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FRANCO'S INTERNATIONALISTS

SOCIAL EXPERTS AND SPAIN'S SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY

DAVID BRYDAN

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

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List of Abbreviations

ACNP	National Catholic Association of Propagandists (Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas)
AHG	Hispano-German Association (Asociación Hispano-Germana)
ASA	American Social Aid (Ayuda Social Americana)
CCTA	Combined Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara
CEDI	European Centre for Documentation and Information (Centro Europeo de Documentación e Información)
CICIAMS	International Catholic Committee of Nurses and Medico-Social Assistants (Comité International Catholique des Infirmières et Assistantes Médico-Sociales)
CIPETA	Interministerial Commission for the Dispatch of Workers to Germany (Comisión Interministerial para el Envío de Trabajadores a Alemania)
CSIC	Spanish National Research Council (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas)
DIAA	German-Ibero-American Medical Academy (Deutsch-Ibero-Amerikanischen Ärzteakademie)
DSG	German-Spanish Society (Deutsch-Spanische Gesellschaft)
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
EEC	European Economic Community
ICH	Institute of Hispanic Culture (Instituto de Cultura Hispánica)
ICN	International Council of Nurses
ICO	international Catholic organization
ILO	International Labour Organization
INP	National Welfare Institute (Instituto Nacional de Previsión)
JAE	Council for the Extension of Studies and Scientific Research (Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios)
LNHO	League of Nations Health Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCWC	National Catholic Welfare Conference
NGO	non-governmental organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OIHP	International Office of Public Hygiene (Office International d'Hygiène Publique)
OISS	Ibero-American Organization of Social Security (Organización Ibero-Americana de Seguridad Social)
SOE	Compulsory Sickness Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Enfermedad)
TPC	WHO Technical Preparatory Committee
UK	United Kingdom

UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Soviet Union
WHO	World Health Organization

Introduction

In May 1951, Francisco Franco attended an international social security congress in Madrid. In the audience were experts and officials from across Spain, Latin America, and western Europe, including ministers from various foreign governments and representatives from international bodies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO). Addressing the conference, Franco told delegates that two factors had come to dominate modern politics. 'One is the social factor,' he declared, 'which has imprinted its character on our entire era.' Despite the devastation caused by the civil war, Franco argued, Spain had come to define itself as a 'social state', one in which 'all of the nation's resources' were dedicated to improving social conditions. The 'New State' established after the Spanish Civil War was underpinned by the labour laws, sickness insurance, infant health provision, and housing programmes the regime had introduced. In this regard Spain was at the forefront of developments which defined the modern world. Whereas in the past many states, particularly liberal democracies, had ignored the social needs of the people, today 'all politics is becoming social'.[1]

The second, related factor was 'the relations between peoples, which, breaching the walls of the old borders, unite us in our fears, in our sorrows, or in our wellbeing'.[2] In an age of increasing global integration and interdependence, Franco argued, poor social conditions in one country could prevent the pursuit of social progress in another. And many of the challenges facing the modern world stemmed from the vast differences in living standards between rich and poor states. Countries now needed to work together to ensure all of humankind enjoyed basic levels of social security. Spain, Franco stressed, was committed to international cooperation. Its own pursuit of social justice meant it was ready to show the rest of the world the way forward. For Franco and his regime, social development and international cooperation were two sides of the same coin.

The regime had come to power during the civil war of 1936–9, sparked by an army-led *coup d'état* against the democratic institutions of the Second Republic which had been formed just five years earlier. Franco had consolidated his personal rule over the course of the civil war, and by the time of his speech in

[1] Francisco Franco, *Discursos y mensajes del Jefe del Estado, 1951–1954* (Madrid: Dirección General de Información, 1955), 62–6.

[2] Ibid.

1951 had ruled unopposed as Spain's *Caudillo* and head of state for over a decade. Although the speech extolled the 'titanic efforts made over the last ten years to achieve social development and social security in our country', Francoist rule had in reality been characterized by repression, violence, hunger, and social hardship.

But social policy and the idea of the Francoist 'social state' were central to the regime's attempts to 'capture the masses', as the historian Carme Molinero has argued, both a political reference point and a vital propaganda tool.[3] The language of the social state had emerged from the civil war as a response to the democratic and social reforms of the Republican government. Health and welfare services were presented as symbols of the regime's commitment to social justice, an attempt to gain the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the Spanish working classes. This vision had been promoted by specific elements within the Francoist coalition. Franco had forced the various factions of the rebel coalition to unite during the civil war, carefully managing their competing interests and influence thereafter. Of those factions, Spanish monarchists and army officers had traditionally been little interested in, and in many cases actively opposed to, social reform. Sections of the Church and certain Catholic political groups had for their part flirted with the doctrines of social Catholicism prior to the war, while others had remained indifferent or hostile. But it was the Spanish fascist party, the Falange, which initially led the way in promoting the language of social justice, influenced in part by the social model of interwar European fascism, particularly in Mussolini's Italy. Despite the shared terminology, theirs was a vision of social justice developed in opposition to socialist and liberal reform movements of the era, emphasizing hierarchy, traditionalist religious and moral values, and the biological strength of the nation, and eschewing all liberalizing social reforms or independent working-class organization. After the civil war, the language, if not the practice, of social justice was adopted by all factions within the regime and became institutionalized within the Francoist state.

If the idea of the social state was aimed at capturing the support of the masses, this study argues that it was also used to capture the support of the world. As Franco's speech at the 1951 conference suggested, the regime placed the language of the social state at the heart of its ongoing quest for international status and legitimacy. Rebel victory during the civil war had been due in large part to the non-intervention of the democratic western powers and to the military support of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, which had dwarfed the aid for the Republic coming from the Soviet Union and the International Brigades. Just months after the end of the Spanish conflict, the Second World War had broken out. During the geopolitical instability of the 1940s and 1950s, the Francoist state confronted a shifting ideological environment and an often hostile international system.

[3] Carme Molinero, *La captación de las masas: política social y propaganda en el régimen franquista* (Madrid: Cátedra, 2005).

It constantly struggled to assert itself on the international stage over the course of Second World War, the defeat of the Axis powers, the construction of the post-war international system, and the arrival of the Cold War. In the face of those who denounced the regime as a hostile and backwards remnant of interwar fascism after 1945, Francoist diplomats and elites sought to project an image of a country committed to social progress on the one hand, and to international cooperation on the other.

Spanish social experts were at the forefront of efforts to promote the regime to the outside world, particularly those working in the fields of public health, medicine, and social insurance like those at the Madrid conference in 1951. A wide range of experts holding academic and government positions under the Franco regime worked actively on the international stage throughout the 1940s and 1950s. They travelled the world attending international conferences and events, collaborated with colleagues abroad, and both contributed to and drew on the work of international organizations. In part, they were driven by a professional commitment to international science, medicine, and social policy. But they were also, in the words of the leading Spanish medical researcher Carlos Jiménez Díaz, 'Spaniards and patriots', eager to re-establish Spain's international reputation by representing the country to the outside world.[4] By working with international organizations and transnational networks, they sought to sell the idea of Franco's Spain as a respectable, modern, and socially just state.

This book tells the story of the experts who sold Franco's social state; their motivations, their strategies, and their successes and failures. They pursued their goal in two ways. The first was to adapt to the world as it presented itself, to the shifting reality of the international order. In the immediate aftermath of Franco's victory in 1939 this meant the Axis powers and the Nazi-fascist 'New Order'. This was in many ways a comfortable fit for a regime which owed its victory in the civil war to the support of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, and whose political and ideological origins lay in the authoritarian European right of the 1930s. But after 1945 Spanish experts were forced to adapt to the post-war international system built around the United Nations (UN).

The second approach was to forge new international networks, affiliations, and imagined communities more closely aligned with Spanish history, politics, and culture, structures in which Spain would be at the centre rather than the periphery. Many of these structures were built around Spain's imperial status, both its limited colonial territories in Africa and its imperial history in Latin America which was so central to the identity and self-perception of the Franco regime. It was for this reason that the 1940s and 1950s witnessed a sustained interest in Spanish Africa and Spain's status as one of the remaining European imperial

[4] M. Jiménez Casado, *Doctor Jiménez Díaz, vida y obra: la persecución de un sueño* (Madrid: Fundación Conchita Rábago de Jiménez Díaz, 1993), 296.

powers, and in the idea of an Ibero-American region united under Spanish tutelage by the historical, cultural, and linguistic ties of *hispanidad*. But it also saw increasing interest in new forms of international Catholic cooperation in which Spain, as the most Catholic of nations led by the most Catholic of regimes, could play a prominent role. In some cases, these experts had a clear impact on Spain's international standing; in others, their efforts met with opposition or ended in failure. But they were all central to the ongoing pursuit of international legitimacy which characterized the first two decades of the Franco regime.

Exploring the activities of these experts helps to shed new light on the relationship between Franco's Spain and the outside world. It also, however, provides a new perspective on the wider history of twentieth-century internationalism. The social and scientific projects these experts were involved with, and the international organizations and networks they worked within, form a familiar part of historical accounts of modern internationalism. Spanish experts worked with international organizations in Geneva, Paris, and New York, travelled the world to attend international conferences, and were involved in intensive exchange and cooperation with colleagues across the globe. Events such as the 1951 social security conference in Madrid, with their cast of international experts and officials, their discussion of social policy, and their familiar paraphernalia of flags, exhibitions, and social events, were characteristic of this kind of mid-twentieth-century internationalism. The system in which they operated had been shaped by the increasing transnational ties between experts, officials, and humanitarians which emerged from the mid-nineteenth century, and by the twentieth-century formation of international organizations such as the League of Nations and the UN. They formed part of a history which we generally associate with progressive causes, social and scientific development, and liberal internationalist principles.

But Spanish experts were not solely driven by a commitment to international science and humanitarianism. In a context in which many supporters of the defeated Republic had been purged from the Francoist social and scientific system, or had fled into exile after the civil war, those experts who rose to senior positions had to demonstrate their adherence to the principles of the Francoist New State.[5] On the international stage, these experts acted in the interests of Spain's authoritarian government, helping to strengthen ties with its fascist allies, buttressing its imperial and post-imperial pretensions, and whitewashing its record of domestic repression. They were internationalists, but they were Franco's internationalists.

By examining the way elites within an authoritarian nationalist regime thought and acted internationally, this book highlights the contested and heterogeneous nature of mid-twentieth-century internationalism. The Franco regime provides a

[5] Luis Enrique Otero Carvajal (ed.), *La destrucción de la ciencia en España: depuración universitaria en el franquismo* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 2006); Josep Lluís Barona (ed.), *El exilio científico republicano* (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2010).

unique perspective from which to examine this history, not least because of its longevity. Emerging from the milieu of European authoritarian movements in the 1930s, it built close ties with the Axis powers during the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War, survived the transition to a liberal world order after 1945, continued to promote itself as an imperial power, and exploited the divisions of the Cold War to re-establish itself as a semi-integrated member of the international community. As such it allows us to examine not just individual international organizations or movements, or particular moments of international cooperation, but the interaction and relationship between the multiple and competing *internationalisms* which transcended the period.[6] In particular, the case of Spain brings into focus the overlooked continuities between international structures and projects before and after 1945.

Franco's Spain

Spain's international relations in the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War were both uncertain and unstable, and the early decades of the regime have often been depicted as a period of isolation.[7] During the early stages of the Second World War, Spain was broadly aligned with the Axis powers, officially declaring itself 'non-belligerent' (rather than neutral) in 1940. But Franco's offer to formally join the Axis military coalition was rejected by Hitler, who was unwilling to meet Spain's economic and territorial demands. As the tide of war turned the regime increasingly distanced itself from the Axis, without ever fully being accepted by the Allied powers.[8] This distrust lingered into the post-war period. The Franco regime's ties to the defeated Axis powers meant that it was excluded from the UN in 1945 and faced a widespread diplomatic boycott.[9] On the economic front, the regime's pursuit of autarky and import substitution cut Spain off from

[6] Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (eds), *Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). For a work which adopts a similar approach from the perspective of Japan, see Jessamyn Abel, *The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan's Global Engagement, 1933–1964* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015).

[7] General works on the international history of Franco's Spain include Christian Leitz and David J. Dunthorn (eds), *Spain in an International Context, 1936–1959* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1999); Javier Tussell, Juan Avilés, and Rosa Pardo (eds), *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2000); Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, and Rosa Pardo Sanz (eds), *La apertura internacional de España: entre el franquismo y la democracia, 1953–1986* (Madrid: Silex, 2016).

[8] Wayne H. Bowen, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany: Collaboration in the New Order* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2000); Stanley G. Payne, *Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); David Wingate Pike, *Franco and the Axis Stigma* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

[9] Florentino Portero, *Franco aislado: la cuestión española, 1945–1950* (Madrid: Aguilar, 1989); Irene Sánchez González, *Diez años de soledad: España, la ONU y la dictadura franquista, 1945–1955* (Seville: Editorial Universidad de Sevilla, 2015).

international capital flows and, combined with its post-war exclusion from the Marshall Plan, meant that it did not share in the rapid economic recovery experienced by most of its European neighbours from the late 1940s.[10] Michael Richards has argued that the pursuit of autarky was part of a wider attempt to impose a form of self-sufficiency and violent social quarantine on Spanish society, and that this isolation formed a vital part of the regime's post-war repression.[11]

Over the course of the 1950s, Spain began to be partially integrated into the post-war international system. The emergence of the Cold War allowed Franco to shift attention away from the regime's fascist past towards its anti-communist credentials, and the opposition of the western democracies quickly began to weaken. Spain initially sought access to the UN system through membership of its specialized agencies, joining the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1951 and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1952. In 1953, it signed a concordat with the Vatican and the Pact of Madrid with the United States (US), through which the US agreed to provide military and economic aid in return for permission to build air and naval bases on Spanish territory.[12] Thanks to its improved diplomatic fortunes, Spain was granted full membership of the UN in 1955. This was followed later in the decade by membership of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.[13] Despite some liberalization of the economy, the regime remained formally committed to autarky during the first half of the 1950s. It was not until the promotion of a new generation of technocrats linked to the Catholic group Opus Dei from 1957 that large-scale reforms were implemented. These culminated in the Stabilization Plan of 1959 which liberalized foreign trade and opened up the Spanish economy to foreign investment.[14] Closer integration into the world economy followed, alongside improved diplomatic relations. But opposition from its western European neighbours meant that Spain remained outside of the European Economic Community (EEC) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) until after the transition to democracy which took place following Franco's death in 1975.

Various studies have claimed that the 'internationalization' or 'transnationalization' of Spain began either with the transition to democracy or at the earliest

[10] Carlos Barciela (ed.), *Autarquía y mercado negro: el fracaso económico del primer franquismo, 1939–1959* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003); Glicerio Sánchez Recio and Luis Julio Tascón Fernández, *Los empresarios de Franco: política y economía en España, 1936–1957* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003).

[11] Michael Richards, *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[12] Ángel Viñas, *En las garras del águila: los pactos con Estados Unidos de Francisco Franco a Felipe González, 1945–1995* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003).

[13] Manuel Varela Parache (ed.), *El Fondo Monetario Internacional, el Banco Mundial y la economía española* (Madrid: Ediciones Pirámide, 1994).

[14] María Elena Cavallaro, *Los orígenes de la integración de España en Europa: desde el franquismo hasta los años de la transición* (Madrid: Silez, 2009); Jesús M. Zaratiegui, *Una Europa para dos Españas: primeros pasos hacia la integración, 1957–1963* (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2010).

with the economic and foreign policy reforms of the late 1950s.[15] But rather than turning its back on the outside world during the 1940s and 1950s, this book argues that the Franco regime and its supporters were engaged in a constant struggle to establish Spain's international legitimacy and status. Although the mass of the Spanish population were indeed subject to a degree of social and cultural isolation, many among the Francoist elites actively sought to strengthen the country's international influence. They did so in a context in which Spain continued to build strong diplomatic ties with key partners such as Perón's Argentina and the Arab states, maintained a significant degree of economic exchange with its European neighbours, and was increasingly influenced by the early stages of mass emigration and tourism.[16] Social experts were at the forefront of this exchange with the outside world, and their extensive international activities highlight the limits of the idea of Spanish isolation.

On the domestic front, social justice was far from the priority the regime claimed it to be. At the end of the civil war in 1939, Franco had rejected all possibility of social or political reconciliation. Over the following decade, hundreds of thousands of former Republicans were imprisoned and up to 20,000 executed, in addition to the more than 100,000 estimated to have been killed outside of the field of battle during the war itself.[17] The vast majority were convicted by arbitrary, partisan, and unaccountable military tribunals, with little or no recourse to regular juridical safeguards. Others who could not prove their loyalty to the new regime were purged from their jobs, persecuted by the police and local authorities, and denied access to social services. The Spanish economy was crippled by the regime's pursuit of autarky, combined with the economic and physical dislocation caused by both the civil war and the Second World War. Scarce supplies of food and basic resources were funnelled towards the regime's supporters or were siphoned off into the black market by corrupt officials. The 'hunger years' of 1939–45 saw an estimated 200,000 deaths from starvation and malnutrition.[18] Thousands of landless rural workers fled the hunger of the

[15] See for example Otto Holman, *Integrating Southern Europe: EC Expansion and the Transnationalization of Spain* (London: Routledge, 1996); Nigel Townson, *Spain Transformed: The Franco Dictatorship, 1959–1975* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 3; Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla et al., *La apertura internacional de España*.

[16] Raanan Rein, *The Franco-Perón Alliance: Relations between Spain and Argentina, 1946–1955* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993); Fernando Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57: Challenge and Response* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Sasha D. Pack, *Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe's Peaceful Invasion of Franco's Spain* (London: Palgrave, 2006).

[17] Paul Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain* (London: Harper Press, 2012). There is a large and growing literature on repression and violence during the civil war and its aftermath, including Javier Rodrigo, *Hasta la raíz: violencia durante la Guerra Civil y la dictadura franquista* (Madrid: Alianza, 2008); Peter Anderson, *The Francoist Military Trials: Terror and Complicity, 1939–1945* (London: Routledge, 2010); Julius Ruiz, *El terror rojo* (Madrid: Espasa, 2012).

[18] Richards, *A Time of Silence*, 11. On social conditions under the Franco regime, see Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, *Fear and Progress: Ordinary Lives in Franco's Spain, 1939–1975* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

countryside by migrating to urban areas, settling in unsanitary and unplanned shanty towns on the outskirts of the major cities. The Franco regime did little to improve general living standards and social spending remained far below, for example, resources dedicated to the military.

Nevertheless, the idea of the 'social state' played a key role in the domestic and international history of the regime. The Francoist emphasis on social justice had first been institutionalized in the 1938 labour code, the *Fuero del Trabajo*, which was promoted by the Falange and which echoed many of the features of Italy's fascist labour laws. The Falange was Spain's native fascist party, originally a relatively small group which had grown exponentially at the beginning of the civil war, before being incorporated into the new single party established by Franco in 1937. The language of social justice was key to its workerist message and its claim to offer the Spanish working classes an alternative to socialism, communism, and anarchism. The *Fuero* established a system of vertical syndicates which abolished trade unions, and which integrated workers into syndical structures dominated by employers and the single party. In return for complying with their duty to work and contribute to the national interest, workers were promised a system of social security protecting their families from the effects of illness, old age, and unemployment. New subsidies for large families were introduced after 1939, alongside an old-age insurance system, a major new compulsory sickness insurance system, and a series of new initiatives covering housing, unemployment insurance, and infant and maternal health.[19]

The regime's social services, however, were plagued by underfunding, inefficiency, and political infighting. Most social programmes were funded by workers' and employers' contributions, with little or no direct subsidy from the state. This meant that services were underfunded and the real value of benefits was quickly undermined by inflation. Workers resented being forced to contribute a fixed proportion of their already meagre wages to programmes which provided them with poor coverage. The new social programmes were also implemented in a rushed manner and hampered by poor collaboration between the multiple providers involved. Political infighting helped create a social system plagued by duplication and fragmentation, with the Falange fighting for control of social services against conservative and Catholic factions within the regime.

The term 'Catholics' in this context is not primarily a reference to religious identity. All of the various groups and factions within the Francoist coalition were Catholic, in the sense that their adherents were generally practising Catholics and their political views were firmly embedded in their religious faith and identity. The term denotes those figures, often associated with lay Catholic organizations, who aimed to establish an autonomous and hegemonic role for the Church within

[19] Carme Molinero, *La captación de las masas.*

Spanish politics and society, in contrast to those Falangists who saw the single party and the syndicalist organizations as the foundations of the Francoist state. The Falange dominated Francoist politics during the early years of the Second World War when European fascism was in its ascendency. It was then marginalized after 1945 as part of Franco's attempts to distance the regime from its fascist origins. But despite its diminished political status, it continued to play a significant role in social and labour provision throughout the dictatorship. In the fields of health and welfare, Falangist organizations such as the Women's Section and *Auxilio Social* vied for dominance with their rivals from Catholic groups and the Red Cross.[20]

The regime treated social policy not just as a means to improve living standards, but as a tool of political and ideological control. Its efforts to confine women to the domestic sphere were reflected in the provisions of the *Fuero del Trabajo* 'liberating' women from the burden of payed employment, and in the promotion of family welfare channelled through a male breadwinner. As in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, the Franco regime aimed to improve the size and condition of the Spanish race through pro-natalist welfare policies, and by promoting a health system which prioritized infant health and controlled the behaviour of mothers.[21] The system of health visitors organized by the Falange's Women's Section aimed to reduce infant and maternal mortality rates. But it was also used to promote the *españolización* of patients and mothers based on Catholic and nationalist doctrine, as well as gathering information about their moral, political, and religious views. The spread of infectious diseases was blamed on moral failings within Republican zones during the war. And disease-control programmes, particularly the post-war campaigns against typhus, were used as a tool of social control through coercive systems of monitoring and isolation.[22]

But this inefficiency, fragmentation, and coercion did nothing to prevent the Franco regime from placing social justice at the heart of its domestic propaganda efforts. Nor did it affect the centrality of social experts to the regime's attempts to establish its international legitimacy. Spain's absence from formal international

[20] Kathleen Richmond, *Women and Spanish Fascism: The Women's Section of the Falange, 1934–1959* (London: Routledge, 2003); Ángela Cenarro Lagunas, *La sonrisa de Falange: Auxilio Social en la Guerra Civil y en la posguerra* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2006).

[21] On the history of Francoist pronatalist and eugenic policies, see Mary Nash, 'Pronatalism and Motherhood in Franco's Spain', in Gisela Bock and Pat Thane (eds), *Maternity and Gender Policies: Women and the Rise of the European Welfare States: 1880s–1950s* (London: Routledge, 1991), 160–77; Josep Bernabeu-Mestre and Enrique Perdiguero-Gil, 'At the Service of Spain and Spanish Children: Mother-and-Child Healthcare in Spain during the First Two Decades of Franco's Regime (1939–1963)', in Iris Lowry and John Krige (eds), *Images of Disease: Science, Public Policy and Health in Post-War Europe* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Union, 2001), 167–86; Antonio Polo Blanco, *Gobierno de las poblaciones en el primer franquismo, 1939–1945* (Cádiz: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Cádiz, 2006).

[22] Isabel Jiménez Lucena, 'El tifus exantemático de la posguerra española (1939–1943): el uso de una enfermedad colectiva en la legitimación del "Nuevo Estado"', *Dynamis*, 14 (1994), 185–98.

institutions, whether temporarily in the case of the UN or permanently in the case of NATO and the EEC, increased the emphasis which the Franco regime placed on cultural diplomacy to bolster its international standing and to cement its place within the international community.[23] Its cultural relations apparatus used social experts as a diplomatic vanguard. Experts were particularly useful because they could gain acceptance in international arenas from which Francoist ministers and officials were excluded, and could project an image of Spain as a modern, scientifically advanced state.

In this sense, health and welfare formed part of a wider set of 'technical' fields which could be exploited to enhance the international standing of the regime, such as aviation, telecommunications, and agriculture. But in other ways the fields of health and welfare were unique. Many of the Franco regime's international opponents saw it as a backwards-looking, traditionalist coalition of reactionary elites, which had emerged in response to the modernizing and socially progressive reforms of the Second Republic. The fact that many of the country's most internationally renowned scientific and cultural figures had fled into exile after the civil war reinforced the idea of Franco's Spain as a reactionary remnant of the interwar era. Health, medicine, and welfare served to counteract these negative images in ways that other 'technical' fields could not. Social experts could be used to demonstrate the continued vitality of Spanish science. But they could also promote the regime's apparent commitment to social justice and its efforts to establish a modern welfare system. In an era in which western states were attempting to refashion a liberal social model to overcome the inadequacies of pre-war systems and to counter the appeal of communism, social experts helped to normalize Franco's Spain and to situate it with, rather than against, the grain of post-war history. Their work showcased a distinct model of conservative-Catholic modernity which the regime sought to promote to the outside world.

Internationalism

By examining the international activities of Francoist experts, this book systematically brings together the history of the Franco regime with the history of internationalism and international health for the first time. In addition to its analysis of the early Franco era, it also provides a new perspective on the history of twentieth-century internationalism. In particular, it challenges dominant narratives of internationalism as a liberal, progressive movement by foregrounding

[23] Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Imperio de papel: acción cultural y política exterior durante el primer franquismo* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1992); Francisco Javier Rodríguez Jiménez, Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, and Nicholas J. Cull (eds), *US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain: Selling Democracy?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

the history of fascist, nationalist, imperialist, and religious forms of international cooperation.

