versorgung der Kriegsinvaliden*. The two milieu parties also boasted about their contributions to the improvement in war victim welfare in their respective self-produced “report cards” for their public. Verband der sozialdemokratischen Abgeordneten zur Deutschösterreichischen Nationalversammlung, ed., *Die Tätigkeit des Verbandes der sozialdemokratischen Abgeordneten*, 37–41; and Gimpl, *Christlichsoziale Arbeit*, 73–76.

24. For its 1924 membership figures, see ÖStA AdR BMfS V KBF K 1426 24063/1924. Drexel also authored a pamphlet on the two main war victim welfare laws after their

respective revisions in 1926 and 1927. See Drexel, *Invaliden-entschädigungsgesetz . . . Mit Erläuterungen von Prof. Dr. Karl Drexel*.

25. Some called him “the Angel of Siberia.” He wrote a memoir, *Feldkurat in Sibirien*, and was an advocate for the pacifist cause. Drexel, *Friede oder Krieg!*

26. KvVI CSP Parlamentsklub K 22 Klubsitzung, 20 December 1926, Protokolle.

27. These words came from Franz Spalowsky, a Christian Social trade union leader and parliamentary deputy. KvVI CSP Parlamentsklub K 22 Klubsitzung, 3 February 1927, Protokolle.

28. KvVI CSP Parlamentsklub K 22 Klubsitzung 21 April 1926, Protokolle.

29. The title of Günther Steinbach’s more popularly oriented history of the First Republic, *Kanzler, Krisen, Katastrophen*, encapsulates this dominant frame of analysis and narration. The gloom-and-doom narrative of the First Republic justifies the post-1945 grand coalition regime by presuming that the lessons from the interwar years had been learned and the “right path” was taken by the Second Republic’s two leading milieu parties and their leaders.

30. Pfoser and Weigl, *Die erste Stunde Null*, is a good recent attempt to put the early First Republic in a more positive light. The title, “The First Zero Hour,” calls for rethinking the entire narrative of the post-Habsburg Austrian history.

31. The First Republic has often been remembered as “the state that no one wanted.” This description was made famous by Andics, *Der Staat, den keiner wollte*. The venerated Swiss daily *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* still uses this moniker to name its special series on the centenary of the founding of the Austrian Republic. See <https://www.nzz.ch/podium-dossiers/der-staat-den-keiner-wollte-hundert-jahre-oesterreich> (accessed 5 November 2021).

32. The classic account of corporatist stabilization is Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*.

33. For a recent reflection on the rise and decline of the Austrian “social partnership,” see Tálos and Hinterseer, *Sozialpartnerschaft*. On the evolution of the post-1945 Austrian welfare state in this corporatist context, see Tálos and Obinger, *Sozialstaat Österreich*.

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Abbreviations

§	Article (of law)
AOK	Armeeoberkommando
AdR	Archiv der Republik
AVA	Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv
<i>BGBL.</i>	<i>Bundesgesetzblatt</i>
BKA	Bundeskanzleramt
BMfsV	Bundesministerium für soziale Verwaltung
Ca	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
<i>GKKOH</i>	<i>Die Gebühren des Kaiserl. Königl. Oesterreichischen Heeres an Geld, Naturalien, und Service</i> (ed. Wenzel Pokorny)
<i>DI</i>	<i>Der Invalide</i>
HR	Hauptreihe
HHStA	Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv
K	Karton (carton)
KA	Kriegsarchiv
KBF	Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge
KFA	Kriegsfürsorgeamt
KFF	Kaiser und König Karl Kriegsfürsorgefonds
KM	Kriegsministerium
MdI	Minsiterium des Innern
MKSM	Militärkanzlei Seiner k.u.k. Apostolischen Majestät
MRP	Ministerratsprotokoll
<i>NZdK</i>	<i>Nachrichten des Zentralverbandes der deutschösterreichischen Kriegsbeschädigten</i>
Präs	Präsidium
ÖStA	Österreichisches Staatsarchiv
<i>RGBL.</i>	<i>Reichsgesetzblatt</i>
SB	Sonderbestand
<i>SPHA</i>	<i>Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten</i>
<i>SPHH</i>	<i>Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Herrenhauses</i>

SPKN	<i>Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen der Konstituierenden Nationalversammlung für Deutschösterreich</i>
SPNR	<i>Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich</i>
SPPN	<i>Stenographische Protokolle der Provisorischen Nationalversammlung für Deutschösterreich</i>
SR	Sonderreihe
StGBL.	<i>Staatsgesetzblatt</i>
StRP	Staatsratsprotokoll
SWR	Schlagwörterreihe
TLA	Tiroler Landesarchiv
VGA	Verein für Geschichte der ArbeiterInnenbewegung
WBR	Wienbibliothek im Rathaus
ZSt	Zentralstelle

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 - Minsiterium des Innern
 - Kaiser und König Karl Kriegsfürsorgefonds
- Archiv der Republik
 - Bundeskanzleramt
 - Staatskanzlei-Bundeskanzleramt/alt Kriegsgeschädigtenfonds
 - Staatsratsprotokolle, Kabinettsratsprotokolle, Ministerratsprotokolle (1920–1924)
 - Bundeskanzleramt-allgemeines Inneres
 - 15/3 Volksversammlungen, Aufmärsche
 - 22 Übertretungen, Excesse
 - Varia
 - Verwaltungsreform Material
 - Bundesministerium für soziale Verwaltung
 - Kriegsbeschädigtenfürsorge
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