Scholarship on the history of internationalism and transnationalism has expanded rapidly over the past two decades. But it has often been characterized by a focus on liberal models of international cooperation, on Anglo-American actors, or on international organizations such as the League of Nations and the UN. On occasions this has led to a teleological approach to the growth of international society. By reading backwards from contemporary concepts of globalization, such accounts have presented the history of internationalism as a form of linear progress towards the 'global', in which the growth of international organizations and transnational society gradually served to overcome political and cultural divisions between nations and peoples. These narratives have been reinforced by research into the history of humanitarian and philanthropic organizations, scientific exchange, social movements, and liberal activists from Europe and North America, topics which have foregrounded the internationalist ambitions of actors driven by the desire to overcome national divisions and build new forms of global community.[24]

These progressive movements undeniably constitute an important strand of the history of internationalism. But they were not the only ways of thinking and acting internationally which emerged during the twentieth century. In recent years historians have begun to highlight the alternative forms of internationalism which developed during the same period, broadening the field out from its traditional focus on liberal international organizations and movements.[25] These included the forms of socialist and communist internationalism which also emerged in the late nineteenth century, and which existed alongside and in opposition to liberal international organizations.[26] The case of Franco's Spain, however, demonstrates that diverse models of international cooperation existed across the political spectrum, based on a variety of ideological, geographical, historical, and religious affiliations. In response to socialist and liberal forms of internationalism, for example, fascists and nationalists began to pursue international cooperation from the end of the nineteenth century, the 'dark side of internationalism' which culminated in the Nazi's European New Order during the Second World War.[27] Europe's imperial powers built international structures

[24] This is particularly evident in histories of international and global health.

[25] For an overview and analysis of these trends, see Ana Antic, Johanna Conterio, and Dora Vargha, 'Conclusion: Beyond Liberal Internationalism', *Contemporary European History*, 25 (2016), 359–71; Daniel Gorman, *International Cooperation in the Early Twentieth Century* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 1–13.

[26] Brigitte Studer, *The Transnational World of the Cominternians* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

[27] Martin Durham and Margaret Power (eds), *New Perspectives on the Transnational Right* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Kiran Klaus Patel and Sven Reichardt, 'The Dark Side of Transnationalism: Social Engineering and Nazism, 1930s–40s', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 51 (2016), 3–21.

which protected and strengthened their empires. After these empires had collapsed, they attempted to construct new quasi-imperial networks to maintain their power and influence.[28] Jewish, Protestant, Catholic, and other religious international organizations were also established to pursue humanitarian work, advocate for the rights of particular communities, and promote religious values on the world stage. These forms of internationalism combined traditional notions of religious universality with modern models of international association.[29]

The case of Spain sheds new light on two of these 'alternative' forms of internationalism in particular: the fascist internationalism which dominated Europe during the early years of the Second World War; and the revitalized forms of Catholic internationalism which emerged after it. Although the European authoritarian right denounced both socialist and liberal forms of internationalism, the Second World War represented the culmination of the kind of international cooperation which had been developing on the radical right since the end of the First World War.[30] Mussolini's Italy had worked hard to establish Rome as the capital of international fascism, creating organizations and networks which brought together fascists from around the world during the 1920s and early 1930s. Italian dominance of international fascism was challenged by Nazi Germany after 1933, but the corresponding rise of the radical right across the continent helped to intensify transnational connections. The Anti-Comintern Pact formalized patterns of international cooperation between fascist and authoritarian states. The wartime Nazi New Order, although based on German imperial expansion, borrowed from the language and practices of interwar internationalism to promote a vision of a new, more effective form of European cooperation.[31] By tracing the international activities of Francoist experts, this study identifies the important role that health and welfare played in these forms of fascist internationalism, and the extent of their appeal during the early years of the Second World War.

When the promise of the Nazi New Order collapsed in 1945, Spanish experts attempted to construct new networks and organizations through which they could engage with the outside world. In many cases these revolved around Spain's small imperial territories in Africa or its former empire in Latin America. Perhaps more significant, however, was Spanish involvement in post-war Catholic

[28] Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[29] Abigail Green and Vincent Viaene (eds), *Religious Internationals in the Modern World: Globalization and Faith Communities since 1750* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

[30] Arnd Bauerkämper and Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, *Fascism without Borders: Transnational Connections and Cooperation between Movements and Regimes in Europe from 1918 to 1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017).

[31] Roger Griffin, 'Europe for the Europeans: Fascist Myths of the European New Order, 1922–1992', in Matthew Feldman (ed.), *A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger Griffin* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Benjamin G. Martin, *The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

internationalism. Building on concepts of Christian universalism, modern forms of Catholic internationalism had begun to emerge in western Europe following the Napoleonic wars and the revolutions of 1830 and 1848. They were driven by the rise of political Catholicism from the 1830s, the emergence of ultramontane transnational networks, and, crucially, by international Catholic mobilization in defence of the pope following Italian reunification.[32]

In the fields of health and welfare, international Catholic networks emerged during the nineteenth century around religious orders, lay charity networks, and the overseas missions which helped to 'globalize' Catholic social action beyond the confines of western Europe. Catholic internationalism overlapped with and confronted secular forms of internationalism, as well as rival religious internationalisms, and was thus boosted by the growth of secular international society during the early twentieth century. Groups such as Catholic Action helped to foster transnational connections, and an increasing number of international Catholic conferences, organizations, and events coalesced around themes such as refugees, peace, and the slave trade. The historical literature on post-Second World War Catholic internationalism has focussed on the influence of Christian democracy on the process of European integration, and on the Catholic 'turn to the world' following the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s.[33] This study, however, explores the period before the Second Vatican Council, when Catholics were trying to come to terms with the new international system that had developed after 1945.[34] By focussing on the international activities of Spanish Catholics, it shows how Catholic internationalism outside of the liberal Christian democratic mainstream flourished in the post-war era, particularly in the context of the early Cold War.

The work of Spanish social experts provides an in-depth case study of the relationship between nationalism and internationalism in the twentieth century, allowing us to examine what the 'international' meant for nationalists and nationalist regimes, and what the 'national' meant for international experts and institutions.[35] It serves to highlight the existence of various forms of internationalism embraced by fascist, conservative, and religious groups during the mid-twentieth century. But it also reveals the overlaps and continuities between them, and between liberal and illiberal forms of internationalism. It shows how individuals

[32] Vincent Viaene, 'International History, Religious History, Catholic History: Perspectives for Cross-Fertilization (1830–1914)', *European History Quarterly*, 38 (2008), 578–607.

[33] Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); R. Scott Appleby, 'From State to Civil Society and Back Again: The Catholic Church as Transnational Actor, 1965–2005', in Vincent Viaene and Abigail Green (eds), *Religious Internationals in the Modern World* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 319–42.

[34] In doing so it speaks to recent works on intellectual and human rights history, including Samuel Moyn, *Christian Human Rights* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Or Rosenboim, *The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939–1950* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 241–71.

[35] It thus seeks to build on ideas set out in Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2013).

moved seamlessly from the League of Nations, to the Nazi New Order, and back again to the UN system. It also shows how these competing forms of internationalism developed both alongside and in opposition to each other. The Catholic internationalism which was so important to Franco's Spain, for example, represented both an intense engagement with the post-war international system, and an attempt to prevent secular organizations such as the UN from forging a new world order based on 'material' values anathema to the Catholic faith.

The case of Spain also reveals overlooked continuities between the international structures of the pre- and post-1945 world. 1945 is traditionally taken as a, if not *the* key turning point in the history of twentieth-century internationalism and international relations. It is the point at which the projects associated with interwar fascism and authoritarianism were finally defeated, and the discredited League of Nations system was reinvented within what is now often referred to as the post-war 'liberal world order'. In certain ways the history of Franco's internationalists reinforces this chronology. The Spanish embrace of the Nazi New Order as an alternative international system in which Spain could regain some of its former glories was finally buried in the rubble of Berlin in 1945. But the discordant chronology for the Franco regime, the continued existence of a fascist-inspired system into the apparently post-fascist era, also brings into focus the persistence of pre-1945 individuals and ideas in the post-war world. As this story shows, many of the international plans and projects developed in the early years of Francoist rule continued to function to some degree after 1945.

The partial success of Spain's international projects required collaborators willing to engage, at least to a certain extent, with Francoist ideas and rhetoric. Despite its fascist origins, after the Second World War the Francoist 'social state' was increasingly presented as a model of conservative-Catholic third-way modernity, defined by a commitment to 'spiritual' over 'material' social values, but designed to buttress a hierarchical political and social system capable of facing the challenges of the modern world. Although most of Spain's post-war international interlocutors were formally committed to the principles of democracy, at least outside of the colonial realm, there were many who retained a degree of sympathy for such ideas. Latin American nationalists and conservatives were happy to embrace a 'spiritual' counterweight to US materialism. Western European advocates of the idea of a European *Abendland* may have been post-war democrats, but they shared the Francoist devotion to historical notions of the 'Christian west' and to the maintenance of conservative social relations and political structures.[36] As the Cold War emerged, increasing numbers of western politicians, particularly conservative

[36] Vanessa Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen. Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (1920–1970)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005); Rosario Forlenza, 'The Politics of *Abendland*: Christian Democracy and the Idea of Europe after the Second World War', *Contemporary European History*, 26, 2 (2017), 261–86.

Catholics, began to openly echo Francoist language about the Soviet Union's materialist threat to the spiritual values of the west. The extent of the international engagement with Franco's Spain and its projects after 1945 brings into focus some of these profoundly anti-liberal features of the post-war world order.

This study also shows how 'technical' experts and expertise came to play a key political role in the history of mid-twentieth-century internationalism, shaping crucial debates about universality, international hierarchies, and the status of international outsiders. The fields in which international cooperation began to flourish during the nineteenth century, from public health to communications and social reform, required individuals with a high degree of technical understanding to deal with the demands of formulating policy across borders. By coming together in conferences, committees, and organizations to discuss these issues, the experts involved developed 'epistemic communities', transnational networks of expertise composed of professionals apparently working beyond the interests of their individual states, whose authority lay in their provision of dispassionate, scientifically based advice.[37] The international organizations that developed both before and after the First World War often institutionalized these networks by structuring their work around committees of experts, particularly in the field of health. The identity of the modern expert thus came to be defined by the idea of belonging to a transnational community united by scientific expertise and transcending national borders. Experts, in turn, became constitutive of the 'transnational sphere', of international society and the institutions which encompassed it.[38]

But as the case of Spain demonstrates, these transnational networks of experts and the idea of 'technical' cooperation could be exploited by outsiders such as the Franco regime to overcome political obstacles to their international integration. The regime saw international specialized agencies and technical organizations as stepping stones towards acceptance into political bodies such as the UN. This was not simply a case of political exploitation of technical expertise. Most of those experts who chose to remain in Spain after the civil war and who continued to hold senior positions shared elements of the regime's political and ideological outlook, although the degree of political engagement varied between individuals. Many Spanish social experts had been active in right-wing politics before the war, and those who had not were shaped by their experiences serving with rebel forces during the conflict. These experts enjoyed material advantages and freedoms unavailable to the vast majority of the Spanish population, including access to the scarce foreign currency reserves which were necessary for international travel.

[37] Peter M. Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', *International Organization*, 46 (1992), 1–35.

[38] Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Vogel (eds), *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks and Issues from the 1840s to the 1930s* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2014); Christophe Charle, Jürgen Schriewer, and Peter Wagner (eds), *Transnational Intellectual Networks: Forms of Academic Knowledge and the Search for Cultural Identities* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2004).

Their professional standing, political beliefs, and social and material privileges meant that many were willing, even enthusiastic participants in efforts to promote the image of Franco's Spain to the outside world. It was not until the emergence of an internal opposition to the regime in the late 1950s that the link between professional advancement and political loyalty began to fray.

Francoist experts thus undeniably belonged to transnational 'epistemic communities', but their identities were not solely defined by membership of those communities. This study argues that transnational networks of experts need to be viewed as both situated and instrumental; they existed within a wider political context and could be used for a variety of political, national, personal, or professional ends. As well as being leaders of their respective fields, cooperating with international colleagues on the basis of a shared set of beliefs and practices, the actions and attitudes of experts were also shaped by their national, political, historical, cultural, or religious circumstances. Arriving at an international conference or sitting down at an expert committee, they did not shift seamlessly from national to international affiliations, from political beings to apolitical experts. On the one hand, Francoist experts were acting as independent scientific figures, members of a community united across borders by a shared commitment to science and the technical demands of their field. On the other, they were representing Spain before the world, either directly as government officials and delegates at international organizations, or indirectly as informal ambassadors of Spanish science, the Spanish nation, and, by extension, the Spanish state.

Structure, Sources, and Chronology

The book is divided into five thematic chapters, arranged in broadly chronological order. Each chapter explores a particular form of international cooperation—a network, organization, or community—within which Spanish experts worked. Each examines the international network's political and cultural context, Spain's position within it, the constraints or barriers to international cooperation which Spanish experts faced, and their relationship with counterparts from other countries. These diverse networks, organizations, and communities represent the different ways in which Spanish experts conceived of the 'international', and show how these ideas developed in response to the shifting political climate of the period. Their story is reconstructed using a range of sources drawn from research across six different countries, including the archives of national governments and international organizations, records of philanthropic groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and professional journals and publications. The 'experts' it follows are broadly defined, ranging from leading national officials and researchers to ordinary health and welfare professionals who were sufficiently well respected to participate in international conferences and events.

The first chapter explores the relationship between Spain and the Axis powers during the Second World War. Spanish experts worked closely with Nazi Germany throughout the war. They formed part of a wider pattern of cooperation between Axis, Axis-aligned, and neutral states under the auspices of the Nazi-fascist New Order. This chapter argues that the scientific networks, conferences, and organizations promoted by Nazi Germany represented a form of 'Axis internationalism', which appropriated the language and practices of pre-war internationalism to promote the idea of a collaborative continental order under Nazi leadership. There were considerable differences between Spanish experts and their German counterparts. But a shared rejection of the pre-war liberal system and a common commitment to new social models meant that Spanish experts, like many of their European counterparts, were willing to embrace Axis internationalism as a new, and in many ways improved, form of international cooperation.

The second chapter focusses on Spain's relationship with liberal international health organizations such as the WHO. These organizations played an important role in Spain's search for legitimacy, and social experts served as a vanguard for Spain's post-war integration into the UN system. The idea of international health as a technical, apolitical field was particularly important in enabling the Franco regime to overcome its outsider status. Philanthropic groups such as the Rockefeller Foundation were willing to work with Franco's Spain even in the immediate aftermath of the civil war, claiming that the humanitarian needs of the Spanish people overrode any political objections to the Franco regime. Even at the height of Spain's diplomatic isolation after 1945 a fierce battle raged at the WHO over the question of Spanish membership. Although Spain was excluded in 1946, the WHO was one of the first international organizations Spain was admitted to in the early 1950s, helping to pave the way to full UN membership.

The third chapter turns to the colonial dimension of Franco's social state. Spain's African colonies were geographically tiny but were of extraordinary symbolic value for the Franco regime. Despite the brutality and neglect which characterized Spanish colonial rule, the regime sought to promote Spain as a responsible European colonial power committed to African development. Social experts were at the heart of this process, particularly during the early years of the regime. Spain's status as an 'imperial power' promised to grant Spanish experts a role within the regional structures set up to promote African health and welfare after 1945, but the reality fell far short of these grand visions. This chapter explores the international and interimperial dimensions of Spanish colonial health, charting both its ambitions and its failures. In doing so, it sheds new light on the entangled histories of mid-twentieth-century international and colonial health, and of imperialism and internationalism more generally.

Chapter 4 reveals the important but contested role which social experts played in Francoist attempts to promote Spanish influence in Latin America during the 1940s and 1950s. The concept of *hispanidad*, which included the idea that Spain

stood at the head of a community of Ibero-American nations united by ties of history, culture, religion, and language, was central to Francoist domestic discourse and foreign policy. The regime sought to integrate the traditionalist vision of *hispanidad* into a new model of socially advanced, conservative-Catholic modernity. By encouraging Spanish experts to form ties with their Latin American colleagues, it aimed to promote an image of the Francoist state as modern, scientific, and socially advanced. Despite the significant resources dedicated to this task, the Francoist narrative was strongly resisted both by Latin American leftists and by the many exiled Spanish Republicans who promoted a more collaborative model of Ibero-American identity. Nevertheless, Latin America did offer a route through which Francoist experts were able to engage with wider forms of international health and welfare, particularly in fields such as social insurance.

The fifth chapter examines Spanish involvement with post-war Catholic internationalism. It argues that international Catholic organizations and networks provided a crucial conduit for Franco's Spain to engage with the outside world after 1945. Health and humanitarian organizations were vital to Spain's post-war engagement with international Catholicism, including the nursing group Salus Infirmorum and the Catholic charity Caritas. The work of these organizations serves to highlight the prominent involvement of Spanish women in these international activities. At the same time, they illustrate the limits to Spain's involvement with post-war Catholic internationalism, during a period when Spain's Catholic elites remained isolated from mainstream European Christian democracy by their inability to reconcile Francoist National Catholicism with post-war liberal democracy.

This study focusses on the first two decades of the Franco regime, starting from the end of the civil war in 1939. The cut-off point is taken as the publication of the Stabilization Plan in 1959, which marked the end of the period of autarky by liberalizing foreign trade and opening up the Spanish economy to foreign investment. The plan did not cause a decisive shift in Spain's relationship with the outside world in and of itself. Rather, it was the culmination of a process of gradual reintegration into the international community which had been taking place over the course of the 1950s. It accelerated the economic growth which had begun over the previous few years, laying the groundwork for the rapid economic expansion of the 1960s and the social, cultural, and political changes which came with it. By the start of the 1960s Spain's international position had stabilized; a semi-integrated member of the Cold War west, accepted into some international organizations but excluded from others, valued as an enemy of communism but ignored as a military power, admired as a tourist destination but largely dismissed as a political relic of a bygone age.

During the 1940s and 1950s, however, Spain's relationship with the outside world had been in flux, lending political significance to the international work of social experts, and encouraging the exploration of new ways for Franco's Spain to

establish its legitimacy on the world stage. The generation of experts who led Spain's engagement with the outside world were products of the interwar era and the civil war, both professionally and politically. They saw the Franco regime, and the authoritarian right of interwar Europe from which it emerged, as modern, dynamic alternatives to sclerotic and ineffective forms of liberal democracy. During the early years of the Second World War, this belief underpinned their willingness to see Nazi Germany as the harbinger of a new international system. After 1945 they found it difficult to embrace the new political and ideological realities of the post-war global order, prompting them to search for alternative ways to imagine and interact with the world. It was only with the rise of a new generation, who had not necessarily fought in the civil war or been so profoundly shaped by the interwar period, that Spanish experts abandoned these dreams and began to accept the immutability of the post-war international system, seeking to adapt Spain to the world rather than adapting the world to Spain. The emergence of this new generation and the changes after 1959 are discussed in the Epilogue.

Ultimately this study aims to disrupt and decentre our understanding of twentieth-century internationalism. Moving beyond liberal international organizations and movements reveals the range of illiberal, fascist, religious, and imperial internationalisms which competed for influence both before and after 1945. Turning away from the major powers and Anglo-American elites which have dominated much of the historiography shows what the 'international' meant from the perspective of a political outlier on the periphery of Europe. Questioning the distinction between political organizations and the technical work of specialized agencies, humanitarian organizations, and expert networks reveals social experts as political actors, promoting national agendas, pursuing ideological goals, and attempting to shape international organizations and networks in their own interests. The book thus sets out a history of the mid-twentieth century characterized by the tumultuous interplay of overlapping global, regional, and imperial projects, in which social experts played a central role in attempts to imagine and construct new visions of world order and national prestige.

1

Axis Internationalism

Spanish Experts and the Nazi New Order

In November 1941 over fifty health officials and experts representing twenty different states met at an international tuberculosis conference in Berlin.[1] There they agreed to establish a new International Association against Tuberculosis which would help to combat the rapid spread of the disease across Europe, and to lay the foundations for a better post-war future.[2] On the surface the conference looked like a straightforward example of the kind of international scientific cooperation that had become increasingly common since the mid-nineteenth century. Indeed, many of the delegates had been involved with pre-war international health organizations such as the International Union against Tuberculosis and the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO), and would go on in the post-war era to work with the WHO and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). The difference, of course, was the context in which the conference occurred. Organized at the invitation of the Reich Health Office, it encompassed only Axis, occupied, or neutral states. And it took place in the midst of a European public health crisis provoked by the Nazi war effort and occupation, characterized by the deliberate starvation of millions of Soviet prisoners of war, the restriction of food, fuel, and medical supplies across the occupied territories, and the unchecked spread of disease in Jewish ghettos.[3] The largest foreign delegation at the conference came from Spain, and the Spanish director general of health, José Palanca, was elected as the new association's vice president.

[1] Parts of this chapter have previously appeared in the following articles: David Brydan, 'Axis Internationalism: Spanish Health Experts and the Nazi "New Order"', *Contemporary European History*, 25, 2 (2016), 291–311 © Cambridge University Press 2016, reprinted with permission; David Brydan, 'Transnational Exchange in the Nazi New Order: The Spanish Blue Division and Its Medical Services', *Journal of Contemporary History*, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009418786789, first published 28 August 2018 © SAGE Publications 2018, CC BY 4.0.

[2] The proceedings of the conference and a full list of delegates were published in the journal of the Italian Tuberculosis Federation in January 1942, based on the official report of the conference committee. 'La fondazione dell'Associazione Internazionale contro la Tubercolosi', *Lotta Contro La Tubercuolosi*, anno 13, 3 (1942), 236–59. See also 'L'associazione internazionale contro la tubercolosi', *Rivista Italiana d'Igiene*, vol. 20, 1 (1942), 78–9.

[3] Christopher R. Browning, 'Genocide and Public Health: German Doctors and Polish Jews, 1939–41', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 3 (1988), 21–36; Paul Weindling, *Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, 1890–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

This chapter explores the involvement of Spanish social experts with Nazi Germany and its fascist allies during the Second World War. But it also argues that these ties need to be understood as part of the wider history of international health and welfare across the middle of the twentieth century. The involvement of Spanish experts with Nazi Germany was based in part on the traditional prestige of German science and medicine, and on historical links between the Spanish and German scientific communities. It also represented a continuation of pre-war German cultural diplomacy, which had used science and medicine to strengthen ties with friendly states since the end of the First World War, including with rebel Spain during the Spanish Civil War. But the popularity of these Nazi-led projects among Spanish experts also reflected a widespread belief, at least during the early years of the Second World War, that the future of international cooperation and exchange would take place within an Axis-dominated system. Events such as the tuberculosis conference consciously echoed the language and practices of interwar internationalism, and by doing so helped to appeal to experts and elites from across the political spectrum of the European right. For many both in Spain and other European countries, this 'Axis internationalism' represented a new model of international cooperation more suited to the political and ideological demands of the modern era.

The relationship between Francoist Spain and the fascism of Germany and Italy is a complicated one, and has been the subject of much historical debate.[4] German and Italian military aid had been vital to Franco's victory in the Spanish Civil War, and the Franco regime was heavily influenced by the political models of both countries. This was particularly the case during the Spanish Civil War and the early stages of the Second World War. The Franco regime adopted much of the language and trappings of European fascism, establishing a corporatist political system built around a single party, formally called the *Falange Española Tradicionalista y de los JONS* but commonly referred to as the 'Movement' (*Movimiento* or *Movimiento Nacional*). The party had been established in 1937 through the amalgamation of the Spanish fascist party, the *Falange*, with other reactionary Catholic and monarchist groups which made up the Francoist coalition.[5] This unity masked a certain degree of plurality between the Falangist, Catholic, military, and monarchist 'families' which competed for dominance, and which Franco worked assiduously to manage and balance.[6]

[4] Ismael Saz Campos, *Las caras del franquismo* (Granada: Comares, 2013).

[5] Javier Tusell, *La dictadura de Franco* (Madrid: Altaya, 1988); Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism in Spain, 1923–1977* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999).

[6] The idea of a regime composed of distinct and competing 'families' or 'pillars' is a problematic one, primarily because it risks oversimplifying the complex political, religious, and cultural identities of the regime and its supporters, and the degree to which they changed over time. It is, however, widely used within the historiography of Francoism, partly following Juan Linz's argument about the regime's 'limited pluralism'. See Juan J. Linz, 'An Authoritarian Regime: Spain', in Eric Allardt and Yrjö Littunen (eds), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Strategies: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology* (Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964), 291–341.

This competition was particularly evident in the field of social policy. The language of the Francoist 'social state' and the regime's focus on improving social conditions for workers borrowed heavily from the models of other fascist states, particularly Italy. Falangist officials and experts sought to dominate social provision such as housing and food aid, either through the corporatist structures of the *Movimiento* or through Falangist-dominated government departments like the Ministry of Labour. But they faced stiff competition from the religious institutions which had historically dominated Spanish welfare provision, and from traditional Catholic and monarchist officials who still controlled many social institutions and ministries.

As this chapter will demonstrate, however, all of these groups engaged extensively with Nazi Germany and the other European fascist powers during the early 1940s. This partly reflected the extent to which the 'totalitarian' European states, as they were often referred to in Spain, were seen as the model for modern, effective social provision. But it was also a function of the flexibility of the National-Catholic ideology which underpinned the Franco regime. Combining the authoritarian nationalism of the modern Spanish right with integralist Catholic traditions, National Catholicism provided an umbrella under which the various factions of the Francoist coalition could unite. It was also flexible enough to accommodate shifts in Francoist political culture and the internal balance of power. After 1945 it would be used by the regime to promote an image of Spain as the moderate, respectable, 'spiritual reserve of the west'. But from the early stages of the Spanish Civil War until the collapse of Axis military power after 1943, it was manifested as a more overtly fascist-inspired style of politics built around the rhetoric of national syndicalism.[7]

The 'fascistized' character of the early Franco regime was reflected in the close ties between Spain and the Axis powers during the Second World War.[8] When war broke out in 1939, Spain, like Italy, declared itself formally neutral. This stance shifted in the summer of 1940, when the Franco regime declared 'non-belligerency', which in practice meant supporting the Axis cause in all areas short of military intervention. During this period Spain provided substantial logistical and economic support to the Axis cause. When Franco and Hitler met at Hendaye in October 1940, Hitler refused to meet the substantial territorial demands Franco made in return for Spanish military intervention, an intervention which would almost certainly have represented an additional military and economic burden for

[7] On National Catholicism and its role within the Franco regime, see Alfonso Botti, *Cielo y dinero: el nacionalcatolicismo en España* (Madrid: Alianza, 1992); Ismael Saz Campos, *España contra España: Los nationalismos franquistas* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003); Mary Vincent, 'Ungodly Subjects: Protestants in National-Catholic Spain, 1939–1953', *European History Quarterly*, 45 (2015), 108–31.

[8] On the Franco regime as a 'fascistized' dictatorship, see Ismael Saz Campos, 'Fascism, Fascistization and Developmentalism in Franco's Dictatorship', *Social History*, 29, 3 (2004), 342–57.

the Axis.[9] Despite this failure to reach a formal agreement, Spain agreed to send the volunteer 'Blue Division' to join Wehrmacht forces on the Eastern Front following the invasion of the Soviet Union (USSR) in June 1941.[10] The gradual shift in military fortunes away from the Axis powers over the next few years, combined with sustained economic and political pressure from the Allies, prompted Spain to roll back on its overtly pro-German stance, and Franco redeclared Spanish neutrality in October 1943. The regime's supporters would later make extravagant claims that Franco had always been a friend of the Allies and had played a cunning game in resisting the allures of the Nazi regime. But elements of Spanish economic and logistical support for the Axis powers persisted until the end of the war.

Historians working on the wartime relationship between the two countries have generally focussed on these military and diplomatic ties, or on the fascists, Falangists, and philo-Nazis, many involved with the Blue Division, who were at the forefront of Spanish relations with the Third Reich.[11] This chapter, however, explores the much broader Spanish involvement with the Nazi New Order. The German victory over France in the summer of 1940 and the invasion of the USSR a year later had seen the bulk of mainland Europe fall under the control of Nazi Germany and its allies. For many fascists and fascist fellow travellers across the continent, this moment represented the birth of a new system, a New Order for Europe, ushering in an era of political, economic, and cultural cooperation under German, and to a lesser extent Italian, leadership. Plans for a radically reordered European system under Axis domination were never taken seriously by Hitler. But they were actively embraced by groups of officials, experts, and intellectuals within the German system, particularly in the foreign, economic, and propaganda ministries, and were mirrored by similar initiatives in fascist Italy.[12]

The 'New Order' was a mainstay of Nazi propaganda throughout the war. In part it represented a continuation of the forms of fascist internationalism which had begun to develop during the 1920s and 1930s.[13] But it received support from a broad range of European elites, stretching far beyond the small number of fascist activists who had been involved with these earlier projects. The 1941 tuberculosis conference was only one of many international organizations and meetings convened under its umbrella, bringing together student and women's groups, artists, writers, journalists, scientists, and social policy experts from across Europe,

[9] Paul Preston, 'Franco and Hitler: The Myth of Hendaye 1940', *Contemporary European History*, 1, 1 (1992), 1–16.

[10] Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, *Camarada Invierno: Experiencia y memoria de la División Azul, 1941–1945* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2016).

[11] Bowen, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany*; Payne, *Franco and Hitler*; Wingate Pike, *Franco and the Axis Stigma*.

[12] Walter Lipgens (ed.), *Documents on the History of European Integration, Volume 1: Continental Plans for European Union, 1939–1945* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984).

[13] Bauerkämper and Rossoliński-Liebe (eds), *Fascism without Borders*.

and occasionally beyond.[14] According to its proponents, the New Order would form the basis for a new model of European cooperation, distinct from the discredited liberal and socialist organizations of the past. In contrast to pre-war visions of European unity built around the principles of cosmopolitanism or liberal internationalism, it would be underpinned by solidarity and cooperation between the like-minded peoples of nationalist Europe, celebrating and protecting, rather than undermining, the distinctive characteristics of organic national identities and cultures. Axis internationalism was thus conceived as a form of 'inter-nationalism', with nations and national identity at its heart.[15]

This chapter examines wartime cooperation between Spanish and German social experts in the context of these wider European and international projects. It begins by identifying the origins of wartime scientific and medical relations in pre-war German cultural diplomacy. Thanks to the international prestige of German scientific research and social policy, the fields of medicine, public health, and welfare were central to German cultural relations under both the Weimar and Nazi regimes. It then maps out the fields in which Spanish experts engaged most closely with the Nazi New Order, including the military medicine of the Blue Division and the civilian fields of social insurance, typhus, and tuberculosis. It explores the practical and political factors which underpinned cooperation between Spanish and German experts, particularly their shared belief in a new 'totalitarian' age of health and welfare.

It ends with an analysis of the tensions and contradictions which beset these forms of Axis internationalism. The Axis states and their authoritarian allies were all deeply opposed to the principles of liberal internationalism based on the formal equality of states, mutually guaranteed territorial integrity, and the values of liberal democracy. Nazi geopolitics, to the extent it could be clearly defined, projected theories of world order based on racial struggle between nations, international hierarchies, and regional hegemony.[16] When these ideas were put into practice across occupied Europe after 1939, the result was a racially based hierarchy of European states designed to maintain the German war effort via a system of plunder, coercion, and exploitation, and to expand German *lebensraum* through the destruction or subjugation of the sovereign states of eastern Europe

[14] Robert Edwin Herzstein, *When Nazi Dreams Come True: The Third Reich's Internal Struggle over the Future of Europe after a German Victory* (London: Abacus, 1982); Ronald E. Doel, Dieter Hoffman, and Nikolai Krementsov, 'National States and International Science: A Comparative History of International Science Congresses in Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, and Cold War United States', *Osiris*, 20 (2005), 49–76; Elizabeth Harvey, 'International Networks and Cross-Border Cooperation: National Socialist Women and the Vision of a "New Order" in Europe', *Politics, Religion and Ideology*, 13 (2012), 141–58; Benjamin George Martin, '"European Literature" in the Nazi New Order: The Cultural Politics of the European Writer's Union, 1942–3', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 48 (2013), 486–508.

[15] Martin, *The Nazi-Fascist New Order*, 109–48.

[16] Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin, 2012), 180–8.

and their Slavic and Jewish inhabitants.[17] The relationship between Spanish social experts and Nazi Germany reflected these contradictions. It was complicated by divergent attitudes towards religion, race, and eugenics, but also, and to a much greater degree, by German hegemony and Spain's subservient position within the hierarchical realities of the New Order.

Social Experts and Cultural Diplomacy

Cooperation between Spanish social experts and Nazi Germany during the Second World War needs to be understood as part of a longer history of Hispano-German cultural relations stretching back over two decades. Spanish experts had been studying in Germany since the beginning of the twentieth century and had traditionally regarded it as the centre of European science and medicine.[18] For their part, the German medical and scientific professions had been working to strengthen ties with Spain and other neutral countries since the aftermath of the First World War when they had been excluded from many international organizations. These efforts had been fully supported by the German Foreign Office, and science and medicine had become a central plank of German cultural diplomacy in the interwar years. This trend was further exacerbated under the Nazi regime as relations with the international scientific community became increasingly strained, prompting Germany to concentrate on building bilateral cultural relations with sympathetic European allies. In the case of Spain, the German Foreign Office, the German embassy in Madrid, and a range of organizations interested in fostering Hispano-German relations sought to promote exchange between scientific and social experts in the two countries, and particularly with rebel Spain during the Spanish Civil War. However, the civil war period also foreshadowed some of the tensions that would characterize later links between Spanish experts and Nazi Germany, particularly the unequal nature of the relationship and the hostility of the Catholic Church to Nazi ideology.

The medical and scientific ties which Germany built with Spain after 1918 were part of its wider cultural diplomacy.[19] Like many European states at the beginning of the twentieth century, the German government increasingly saw science, education, art, and other forms of culture as a means of promoting German influence and interests abroad, and of helping to overcome the damage to

[17] Aly Götz, *Hitler's Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War and the Nazi Welfare State* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007); Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (London: Penguin, 2007); Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe* (London: Allen Lane, 2008).

[18] Sandra Rebok (ed.), *Traspasar fronteras: un siglo de intercambio científico entre España y Alemania* (Madrid: CSIC, 2010).

[19] José María López Sánchez, 'Política cultural exterior alemana en España durante la República de Weimar', *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, 25 (2003), 235–53.

Germany's reputation caused by the First World War. Its post-war exclusion from many international scientific and cultural organizations meant that bilateral ties became increasingly important. The German Foreign Office supported a range of organizations and programmes dedicated to improving relations with key partner states through academic exchanges, scholarships, and cultural activities, with a particular focus on science and medicine.[20] Despite some recovery to its international standing from the late 1920s, the gradual nazification of German scientific and medical institutions after 1933 and the withdrawal from the League of Nations limited Germany's ability to participate in mainstream forms of international scientific exchange. By the summer of 1936, for example, the Foreign Office in Berlin was debating whether German experts should be sent to the international malaria conference due to be held in Madrid for fear that 'Marxist-inspired' French and Spanish experts would conspire with German émigrés to protest against the Nazi regime.[21] Instead, German medical experts were encouraged to develop international ties elsewhere. In the field of health, former German delegates to the LNHO turned their attention to the states of central, eastern and southern Europe where the increasing slide towards authoritarian government made relations easier.[22]

Germany's relationship with fascist Italy was at the forefront of these efforts, particularly in the field of health. In May 1937 the Reich Medical Association drew up an agreement with the Italian Ministry for Public Health to establish a joint German-Italian medical commission, with the goal of strengthening the relationship between the German and Italian medical professions. The agreement sought to coordinate the work of delegates at international conferences, promote research and study exchanges, arrange translation of medical texts, and facilitate the exchange of medical journals.[23] The impetus behind the agreement had come partly from the experience of the Paris International Exposition in 1937, which had raised fears of a resurgent French cultural diplomacy and convinced German health leaders of the need for a formal agreement with Italy and other sympathetic states.[24] These German-Italian links would later act as the fulcrum for wider forms

[20] Paul Forman, 'Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar Physicists: The Ideology and Its Manipulation in Germany after World War I', *Isis*, 64 (1973), 150–80; Susan Gross Solomon (ed.), *Doing Medicine Together: Germany and Russia Between the Wars* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); Marició Janué i Miret, 'Un instrumento de los intereses nacionalsocialistas durante la Guerra Civil española: el papel de la Sociedad Germano-Española de Berlín', *Iberoamericana*, 31 (2008), 27–44.

[21] Auswärtiges Amt, Politisches Archiv, Berlin (AAPA), Madrid Botschaft 641, 'Internationaler Malariakongress Madrid', April 1936.

[22] Weindling, *Epidemics and Genocide*, 221.

[23] Bundesarchiv, Lichterfelde (Barch) Reichskanzlei, R43II, 717, 'Deutsch-Italienische Abkommen über die Zusammenarbeit auf medizinischem Gebiete'.

[24] BArch, R43II, 717, 'Bericht über die deutsch-italienischen ärztlichen Beziehungen und die Vertragsvorherhandlungen'. Although the agreement was signed by the Italian Ministry of Public Health and the Reich Medical Association in October 1937, it was never ratified due to a disagreement

of wartime health and welfare cooperation across Axis-dominated Europe. In 1939 the Reich Health Office established a separate department of international health to coordinate such efforts.[25]

Cultural ties between Nazi Germany and Spain increased significantly after Germany's intervention in the Spanish Civil War. In the context of a war in which foreign interventions were crucial, both sides fought hard to promote their image and interests abroad. While the Republic promoted its cause among the western democracies, the rebels concentrated on strengthening ties with their fascist allies. Cultural relations were an important part of this process. A German Foreign Office report from October 1937 written by Wilhelm Petersen, later the cultural attaché at the German embassy in Madrid, argued that the war presented a unique opportunity for German cultural diplomacy in the country. France and Britain, it argued, had ceased all cultural activity in Nationalist Spain, and the only real competition for cultural influence came from fascist Italy whose propaganda the Germans regarded as crudely imperialistic. Petersen recommended a range of new cultural exchange activities, including schemes for Spanish university students to study in Germany. These, he argued, would help to produce a cohort of young leaders who could oppose the older generation of French-trained Spanish 'reactionaries' and support Franco's mission to construct a new Spanish state.[26]

Science, medicine, and welfare played a central role in these exchanges, supported by organizations such as the German-Ibero-American Medical Academy (*Deutsch-Ibero-Amerikanischen Ärzteakademie*; DIAA) in Berlin. The DIAA had been established in April 1935 by Wilhelm Faupel, head of its sister organization the Ibero-American Institute and the man who would become Germany's first ambassador to rebel Spain during the civil war. Faupel was a highly decorated veteran of the First World War, a Freikorps leader in Silesia and participant in the Kapp Putsch, as well as a former adviser to the Argentine and Peruvian armed forces.[27] The DIAA aimed to improve ties between Germany and the medical professions in Spain, Portugal, and Latin America. Under the tutelage of the German Foreign Office and with links to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education, it formed part of the regime's cultural diplomacy apparatus, aiming both to help German medicine regain the international standing it had enjoyed before the First World War and to improve the general image of

with the German Foreign Office about jurisdiction, and in fact caused a wider argument about the ability of various state bodies to negotiate international agreements independent of the Foreign Office.

[25] Weindling, *Epidemics and Genocide*, 221.

[26] AAPA, Madrid Botschaft 614, 'Deutsche Kulturpolitik im Nationalen Spanien', 6 October 1937.

[27] Oliver Gliech, 'Wilhelm Faupel: Generalstaboffizier, Militärberater, Präsident des Ibero-Amerikanischen Instituts', in Reinhard Liehr, Günther Maihold, and Günter Vollmer (eds), *Ein Institut und sein General: Wilhelm Faupel und das Ibero-Amerikanische Institut in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt: Vervuert, 2003), 131–79.

Nazi Germany abroad.[28] By 1939 it had supported visits by over 1,000 doctors to Germany, primarily from Latin America. But from the start of the Spanish Civil War it had begun to prioritize links with rebel Spain. In 1937, for example, it arranged for four Spanish volunteer nurses to be placed in German hospitals.[29] Relations with Spain were further strengthened after Franco's victory, particularly when the outbreak of the Second World War made communication with Latin America more difficult.[30]

The DIAA was only one of a number of German organizations dedicated to promoting scientific and cultural relations with Iberian and Latin American countries. Chief among these was the German-Spanish Society (*Deutsch-Spanische Gesellschaft*; DSG), which was founded in Berlin in 1930. Its goal was to strengthen cultural and economic ties between Spain and Germany via conferences, exhibitions, debates, publications, and other activities. The military and aristocratic background of many of its leaders prompted it to reduce activities during the early years of the Second Republic. But from 1935 it was gradually integrated into the structures of the Nazi state, with board members appointed from a range of ministries and party bodies, and its activities increasingly aligned with German foreign policy. In 1936 its leadership passed to Wilhelm Faupel, who helped ensure that the DSG would play a central role in the relationship between Germany and the rebel authorities during and after the Spanish Civil War.[31]

German enthusiasm for strengthening medical and scientific ties with Spain was matched by elements within the Nationalist academic community. At the height of the civil war in April 1938, Antonio Vallejo Nágera and three other leading doctors from the University of Valladolid organized a celebration of German medicine in the city.[32] The event was attended by Wilhelm Petersen alongside other representatives of the German embassy, the German press corps, and the Francoist government. Alongside a statement from the Nationalist foreign minister, it included talks on the relationship between German and Spanish psychiatry and the significance of German medicine for international science. It was notable for two features which were to characterize Hispano-German medical relations over the coming years. The first was that all four of its organizers had spent time either studying or working in Germany during the 1920s and early 1930s. During the first three decades of the twentieth century many of Spain's leading doctors and

[28] Andrés H. Reggiani, 'Medicina y kulturpolitik en la era del nacionalsocialismo: la Academica Médica Germano-Ibero-Americana, 1936–1939', in Sandra Carreras (ed.), *Der Nationalsozialismus und Lateinamerica: Institutionen—Repräsentationen—Wissenkonstrukte* (Berlin: Ibero-Amerikanische Institut, 2005).

[29] Ibid. [30] Reggiani, 'Medicina y Kulturpolitik', 59. [31] Janué i Miret, 'Un instrumento'.

[32] AAPA, Madrid Botschaft 614, von Stohrer to Auswärtiges Amt, 30 April 1938. In addition to Vallejo Nágera the other three organizers were Isidro de la Villa, gynaecologist, president of the Valladolid Medical Association and rector of Valladolid University; Leopoldo Morales Aparicio, surgeon and member of the International Society for Surgery; and Misael Bañuelos García, professor of internal medicine at Valladolid University. Vallejo Nágera's wider role in Hispano-German medical relations is discussed below.

researchers had spent time studying or working in Germany, including Gregorio Marañón, Carlos Jiménez Díaz, and Juan Negrín.[33] On the Spanish side, these exchanges were supported by the *Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios* (JAE), established by the Spanish government in 1907 to promote Spanish science, often through support for study abroad.[34] The German state supported foreign students through a range of organizations and programmes, including Humboldt scholarships and the Academic Exchange Service. These programmes helped to underpin the wartime collaboration which followed, with many of the Spanish experts involved with Nazi Germany during the Second World War having studied at German universities during the 1920s and 1930s.

The second feature was the unequal relationship between Spanish experts and their German counterparts. Following the success of the event it was suggested by the German Foreign Office that the four men be invited to the University of Berlin as visiting fellows. However, the German ambassador to rebel Spain rejected the idea on the grounds that, with the exception of Vallejo Nágera, and despite their senior roles at Valladolid and their strong reputation within Spanish science, the experts involved were not sufficiently distinguished for such a prestigious post.[35] Throughout this period there was a consistent and clear power discrepancy between Spanish and German experts, and a common belief among Germans that it was their medical achievements and institutions that Spain should learn from, not the other way round. Spanish students would be sent to study at German universities and German experts would often deliver talks or lectures in Spain, but the processes were rarely if ever reversed. The scientific exchange in this relationship was primarily one way. To some extent this was merely a symptom of the high regard in which the German scientific community held itself during the interwar years relative to its European peers, but it would later prove to be a source of tension when combined with racialized Nazi views of national and cultural hierarchies.

The developing cultural ties between Nazi Germany and rebel Spain were formalized in January 1939 with the signing of a bilateral treaty on cultural relations. As with the report drawn up by Wilhelm Petersen in 1937, scientific education and exchange were at the heart of the proposals. They included agreement on the provision of guest lectureships and temporary research posts for academics and scientists, formalized student exchange programmes, and the regular provision of Humboldt scholarships for Spanish students wishing to study

[33] Gregorio Marañón (1887–1960) was a physician, intellectual, and historian of medicine who specialized in endocrinology and played an important role in the development of medical pathology and biological research in twentieth-century Spain, as well as being politically active throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Juan Negrín (1892–1956) was a Spanish doctor and politician who became prime minister during the second half of the Spanish Civil War. Both had studied under the pathologist, neurologist, and Nobel laureate Santiago Ramón y Cajal.

[34] Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Imperio de papel*, 14.

[35] AAPA, Madrid Botschaft 614, von Stohrer to Auswärtiges Amt, 12 January 1939.

in Germany.[36] A parallel agreement stipulated that half of the students involved in the exchange programme should be studying medicine or natural sciences. The agreement illustrated the importance of science and medicine to Hispano-German cultural relations during the period, as well as the increasing significance of cultural relations to their respective national governments.

However, the controversy which the agreement caused in Spain also illustrates some of the tensions between the two countries stemming from Nazi attitudes to religion and the Catholic Church. Although the agreement was signed by Spanish officials in 1939, it faced immediate and strong opposition from Catholic authorities, notably from the Spanish Cardinal Isidro Gomá and the Papal Nuncio Gaetano Cicognani. The Church was concerned that the agreement would open the gates to a flood of Nazi propaganda, encouraging a pagan spirit in Catholic Spain. It was particularly worried that a clause prohibiting the publication of books critical of the German regime would restrict its freedoms, in contravention of the 1851 concordat. These concerns were so great that the Pope wrote directly to Franco at the end of January urging him to scrap the agreement. In the face of such opposition, Spanish authorities agreed that the document would not be ratified, delaying the implementation of much of the programme until 1941.[37]

Despite these tensions, science and medicine remained at the heart of Nazi cultural diplomacy in Spain after the outbreak of the Second World War. German efforts were enhanced in May 1941 when the Madrid embassy opened a new German scholarly institute. Supported by the cultural relations section of the Germany embassy, the institute put medical and scientific collaboration at the centre of its work.[38] One of its first events was the screening of a series of medical and surgical films as part of the Spanish National Medical Congress, attended by over seventy leading physicians and public health experts. The films were part of an ongoing series of screenings that the institute held over the coming years in collaboration with the Madrid medical faculty.[39] The same year saw the establishment of the Hispano-German Association (*Asociación Hispano-Germana*; AHG) in Madrid. Formed in collaboration with the embassy's cultural relations section and with the encouragement of von Ribbentrop and the German Foreign Office, the AHG aimed to develop bilateral relations, to serve as a channel for news about Germany within Spain, and to influence leading members of Spanish society and the Franco regime.[40] The association's membership included leading figures from

[36] AAPA, Madrid Botschaft 852, 'Deutsch-Spanisches Kulturabkommen'.

[37] Antonio Marquina, 'La iglesia española y los planes culturales alemanes para España', *Razon y Fe*, 975 (1979), 354–70.

[38] *Revista de Sanidad e Higiene Pública*, 4 (July–August 1941), 412.

[39] Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin (GStA), Deutsch-Ibero-Amerikanische Ärzteakademie 218 A, 19, various correspondence concerning medical films, May–July 1941.

[40] Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Imperio de papel*, 197.

the Spanish medical and scientific professions, including José Palanca, Carlos Jimenez Díaz, and Gregorio Marañón.[41]

Cultural relations were central to the battle for influence over Spain during the war, with both Axis and Allied powers working to shape the allegiances of various factions among Francoist elites, and in turn to influence Spanish foreign policy. For Nazi Germany, relations with Spain were important from both strategic and economic perspectives. But they also formed part of wider efforts to establish a cultural New Order which would underpin, and legitimize, its military dominance of the continent.[42] These efforts built on a longer history of German cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. They relied, in part, on the long-standing reputation of German science, medicine, and social policy across Europe, and on relationships between experts and officials which had often been formed in the pre-Nazi era. As we shall see, the engagement of Spanish social experts with Nazi Germany was built as much on these factors as it was on ideological affinities with the Nazi project.

Spanish Experts and the Nazi New Order

In October 1941, two leading Spanish social experts departed on a tour of the Nazi New Europe. Over the next two months the director general of health, José Palanca, and the head of public health in Madrid, Primitivo de la Quintana, travelled to Berlin, Stuttgart, Munich, Vienna, Cracow, Warsaw, Lemberg (present-day Lviv), Milan, and Rome. During the trip they visited sanatoria and troop hospitals, studied the nutritional situation in various countries, discussed the typhus epidemic sweeping through the territories of the General Government, and met with the leaders of the Italian public health service.[43]

The tour revolved around the two public health issues which lay at the heart of the new forms of Axis internationalism established during the war: typhus and tuberculosis. The fight against typhus, in particular, was central to the extensive public health cooperation between Axis and Axis-aligned states during the war, including exchanges among researchers and international work on the development of vaccines. The disease had become endemic across eastern and central Europe since the start of the war, exacerbated by military mobilization and civilian displacement, and posing a major risk to both the German public health system and troops fighting on the Eastern Front. Spain was also suffering from a major

[41] AAPA, Madrid Botschaft, Kultur, 44, 'Relacion de Asociados de la Asociación Hispano-Germana'. The future rector of the University of Madrid and prominent Falangist, Pedro Laín Entralgo, was also a member, alongside Juan José Lopez Ibor and Primitivo de la Quintana.

[42] Martin, *The Nazi-Fascist New Order*.

[43] José Alberto Palanca, *Medio siglo al servicio de la sanidad pública* (Madrid: Cultura Clásica y Moderna, 1963), 207–9.

typhus outbreak at the time, in part due to the Franco regime's initial reluctance to recognize the problem in the aftermath of the civil war.[44]

Spanish experts were deeply involved in international typhus cooperation during the war. Typhus experts from German institutions, including the Hamburg Institute of Tropical Medicine and the Frankfurt Institute for Experimental Therapy, undertook study visits and lecture tours to Spain during the first half of the war, and German researchers worked on typhus in Seville and elsewhere. Spanish students were also invited to join international teams working on typhus vaccines at the Military Institute for Virology in Cracow, and the Behring Institute in Lemberg.[45] One of Spain's leading typhus researchers during the Franco era, Florencio Pérez Gallardo, visited Germany and occupied Poland in the early 1940s to study laboratory techniques.[46] There was also a significant degree of cooperation in the development of anti-typhus policies. Primitivo de la Quintana, for example, led the fight against typhus in Madrid between 1941 and 1942. During his trip to Germany he studied anti-typhus measures there and in the occupied territories, and gave a paper on the Spanish epidemic to the Reich Medial Association in the presence of Reich health minister, Leonardo Conti.[47] In 1942 José Palanca cited the influence of his visit to Germany and the support of the Reich Medical Association in the development of Spanish anti-typhus programmes.[48]

In the field of tuberculosis, cooperation between Francoist experts and their German and Italian counterparts had begun shortly after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Like many authoritarian states across Europe, Franco's government saw the control of tuberculosis as a means to demonstrate its political effectiveness and concern for social welfare. The construction of sanatoria was presented by Francoist propaganda as a symbol of social progress and scientific modernity.[49] Francoist authorities established the National Anti-Tuberculosis Council, under the leadership of José Palanca, just a few months after the outbreak of the civil war in 1936, and the provision of sanatoria beds was a recurring theme in both domestic and international propaganda.[50] Francoist experts were influenced

[44] Jiménez Lucena, 'El tifus exantemático'.

[45] Weindling, *Epidemics and Genocide*, 323. In December 1941 the Spanish newspaper *ABC* claimed that a German researcher working in Seville had succeeded in developing a new form of typhus vaccine. See 'La Medicina y los Médicos', *ABC*, 19 December 1941, 12.

[46] G. Clavero del Campo and F. Pérez Gallardo, *Técnicas de laboratorio en el tifus exantemático* (Madrid: Imprenta de Prensa Española, 1943), 11.

[47] 'La Medicina y los Médicos', *ABC*, 19 December 1941, 12; Primitivo Quintana López, *Sociedad, cambio social y problemas de salud* (Madrid: Real Academia Nacional de Medicina, 1966), 206.

[48] José Palanca, 'Los servicios sanitarios españoles a través de la guerra de liberación', *Actualidad Médica*, 18 (1942), 1–12.

[49] Jorge Molero Mesa, 'Health and Public Policy in Spain during the Early Francoist Regime (1936–1951): The Tuberculosis Problem', in Iris Löwy and John Krige (eds), *Images of Disease: Science, Public Policy and Health in Post-War Europe* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Union, 2001), 141–66.

[50] An example of the use of tuberculosis within the regime's international propaganda can be seen in 'Spanish Letter', *The Tablet*, 27 August 1938, 11.

by the tuberculosis control policies adopted by other authoritarian European governments, with Spanish journals carrying frequent reports on developments in Italy, Germany, and Hungary.[51] Fascist Italy had introduced a tuberculosis insurance scheme in 1927, which the Falange proposed to copy in Spain during the civil war, and which loomed large in Spanish thinking on the construction of a modern social welfare system.[52] The relationship between the National Anti-Tuberculosis Council and its equivalents in Germany and Italy formed the foundation of international cooperation during the Second World War, with the three organizations regularly sending experts to speak at each other's conferences and organizing tours, exchanges, and research visits after 1939.[53]

The result of these efforts, and the centrepiece of Palanca and Quintana's tour, was the International Tuberculosis Conference in Berlin. Spain's delegation included the director of the National School of Public Health, Gerardo Clavero Campo, and leading figures from the National Antituberculosis Council. It had been organized by Leonardo Conti and the president of the Reich Tuberculosis Committee, Otto Walter, with the stated goal of forging international cooperation at a time when the mass movement of people across Europe, particularly migrant workers, risked sparking the kind of tuberculosis epidemic witnessed during the First World War.[54] The new International Association against Tuberculosis, its leaders proposed, would help disseminate experiences and ideas through a biannual 'world conference' and a multilingual international journal. Its structure reflected the political hierarchies of the Nazi New Order. Germany and Italy were assigned the most senior roles, while more junior positions were granted to key allies such as Hungary and Spain. In reality, however, the association remained under German control, with its headquarters in Berlin and Otto Walter placed in charge of its administrative committee. The 1941 conference was primarily intended to begin preparations for post-war cooperation, but the delegates also began to draw up ambitious plans for the immediate treatment of migrant workers, occupational therapy, and the collection of epidemiological statistics.[55]

[51] The Department of Health's official journal published three articles on European tuberculosis policies between 1938 and 1939: J. L'Eltore, 'Notas sobre la Organización Antituberculoso en Italia', *Revista de Sanidad e Higiene Pública*, 5 (1938), 338–41; José Argemi Lloveras, 'La ley del Seguro Obligatorio contra la Tuberculosis en Italia', *Revista de Sanidad e Higiene Pública*, 6 (1938), 373–8; José Argemi Lloveras, 'La Obra Antituberculosa Escolar en Hungría', *Revista de Sanidad e Higiene Pública*, 7 (1939), 444–57.

[52] Jorge Molero Mesa, 'Enfermedad y previsión social en España durante el primer franquismo (1936–1951): el frustrado seguro obligatorio contra la tuberculosis', *Dynamis*, 14 (1994), 199–225.

[53] See, for example, the reports on visits of Italian experts to Spain and international participation in German conferences in *Lotta Contro La Tubercuolosi*, anno 12, 7 (1941), 448, and anno 13, 10 (1942), 271.

[54] 'La fondazione dell'Associazione Internazionale contro la Tubercolosi', *Lotta Contro La Tubercuolosi*, anno 13, 3 (1942), 236–59.

[55] 'La fondazione', 250; 'L'associazione internazionale contro la tubercolosi', *Revista Italiana d'Igiene*, vol. 20, 1 (1942), 78–9.

The language used at the conference reflected Nazi efforts to position themselves within the traditions of international scientific cooperation, and to present the proposed International Association against Tuberculosis as an improved version of the pre-war international health system. Otto Walter lamented that international efforts in the past had not always been easy or effective, but argued that the war had brought the peoples of Europe into much closer contact than ever before, ushering in a new era of 'intimate collaboration'.[56] He presented the field of public health as the perfect vehicle for strengthening international cooperation, on the grounds that 'no state wishes to become better than the others in preserving the health of its own people'.[57] The new association, he argued, would represent an improved form of international health, and would prove more effective than the pre-war International Union against Tuberculosis by going beyond sterile debates at conferences to foster regular, active exchange between experts in different countries and by directly shaping national policies.[58] Leonardo Conti, meanwhile, dwelt on the need to respond to an international problem with international solutions, and argued that the success of this new form of cross-border cooperation would rest on the ideological unity of the nations involved, 'intimately connected peoples, who constitute a bloc with a common destiny'.[59] The scientific mission of the conference presented analogies, he argued, with the political mission of the Anti-Comintern Pact meeting taking place in Berlin at the same time. Joint work in the field of tuberculosis would be the foundation stone for wider social cooperation across Europe, helping not only to win the war but to forge a better post-war world.[60]

The 1941 tuberculosis conference, then, consciously borrowed from the language and practices of pre-war internationalism. And a similar approach was adopted by Nazi authorities across many other scientific and cultural fields during the war. In some instances they founded new 'international' or 'European' bodies bringing together cultural, technical, or professional groups, such as the organizations for European youth, women, and writers set up between 1941 and 1942. In others they appropriated existing international organizations which had either fallen under direct German control or were of practical interest to Nazi authorities. In the field of health, for example, German officials attempted to transfer the International Office of Public Hygiene (*Office International d'Hygiène Publique*; OIHP) from Paris to Berlin or Vienna, and to 'Europeanize' the Swiss-based International Hospital Federation.[61] In some instances Nazi authorities physically expropriated the sites of pre-war international institutions. When the ILO moved

[56] 'La fondazione', 244. [57] Ibid., 242. [58] Ibid., 244. [59] Ibid., 241.
[60] Ibid., 240–1.
[61] Madeleine Herren and Sacha Zala, *Netzwerk Aussenpolitik: Internationale Kongresse und Organisationen als Instrumente der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, 1914–1950* (Zurich: Chronos, 2002), 216–17; Iris Borowy, 'Freundschaft, Feindschaft, Neutralität? Die LNHO des Völkerbundes und das Deutsche Reich während des Zweiten Weltkriegs', in Wolfgang U. Eckart and Alexander Neumann (eds), *Medizin im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Militärmedizinische Praxis und medizinische Wissenschaft im 'Totalen Krieg'* (Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), 34.

to Montreal in 1940, the German Labour Front attempted to occupy its former headquarters in Geneva and transform the Central Office for Joy and Labour into an alternative international labour organization.[62]

Beyond these rather superficial attempts to expropriate the trappings of pre-war internationalism, Nazi authorities also demonstrated a willingness to borrow ideas and practices from liberal international organizations when the occasion demanded. The wartime dispute between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania, for example, prompted Nazi authorities to adopt the language of international mediation and minority rights to defuse a potentially damaging conflict between its Axis rivals. The joint German-Italian commission they established to address the issue echoed many of the goals, assumptions, and practices of its precursors within the League of Nations.[63] While the New Order for Europe was pitched as just that, a *new* model of European cooperation for a new political era, the events and initiatives surrounding it often echoed older models of international cooperation. For many who engaged with these initiatives, particularly from outside Germany, it represented a continuation of pre-war internationalism adapted to the circumstances of wartime Europe, a form of Axis internationalism.

Many of these initiatives were aimed at establishing German hegemony over influential technical bodies. But the evidence from the International Tuberculosis Conference also suggests that they were remarkably successful in attracting support from experts who had worked with ‘mainstream’ international organizations prior to the war, or would go on to do so in the post-war era. This was particularly true in the case of Spain. José Palanca, for example, was a former Rockefeller Fellow who had been Spain’s representative at the OIHP before the civil war and would be Spain’s lead delegate to the WHO from 1951.[64] Primitivo de la Quintana also worked with the WHO in the 1950s, while Gerardo Clavero Campo worked with both the WHO and UNICEF.[65] Like José Palanca, Clavero Campo was happy to maintain links with the Rockefeller Foundation, the LNHO, and Nazi Germany throughout the Second World War, reflecting a professional enthusiasm for international health which appeared to transcend political boundaries.[66]

Other delegates at the conference had a similar international pedigree. The Hungarian bacteriologist Jósef Tomcsik had worked with the Rockefeller

[62] Sandrine Kott, ‘Fighting for War or Preparing for Peace? The ILO during the Second World War’, *Journal of Modern European History*, 12 (2014), 359–76.

[63] Holly Case, *Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 151–74.

[64] Palanca, *Medio siglo*, 62, 94–4, 159–63.

[65] *Académicos Numerarios del Instituto de España. 1938–2004* (Madrid: Instituto de España, 2005), 179.

[66] League of Nations Archive, Geneva (LONA), Registry Files 1933–1947, Section 8a, Series 15197, R. 6118, Biraud to Gautier, 22 March 1943 and 6 June 1943.

Foundation in the interwar period.[67] The German social hygienist Wilhelm Hagen, officially representing the General Government at the conference, went on to work with the WHO after the war.[68] Both Niels Sjorslev from Denmark and Edouard Rist from France attended the first post-war meeting of the re-formed International Union against Tuberculosis in 1950.[69] The overlap of participants between liberal and Nazi-led organizations illustrates the success of Nazi authorities in presenting their wartime plans as a continuation of pre-war international health, and the willingness of European experts to accept Nazi leadership during a period of global dislocation when pre-war international networks had largely broken down.

It also demonstrates the success of Axis internationalism in attracting participants from across the political spectrum of the European right. The background of Spanish experts involved with Nazi Germany illustrates the willingness of traditional, conservative elites to engage with Axis internationalism, particularly during the first half of the war. The majority of health-related cooperation between Spain and the Third Reich involved the Spanish Department of Health and the relatively moderate conservative experts who belonged to it. The department formed part of the Interior Ministry (*Ministerio de la Gobernación*), led in 1941 by the monarchist Valentín Galarza, a prominent opponent of the Falange within the Franco regime. Over the course of the 1940s the department was involved in an ongoing power struggle with the Falange over control of the Spanish health system.[70] It was dominated by military, Catholic, and monarchist figures, representatives of the National Catholicism that lay at the heart of the early Franco regime.[71] These conservative elites, in contrast to their Falangist counterparts, were generally more ambivalent towards Nazi ideology and traditionally much more hostile towards the idea of European unity and cooperation.[72] Of the department's experts who cooperated most closely with Nazi authorities, José Palanca came from a family of military doctors and had served as a parliamentary deputy with the right-wing CEDA party under the Second Republic, while Primitivo de la Quintana went on to join the monarchist opposition to Franco after the Second

[67] Hans Girsberger, *Who's Who in Switzerland, Including the Principality of Liechtenstein* (Zurich: Central European Times Publishing, 1955), 418.

[68] WHO Institutional Repository for Data Sharing (WHO IRIS), Report on First Session of the International Anti-Venereal Disease Commission of the Rhine, 21 Dec 1951. http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/128169/1/EB9_39_eng.pdf (accessed 15 June 2015).

[69] *XIe Conférence de l'Union internationale contre la tuberculose, Copenhague, 3–6 Septembre 1950* (Copenhagen: A. Busck, 1951).

[70] Esteban Rodríguez Ocaña, *Salud pública en España: ciencia, profesión y política, siglos XVIII–XX* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2005), 109.

[71] Molero Mesa and Jiménez Lucena, 'Salud y burocracia', 71.

[72] Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (London: Fontana Press, 1995), 343–505; Rafael García Pérez, 'La idea de la "Nueva Europa" en el pensamiento nacionalista española de la inmediata posguerra, 1939–1944', *Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales*, 5 (1990), 203–40.

World War.[73] Nevertheless, these conservative experts proved just as willing to work with Nazi Germany as their Falangist counterparts, and in many instances the two groups were involved in the same networks and initiatives.

For many Falangist social experts on the other hand, engagement with the Third Reich and the Nazi New Order came primarily through the Blue Division, and particularly through its medical services. The Blue Division's volunteers believed that they were fighting for a common European cause, defending the continent and its civilization against the threat of Asiatic bolshevism, as both Spanish and Nazi propaganda constantly reminded them. But they also gained direct experience of life within the 'New Europe' they were supposedly fighting for. The journey to the frontline took them through France, Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states. For most, it was the first time in their lives they had left Spain. Often travelling on foot, it brought them into contact with German military and civilian authorities, local populations displaying varying degrees of enthusiasm or hostility, and camps and columns of Soviet prisoners. At the front itself they fought alongside their German comrades and lived among Russian civilians. In the rear areas they experienced the multinational environment of towns such as Riga, Vilnius, and Königsberg, where displaced civilians from across the region and mobilized soldiers from the four corners of Europe rubbed shoulders with cosmopolitan pre-war populations disrupted by the effects of war, occupation, and extermination.

It was the division's medical corps which was required to engage most closely with this international environment. Not only were hospitals dependent on German supplies and liaison officers, but many were staffed by mixed Spanish and German teams. Spanish doctors and nurses worked in German military hospitals. Spanish hospitals employed Polish, Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, and Jewish staff, and treated troops and civilians from a range of different countries. The division's Military Health Group was made up of over 500 personnel drawn from a wide range of backgrounds, including experienced military health professionals and civilian volunteers.[74] Among them were senior health experts from both civilian and military backgrounds, including the main Falangist health and social organizations. They included the Falange's national inspector of health, Armando Muñoz Calero, who served as a front-line surgeon, and José María Guitiérrez del Castillo, the national secretary of the *Sindicato Español Universitario*. Agustín Aznar, Falangist 'old shirt' and national delegate for health, also served in the division but was attached to an anti-tank unit rather than a medical

[73] *Anales de la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas*, 74 (1997), 617–18; Palanca, *Medio siglo*.

[74] Jesús Bescós Torres, 'Misiones de la sanidad militar española en el extranjero: la sanidad militar en la División Azul', *Medicina Militar*, 51 (1995), 184–93. Further information about the division's health services can be found in J.M. Poyato, *Bajo el fuego y sobre el hielo: la sanidad en la campaña de la División Azul* (Madrid: Actas, 2015).

team. Working alongside them were Spanish doctors, surgeons, and newly qualified medical students, as well as nurses from the Falange's Women's Section, the Army Nursing Corps, and the Spanish Red Cross.[75] The first Spanish hospitals were established in October 1941 close to the front line, complemented later by a network of hospitals in the rear, including Riga, Vilnius, Königsberg, and Berlin.[76]

For the most ideologically committed volunteers of the Blue Division, some of the best opportunities to develop their understanding of and links with the Nazi regime came during their time recuperating in these hospitals. Health services in the rear, particularly the Spanish hospitals in Berlin and Königsberg, were used by groups on both sides to promote Hispano-German solidarity. The local Nazi Party, the Hitler Youth, and the Ibero-American Institute all worked closely with the Spanish hospital in Berlin. Regional Nazi organizations in both Berlin and Königsberg were active in providing theatre and sporting tickets for Spanish patients, arranging parties and social events around particular anniversaries and festivals, and delivering food parcels.[77] These activities were supported by local Falangist officials in the Berlin embassy, keen to promote Hispano-German unity and to strengthen the ideological commitment of Blue Division soldiers.

But political beliefs were not the only factor shaping the identification of Spanish volunteers with their German counterparts. Within the Blue Division's medical corps, these ideological factors were combined with a strong professional desire to build positive relations with German colleagues. In keeping with its incorporation into the Wehrmacht, the Military Health Group worked extremely closely with German military medical services.[78] Divisional regulations stipulated that military health personnel should form close ties with their German counterparts and work in accordance with German procedures. A special order was sent from the captain of the Military Health Group to all his officers in March 1942 emphasizing the importance of reflecting the 'intimate unity' of the Hispano-German alliance in relations with their German colleagues and of dealing appropriately with any disagreements.[79] Once the division's medical services were fully established, Spanish hospitals were inspected regularly by German authorities, and German and Spanish officers formed a joint discharge commission to assess the cases of Spanish troops presented for medical discharge. Spanish hospital regulations were amended to reflect German procedures, including rules

[75] Centro de Documentación de Cruz Roja Española, Madrid (CDCRE), box 657, file 14, Mercedes Milá to Marquesa de Valdeiglesias, 9 December 1941, and Mauel Martínez de Tena to Valdeiglesias, 19 December 1941; Luis Suárez Fernández, *Cronica de la Sección Femenina y su tiempo* (Madrid: Nueva Andadura, 1995), 140–2.

[76] Bescós Torres, 'Misiones de la sanidad militar'.

[77] Archivo General Militar de Ávila (AGM), fondo de la *División Española* de *Voluntarios* (DEV), C.2021,1,1, 'Berlin Diario de Operaciones', 1942.

[78] Bescós Torres, 'Misiones de la sanidad militar'.

[79] AGM, DEV, C.2029,8,3, and C.2023,4,1, circular from the Head of Military Health, 30 March 1942.

concerning patient discipline, maintaining cleanliness and order in the hospitals, requests for leave, time of lights out, and the use of regulation pyjamas.[80]

The division worked hard to maintain good relations between Spanish medical personnel and their German colleagues. The monthly reports submitted by Spanish hospitals regularly discussed relations with foreign personnel, and between wounded Spanish troops and their German counterparts. In general these reports painted a positive picture of the relationship between Spanish and German medics. The director of the Königsberg hospital described a 'current of extraordinary camaraderie' between Spanish medical officers and their counterparts at the nearby German hospital, who frequently organized joint scientific, cultural, and social events, and made their facilities and resources available to each other whenever necessary.[81] These positive attitudes were often reciprocated by German health officers. Towards the end of 1941 the German military surgeon, Hans Killian, visited the Spanish frontline hospital in Grigorowo and spent time with the two Spanish surgeons working there who he described as 'cheerful, friendly and helpful', speaking positively about their experience and their knowledge of modern techniques for treating wounds.[82] On both sides, these positive relations were underpinned by a shared professional identity and sense of scientific community. Health experts in the Blue Division, like their civilian counterparts, were particularly motivated by the opportunity to work with colleagues from the prestigious world of German medicine.

But Spanish medical officers were not just required to work closely with their German colleagues. The nature of the Nazi military occupation and the demography of both front and rear areas meant that Spanish medical services incorporated workers and patients from a wide range of national and ethnic backgrounds. Russians, Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Jews all worked in various capacities for Spanish military health services, particularly at hospitals in the rear. Russian prisoners of war were used by the division to carry out menial tasks, including cleaning and orderly duties in hospitals, and on occasion Spanish frontline hospitals also treated Russian civilians.[83] The hospital in Königsberg, for instance, employed Polish, Russian, and Jewish civilians, the majority of whom were women working in nursing and medical auxiliary roles. Other women held more senior posts elsewhere. A female Russian pharmacist worked at the hospital in Grigorowo, and the lab at the Vilnius hospital was run by a female Polish doctor.[84]

[80] AGM, DEV, C.3805,C, 'Orden Interior de las Clínicas (de acuerdo con las instrucciones alemanes)'.

[81] AGM, DEV, C.2024,19,1, Annual Report of the Commander of the Spanish Hospital in Vilnius, 26.

[82] Hans Killian, *In Schatten der Siege: Chirurg am Ilmensee, 1941–1942–1943* (Munich: Ehrenwirth, 1972), 149–50.

[83] AGM, DEV, C.1988,10,2.

[84] José Alvarez Esteban, *Agonia de Europa* (Madrid: Estades, 1947), 371–6.

Spanish medical personnel saw this working environment as an opportunity for the kind of international professional development which had been largely unavailable to them since the start of the civil war. A military dentist, Alfonso Ribera Sanchis, published an account of his time on the Eastern Front in the Falangist newspaper *Arriba* in October 1942, which emphasized the benefits of working within a team comprised of Spanish, German, and Russian practitioners, and with patients from multiple countries. 'In his professional life,' he wrote, 'the orthodontist has few occasions to deepen his understanding of areas that can only be grasped by leaving the *Patria*.'[85] The army journal, *Ejército*, published an article by a military health colonel in June 1942 examining the medical corps in both the German and Soviet armies. The unprecedented scale of the coming conflict between the two largest mechanized armies the world had ever seen, the colonel argued, 'provides ample motives for us as military professionals to try and learn, each within his own sphere, how the pieces of these great war machines function'.[86] The diary of the Blue Division medical captain, Manuel de Cárdenas Rodríguez, recounted his work alongside German, Polish, and Russian doctors, including a renowned Polish surgeon who had been dismissed from his university post by the Germans, and a female Russian doctor who taught him about the development and treatment of typhus.[87] For Spanish medics in the Blue Division, working alongside colleagues from the prestigious world of German medicine could thus represent both a positive social experience and an opportunity for professional development. Such opportunities, however, were not just connected to the chance to work alongside German colleagues, but also reflected a positive attitude towards the wider international experience the Blue Division provided, including the opportunity to work with doctors, nurses, and patients from across the region.

This attitude was reflected in the fact that many of the leading medical figures within the Blue Division had substantial pre-war experience of international health, in both military and civilian fields. Mariano Gómez Ulla, for example, was the Spanish army's head of surgery who travelled to Berlin and the Eastern Front in 1942 to help reorganize the division's health services. His first visit to Germany had come during the First World War, when he had inspected prisoner-of-war camps on behalf of the Red Cross. After serving in the Spanish colonial wars in Morocco, he had established himself as one of the leaders of the international surgical community, holding a Rockefeller fellowship and spending time studying in the US.[88] His counterpart as head of the Spanish army's nursing unit,

[85] Alfonso Ribera Sanchis, 'Odontología de Campaña en la División Azul', *Ser*, 9 (October 1942), 89.

[86] Sebastian Monserrat, 'Sanidad de Campaña en el Reich y la URSS', *Ejército*, 30 (July 1942), 51.

[87] Archivo particular de D. José Manuel de Cárdenas, San Sebastián, 'Diario de Manuel de Cárdenas Rodríguez, Capitán médico de la División Azul (febrero 1942–noviembre 1943)'.

[88] José María Gómez Ulla y Lea, *Mariano Gómez Ulla: un hombre, un cirujano, un militar* (Madrid: Editorial Madrid, 1981), 155–61; R. Navarro Suay and J.F. Plaza Torres, 'Una "hazaña prácticamente desconocida": la participación de médicos militares españoles en la Primera Guerra Mundial', *Sanidad Militar*, 70 (2014), 51–7. On the history of the Rockefeller Foundation and its important role in

Mercedes Milá Nolla, also travelled to the Eastern Front in 1943 to visit the Spanish nurses serving with the division. Her international experience was in the field of civilian nursing, an alumnus of the Red Cross international nursing school in London (a group referred to as the 'Old Internationals'), a Rockefeller fellow, and a frequent participant in international nursing conferences and organizations.[89] The first leader of the Blue Division's medical group from 1941 until July 1942, Alberto Blanco Rodríguez, was also an active member of the international military medicine community and was involved with the International Conference of Military Medicine both before and after the Second World War.[90]

For Spain's military health experts, like their civilian counterparts, there were many different reasons to engage with the Nazi New Order. But for many, working internationally was an ingrained professional habit, a core part of their professional identities. Whether working alongside European colleagues in military hospitals or coming together in international conferences, the kind of opportunities available within the Nazi New Order represented an extension of the forms of internationalism they had been involved with before the Second World War, and would continue to be involved with after it ended.

Social Experts in the 'Totalitarian' Age

But can a commitment to international exchange really explain the willingness of experts from across the Francoist political spectrum to work with Nazi Germany, particularly given that Spain's ambiguous relationship with the Axis powers meant they were free from the direct pressures faced by their counterparts in occupied Europe? In the post-war era many of those most closely involved with the Third Reich sought to emphasize the tensions and areas of disagreement in their relationship with Nazi Germany, presenting them as indicative of a fundamental incompatibility between Spanish principles, whether Falangist or conservative, and the Nazi regime. Primitivo de la Quintana, for example, gave enthusiastic reports to newspapers about his visit to Germany after his return in

international health during the interwar period, see John Farley, *To Cast out Disease: A History of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, 1913–1951* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[89] 'M. Milá Nolla, La mujer en la guerra: enfermeras', in D García-Sabell (ed.), *Los médicos y la medicina en la Guerra Civil Española* (Madrid: Laboratorios Beecham, 1986); 'Entrevista con Mercedes Milá', *Revista de Cruz Roja Española* (October 1984), 44.

[90] Alberto Blanco and Manuel Gómez Durán, *Memoria resumen de una misión de estudios al extranjero* (Madrid: Servicio Geográfico y Cartográfico de Ejército, 1941); *XI Congrés International de Médicine et de Pharmacie Militaires, Basel, du 2 au 7 Juin 1947* (Basel: Compte-Rendu Général Discussions des Rapports et Communitions, 1947).

1941.[91] But following his death in 1996, a contemporary claimed that Quintana's despair at what he witnessed in Nazi-occupied Europe had prompted him to break from the Franco regime and resign from the Department of Health.[92] In his memoirs published in 1964, José Palanca presented his experiences of Nazi Germany in a similarly negative light. He described the tuberculosis conference as 'a small farce', with everyone present aware that Germany was going to lose the war and that plans for a new organization weren't going to bear fruit.[93] As well as criticizing the atheism of the Nazi regime, he also dwelt on the experience of Jews in the General Government territories, claiming he knew that the Nazis weren't interested in combatting the typhus epidemic in ghettos, and describing how he witnessed the head of public health in Warsaw mistreating a Jewish doctor and threatening to send him to a concentration camp.[94]

These sources, however, need to be treated with a degree of caution. It is conceivable that as part of their visit Palanca and Quintana would have come across incidents and attitudes they were uncomfortable with, particularly related to euthanasia policies and the atheism of the Nazi regime. It is even credible that their experiences in the occupied territories, at a time when conditions for Jews and Poles were truly terrible, would have had a profoundly negative affect on a relative moderate such as Quintana. However, these accounts follow a pattern of post-war Spanish memoirs and testimonials which sought to play down links with the Third Reich. Many were written by Blue Division veterans and were coloured by their desire to distance themselves from the discredited Nazi cause, while retaining the more positive pro-European and anti-Bolshevik character of their involvement with the Axis struggle.[95] One way they did this was to emphasize Nazi anti-Semitism and to make clear their opposition to it, a trope absent from accounts published during the war but increasingly prominent after it as awareness of the Holocaust grew in Spanish society.[96] Palanca's story about the Jewish doctor in Warsaw certainly fits this pattern. The autobiography of Pedro Laín Entralgo, another Spanish expert who had worked extensively with Nazi Germany, was at

[91] 'La Medicina y los Médicos', *ABC*, 19 December 1941, 12.

[92] The comments came from Pedro Laín Entralgo, who had himself renounced his support for Nazi Germany and the Franco regime in the post-war period. See Pedro Laín Entralgo, 'En memoria de Primitivo de la Quintana', *El País*, 21 September 1996, 26. Quintana did leave his role in the department towards the end of the war, but continued to hold important positions within the Spanish health system. For more on the post-war trajectory of Pedro Laín Entralgo, see Santos Juliá, '¿Falange liberal o intelectuales fascistas?', *Claves de Razón Práctica*, 121 (2002), 4–13; Michael Richards, *After the Civil War: Making Memory and Re-Making Spain since 1936* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 17–23.

[93] Palanca, *Medio siglo*, 208.

[94] Ibid., 207–9.

[95] Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, '"Russland war nicht schuldig": Die Ostfronterfahrung der spanischen Blauen Division in Selbstzeugnissen und Autobiographien, 1943–2004', in Michael Epkenhans, Stig Förster, and Karen Hagemann (eds), *Militärische Erinnerungskultur: Soldaten im Spiegel von Biographien, Memoiren und Selbstzeugnissen* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöning, 2006).

[96] Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, 'Testigos o encubridores? la División Azul y el Holocausto de los judíos europeos: entre historia y memoria', *Historia y Politica*, 26 (2011), 259–90.

pains to highlight the number of times he had received disapproving looks from Germans for helping elderly Jews to cross the street.[97]

There were, however, genuine ideological disagreements over Nazi attitudes towards racial hygiene, eugenics, and euthanasia which affected Hispano-German cooperation. Spanish attitudes towards race, even among the extreme right, had traditionally been based on ideas of mixture, hybridity, and the fusion of peoples rather than on the idealization of racial purity which underlay Nazi racial thought.[98] Spanish experts, both conservatives and Falangists, also took their lead from the Catholic Church in opposing 'negative' eugenics policies, and were much more comfortable with the idea of a 'positive' Latin eugenics shared by colleagues in Italy, Portugal, and Latin America.[99]

This was reflected in patterns of international cooperation in the fields of population policy and racial hygiene. Demographic concerns underpinned much early Francoist social policy, with a wide range of programmes and institutions established to support Franco's goal of reaching a population of 40 million people.[100] These included infant hygiene services under the control of the Department of Health, compulsory education for mothers organized by the *Sección Femenina* and *Auxilio Social*, and bodies such as the *Instituto de Puericultura*. Spanish experts generally rejected the idea of sterilization, emphasizing instead the need to boost birth rates and lower infant mortality. The field of *puericultura* was central to these policies, distinct from traditional paediatrics in that it concerned itself not just with the control of infant health but also with the reproductive habits of mothers, thereby linking public health policies to forms of social, political, and ideological control.[101] Spanish experts interested in population policies looked towards the 'totalitarian' states which were perceived to be vigorously addressing the problem of demographic decline. But they rejected the idea of active biological selection through abortion or forced sterilization in favour of increasing the quantity of births and moulding the behaviour of parents.[102]

As a result, Spanish interest was focussed much more on the example of Italy than on the policies pursued by the Nazi regime, which raised uncomfortable questions for Catholic experts.[103] Where Germany was cited as an example, it was

[97] Pedro Laín Entralgo, *Descargo de conciencia, 1930–1960* (Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, 1976), 297–8.

[98] Joshua Goode, *Impurity of Blood: Defining Race in Spain, 1870–1930* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2009).

[99] Raquel Álvarez Peláez, 'Eugenesia y fascismo en la España de los años treinta', in Rafael Huertas and Carmen Ortiz (eds), *Ciencia y fascismo* (Madrid: Doce Calles, 1998), 77–96; Marius Turda and Aaron Gillette, *Latin Eugenics in Comparative Perspective* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

[100] Polo Blanco, *Gobierno de las poblaciones*.

[101] Bernabeu-Mestre and Perdiguero-Gil, 'At the Service of Spain'; Polo Blanco, *Gobierno de las poblaciones*.

[102] Bernabeu-Mestre and Perdiguero-Gil, 'At the Service of Spain'.

[103] On Italian eugenics and population policies, see Francesco Cassata, *Building the New Man: Eugenics, Racial Science and Genetics in Twentieth-Century Italy* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011).

generally done with a narrow focus on infant and maternal health services rather than on wider German eugenics policies.[104] A partial exception was Antonito Vallejo Nágera, the organizer of the 1938 German medicine conference in Valladolid, whose work was much more directly influenced by German ideas. A psychiatrist with a background in military medicine, his first experience of Germany had come in 1919 when he formed part of a delegation inspecting German prisoner-of-war camps.[105] As a pioneer of racial hygiene and eugenics in Spain, he was heavily influenced by German psychiatry.[106] After the outbreak of the civil war he was appointed head of the Francoist military psychiatric service, and in that role carried out a range of experiments on Republican prisoners during and after the civil war. Based on politicized psychological theories which linked personality with constitutional predispositions towards Marxism, his experiments focussed on the possibility of ideological conversion for prisoners, and on the nature of Marxist fanaticism, particularly among women. Not only were these experiments influenced by the work of German psychiatrists, but Gestapo officers and Nazi doctors also visited the camps where they were taking place to inform their own research.[107] Vallejo Nágera's ties with Germany were emphasized by his invitations to attend the International Congress of Forensic and Social Medicine in Bonn in 1938, and the abortive International Racial Hygiene Conference in Vienna which was planned for 1940.[108]

However, Vallejo Nágera's interest in Nazi racial hygiene did not reflect a widespread embrace of Nazi eugenics policies among Francoist experts. Italian population and demographic policies, in contrast, were widely disseminated in Spain through conferences, exchanges, and medical journals.[109] In September 1940 a population sciences congress in Porto brought together population experts from Spain, Portugal, and Italy, including the famous Italian demographer

[104] See, for example, the three articles published by the Spanish gynaecologist Peña Regidor on German maternity hospitals, maternity legislation, and the mother and infant health service over the course of 1943. 'La obra social de auxilio a la madre y al niño en Alemania', *Ser*, 12 (January 1943), 77; 'Nueva ley social de la protección a la maternidad en Alemania', *Ser*, 19 (August 1943), 100; 'Los Hogares Maternales y su importancia medicosocial en Alemania', *Ser*, 23–4 (November–December 1943), 52.

[105] Michael Richards, 'Antonio Vallejo Nágera: Heritage, Psychiatry and War', in Alejandro Quiroga and Miguel Ángel del Arco (eds), *Right-Wing Spain in the Civil War Era: Soldiers of God and Apostles of the Fatherland, 1914–45* (London: Continuum, 2012), 207.

[106] Michael Richards, 'Spanish Psychiatry c. 1900–1945: Constitutional Theory, Eugenics, and the Nation', *Bulletin of Spanish Studies*, 81 (2010), 823–48.

[107] Richards, 'Antonio Vallejo Nágera', 199; See also Michael Richards, 'Morality and Biology in the Spanish Civil War: Psychiatrists, Revolution and Women Prisoners in Malaga', *Contemporary European History*, 10 (2001), 395–421.

[108] AAPA, Madrid Botschaft 641, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores to Auswärtiges Amt, 18 September 1938, and telegram San Sebastián to Auswärtiges Amt, 19 August 1939. Vallejo Nágera was unable to attend the International Congress of Forensic and Social Medicine but did submit two papers for consideration, one of which was published in the conference proceedings.

[109] See the various articles on Italian demographic policies published in the Falangist medical journal *Ser* and the *Revista de Sanidad e Higiene Pública* between 1939 and 1943.

Corrado Gini.[110] In 1942 the head of infant hygiene services at the Department of Health, Juan Bosch Marin, published a monograph based on a conference held at the Italian Institute of Culture entitled *How Mussolini's Italy Has Resolved the Demographic Problem*.[111] Progress in this field, Bosch Marín argued, was one of the finest achievements of Mussolini's government, which had been uniquely successful in addressing a problem that was besetting the whole of civilized Europe. This success he ascribed to the 'firmness and characteristic efficiency of fascism', which had attacked the causes of negative demographics by putting in place positive eugenic measures to stimulate population. These measures focussed on the institutions of marriage and the family, and were based on the 'moral climate' Mussolini had created.[112] The model of positive 'Latin eugenics' promoted in fascist Italy and underpinned by Catholic values was much more compatible with Francoist attitudes than the 'negative eugenics' pursued by the Nazi regime.

Beyond these immediate fields, however, there is little evidence that ideological tensions placed any significant constraints on Hispano-German cooperation. Communication between Spanish experts and their German colleagues was facilitated by a shared set of assumptions concerning modern health and social policy, its role in national regeneration, and the relationship between the state and the individual. Despite their ideological differences, for example, both regimes used the fight against infectious diseases as a means to exert political control over undesirable populations and social groups. In Nazi-occupied east-central Europe, the language, techniques, and technologies of typhus control were intimately bound up with the control and destruction of Jewish populations.[113] In Spain, typhus was used as a tool to exert social control and to legitimize the Franco regime, with the disease blamed on moral and material failings in the Republican zone and on 'proletarian grime' in Madrid.[114] In a similar way, tuberculosis control was used by both governments, and by many other authoritarian regimes across Europe, as a means of controlling working-class communities and of reinforcing political discourses around race and social hygiene. In Nazi Germany the idea of the 'malicious' tuberculosis patient endangering the wider population by refusing treatment was used to justify forced hospitalization, and the right of tuberculosis patients to marry was restricted in order to prevent the dissemination

[110] *Revista de Sanidad e Higiene Pública*, 1 (1941), 92.

[111] Juan Bosch Marin, *Como ha resuelto la Italia de Mussolini el problema demográfico* (Madrid: Dirección General de Sanidad, 1942).

[112] Ibid., 16 and 33.

[113] Weindling, *Epidemics and Genocide*.

[114] Isabel Jiménez Lucena, *El tifus en la Malaga de la postguerra: un estudio historicomédico en torno a una enfermedad colectiva* (Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1990); Jiménez Lucena, 'El tifus exantemático'.

of their 'inferior genotype'.[115] Anti-tuberculosis campaigns in Spain after the civil war combined disease control with political indoctrination, focussing on changing the malignant habits of the poor.[116]

These overlapping approaches to disease control reflected the shared assumptions which underlay discussions between Spanish and German experts. Both groups were comfortable with the idea that, when it came to the control of infectious diseases, the needs of *Volk* or *Raza* trumped individual or civil rights. When Leonardi Conti told the International Tuberculosis Conference that no other disease was so associated 'with the health and the social life of... the State', that public health experts were 'generals' in the 'battle' against the disease, and that the medical officials working under them were the 'weapons with which we penetrate our sick family communities', his language would not have appeared strange or unfamiliar to Spanish delegates.[117]

Spanish experts also saw themselves as part of a new era of health and social policy which encompassed the 'totalitarian' European states, enabling them to overlook the ideological and political differences between themselves and their German counterparts. This was partly reflected in the Francoist concept of 'social medicine'. Francoist social medicine should not be confused with the pre-war liberal movement of the same name. Despite its rhetoric, Francoist public health largely abandoned the focus on the social dimensions of health policy which had characterized the Republican era.[118] Instead, it represented a loosely defined idea that the significance of the sick individual lay in his or her relationship to the social body and to the strength and productivity of the nation, and that the state should therefore manage the nation's health on a collective basis.[119] The Spanish experts most closely involved with Nazi Germany were at the forefront of this new thinking about the state's role in health and medicine.

In February 1942, shortly after returning from separate trips to Germany, both Primitivo de la Quintana and Pedro Laín Entralgo published articles on medicine and the state which shed light on these shared beliefs.[120] The articles were remarkably similar, both recounting the history of the relationship between

[115] Syvelyn Hähner-Rombach, 'The Construction of the "Anti-Social TB-Patient" in the Interwar Years in Germany and the Consequences for the Patients', in Iris Borowy and Wolf D. Gruner (eds), *Facing Illness in Troubled Times* (Berlin: Peter Lang Verlag, 2005), 345–64.

[116] Molero Mesa, 'Health and Public Policy'.

[117] 'La fondazione dell'Associazione Internazionale contro la Tubercolosi', *Lotta Contro La Tubercuolosi*, anno 13, 3 (1942), 250.

[118] Pedro Marset Campos, José Miguel Sáez Gómez, and Fernando Martínez Navarro, 'La salud pública durante el franquismo', *Dynamis*, 15 (1995), 211–50; Rodríguez Ocaña, *Salud pública*, 89–111.

[119] Isabel Jiménez Lucena, 'Medicina social, racismo y discurso de la desigualdad en el primer franquismo', in Rafael Huertas and Carmen Ortiz (eds), *Ciencia y fascismo* (Madrid: Doce Calles, 1998), 111–27; José Martínez-Pérez and Mercedes Del Cura, 'Bolstering the Greatness of the Homeland: Productivity, Disability and Medicine in Franco's Spain, 1938–1966', *Social History of Medicine*, 28 (2015), 805–24.

[120] Sí was a weekly supplement of the newspaper *Arriba*.

medicine and the state from Ancient Greece to the present day, and presenting the increasingly close ties between the two as the inevitable outcome of political, social, and scientific progress. Both emphasized the fact that Spanish health and social policy was entering a new era in which the care of the sick individual was not only valuable in and of itself but also, in the words of Quintana, 'for the threat to the collective that he represents'.[121] For Laín Entralgo, the driving force for doctors and policy makers in this new era was the 'imperious necessity to attend sufficiently to the multitude'.[122] This focus on collective, state-led medical systems was not, of course, the sole preserve of the Axis states and their allies, and the practice of medicine and public health in Nazi-occupied Europe bore little resemblance to the utopian language of progressive interwar social medicine. Many Spanish experts, however, believed that they formed part of the common endeavour shared by what Laín Entralgo referred to as 'the totalitarian states', united by the need to resolve the damaging legacy of the pre-war democracies and to forge a new era of collective health and social policy.[123]

The idea that Europe's 'totalitarian' states represented the future of social policy was reflected in the research carried out for Spain's new health insurance scheme, the *Seguro Obligatorio de Enfermedad* (SOE), during the early years of the war. Plans for a new health insurance system, originally drawn up under the Second Republic, were revived after the civil war by the first Francoist cabinet.[124] From the very beginning the SOE was the site of both cooperation and conflict between the regime's various factions, particularly the Falange and figures within the Department of Health and the National Welfare Institute (*Instituto Nacional de Previsión*; INP), which was responsible for drawing up the proposals. The INP had traditionally been dominated by sociologists and economists from Spain's centre-right and social Catholic traditions. But its position within the Ministry of Labour meant that it fell under the sway of the Falange with the appointment of the prominent Falangist, Girón de Velasco, as minister in May 1941. Preparations for the new insurance scheme began in July of that year, and the planning committees consisted of a mixture of social Catholics, technocrats, and Falangists, the latter intent on ensuring the new system would fall under their control.[125]

Despite these tensions, the various groups were united in looking towards the countries of the Nazi New Europe for inspiration. In 1941 the INP published a detailed study on the social insurance schemes in the 'totalitarian states', focussing

[121] Primitivo de Quintana 'Medicina y Estado', *Sí*, 1 February 1942, 11.

[122] Laín Entralgo, 'Medicina y Política', *Sí*, 1 February 1942, 3.

[123] Ibid.

[124] Campos et al., 'La salud pública durante el franquismo'; Margarita Vilar-Rodríguez and Jerònia Pons-Pons, 'The Introduction of Sickness Insurance in Spain in the First Decades of the Franco Dictatorship (1939–1962)', *Social History of Medicine*, 26 (2012), 267–87.

[125] Arturo Álvarez Rosete, *Social Welfare Policies in Non-Democratic Regimes: The Development of Social Insurance Schemes in Franco's Spain, 1936–50* (PhD thesis: University of Nottingham, 2003).

on Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Romania.[126] Social security in these states, according to the study, was fundamentally different from liberal regimes. Ignoring the extensive planning for post-war welfare reform being carried out by the Allies, it argued that the focus on collective and family welfare which lay at the heart of the 'totalitarian theory' of social security had 'come to fill a void and resolve a problem which has never, until now, been solved'.[127]

The conviction that the model for Spain's welfare system lay within the totalitarian states of the New Europe was reflected in the INP's practical research into social insurance programmes across Germany, Italy, and occupied Europe during the war, which involved both Falangist and conservative experts. Among them was Primitivo de la Quintana, who had been a member of the INP's governing body since 1939, and who was the Department of Health's representative on the SOE preparatory committee from 1941. In this role he was able to combine his Department of Health trip to Germany in 1941 with an INP study group sent to investigate the design of social security and health insurance provision in Germany, Italy, and occupied Czechoslovakia.[128] This visit was followed in 1943 by a further study group sent to central Europe by the INP, led by the Falangist secretary general of ex-combatants Sebastián Criado del Rey, which looked in particular at the administration of health insurance programmes, including at the German firm Siemens and at welfare institutions in Prague and Budapest.[129] This focus on 'totalitarian' social insurance systems lasted until the military tide had clearly turned against Nazi Germany, after which the social Catholics within the INP began to regain some control from the Falange and the emphasis shifted to the US and United Kingdom (UK), in particular to the model provided by the Beveridge report.[130]

Mutual Self-Interest and German Hegemony

Whether real or perceived, the shared ideals which united Spanish and German experts were underpinned by a mutual self-interest. But they were also undermined by Germany's hegemonic position and the tensions which stemmed from it. Acting internationally during the early years of the war provided clear practical, professional, and political benefits for experts on both sides. For officials in the Spanish Department of Health, good relations with Nazi authorities were

[126] Pedro Arnaldos Gimeno, *Los seguros sociales en los estados totalitarios* (Madrid: Publicaciones del Instituto Nacional de Previsión, 1941).

[127] Ibid., 351.

[128] Quintana López, *Sociedad*, 201–8.

[129] *Anuario del Instituto Nacional de Previsión, 1943* (Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Previsión, 1944), 86–118.

[130] Arturo Álvarez Rosete, '¡Bienvenido, Mister Beveridge! El viaje de William Beveridge a España y la previsión social franquista', *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, 17 (2004), 105–16.

necessary to help secure vital supplies of drugs and vaccines during a period of global shortages when Germany dominated European distribution networks. José Palanca, for example, used his links with German officials to purchase pharmaceutical products on a number of occasions during the war.[131] Other Spanish experts, however, were primarily motivated by the traditional prestige of German science and medicine, and by their personal experiences of studying or working in the country prior to 1936. Many of the experts who cooperated with the Third Reich, including Primitivo de la Quintana, had spent time studying in Germany during the 1920s and early 1930s and had maintained links with German colleagues.[132] The reputation of German science and medicine meant that they valued the opportunity to work with German colleagues regardless of the political circumstances.

As a result, Spanish professional and educational organizations actively promoted academic exchanges with Nazi Germany during the war. Chief among these was the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Madrid. Its location and prestige meant that it was able to use its relationship with the German embassy and the AHG to maintain links with German universities and experts. From 1940 the embassy began to provide the faculty with German scientific journals, to organize visits from German scholars, and to arrange for Spanish researchers to study in Berlin.[133] These contacts were facilitated by the dean of the faculty, Fernando Enríquez de Salamanca, who undertook a lecture tour to Germany in July 1942 organized by the DIAA and the German Academic Exchange Service.[134] The university also sent students to study in Germany throughout the war. After being disrupted by the Spanish Civil War, scholarships from both the Spanish and German governments began to be granted again from 1938, with medical journals advertising courses in Germany in the summer of 1939 organized by the Reich Medical Association.[135] Numbers remained relatively low until 1941 due to Spain's failure to ratify the cultural agreement with Germany. But after 1941 scholarships were provided by a range of organizations, including the Humboldt Foundation, the Reich Medical Association, and the Spanish Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs. The majority of those who travelled to Germany were students at a relatively early stage of their careers, although some were senior researchers.[136]

[131] 'El director general de Sanidad ha regresado de su viaje a Italia y Alemania', *La Vanguardia*, 16 December 1941, 8; Palanca, *Medio siglo*, 206–20.

[132] Quintana López, *Sociedad*, 201–8.

[133] Carolina Rodríguez López, 'La Universidad de Madrid como scenario de las relaciones hispano-alemanas en el primer franquismo (1939–1951)', *Ayer*, 69 (2008), 101–28.

[134] GStA, DIAA, 218 A, 18, DIAA to Deutschen Akademischen Austauschdient, 14 July 1942.

[135] *Revista de Sanidad e Higiene Pública*, 6 (1939), 540.

[136] BArch, DSG, R 64–1, 27; Rodríguez López, 'La Universidad de Madrid'. Amongst the latter group was Vicente Sanchis Olmos, head of the Orthopaedic and Traumatology Service at the Red Cross Hospital in Madrid who would go on to be the first president of the Spanish Rehabilitation and Physical Medicine Society and to carry out internationally recognized research into polio after the war.

These forms of exchange were also beneficial for German authorities. Despite the economic impact of the war, various German institutions continued to provide generous financial support for exchange programmes. While they were in Germany, Spanish students and researchers received funding from the Reich Medical Association, the DIAA and, above all, the DSG. Within the DSG, funding was organized by Edith Faupel, wife of the former ambassador Wilhelm Faupel, who corresponded extensively with Spanish doctors. Although not providing full scholarships directly, the DSG liaised with the Reich Medical Association and other bodies regarding scholarship applications and payments, and had a welfare fund which awarded grants of 150–300 Reichsmarks to students in financial need. Students were placed in hospitals and universities throughout the Reich, with the most popular areas being Berlin, Vienna, and Breslau (present-day Wrocław). The Breslau connection arose primarily due to a grant of 10,000 Reichsmarks donated by the Hispanist and businessman Siegfried Goosens in October 1942 specifically for Spanish doctors who wished to undertake study or research in the city.[137] The money was administered by Faupel at the DSG, who worked with the Reich Medical Association to organize placements for students.

As well as forming part of Nazi cultural diplomacy during the period, medical ties with Spain and the other Axis powers were also used to help meet Germany's military and economic needs during the war. The International Tuberculosis Conference, for example, was accompanied by a meeting between José Palanca, Leonardo Conti, and the public health ministers of Italy and Hungary, in which Conti sealed agreements regarding Italian treatment for wounded German soldiers and Spanish purchase of German pharmaceutical supplies.[138]

At the end of the following year the German government was able to use its strong relationship with the Spanish Department of Health to reach an agreement for Spanish doctors to work in German hospitals. As the war developed Germany had begun to face a serious shortage of doctors in civilian hospitals. Franco's government had already begun to send workers to help cover labour shortages in the Reich under the Interministerial Commission for the Dispatch of Workers to Germany programme (*Comisión Interministerial para el Envío de Trabajadores a Alemania*; CIPETA). In October 1942 the Reich Labour Ministry approached CIPETA about incorporating doctors into the scheme.[139] At least twelve Spanish doctors left for Germany in 1943, with a further forty departing in 1944, the last of them as late as in July. They represented a wide range of specializations and were sent to work at locations across the Reich.[140] The Spanish Department of Health

[137] BArch, DSG, R 64-1, 40, Faupel to Goossens, 23 October 1942.

[138] Palanca, *Medio siglo*, 219–20.

[139] Archivo General de la Administración, Alcalá de Henares (AGA), (14)1.15 74/16260, Olay to Palanca, 8 October 1942. For background on the CIPETA scheme, see José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, *Los esclavos españoles de Hitler* (Barcelona: Planeta, 2002).

[140] AGA (14)1.15 74/16254 and 16255.

justified its agreement partly on the grounds of the professional opportunities the scheme would provide for those involved. But at a time of high Spanish mortality and morbidity rates in the aftermath of the civil war, when the country was facing a shortage of qualified personnel following the death, persecution, or exile of large parts of the Spanish medical profession, the decision clearly prioritized relations with Germany over the interests of the Spanish health system.[141] From a German perspective it could not have been achieved without the close ties already developed with Spanish health authorities.

Germany's rapid military successes at the start of the Second World War also provided an opportunity for German experts to achieve the long-held dream of replacing France as the centre of European science and medicine. This was reflected in the prominent involvement of professional groups such as the Reich Medical Association in international initiatives during the war.[142] At the same time, Germany's political hegemony and the obvious dominance of German experts meant that the new forms of international cooperation they attempted to create were fundamentally different from those which had existed prior to the war. Rather than building a genuine international network, in which ideas and individuals could move in different directions between more or less equal nodes independently of the control of one group or organization, the form of international health that developed in the early years of the war looked much more like a web, with international links radiating out from Germany but little genuine cooperation independent of it. In the case of Spain, this was reflected in the centrality of relations with Nazi Germany, at least until 1942. Despite their shared religious faith and Catholic-inspired distrust of Nazi eugenics, for example, Spanish health and social links with Italy remained more limited than those with Germany throughout the war.[143] The language and forms of pre-war internationalism that were used by Nazi Germany after 1939 masked a very different vision of what the 'international' should be, a vision in which the strict political hierarchies of the New Order were reflected in the unquestioned dominance of German goals and interests.

Spanish experts were acutely aware of the hierarchical and coercive nature of life under the Nazi New Order. It was particularly evident to those working in the Blue Division, who could see first-hand that the Eastern Front was not a positive international environment conducive to professional exchange and development, but one in which the local people working in Spanish hospitals were doing so in a context of occupation and violence. Although the subject was generally avoided in official correspondence, the division's medical staff were aware of the coercion which underlay their relations with local civilians. This was particularly the case

[141] AGA, (14)1.15 74/16260, Olay to Palanca, 8 October 1942.
[142] Weindling, *Epidemics and Genocide*, 246.
[143] Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Imperio de papel*, 208–9.

with the Jews who worked in Spanish hospitals, most notably in Vilnius and Riga, where Spanish troops were conscious of the treatment of the city's Jewish inhabitants and the limited protection provided by hospital work.[144] Neither divisional records nor the memoir literature make clear how Jewish and other local civilian staff were recruited, or the degree of coercion involved in their employment. Hospital reports, however, showed a consistent concern with the levels of discipline among foreign staff members. While their behaviour was generally described as good, the annual report of the director of the Vilnius hospital in 1942 suggested this was 'due to their [the foreign workers'] political situation, which perhaps more from fear than anything else obliges them to behave in this way'.[145] Even if the employment of local civilians did not constitute forced labour, it was almost certainly backed up by fear of punishment or penury if discipline was not maintained. The persistent interest in the discipline of foreign staff suggests that, while they generally posed no problems, divisional commanders were conscious of the potential risks posed by local staff in occupied regions treating Spanish troops.

But more than the pernicious effects of Nazi occupation or the ideological differences between the two regimes, it was the overt German hegemony and the subordinate role of Spain, both real and perceived, which caused the most tension between Spanish and German experts. The poor treatment of Spanish volunteers and the perception that, although formally valued allies, they were openly treated as cultural and racial inferiors by the German authorities, was a constant complaint of the Spanish workers sent to Germany.[146] Although few similar complaints by Spanish social experts were made publicly at the time, and claims in later memoirs must be treated with caution, contemporary records suggest they faced similar issues.

Once again, it was Spanish experts working in the Blue Division who were most obviously exposed to these tensions. The division's medical officers constantly complained about disrespectful treatment by German soldiers, often struggling to assert their authority in front of German troops. One particular report described a military health lieutenant at the Königsberg hospital who was doused in water by a German soldier while sunbathing. The soldier refused to give his name, as did a passing German officer who witnessed the incident, forcing the hospital authorities to report the matter to the German liaison office.[147] German officers made continued complaints about the failure of Spanish troops to follow basic standards of dress and behaviour, and Spanish authorities often responded by bemoaning

[144] Núñez Seixas, 'Testigos'.
[145] AGM, DEV, C.2024,19,1, Annual Report of the Commander of the Spanish Hospital in Vilnius, 26.
[146] Marició Janué i Miret, '"Woe Betide Us if They Win!": National Socialist Treatment of the Spanish "Volunteer" Workers', *Contemporary European History*, 23 (2014), 329–57.
[147] AGM, DEV, C.2027,7,2, 25.

the German obsession with what they saw as petty regulations. Spanish medical staff were frustrated by the approach of German military administrators who were responsible for overseeing the running of Spanish hospitals and ensuring they were appropriately supplied. One report from the Berlin hospital asked for these duties to be transferred to Spanish officials on the grounds that German officers spent less time on procuring adequate supplies than they did on complaining about breaches of regulations. 'Due to their psychology, their discipline and their character,' the hospital's director wrote, 'they [the Germans] consider things of no consequence important.'[148] The focus on relations with German colleagues in monthly reports and the official reminders to ensure disagreements were handled appropriately reflected the extent of the tensions between German and Spanish teams, and the concerns these tensions caused among divisional commanders.

One way in which Spanish medical officers responded to these problems was by separating German and Spanish medical facilities, on the grounds that the treatment of Spanish troops by Germans or in German-run hospitals caused both practical and cultural difficulties. In part this reflected genuine problems that the division faced in keeping track of those wounded troops sent to hospitals across the Reich, even if they recognized the treatment troops were receiving was of good quality. There were also suggestions, however, that cultural and linguistic barriers made Spanish troops uncomfortable with aspects of the care provided in German hospitals. The Spanish hospital in Hof, for example, had originally been a German hospital which began to receive large numbers of Spanish troops in early 1942. The Blue Division agreed with German authorities to transform it into a purely Spanish hospital, transferring out German patients and staff and bringing in a group of Spanish nurses. The result, the hospital director claimed, was 'the disappearance of language problems in questions as delicate as those relating to the economic situation of patients, removal of psychological differences, and improvement in food'.[149] Indeed, the quality of food was an ongoing complaint from Spanish hospitals reliant on German supplies, with frequent reports claiming that German food was unsuited to Spanish troops and considerable efforts made to send certain key food supplies from Spain.[150] Military health officers appreciated the professional opportunities provided by working alongside their German colleagues. But the problems stemming from the unequal power relations between the two groups prompted many to use the idea of insurmountable cultural differences to achieve the practical separation of German and Spanish services.

Outside of the Blue Division, Spanish doctors, researchers, and students who wrote to Edith Faupel at the DSG often did so to request money, suggesting that

[148] AGM, DEV, C.2027,13,3, General Hospital Report, June 1943.
[149] AGM, DEV, C.2024,19,1, Report on the Functioning of the Spanish Hospital at Hof/Saale during 1942.
[150] Ibid.

many were living in straitened financial circumstances. In September 1943 a Spanish doctor wrote to Faupel following a visit to Hungary and commented favourably that there 'it is a great thing to be Spanish', suggesting that this was not generally the case in Germany. The letter prompted a vituperative reply from Faupel denouncing the Hungarians as 'shameful wretches' who avoided all sacrifices in the fight for Europe. 'It seems to me that Germany has given you plenty of evidence that it loves and values the Spanish,' she chided the doctor, 'and I'm very sorry that you don't see it that way.'[151] The correspondence suggests that in some cases, Spanish doctors did not feel that they were sufficiently valued in Germany and that their positions as Spaniards in German society did not reflect the appreciation they felt they merited. Laín Entralgo later summed up the feeling shared by many Spanish experts with direct experience of the Third Reich. 'As a southerner and Mediterranean,' he wrote, 'I knew at the end of the day that the Nazis despised me.'[152]

The new forms of international health and welfare which briefly emerged within Nazi-dominated wartime Europe had little lasting impact. Although some of Spain's wartime social policies were influenced by Nazi Germany, the more ambitious plans for a new Nazi-led international social system drawn up in 1941 and 1942 were dealt a blow by defeats on the Eastern Front and the Allied invasion of Italy which radically undermined the political credibility of the Axis cause. And these projects were unavoidably anchored in Nazi efforts to reshape Europe according to its own interests and ideology. Examining them within the wider history of twentieth-century internationalism is not to suggest that this context was in any way peripheral, or that there was any ideological affinity between the liberal internationalism of the pre-war era and the Nazi New Order. What it does do, however, is highlight entanglements and parallels between the two phenomena, not least from the perspective of many of the actors involved. It also illustrates how support for the idea of a reformed international system under Nazi leadership was often underpinned by the habit of acting and thinking internationally which had become embedded among European elites through the growth of international organizations and networks prior to the war.

The idea of the Nazi New Order as a new international system, an authoritarian reimagination of interwar internationalism, provides a new perspective on Spain's wartime relationship with Germany. Research into the relatively small number of pro-Nazi Falangists or the complex diplomatic relations between the two countries suggests that support for the Axis cause was somehow equivocal or was limited to a marginal section of Francoist society. In reality, however, Francoist elites saw the Second World War not in terms of their degree of personal ideological affinity with National Socialism, but as a conflict between the modern, 'totalitarian' states, of which Franco's Spain formed a part, and the weak and discredited European

[151] BArch, DSG, R 64-I, 40, Faupel to Andres Amado, 17 September 1943.
[152] Laín Entralgo, *Descargo*, 295.

parliamentary regimes, later joined by their Soviet ally. These views were heavily influenced by the experience of the Spanish Civil War, which had forced individuals to choose between rebel forces aligned with the 'totalitarian' powers, and a Republican government which many on the Spanish right associated with the threat of violence, anarchy, and international communism. Until it became clear that Nazi Germany was likely to lose the war, most of those who supported the Franco regime accepted, and in many cases actively supported, the idea of a 'totalitarian' international future within a Nazi-dominated Europe. It is this attitude which explains, for example, the willingness of a large swathe of Francoist elites to join Hispano-German friendship associations during the early years of the Second World War.

The forms of Axis internationalism promoted by Nazi Germany helped to buttress the idea of the New Order for Europe as a new and more effective version of the pre-war international system. By promoting cultural cooperation, they could draw on the traditional prestige of German culture among European elites, and on pre-existing networks of German cultural diplomacy. By pursuing cooperation in scientific and technical fields such as health and social insurance, they could exploit the idea of international technical cooperation as a necessary response to an increasingly globalized world in which social problems crossed national borders, and conditions in one country were so obviously dependent on those of its neighbours. When Leonardo Conti told the delegates at the tuberculosis conference in Berlin that international cooperation was particularly important in times of war because of the epidemiological risks posed by the mass movement of people, his argument was designed to appeal to those experts who regarded cooperation with Nazi authorities as a 'technical' as much as a political choice.

Rather than representing a brief authoritarian interlude in the progressive history of twentieth-century internationalism, destined to fail and rightfully forgotten, this Axis internationalism highlights the flexibility of a particular group of experts willing to adapt to a new era of health and social policy, and to a new political reality within the Nazi New Order. Many of those who cooperated willingly but unenthusiastically with Nazi Germany in 1941 to advance their professional and national interests had adopted a similar approach to organizations such as the LNHO in the 1930s, and would do the same again with the WHO and UNICEF in the 1950s. More significant than the relatively limited number of pro-Nazi collaborators, these experts formed part of a much wider group of elites from across the European right, who, in the words of Walter Lipgens, 'approved of Nazi doctrines in some though not all respects and, in view of what seemed the finality of Hitler's rule over the continent, were prepared to collaborate sincerely with the Nazis in order to ensure for their own nation a position of importance in the "New Order"'.[153]

[153] Lipgens, *Documents on the History of European Integration*, 9–10.

It was this attitude which led such a wide range of Spanish social experts to cooperate with Nazi Germany, driven by their professional commitment to international cooperation, and a belief that the 'totalitarian' states stood at the vanguard of the modern era. Their goal at this stage was not necessarily to help establish Spain's 'legitimacy'. In the context of a global conflict whose outcome was uncertain and in which Europe was dominated by fascist powers, the international legitimacy of the Franco regime was not in question. Rather, they were working to establish Spain as a leading power within the new international system which they saw emerging around them. In 1941, Axis internationalism represented the future of international cooperation for experts from across Europe, no less legitimate than the liberal international organizations which had gone before.

2

Franco's Spain and the Politics of International Health

In May 1951 the Spanish director general of health, José Palanca, addressed the World Health Assembly in Geneva. Just ten years after his tour of the 'New Europe' and his involvement with the Nazi international tuberculosis conference in Berlin, he was now celebrating Spain's entry into the WHO. Spanish membership had come after five years of acrimonious debate which had seen Spain excluded from the UN and all of its technical agencies. But Palanca was clear about where the blame for this delay should lie:

> Spain ardently desired to become a member of the World Health Organization. Our country has never omitted to fulfil its obligations in matters of welfare work, humanitarianism and health on the international level... Today we have been officially admitted to membership. Is it too late? No, there is always time. But however that may be, the delay cannot be imputed to my country. It was not Spain which obscured the question of our international obligations in matters of health and welfare by considerations of political differences, largely of a passing nature.[1]

This chapter shows how social experts like Palanca, and international social organizations like the WHO, served as a vanguard for Spain's integration into the international system after 1945. Spanish experts used these organizations as a forum to portray Spain as a humanitarian and social state deserving of international recognition and acceptance. They did so by exploiting the idea of international health, humanitarianism, and welfare as technical fields which should be free of political interference. Their success was most clearly evident in the case of the WHO, where the relationship between international health and international politics was at the heart of both Spain's exclusion in 1946 and its rapid reintegration from the early 1950s.

By 1945 the continuing existence of the Franco regime had appeared to hang in the balance. The role of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in advancing the Francoist cause during the Spanish Civil War, and the support of Franco's Spain for the Axis powers during the early years of the Second World War, called into question the

[1] *Offical Records of the World Health Organization, No. 35: Fourth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 7 to 25 May 1951* (New York: World Health Organization, 1952), 123–4.

regime's post-war future. The USSR was a strong advocate of Allied intervention to remove the regime. Britain, France, and the United States, although hostile to the Francoist state, were fearful that military intervention would rekindle a civil war and, increasingly, that it would open the door to Soviet influence in the Iberian Peninsula. Efforts to topple the regime, therefore, soon shifted towards the diplomatic stage. The San Francisco conference called to draw up a constitution for the UN in 1945 witnessed fierce debates about the Francoist state. In December 1946 the Security Council voted to bar Spain from membership in the UN, and by 1947 most countries had severed diplomatic ties with the regime.[2]

It was in this context that the idea of health as a technical and humanitarian field, and the personal relationships between Spanish and international experts, could be used to pull international health organizations into Spain's struggle for legitimacy. Spanish experts were at the forefront of the campaign against Spain's international exclusion in the aftermath of the Second World War, helping to transform the Franco regime from an ally of the Nazi New Order in 1941 to an established member of the post-war international community a decade later. They were among the first Spaniards, other than exiled Republicans, to gain access to the UN system from the early 1950s. The 'technical' nature of the UN specialized agencies meant that they could be used as a gateway to begin reintegrating Franco's Spain into the international community once the political environment shifted from the late 1940s.

The WHO was particularly important in this process. It was established in 1946 as the successor of the LNHO, coordinating global health, directing disease-eradication campaigns, and, later, promoting the spread of primary health care around the world.[3] The question of Spanish membership was fiercely debated during the foundation of the WHO in 1946 and was ultimately blocked by the UN General Assembly. But in 1951 it became one of the first UN specialized agencies Spain was able to join. As such it prefigured other key markers of Spain's international reintegration such as the 1953 Vatican concordat and agreements with the US, and the granting of full UN membership in 1955.

The reasons behind the importance of the WHO to Spain, and of Spain to the WHO, might not be obvious at first glance. International health organizations such as the LNHO and the Rockefeller Foundation had had a profound impact on the development of Spanish health and welfare systems during the interwar period.[4] But they and their successors such as the WHO were almost entirely absent from

[2] Portero, *Franco aislado*.

[3] Yves Beigbeder et al., *The World Health Organization* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998); Nitsan Chorev, *The World Health Organization between North and South* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).

[4] Rodríguez Ocaña, *Salud Pública*; Josep Lluís Barona and Josep Bernabeu-Mestre, *La salud y el estado: el movimiento sanitario internacional y la administración española, 1815–1945* (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2008).

early Francoist Spain, at least until the late 1950s when Spanish experts began to engage with international work on polio, disability, and maternal health.[5] Their absence partly reflected a shift in international attention away from the European countries which had been a major focus of interwar health and development work, and towards new priority regions in Africa and Asia. Some historians of medicine have suggested that it also reflected the Franco regime's general attitude of 'disdain and distancing' towards international health organizations.[6] Although Francoist politicians and health officials were always willing to accept international financial aid, they were certainly less keen than their Republican predecessors to seek technical training and support from international organizations.

But they were extremely aware of the political opportunities which international health organizations offered, thanks largely to the universalist and humanitarian rhetoric which surrounded them. A report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the WHO and the other UN specialized agencies written in 1952 summarized this attitude, and is worth quoting at length:

> It is important to highlight that, apart from the importance of the work of these Organizations and Associations in and of themselves, whatever their specific activity may be, in all of them, and particularly in the regular conferences they organise, an international political dimension dominates. Every country monitors and cultivates this political dimension, trying to exploit it for their own diplomatic and propaganda purposes. There are innumerable instances in which this political activity takes place, the principle ones being: the election of senior officials, the choice of sites to establish the headquarters of organizations or to celebrate their meetings, and, in general, the intrigues, electoral campaigns and influence peddling between different countries or the ethnic, political or religious blocs they form, in which, on the margins of the innocuous technical or administrative discussions on the daily agenda, governments seek to buttress their prestige and improve their international standing, winning new friendships or consolidating old ones, all the while hindering or undermining the efforts of their enemies.[7]

[5] On later Spanish engagement with international health organizations, particularly in the field of polio and rehabilitation, see María Isabel Porras, María José Báguena, and Rosa Ballester, 'Spain and the International Scientific Conferences on Polio, 1940s–1960s', *Dynamis*, 30 (2010), 91–118; María Isabel Porras, María José Báguena, Rosa Ballester, and Jaime de las Heras, 'La Asociación Europea contra la Poliomielitis y los programas europeos de vacunación', *Dynamis*, 32 (2012), 287–310; María Isabel Porras, Mariano Ayarzagüena Sanz, Jaime de las Heras Salord, and María José Báguena Cerellera (eds), *El drama de la polio: Un problema social y familiar en la España franquista* (Madrid: Catarata, 2013). On wider post-war Spanish engagement with the international circulation of medical products and ideas, see María Santesmases, *The Circulation of Penicillin in Spain: Health, Wealth and Authority* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

[6] Barona and Bernabeu-Mestre, *La salud y el estado*, 295.

[7] AGA, 82/09200, Organismos Políticos Internacionales, 'Cuotas en General de España con Agencias Especializadas y Otros Organismos Internacionales, 1952–53', 7 June 1952.

The regime did not deny or disregard the importance of international health and other forms of technical cooperation in their own right, but saw them in a Machiavellian light in which 'technical' activities could be used as a cover for political manoeuvring. During a period of diplomatic isolation and international hostility, these technical organizations provided a vital forum for Spain to further its interests and promote its image on the international stage. Specialized agencies such as the WHO, whose technical nature made Spanish participation less controversial than in the more overtly political context of the UN, could therefore be used as a stepping stone to full UN membership.

In this respect, the field of health differed fundamentally from other forms of international technical cooperation such as communications, culture, or trade. As Palanca was so keen to remind his audience in 1951, international health and welfare were seen as essentially 'humanitarian' activities, in which international cooperation was not just driven by technical or political need, but by the moral imperative to fight disease and save lives. The idea of international health as a humanitarian and apolitical field, one embraced by the WHO and other liberal health organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, provided a platform for the Franco regime to argue for its international integration. The experts who led these organizations were wary of allowing 'political' considerations to influence their work, and were thus reluctant to accept the validity of overtly political arguments against Spanish participation. This does not mean that they didn't understand or appreciate these arguments—many were liberal or left-wing figures with a long history of political opposition to fascism and the radical right—but that they believed the humanitarian imperative of their work carried more weight.

The long-standing relationships between Francoist experts and their international counterparts also helped to ease the path towards Spanish integration. Organizations such as the LNHO and the Rockefeller Foundation had traditionally formed their most productive relationships with left-leaning Spanish experts, particularly those who led the Second Republic's health administration. But they had built ties with Spanish experts from across the political spectrum. Palanca and many of his colleagues within the Francoist Department of Health had received Rockefeller fellowships to pursue training and research abroad before 1936. After 1939, many of these experts sought to use these relationships to re-establish international ties, leveraging resources and support from liberal international organizations at the same time as they cooperated with the Axis powers. In order to do so they presented themselves as moderates, struggling to pursue health work for its own sake and fending off the attacks of extremist elements bent on implementing damaging political agendas. The strength of their personal ties was reflected in the ongoing support of officials from these liberal international organizations, who argued that scientific experts should not be ostracized on account of the crimes committed by their governments.

This chapter begins by mapping out the relationship which Francoist health experts maintained with liberal international health organizations both before and during the Second World War, often alongside their engagement with the Axis powers. These relationships were crucial to Spain's reintegration into international health organizations and networks after 1945. The willingness of officials from the Rockefeller Foundation and the LNHO to work with Franco's Spain, even during the height of the Second World War, was justified on professional, humanitarian, and technical grounds. And it was these attitudes which help explain why there was so much continuity of personnel and policy within the field of international health before and after 1945, despite the radically different political context. The chapter then explores the fierce battle which raged over Spain's exclusion from the WHO in 1946. International experts fought to establish the WHO as a 'non-political' body with universal membership, allowing Francoist diplomats to present Spain as a responsible social state excluded from humanitarian action for base political motives. The wider debate over the 'Spanish question' at the UN ultimately saw Spain excluded. But the final section of the chapter shows how the shifting political landscape facilitated Spanish membership in 1951, laying the foundation for its later incorporation into the UN and its other specialized agencies.

These events not only reveal the significance of international social and technical institutions in the Franco's regime's search for legitimacy, but also shed new light on how these institutions, despite their post-war claims to universality, became embroiled in the political conflicts of the Cold War era. In the case of the WHO, the debate about Spanish membership became a proxy battle not only between supporters and opponents of the Franco regime, but between opposing 'technical' and 'political' conceptions of the nature of international health. The decision to exclude Spain in 1946 illustrated the dominance of national governments and the major powers within the WHO, undermining those international experts who had envisaged it as a universal organization free from the tensions and conflicts of contemporary geopolitics. The recent literature on the early years of the WHO has demonstrated the extent to which the organization was shaped by these geopolitical forces. Erez Manela and Marcos Cueto, for example, have both demonstrated how Cold War politics helped to drive the WHO towards a top-down, disease-specific approach to international health, particularly in the case of its malaria- and smallpox-eradication programmes.[8] Sunil Amrith has shown how the organization's work in South Asia was shaped by the politics of the Cold War, colonialism, and post-colonialism.[9] The debate over Spanish membership helps to

[8] Marcos Cueto, *Cold War, Deadly Fevers: Malaria Eradication in Mexico, 1955–1975* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Erez Manela, 'A Pox on Your Narrative: Writing Disease Control into Cold War History', *Diplomatic History*, 34 (2010), 299–323.

[9] Sunil S. Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930–65* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

explain how these forces and interests came to dominate the early decades of the WHO and the UN's other technical agencies, despite the hopes of its founders to learn the lessons of the past and build new international structures free from political interference.

International Health during the Second World War

The controversy surrounding Spain's membership of the WHO cannot be understood without reference to its relationship with liberal international health organizations prior to 1945. These organizations played an important part in the history of interwar internationalism. The creation of the LNHO in the 1920s helped to strengthen and expand the forms of international health and welfare cooperation which had first emerged during the nineteenth century. Partly funded by philanthropic groups such as the Rockefeller Foundation's International Health Division, which provided extensive support for public health and disease-control projects during the period, the LNHO aimed to coordinate and expand existing forms of international health cooperation.[10] It focussed on standardization and epidemiological intelligence, statistical programmes, the control of individual diseases, and, increasingly, areas of social medicine such as nutrition, housing, and rural hygiene. With the majority of its work structured around expert committees, it also did much to promote the concept of international health experts as part of a wider epistemic community, a body of professionals whose knowledge and technical skill placed them above the political and ideological divisions that dominated the international scene during the interwar period.[11]

International organizations also had a profound impact on the development of Spanish health and welfare systems during the first third of the twentieth century. Public health legislation introduced in Spain towards the end of the nineteenth century had emerged in part from Spanish participation in international sanitary conferences. Spanish health experts, particularly Republican figures such as Gustavo Pittaluga and Marcelino Pascua, worked closely with the LNHO.[12] The Rockefeller Foundation played an influential role in helping to train and expand

[10] Iris Borowy, *Coming to Terms with World Health: The League of Nations Health Organisation, 1921–1946* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009); Susan Gross Solomon, Lion Murard, and Patrick Zylberman (eds), *Shifting Boundaries of Public Health: Europe in the Twentieth Century* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2008). On the Rockefeller Foundation's role in the history of international health, see Farley, *To Cast out Disease*; Marcos Cueto (ed.), *Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994).

[11] Paul Weindling (ed.), *International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[12] Bernabeu Mestre, 'La utopía reformadora de la Segunda República: la labor de Marcelino Pascua al frente de la Dirección General de Sanidad, 1931–1933', *Revista Española de Salud Pública*, 74 (2000), 1–13; Iris Borowy and Anne Hardy (eds), *Of Medicine and Men: Biographies and Ideas in European Social Medicine between the World Wars* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008).

the Spanish public health profession, with many of the leading experts under both the Second Republic and the Franco regime having received Rockefeller fellowships during the 1920s and early 1930s. It also helped to fund the establishment of many of Spain's key public health institutions during the same period, supporting the gradual development of Spanish public health infrastructure and the health reforms introduced under the Second Republic.[13] Other international organizations and networks shaped the development of the Spanish social security system, which was heavily influenced by European models and by the work of the ILO during the 1920s and 1930s.[14] This international engagement in Spanish health and welfare continued, and in many ways intensified, during the civil war, when a range of international health and humanitarian organizations provided support to both Republican and Nationalist zones.[15]

The work of international organizations such as the LNHO, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the OIHP was either curtailed or substantially disrupted during the course of the Second World War.[16] The Allies developed internal systems to manage epidemiological intelligence, and public health measures such as vaccination and disease-control programmes were organized by the armed forces. Towards the end of the war, many of these functions were passed to the newly created UN Relief and Rehabilitation Service (UNRRA).[17] A similar process took place among the Axis powers and within Nazi-dominated Europe and, as we have seen, Spanish experts were active participants in the forms of 'Axis internationalism' organized by Nazi Germany. During the same period, however, many Spanish experts, including those working with Nazi Germany, continued to maintain relations with liberal international health organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation and the LNHO. In part this was a legacy of their

[13] Barona and Bernabeu-Mestre, *La salud y el estado*, 89–134; Esteban Rodríguez Ocaña, 'Por razón de ciencia: la Fundación Rockefeller en España, 1930–1941', in Ricardo Campos Marín, Ángel González de Pablo, Mª Isabel Porras Gallo, and Luis Montiel (eds), *Medicina y poder político: XVI Congreso de la Sociedad Española de Historia de la Medicina* (Madrid: SEHM, 2014), 473–8; Paul Weindling, 'La Fundación Rockefeller y el organismo de salud de la Sociedad de Naciones: algunas conexiones españolas', *Revista Española de Salud Pública*, 74 (2000), 15–26; Esteban Rodríguez Ocaña, 'La intervención de la Fundación Rockefeller en la creación de la sanidad contemporánea en España', *Revista Española de Salud Pública*, 74 (2000).

[14] Josep Lluís Barona and Steven Cherry (eds), *Health and Medicine in Rural Europe, 1850–1945* (Valencia: Seminari d'Estudis sobre la Ciencia, 2004); Jerònia Pons-Pons and Javier Silvestre Rodríguez (eds), *Los orígenes del Estado del Bienestar en España, 1900–1945: los seguros de accidentes, vejez, desempleo y enfermedad* (Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2010); Maria Isabel Porras, 'Between the German Model and Liberal Medicine: The Negotiating Process of the State Health Care System in France and Spain (1919–1944)', *Hygiea Internationalis*, 6 (2007), 135–49.

[15] Gabriel Pretus, *Humanitarian Relief in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939* (Lewiston, ME: Edwin Mellen Press, 2013); Josep Lluís Barona and Enrique Perdiguero-Gil, 'Health and the War: Changing Schemes and Health Conditions during the Spanish Civil War', *Dynamis*, 28 (2008), 103–26.

[16] Iris Borowy, 'Manoeuvring for Space: International Health Work of the League of Nations during World War II', in Susan Gross Solomon, Lion Murard, and Patrick Zylberman (eds), *Shifting Boundaries of Public Health: Europe in the Twentieth Century* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2008), 87–113.

[17] Jessica Reinisch, '"Auntie UNRRA" at the Crossroads', *Past and Present*, 218 (2013), 70–97.

pre-war relationships with these organizations. It also reflected a degree of political flexibility in their attitudes towards international health cooperation, willing to accept resources wherever they were available, and hedging their bets in case of an Allied military victory. But it also showed how liberal international organizations were willing to cooperate with Franco's Spain despite their professed hostility to the regime, rationalizing their involvement by arguing that they were supporting 'moderate' forces and apolitical experts who were fighting to maintain the professional integrity of the Spanish health and welfare system.

Spanish health experts, in many cases the same ones who were cooperating most closely with Nazi Germany, maintained close contact with the LNHO throughout the war. The League of Nations as a whole had almost ceased to exist after 1939. But the LNHO limped on thanks to the work of a skeleton staff which remained in Geneva. Led by Yves Biraud and Raymond Gautier, they maintained publication of the organization's epidemiological bulletin and the collection and dissemination of health statistics.[18] Links between Spain and the LNHO, previously very close, had been disrupted ever since the start of the civil war. During the war itself the League had sent a delegation to Spain to report on the health situation, focussing primarily on the Republican zone.[19] In 1939, José Palanca had submitted a report to the League on wartime sanitary measures in the rebel zone and the current health situation in Spain.[20] Spanish health authorities provided ongoing, although somewhat sporadic, epidemiological data to the LNHO following the outbreak of the Second World War, and in return continued to receive its quarterly *Bulletin*. This exchange continued despite the communication difficulties caused by the war, with information sometimes having to be sent through the Spanish diplomatic pouch in Bern when regular postal services were disrupted, and occasionally even coming via the Spanish embassy in New York.[21] Such levels of contact certainly weren't the norm at the time, with the LNHO ignored by most states within the Axis sphere of influence and increasingly bypassed by the Allies. The organization had had no contact with Italy or Germany since 1937, while even neutral countries like Ireland stopped supplying epidemiological data from 1940.[22]

As well as these institutional links, personal relationships were developed between the LNHO leadership and senior figures within the Spanish Department of Health. José Palanca maintained a regular and cordial correspondence with Yves Biraud during the war, at the same time as he was working closely with Nazi Germany. Biraud, for example, highlighted articles in the *LNHO Bulletin*

[18] Information on wartime international health in general and the LNHO in particular can be found in Borowy, 'Manoeuvring for Space'.

[19] League of Nations Archive, Geneva (LONA), 391 (R6021), Committee Meetings, 'Rapport sur la Mission Sanitaire en Espagne, 28 December 1936–15 January 1937'.

[20] Barona and Perdiguero-Gil, 'Health and the War'.

[21] All correspondence held in LONA, Registry Files 1933–1947 Section 8a, Series 224, R6191, Spain folder, 'Epidemiological Information and Government Reports'.

[22] Information taken from respective country folders in the LONA files listed above.

which may have been of interest and asked Palanca to forward them to particular experts within Spain.[23] The LNHO also maintained contact with Gerardo Clavero Campo, director of the National Institute of Health in Madrid, and his assistant Florencio Pérez Gallardo, both of whom would play a leading role in post-war links between Spain and the WHO. In 1943 the two men wrote to Biraud offering a study on typhus for publication in the *Bulletin*, as well as a report on the effectiveness of the new Cox typhus vaccine. Although the offer of the initial study was rejected, both Biraud and his colleague Raymond Gautier spoke positively about the work and were enthusiastic about the report on the Cox vaccine.[24] Clavero Campo was one of the Spanish experts who had attended the international tuberculosis conference in Berlin in 1941.

Spanish health authorities also continued to cooperate with other international bodies concerned with epidemiological intelligence and the control of drugs. The OIHP, which was primarily responsible for overseeing international quarantine rules and other public health conventions, had been forced to move from occupied Paris to Royat in the Vichy zone during the war. It faced considerable difficulties in collecting epidemiological data, but Spain was one of the few countries which continued to provide regular information throughout the conflict. José Palanca, who had represented Spain at the OIHP prior to the civil war, later attended its final permanent committee meeting in April 1946.[25] Spanish health officials maintained contact with the League's Opium Section up until 1942.[26] And Spain continued to provide regular statistics on the import and export of opiates, as well as annual estimates of likely use, to the Permanent Central Opium Board.[27] A technically independent body set up under the 1925 Opium Convention, the board was nonetheless affiliated with the League and remained so throughout the war, despite moving from Geneva to Washington. As with the League's health section, such cooperation was not a given at the time, with many states ceasing to provide statistics following the outbreak of war.

None of this represents a large-scale engagement with the League-based international health system. Nonetheless, the fact that Spain was unique amongst the Axis-aligned and neutral states in continuing to work with these liberal organizations, and that Spanish experts were willing to work with both Nazi Germany and the remnants of the League system during the war, suggests an unusually flexible attitude towards international cooperation. This may have resulted from a degree of bureaucratic inertia, with the Department of Health continuing to work with

[23] LONA, Section 8a, 224 (R6191), Spain folder, various correspondence between Palanca and Biraud.

[24] LONA, Section 8a, 15197 (R6118), Biraud to Gautier, 22 March 1943 and 6 June 1943.

[25] World Health Organization Archive (WHOA), 'Records of the *Office International d'Hygiène Publique*', files A64 and T20.

[26] LONA, Section 12, Opium Control Commission, 256 (R4785), and 8448 (R4950).

[27] LONA, Section 12a, Opium Central Board, 6046 (R5063), 'Quarterly Statistics on Imports and Exports'.

international organizations in the absence of any active reason to stop doing so. It also reflected the practical benefits of ongoing cooperation. The exchange of epidemiological intelligence still had important benefits at a time when Spain was suffering from epidemics of typhus and rising cases of other infectious diseases. It also, however, stemmed from the historical links between Francoist health experts and liberal international health organizations, which continued to shape their international work both during and after the war.

The other key international organization which maintained a relationship with Francoist Spain after 1939 was the Rockefeller Foundation. The International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation had played an influential role in helping to train and expand the Spanish public health profession in the early twentieth century, not least through its globally prestigious fellowship scheme which provided funding for overseas training and research trips. The Foundation had suspended all work in Spain at the outset of the civil war in 1936, and did not participate in any relief efforts.[28] In 1939, however, it decided to renew its support. Over the next two years it pursued a number of major projects. The most important was a nutrition study carried out in Madrid. Following a tour of the country in early 1940, Foundation officials identified widespread food shortages and malnutrition as the gravest public health crisis facing the new government's public health services. With the cooperation of the Spanish Department of Health, they established a study in the working-class Madrid suburb of Vallecas, surveying the nutritional intake and health of local families. It was designed as both a scientific study to improve understanding of malnutrition and its related diseases and a project to promote practical solutions to Spain's malnutrition problem, including informing the limited food aid programme which was established by the American Red Cross in 1940.[29] The initial findings of the study were published in the US in 1942, and the project was transferred to an independent research institute in Spain when the Foundation was forced to withdraw from Europe after US entry to the war in 1941.[30]

The Foundation's other focus was typhus. Spain suffered a serious epidemic in the aftermath of the civil war, which affected both Madrid and the south of the country.[31] As a louse-borne disease which spreads in unsanitary and overcrowded environments, typhus thrived in the regime's overcrowded prisons and among Spain's defeated and neglected working-class communities. The Rockefeller

[28] Rodríguez Ocaña, 'Por razón de ciencia'.

[29] Rockefeller Archive Centre (RAC), Rockefeller Foundation Archives (RF), record group 1.1, series 700 Europe, box 11, folder 66.

[30] William D. Robinson, John H. Janney, and Francisco Grande, 'An Evaluation of the Nutritional Status of a Population Group in Madrid, Spain, during the Summer of 1941', *Journal of Nutrition*, 24 (1942), 557–84; RAC, RF, record group 1.1, series 700 Europe, box 11, folder 67. The institute which took control of the project was led by Carlos Jiménez Díaz, whose work is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

[31] Jiménez Lucena, 'El tifus exantemático'.

Foundation sent US experts to work with Spanish public health officials on comparative studies of available vaccines. They also provided large supplies of the Cox vaccine then being produced in the US, and continued to do so even after the Foundation withdrew from Spain at the end of 1942.[32] In many cases, the Spanish experts who worked with the Rockefeller Foundation were also those who collaborated with Nazi Germany and the Axis powers on typhus control and research during the Second World War. In addition to their work on typhus, the Foundation provided yellow fever vaccines for use in both Spain and its African colonies, as well as further support for nursing training and scientific equipment.[33]

But the Rockefeller Foundation's engagement with Franco's Spain raised awkward political questions for the organization. Many international humanitarian agencies had been reluctant to engage with rebel forces during the civil war. After the outbreak of the Second World War, it was difficult for organizations from the liberal democracies to collaborate with a regime so closely associated with the Axis powers, even one which was officially neutral in the conflict. The Foundation's officers were well aware of these issues. The reports of those in Spain demonstrated a thorough awareness of the widespread repression taking place in the aftermath of the civil war, the purging of political enemies, the regime's rampant corruption, and the social hardship which the majority of Spaniards faced. Until their hand was forced by the US entry into the war at the end of 1941, however, the Foundation's staff were almost unanimously agreed that they should continue working with the Franco regime, despite their knowledge of these issues.[34]

Their decision was underpinned by a number of factors. Officials on the ground, particularly those who travelled around the country to investigate the nutrition situation, were driven by the obvious humanitarian need of the Spanish people in the face of the post-war public health crisis.[35] But by 1939, the Foundation had also begun to think seriously about the reconstruction effort in Europe which would inevitably follow the end of the war. As such, they were interested in issues such as nutrition and infectious diseases which were likely to be key to post-war relief. Spain, a country emerging from a war which had involved some of the features of modern warfare—mass displacement, the destruction of cities, aerial bombardment—represented a perfect opportunity to study how these challenges should be met. On his return to the US in 1941, the leader of the Foundation's typhus project told the *New York Times* that Spain had become 'a vast laboratory for medical men studying war diseases'.[36]

[32] RAC, RF, record group 1.1, series 700 Europe, box 14, folders 101 and 102. Over 26,000 doses of the Cox vaccine were provided in the first six months of 1941.

[33] RAC, RF, record group 5, series 3, box 244, folder 2951, 'Europe Office: Portugal and Spain, 1st Semi-annual Report, 1941'.

[34] RAC, RF, record group 1.1, series 700 Europe, box 11, folder 66.

[35] RAC, RF, record group 1.1, series 700 Europe, box 11, folder 66, 'Note on the food situation in Spain made during October 1940 by Dr. J.H. Janney'.

[36] RAC, RF, record group 1.1, series 700 Europe, box 14, folder 101, *New York Times*, 15 July 1941.

But perhaps more important was their understanding of the Franco regime as a 'moderate' political force. The first post-war report from a Rockefeller Foundation official in Spain, written in August 1939, argued that the government was attempting to steer a 'middle course', between the radical factions of traditionalist Catholics and Falangists. The government's goal, the report argued, was to pursue a policy of 'appeasement', with 'work for the masses, order in civil life, and a not-too-militant Catholicism'.[37] This supposed moderation was frequently cited by Foundation officials seeking to seeking to justify their work in Spain. It meant that the repression, corruption, and political purges which they saw happening around them could be explained as the work of the extremist elements within the Francoist coalition, which mainstream officials and politicians were working to counter.

The idea of Francoist moderation was particularly evident in the Foundation's attitudes towards Spanish health organizations and experts. Foundation staff drew a sharp distinction between the majority of those Francoist officials with 'a real non-political interest in health work', and those for whom 'political considerations still have a good deal of weight in health matters'.[38] This distinction was key to the Foundation's outlook. Health experts who were perceived as putting their professional duties above political concerns were praised, while those who had actively engaged in the political struggles of the civil war were accused of being 'carried away by hysteria, by fear, or by conviction'.[39] The Foundation's strongest criticism of the Franco regime was directed at its decision to investigate all public health officials who had worked in the Republican zone as part of its post-war purges, a process which for them represented an unjustifiable imposition of political concerns in the technical and humanitarian field of public health. In general though, Foundation officials were convinced that the Franco regime was demonstrating its 'vital interest' in health services, commenting favourably on new funding allocated to tuberculosis control in 1940, for example.[40] The purge of health officials, they agreed, was a temporary measure driven by the political instability of the post-war period, and was being resisted by moderates such as José Palanca in the Department of Health.

These views, in fact, were heavily influenced by the image promoted by Palanca and other former Rockefeller Fellows in Spain. Understanding the importance of portraying the Franco regime as a moderating force in order to gain outside support, they emphasized their commitment to independent health work, and

[37] RAC, RF, record group 1.1, series 795, box 1, folder 3, 'Report on present conditions in Spain, August 20, 1939'. The report was unattributed, but was probably produced by the Foundation official Rolla B. Hill who had worked in Spain throughout the 1930s.

[38] Ibid.

[39] RAC, RF, record group 1.1, series 795, box 1, folder 3, 'Report on present conditions in Spain, August 20, 1939'.

[40] RAC, RF, record group 5, series 3, box 244, folder 700, 'Semi-annual report on Spain, 1940'.

their status as mainstream figures fighting against extremist elements within the regime. In 1939, for example, Palanca told a visiting Rockefeller official how twenty-seven members of his extended family had been killed by 'Reds' during the civil war. 'He [Palanca] told me this to show that he had some just cause for feeling bitter against the extremists,' reported the official, 'but . . . he has acted with extreme moderation and impartiality throughout the war. It would seem he is a sanitarian before being a Nationalist.'[41] To other Rockefeller officials Palanca explained the political conflicts taking place in the regime, emphasizing his commitment to countering the factions of Carlists and Falangists who were seeking to gain control of the Department of Health, and his conviction that official appointments should be made 'on the basis of aptitude and training, without any reference to political creed'.[42]

The Foundation's understanding of internal Francoist politics was thus filtered through the prism of Palanca's account. His status as a former Rockefeller Fellow lent weight to his testimony, and his insistence that he was prioritizing technical work over political considerations provided Rockefeller officials with the narrative they needed to argue for continued intervention in Spain. These arguments not only helped to secure ongoing support for the Spanish health system, but also opened up significant professional opportunities for Palanca and his colleagues. In December 1940, for example, just months before they both visited Nazi Germany, Palanca and Gerardo Clavero Campo received new Rockefeller grants to fund training and travel.[43] For Clavero Campo, this relationship and the financial support that went with it would continue into the post-war era.

Although the Foundation's decision to withdraw from Spain at the end of 1941 was driven primarily by US entry into the war and subsequent pressure from the State Department, a number of Foundation officials also felt that their work was coming under threat from political ascendancy of the Falange at the expense of the 'moderate' officials and experts they had been working with. By the summer of 1941 they were reporting that Palanca, despite the support of Franco and the minister of the interior, was coming under increasing pressure from Falangists and would soon be forced to resign, leaving the Department of Health to be 'taken over by politicians'.[44] But Palanca remained in place, and was able to resume negotiations with the Foundation after 1945. Now, however, more pressing humanitarian crises elsewhere and the renewed international opprobrium faced by the Franco regime led the Foundation, and the US State Department, to

[41] RAC, RF, record group 1.1, series 795, box 1, folder 3, 'Report on present conditions in Spain, August 20, 1939'.

[42] RAC, RF, record group 1.1, series 795, box 1, folder 3, Rolla B. Hill, 'Notes on Trip to Madrid', 2 May 1940.

[43] RAC, RF, record group 10.1, series 795E–800E, box 47, folder 6992–6993, personal files for Gerardo Clavero Campo and José Palanca.

[44] RAC, RF, record group 1.1, series 795 Spain, box 1, file 3, Rolla B. Hill to Andrew J. Warren, 28 May 1941.

conclude that there were 'real dangers' in cooperating with Spain. Although some additional funding was awarded to previous Rockefeller Fellows such as Clavero Campo and Pérez Gallardo, no new projects were implemented after 1945.[45] But the idea of Spain as a 'moderate' power committed to international health and welfare would prove crucial in the forthcoming debates about its membership of the WHO.

The 'Spanish Question' and the WHO, 1946

Many of the key figures involved in drawing up plans for the WHO and negotiating its constitution in 1946 were leading international health experts from the interwar period. Men such as Ludwik Rajchman, Andrija Stampar, Yves Biraud, Raymond Gautier, and Jacques Parisot had all held senior positions within LNHO, and would go on to play important roles in the foundation and early years of the WHO. They were proud of the achievements of the League's health organization and were keen to ensure its positive features were retained in the post-war era.[46] However, they were also keenly aware of the organization's weaknesses, particularly its position within the wider League of Nations structure which had made it vulnerable to the political divisions of the 1930s. The fate of the LNHO, argued Stampar in 1946, demonstrated 'the danger of political connexions for a technical institution'. The only way for the WHO to avoid the same fate, Stampar and his colleagues argued, was to ensure that it was established as 'non-political' body.[47] The early history of the WHO, when the organization was abandoned by the communist states and buffeted by the forces of the emerging Cold War, suggests that their plans to create a truly 'non-political' body failed. The debate around Spanish membership of the WHO which ran from 1946 until 1951 helps to explain how and why this happened. The arguments over universal membership, which became a proxy for the question of Spanish participation, reflected a struggle between international health experts and nation states over the nature of the WHO, and the success of the latter in establishing their control over the new organization.

What did experts like Stampar and Biraud mean when they used the term 'non-political'? The idea of a purely 'technical' field of international health divorced from political forces may seem to us at best naïve, at worst meaningless.

[45] RAC, RF, record group 2–1955, series 70, box 60, folder 4, G.K. Strode to Charles N. Leach, 22 Apr 1946; Rodríguez Ocaña, 'Por razón de ciencia', 476.

[46] Ludwik Rajchman, 'Why Not a United Nations Health Service?', *Free World*, September 1943, pp. 216–21.

[47] *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 1: Minutes of the Technical Preparatory Committee for the International Health Conference* (New York and Geneva: World Health Organization, 1947), 58.

But for these experts, all of whom had considerable experience of dealing with the political dimension of international health, the idea of a 'non-political' WHO had a number of more specific and concrete meanings. The first was that, unlike the LNHO's close relationship with the wider League structure, the WHO should maintain its distance from the UN. As the French expert Jacques Parisot argued, 'in the light of regrettable past experience, [the WHO] should be sufficiently independent of the latter [the UN] to ensure that the technical organ would not suffer from any vicissitudes which might affect the political body'.[48] The second was that membership of the WHO should be universal, to reflect the fact, as Stampar argued, that 'disease knows no boundaries'.[49] It was in relation to universal membership that the question of Spain came to play such a crucial role. The debate about universal membership which took place in 1946 concerned, on the one hand, the relationship between the WHO and colonies controlled by Britain and France, and on the other the role of 'ex-enemy' countries within the new organization. In the latter case, the involvement of countries such as Italy and Austria, where democratic governments had been established, was seen as fairly unproblematic. Japan and Germany, it was generally accepted, would be admitted once new governments emerged under the tutelage of the Allied Control Councils. The case of Spain, however, was more complicated.

The 'Spanish Question', as the debate over the future of Spain taking place around the UN was known, had a profound influence on the WHO's universal membership debate in 1946. Following a complex series of negotiations at the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the WHO's Technical Preparatory Committee (TPC), Spain was denied entry to the organization at the International Health Conference held between June and July. This decision was reinforced by the UN Security Council's resolution in December, which specifically barred Spain from joining any of the UN specialized agencies. However, the changing political landscape meant that the diplomatic isolation of the Franco regime would be gradually eroded during the late 1940s. It was eventually admitted to the WHO in 1951, going on to gain full UN membership in 1955.

Three main factors shaped the initial decision to exclude Spain in 1946, and later to grant entry in 1951. The first was the disintegrating relationship between the USSR and the western Allies which overshadowed the formation of the WHO, and which would go on to have such a profound effect on its early history. The second was the work of the Franco regime in lobbying for membership of the WHO, and its success in exploiting diplomatic alliances and the rhetoric of international health as a 'technical' and 'non-political' field. The third, and perhaps most crucial, was the limited ability of international experts to influence

[48] Ibid., 23. [49] Ibid., 58.

the structure and make-up of the WHO in the face of national governments and their representatives.

The debate about Spanish membership of the WHO played out during the complex series of committees, conferences, and negotiations leading up to its creation in July 1946. Plans for a new international health body had emerged from various sources during the Second World War, promoted in part by senior LNHO figures such as Raymond Gautier who travelled to both Washington and London in 1943 to discuss plans with Allied governments.[50] The process which eventually led to the formation of the WHO formally began with a call at the San Francisco conference in 1945 to establish a new international health organization. The first indications of the significance of the Spanish question came in February 1946 when ECOSOC drew up plans for a conference to set up the new organization. ECOSOC was responsible for coordinating all of the economic and social work which would eventually be carried out by the UN's specialized agencies, and was made up of government representatives from UN member states. The nature of the council's work meant that several delegates had an international health background and had been involved in the initial debates about the proposed health body. The council's vice-chairman was the Yugoslav delegate Andrija Stampar, who had played a major role in the LNHO and would later be the president of the first World Health Assembly. The Chinese delegate on the council was Szeming Sze who would later go on to be a senior official at the WHO. In the initial discussions that took place at the council there was general agreement that the new organization should avoid any political or racial discrimination, and although proposed as a specialized agency, that it should remain sufficiently distant from the UN's political activities to ensure the participation of neutral and 'ex-enemy' states, including Spain.[51]

ECOSOC convened the TPC to carry out preparations and draw up a draft constitution to present to the International Health Conference in June. Unlike ECOSOC, the TPC was made up of sixteen public health experts officially serving in a personal capacity rather than as representatives of their governments. Many of these experts had extensive experience of international health through pre-war work with the LNHO, OIHP, or the Rockefeller Foundation.[52] However, the majority were also senior figures within their respective national health departments and were therefore acutely aware of the political context of their deliberations.

As with the discussions in ECOSOC, there was widespread agreement that the new organization should be 'non-political', and that membership should therefore

[50] LONA, Section 8a, 15197 (R6118), Missions of Members of the Health Section, Yves Biraud, 'Report on a Mission to Washington and London', 20 February 1946.

[51] Ibid.

[52] *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 1*, 5–6.

be universal. But behind this general agreement lay a range of different arguments and opinions. The principal and least controversial argument for universal membership was an epidemiological one, upon which all the committee members agreed. As numerous delegates pointed out, disease knows no borders, and the increase in international transport and communication resulting from technological advances during the war would make it even easier for diseases to spread in the post-war world. As it was proposed that the new organization would take over responsibility for epidemiological control from the OIHP, UNRRA, and the LNHO, universal membership would be vital if it was to be able to carry out these functions adequately. And as the British Ministry of Health observed in response to the committee's proposals, the Spanish and Portuguese empires were particularly crucial from a global epidemiological point of view.[53]

There were also other, less technical arguments advanced in favour of universal membership. Several committee members argued for universal participation on the grounds that the organization needed to remain politically neutral and that no political considerations should be allowed to affect questions of membership. Among the experts advancing this argument were those such as Andrija Stampar who had been most closely involved in the LNHO, and who had first-hand experience of the problems political affiliation could cause. 'The non-political character of the Health Organization,' he wrote, 'might facilitate its task—particularly in times of international crisis. The weakening of the Health Organization of the League of Nations by the loss of political power of the League shows the danger of political connexions for a technical institution.'[54] This argument also appealed to those functionalists who saw technical cooperation as a stepping stone to the wider political cooperation which they hoped would secure international peace in the post-war world.[55]

The principle of universality was also supported by the so-called 'visionaries' on the committee who saw the role of the new organization as extending beyond the control of epidemics, instead encompassing a holistic approach which would bring people together and help to tackle a range of human ills. Brock Chisholm, Canada's deputy minister of health, argued that the world was sick and that it was the responsibility of the committee to forge an organization 'to bring all the people in the world together in the service of physical, social and emotional health'.[56] These sentiments also fed into the debate about the name of the new organization, with Chisholm proposing the title of World Health Organization (rather than the United Nations Health Organization) to show that 'unlike other bodies, the

[53] The National Archives (TNA), FO 371/57073, 'Note by the Ministry of Health on Draft Constitutional Proposals of the Technical Preparatory Committee', May 1946.

[54] *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 1*, 58.

[55] David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* (London: National Peace Council, 1946).

[56] *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 1*, 13.

Organization would be even more than international'.[57] The Chinese representative Szeming Sze felt that the word 'international' had been suitable when proposed at the original San Francisco conference, but that since then the dropping of the atomic bomb had thrust the world into a new era of interconnectedness, and the name of the new organization should reflect the arrival of the 'new world age'.[58] For those who saw international health as the foundation stone for a new era of global harmony and cooperation, there was no question of compromising the principle of universal membership for short-term political considerations.

But this widespread support for a 'non-political' organization with universal membership was tempered by an awareness of the political difficulties of admitting all states immediately, particularly in the case of Spain. The constitutional proposals submitted by the British, US, and French governments reflected these concerns, despite their general support for the principle of universality. In the official UK proposal, for example, there was an emphasis on the link between the WHO and the UN rather than on the uniqueness of a global health body. While conceding that it was desirable on technical grounds that as many countries should be brought on board as soon as possible, it went no further than proposing that 'the door should be left open so that, *as soon as political considerations permit*, nations may become members'[59] (my italics). The proposals had been drawn up by a committee consisting of Department of Health and Foreign Office officials, with the ambivalent tone reflecting some of the tensions between the two groups. The French and US submissions had been drafted in a similar fashion and took a similar line in proposing that new members should be admitted, not simply by virtue of signing up to the WHO constitution as had been proposed by some members of the committee, but with the agreement of two thirds of the future World Health Assembly.[60]

These divergent views led to significant disagreement within the TPC about the nature of the new organization's universality and the exact criteria for admitting new members. In the background of this debate was the concern about the future participation of the USSR in the new organization. The Soviets had not sent a delegate to the TPC and Britain in particular was worried this could prefigure a future lack of engagement.[61] The USSR had been the state most opposed to Spanish participation in other international technical bodies established or re-established since the war. It had recently refused to participate in the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organisation, a body also interested in epidemiological control, because Spain had been admitted.[62] There were fears

[57] Ibid., 17. [58] Ibid., 19. [59] Ibid., 42. [60] Ibid., 46–53.

[61] TNA: FO 371/57071, 'Foreign Office Preparations for International Health Conference', February 1946.

[62] TNA: FO 371/60453, 'Attendance of Spain at International Conferences', July 1946.

that a similar situation would occur with the WHO if Spanish membership was promoted too forcefully.

Ultimately, the committee was unable to reconcile these differing approaches. Its proposed constitution reflected the technical and ideological desire for universality by stating that membership of the new organization would be open to all states. However, a clause was added providing for membership to be suspended in certain circumstances, which it was hoped would calm fears about potential political embarrassment caused by the entry of non-UN members. No agreement could be reached regarding the specific question of membership criteria, and the issue was referred for resolution to the June conference. Given that the TPC was the one point in the negotiations where long-standing international health experts were in a majority, their failure to fully enshrine the principle of universal membership was a significant early setback.

The next stage of the negotiations took place at the second ECOSOC session in May, which debated the TPC's proposed constitution and finalized the arrangements for the June conference.[63] The debate on membership was approached slightly differently here than it had been at the TPC. Although several delegates, including Andrija Stampar and Szeming Sze, had been involved in the TPC negotiations, at ECOSOC they were acting as formal representatives of their governments rather than as independent experts. Many other delegates, such as the UK's Phillip Gore-Booth, came from within their respective countries' foreign ministries rather than from health or social departments. Crucially, there were also delegates present from the USSR and Ukraine, neither of whom had been represented at the TPC.

The different perspectives brought by these delegates were reflected in the greater emphasis on the political difficulties posed by universal membership. The French delegate, for example, argued that 'some States were not Members of the United Nations because they did not conform to its principles or because they had violated those principles', and that 'such States should not become members of the new organization'.[64] The council recommended that as well as including a clause in the constitution allowing for member states to be suspended, membership questions should ultimately be regulated by the WHO's relationship with the UN.[65] As Phillip Gore-Booth reported to the British Foreign Office, this agreement was designed to ensure that national governments could use ECOSOC to block states such as Franco's Spain where there were 'overriding political objections' to membership.[66]

[63] *Official Records Economic and Social Council: First Year, Second Session, 25 May–21 June 1946* (New York: United Nations, 1946).

[64] Ibid., 17–19. [65] Ibid., 345.

[66] TNA: FO 371/59613, 'Note on Remaining Items of Business at Health Committee', Phillip Gore Booth, 6 June 1946.

ECOSOC also addressed the question of exactly which states should be invited to the June conference, the first practical application of the previously theoretical membership debate. While all UN member states would clearly be invited, alongside non-controversial neutral countries such as Sweden, the debate centred around the question of how 'ex-enemy' countries should be represented.[67] With British support, it was agreed that the Italian and Austrian governments should be because they would soon be directly responsible for public health within their borders. Germany and Japan were not invited because they would be represented by members of their respective Allied Control Councils. The only major state not invited in any capacity was Spain, a decision which was later to prove crucial given that the final version of the constitution would grant automatic membership to all states who had been represented there. This moment therefore represented a second major setback for those supporters of universal membership.

The defeat had its roots in both the opposition of the USSR and the composition of ECOSOC. In contrast to the familiarly internationalist atmosphere among the experts of the TPC, at ECOSOC political influences were felt more strongly. Melville Mackenzie, a member of the British delegations at all stages of the process and veteran of the international health scene, told his wife that there was 'great solemnity and Foreign Office atmosphere' at ECOSOC compared to the 'family life at the TPC'.[68] The Chinese representative Szeming Sze highlighted the contrast between the TPC and the 'strictly political' atmosphere at ECOSOC. He also described how Andrija Stampar was forced to vote against a resolution at ECOSOC which he himself had previously agreed to second, because as the representative of the Yugoslav government he was required to vote in line with the Soviets who opposed the motion.[69] Sze's memoirs emphasized the importance of the USSR at this stage of the negotiations. Soviet health experts, he argued, were unable to make any decisions without deferring to the political commissars on the delegation, who were 'highly suspicious of the motives of all things Western' and were themselves required to refer issues to Moscow.[70] He felt that this attitude was the primary barrier to the efforts made by himself and his colleagues to build 'what we hoped would be a non-controversial technical organization', and complained that western powers bent over backwards to accommodate Soviet objections.[71]

The International Health Conference began in New York on 19 June. The preoccupation with Spanish involvement was reflected in the words of Melville Mackenzie, who described it as 'by far the largest International Health Conference

[67] TNA: FO 371/59615, 'Summary Record of the Drafting Committee of the Economic and Social Council', June 1946.

[68] Wellcome Library Archives and Manuscripts (WLA), Melville Mackenzie Papers, PP/MDM/B/17, letter dated 2 May 1946.

[69] Szeming Sze, *The Origins of the World Health Organization: A Personal Memoir, 1945–1948* (Boca Raton: L.I.S.Z. Publications, 1982), 10.

[70] Ibid., 11–12. [71] Ibid.

ever held—between 300 and 400 delegates from every country in the world (including all ex-enemy countries) with the single exception of Spain'.[72] Delegations were made up of ministers and senior officials from national health departments, often with representation from their respective foreign ministries. Whilst most delegates were therefore 'medical men', they did not always share the ideals and outlook of the experienced international health experts who had dominated the TPC. As with ECOSOC, this again meant that the political implications of the Spanish membership debate would continue to play a prominent role in discussions and would prove to be one of the main areas of disagreement.

Despite not being present at the conference, the Spanish government mobilized its diplomatic corps to lobby for membership. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed all its ambassadors to discuss the issue with their respective governments and to request support for Spanish entry.[73] The regime was able to exploit the language of universal health and internationalism used by the health 'visionaries' to further its case. In his submission to the UK government, for example, the Spanish ambassador in London declared that Spain was 'always desirous of collaboration in any peaceful international organisation, particularly when of a humanitarian character'.[74]

These interventions were made firmly within the context of the wider 'Spanish Question', coming only days after the Security Council had discussed the Franco regime's threat to world peace. For the Spanish government, participation on the international stage via technical or cultural organizations was a way of demonstrating Spain's commitment to international collaboration and cooperation. Throughout this period the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs heavily publicized various international legal and academic conferences which had recently been held in Spain as evidence that it remained a respectable and moderate member of the international community.[75] The technical nature of the WHO's work provided Spanish authorities with an opportunity to lobby for membership. Gaining entry to a major UN body such as the WHO, one of the first of the specialized agencies to be established, would have represented a major diplomatic coup at a very dangerous time for the Franco regime.

Spanish involvement in international technical institutions was an active question within international diplomatic circles during 1946, and was seen by both Spanish and foreign governments as a key part of the wider Spanish Question. This coloured reactions to Spain's lobbying efforts over the WHO. The plea to the UK government made by the Spanish ambassador in London was met with a brusque response, with the explicit message that any support in regards to the WHO would be conditional on greater political cooperation, particularly in the

[72] WLA, PP/MDM/B/17, letter dated 9 June 1946.
[73] AGA (10)91 54/11850, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (MAE) circular 145, 6 July 1946.
[74] TNA: FO 371/59615, Memorandum from Spanish Embassy in London, 8 July 1946.
[75] AGA (10)91 54/11850, MAE, telegram from MAE to Caracas Embassy dated 26 June.

return of Nazi assets and individuals then based in Spain.[76] Throughout the summer of 1946 the British Foreign Office had discussed whether Spain should be invited to a range of international technical events and bodies, including health, meteorological, and shipping conferences.[77] The technical merits of Spanish participation in these activities was broadly agreed. But political considerations were also given significant weight in the discussions, especially when it was feared that Spanish participation could lead to Soviet withdrawal.

The results of Spain's diplomatic efforts, however, were evident in the vocal support Spanish membership received as soon as the International Health Conference opened. The issue was first raised by the Argentine representative who adopted the discourse of the conference 'visionaries' to argue that all human beings had a right to health and well-being regardless of race, religion, or political belief, and that the spirit of the word 'World' in the organization's proposed title implied that all countries, including Spain, should be able to benefit from it. He also cited the historical relationship between the two nations, and the fact that Argentina 'owed to Spain its language, culture and religion . . . and the work of [its] sons who forged the Argentine nation', reflecting the success of the Franco regime in exploiting ties of *hispanidad* and cultural links with Latin America.[78] In a similar vein, the Chilean delegate proposed looser criteria for admitting members, while the Paraguayan representative, describing the exclusion of states as 'suicidal', argued that membership be based solely on a state's signature of the constitution which would have made Spanish membership a mere formality. Even countries politically hostile to the Franco regime supported these pro-Spanish motions. The Venezuelan government, for example, had been a long-standing opponent of Franco, but its delegate argued in New York that 'whatever ideologies a country might hold, the world from the point of view of health was indivisible'.[79]

On the other side, the USSR and its allies forcefully opposed the idea of Spanish membership. The delegate from the USSR asked why the countries advocating for Spain were not also calling for German and Japanese membership. The Byelorussian representative raised the spectre of Spain's involvement with the Nazi war effort on the Eastern Front. 'One could not forget,' he told delegates,

> the bloody activities of the Fascist Blueshirt Division sent by Spain into Byelorussia during the Second World War to help the Hitlerite army, nor that those troops were real participants in the war against peaceful countries and that they came to destroy the towns and villages of Byelorussia and to murder little children, together with their fathers and their mothers.[80]

[76] TNA: FO 371/60453, 'Attendance of Spain at International Conferences: Conversation with the Marques de Santa Cruz', July 1946.

[77] TNA: FO 371/60453, 'Attendance of Spain at International Conferences', July 1946.

[78] *Offical Records of the World Health Organization, No. 2*, 48. For more on the importance of *hispanidad* to Spain's post-war engagement with international health, see Chapter 4.

[79] Ibid., p. 70. [80] Ibid.

The debate ended without any clear agreement. Spain was not admitted, but membership rules were agreed which would have made it relatively easy for it to gain membership with the support of the US, Latin American and other western states. However, the conference also agreed that the WHO would be constituted as a specialized agency with significant levels of oversight by the UN. When the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on Spain in December 1946, it explicitly excluded the Franco regime from any UN specialized agencies and technical bodies, meaning that Spanish membership would be impossible while the resolution was in force. From that point on it would be another five years before Spain was able to join the WHO.

The refusal to admit Spain represented an early defeat for the leaders of the pre-war international health movement and the international health 'visionaries' who had hoped to forge a universal body free from political ties and interference. The root of their defeat lay in the structure of the decision-making process during the constitutional negotiations. Their influence was at its height during the TPC, which was made up solely of experienced health experts officially acting in a professional capacity. It was here that support for universal membership and the voice of the visionaries was at its strongest. However, even at this stage political constraints were felt through the positions that many of the delegates held at senior levels of their national health administrations, and the various plans submitted by the British, US, and French governments. At ECOSOC and the International Health Conference their influence would be weaker still. Ultimately, the final say on Spanish membership in 1946 came not from any factions within the WHO or the international health community, but from the UN General Assembly and the national governments represented there. For those who hoped that the post-war era would provide an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the League and develop a genuinely apolitical sphere in which international health could flourish, the case of Spain provided an early wake-up call. Indeed, the debate over Spanish membership highlighted the continuities between the pre-war League hamstrung by political conflict and questions of US, Soviet, and German participation, and a post-war WHO whose effectiveness would be significantly undermined by the political divisions of the Cold War. For the Franco regime it represented a diplomatic setback, but one which didn't last for long.

'Everyone applauded': Spain in the WHO

If diplomatic conditions and the influence of national governments had blocked Spanish membership in 1946, they also paved the way for Spain's entry into the WHO in 1951. There were two crucial developments in the intervening years which enabled this to happen. The first was the withdrawal of the USSR and most eastern European states from the WHO between 1949 and 1950. The reasons

given for Soviet withdrawal were unhappiness at the way the organization was being run and the high costs involved, although it was part of a general Soviet disengagement from UN economic and social activities after the emergence of the Cold War.[81] These changes meant that the main source of opposition to Spanish membership within the WHO had been removed, and between 1950 and the 1955, when the Eastern Bloc countries began to return, the US and its allies held a dominant position.[82] The path to Spanish entry would therefore be much smoother within the WHO once external conditions permitted.

Those external conditions changed quickly in the years following the crucial General Assembly resolution of 1946. The Franco regime's diplomatic fortunes had slowly begun to turn from 1947. Increasing tensions between the west and the USSR, and the emergence of the Truman doctrine in March 1947, buttressed Franco's portrayal of his government as an anti-communist ally in the emerging Cold War. Over the course of 1947 the US re-evaluated the strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula in any coming conflict with the USSR, and increasingly came to see the Franco regime as an important bulwark against communism in southern Europe. France reopened its border with Spain in February 1948, while in Britain the cross-party consensus against the Franco regime crumbled as an increasing number of Conservatives began to call for a normalization of relations. Although the UN General Assembly reaffirmed its 1946 resolution in November 1947, the mood was turning in favour of the Franco regime as more and more countries, particularly in Latin America, began to re-establish diplomatic ties with Spain. The Korean War was the final nail in the coffin of the international anti-Franco consensus.[83]

The second development on the road to Spanish membership occurred in November 1950, when a proposal put forward by a coalition of Latin American countries to overturn the 1946 ruling was passed in the UN General Assembly. It was at this point that the role of the WHO and other technical agencies as a pathway towards full UN membership was made explicit. The resolution, while not granting Spain entry to the UN as a whole, specifically lifted the ban on Spanish membership of UN specialized agencies and affiliated bodies. 'The specialized agencies of the United Nations,' it read, 'are technical and largely non-political in character and have been established in order the benefit the people of all nations, and therefore, they should be free to decide for themselves whether the

[81] Javed Siddiqi, *World Health and World Politics: The World Health Organization and the UN system* (London: Hurst, 1995), 106.

[82] Ibid., 35. The US and Latin American states in particular tended to vote as a bloc within the WHO, partly as a result of their shared history of public health cooperation through the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau. Prior to the entry of a large number of post-colonial African and Asian states during the 1950s and 1960s, they were usually able to win a majority of votes at the World Health Assemblies.

[83] Portero, *Franco aislado.*

participation of Spain in their activities is desirable and in the interest of their work.'[84] The ruling echoed the language used both by the Franco regime and by international health experts in the debate over Spanish membership in 1946, emphasizing the 'non-political' nature of international technical work and the freedom of specialized agencies to make their own membership decisions. In the same way that the regime had exploited the rhetoric of international health and technical cooperation in 1946, its supporters were now using it as a stepping stone to full international rehabilitation.

Negotiations over Spain's entry to the WHO began immediately, and Spanish enthusiasm was reflected in the speed with which the regime responded to the General Assembly resolution of November 1950. The first enquiry about applying for membership arrived at the WHO in February 1951, and the full application for membership was submitted by 5 April.[85] The WHO was the first specialized agency that Spain moved actively to join following the General Assembly resolution.[86] Membership was granted relatively easily at the Fourth World Health Assembly in May. In the absence of the USSR and most of the eastern European states opposition was limited to Mexico, whose government had retained its resolutely anti-Francoist stance.[87] Tellingly, the decision to admit Spain came at the same time as membership was granted to West Germany and Japan. Both countries had spent the previous six years emerging from the devastation of war, initially under Allied tutelage, and had to a certain extent been forced to confront their past actions and to undergo a process of de-Nazification or purging of war criminals. Both had held free elections and formed governments under new, liberal democratic constitutions, and were firmly on the road to international rehabilitation within the US sphere of influence. Spain, obviously, had not undergone any similar process. The fact that these countries were all in a similar position in regards to entry into the WHO and other UN technical institutions highlights the extent to which the Franco regime had managed to gain acceptance from the US and its allies in particular, and from international opinion more generally.

Despite their initial absence from the organization, senior figures from both the Spanish Department of Health and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had retained a positive view of the WHO and encouraged Spain's immediate request for membership in 1951. Chief among them was Gerardo Clavero Campo, director of the National School of Public Health and later Spain's lead delegate at the WHO, who

[84] WHOA, First Generation CC-4-3, 'Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly at its 204th Plenary Meeting', 4 November 1950.

[85] WHOA, First Generation, OD 14, Correspondence regarding UN relations with Spain.

[86] WHOA, First Generation, L 2/3, Spanish Ratification. Due to the dates of their respective conferences, Spanish membership of the Food and Agriculture Organization was ratified slightly earlier than its membership of the WHO.

[87] *Offical Records of the World Health Organization, No. 35.*

was the only expert within Spain to have any kind of relationship with the organization prior to 1951. He was the chief advocate for international health work in Spain during this period, writing a regular column on international health from 1948 in the official journal of the Falange's National Health Delegation profiling various WHO programmes. He was the only non-exiled Spaniard to attend any kind of WHO conference before 1951 when his participation in the International Malaria Conference held in Washington in 1948 secured him an invitation to a WHO-sponsored meeting of malariologists at the US State Department.[88] Prior to the Fourth World Health Assembly in 1951, he also attended a WHO conference on revised international sanitary conventions as an observer, alongside representatives from West Germany.[89] Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain's consular representative in Geneva was sceptical about the grand claims about universal happiness and well-being made in the WHO constitution, but admired its 'efficient' disease-control campaigns and spoke positively about the material benefits membership would bring to the Spanish health system.[90]

The question of economic costs and benefits was central to the Franco regime's attitude towards the WHO. Membership of all of the UN specialized agencies required an annual payment in dollars, a significant commitment for a regime which was still under great financial strain in the early 1950s. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was concerned about the fees required by the WHO, $77,000 in 1951 and $93,000 in 1952, and Spain quickly fell into arrears on its payments.[91] In return, however, Spain received an equal, if not greater degree of financial support from the WHO to put towards its health services. For the Department of Health, therefore, the WHO provided a valuable source of funds to pay for pharmaceutical supplies, training courses, and scientific publications which it could not otherwise afford to buy on the open market. In 1952 José Palanca wrote to the minister of foreign affairs, Martín Artajo, urging him to approve payments to the WHO, arguing that Spain's health system was a net beneficiary of the organization, and that its late payments were placing Spain in a 'position of inferiority' within the WHO.[92]

The immediate practical benefits of Spanish membership were indeed considerable.[93] In particular, WHO membership enabled Spain to benefit from

[88] *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 11: Reports of the Expert Committees and Other Advisory Bodies to the Interim Commission* (New York: World Health Organization, 1948), 44 and 60.

[89] *Ser*, 88 (1951), 7–9.

[90] AGA, 82/09200, 'Información General sobre Agencias Especializadas de la O.N.U, 1949–53', Álvaro de Aguilar to MAE, 6 November 1950.

[91] AGA, 82/09200, 'Cuotas en General de España con Agencias Especializadas y Otros Organismos Internacionales'.

[92] AGA, 82/09200, 'Cuotas en General de España con Agencias Especializadas y Otros Organismos Internacionales', Palanca to Martín Artajo, 11 December 1952.

[93] Unless otherwise stated, the information in this section comes from the Annual Reports of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly of the United Nations, published in the *Official*

the UN's new Technical Assistance Programme which had been established in 1949. The forerunner to the UN Development Programme, it funded development projects in specific countries from voluntary contributions made by UN member states. José Palanca signed a Technical Assistance agreement with the WHO in January 1952, only the third European country to do so after Turkey and Yugoslavia.[94] Over the following four years the WHO would establish four major Technical Assistance programmes in Spain, focussing on zoonoses (animal-to-human communicable diseases), venereal diseases, communicable eye diseases, and maternal and infant health. Spain also received considerable levels of support via WHO fellowship programmes during the 1950s. Partly financed by the Technical Assistance programmes, between 1953 and 1956 it received significantly higher numbers of fellowship awards than Italy and other comparable countries, including individual study fellowships for extended periods abroad and group study fellowships for attendance at international training courses and conferences.[95] These programmes were complimented by agreements with UNICEF on infant welfare projects, many of which were connected with infant and maternal health and were carried out in conjunction with the WHO. The executive director of UNICEF, Maurice Pate, first visited Spain in 1954 alongside the deputy executive director of programmes, Charles Egger. Following their conversations with various government agencies, Spain signed a formal agreement concerning UNICEF activity in Spain in May 1954, and continued to receive funding throughout the 1950s.[96]

For Spanish health experts, these material benefits were matched by increasing international prestige and visibility for the Spanish medical profession, as well as access to professional opportunities within the WHO. For the first four years of membership no major WHO training courses were organized in Spain, suggesting both a dearth of suitable expertise within the country and a lack of awareness of the strengths of Spanish medicine among WHO officials, not surprising given the country's extended absence from the international stage. From 1955, however, Spain began to host major international conferences and post-graduate courses, as well as individual WHO fellowship holders who wished to study in the country. The subjects most commonly studied in Spain were those covered by Technical Assistance programmes, notably communicable eye diseases, but also venereal diseases and infant health, suggesting that the programmes were both helping to

Records of the WHO numbers 16, 24, 30, 38, 45, 51, 59, 67, 75, 82, 90, 98, and 105, and covering the period from 1948 to 1960.

[94] *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 45: The Work of the WHO in 1952* (New York: World Health Organization, 1953), 108.

[95] In 1954, as an example, Spanish experts received fifty-four WHO fellowships compared to thirty-two awarded to Italian experts, who prior to 1952 had received consistently higher numbers.

[96] J. Bosch Marin and M. Blanco-Otero, *UNICEF* (Madrid: Dirección General de la Sanidad, 1955), 15–25.

develop expertise within Spain and bringing this expertise to the attention of international health authorities. Spanish experts were also invited to sit on WHO expert committees. These committees were at the centre of the organization's work, with members nominated by committee chairmen and approved by the director general, in theory at least based solely on professional competence and reputation with no consideration of national or political representation. By 1956 there were thirteen Spanish experts sitting on these committees.[97]

One fact which had the potential to complicate relations with the WHO was the involvement of Spanish Republican exiles within the organization. Chief among them was Marcelino Pascua, the only Spaniard to hold a senior position in the WHO during the 1940s and 1950s. One of Spain's leading health experts during the interwar period, Pascua had served as director general of health under the Second Republic. He had also been a socialist deputy in the *Cortes*, and during the civil war had been appointed as Republican ambassador to Moscow, overseeing the controversial transfer of Spanish gold reserves to the USSR. Having ended the civil war in Paris in his role as Republican ambassador to France, he had spent a number of years working at Johns Hopkins University and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, before forming part of the secretariat of the WHO Interim Commission in 1948.[98] His nomination to the commission was based on his extensive pre-war experience with the LNHO and his relationship with international experts such as Yves Biraud and Melville Mackenzie.[99] He took part in a major international conference to revise the international list of diseases and causes of death in April 1948 and acted as secretary of credentials at the first three World Health Assemblies. He was appointed deputy medical director of the Division of Health Statistics in 1949, later becoming director of health statistics.[100] Although travelling on a UN diplomatic passport, he retained his Spanish nationality and was listed among Spanish staff members in official WHO publications.

Pascua's role in the WHO, alongside the involvement of other Republican exiles, coloured the attitude of Francoist expert and diplomats towards the organization. In his initial report on the work of the WHO to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1950, the Spanish Consul in Geneva reported that one of its

[97] Manuel Bermudez Pareja, *Sanidad internacional: Organización Mundial de la Salud* (Madrid: Dirección General de Sanidad, 1956), 89.

[98] *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 11*, 32.

[99] Josep Bernabéu-Mestre, 'El exilio científico republicano español y los inicios de la Organización Mundial de la Salud (1946–1956)', in Josep Lluís Barona (ed.), *El exilio científico republicano* (Valencia: Universitat de Valencia, 2010), 220.

[100] *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 28. Third World Health Assembly, Geneva, 8 to 27 May 1950* (New York: World Health Organization, 1950); *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 51: The Work of the WHO in 1953* (New York: World Health Organization, 1954), 182.

leading figures was the 'unfortunately well-known Spaniard Dr. Pascua'.[101] It also added an important personal dimension to the debate about Spain's membership. The relationship between Marcelino Pascua and José Palanca was particularly fraught, with the two men nurturing a political, professional, and personal rivalry dating back to the 1920s. In the triumphalist account of Spain's entry into the WHO in Palanca's memoirs, he described how at the end of his inaugural speech to the 1951 World Health Assembly, 'everyone applauded, except for Mexico, and Pascua watching the spectacle from the public gallery'.[102] He also alleged that Pascua had actively lobbied Latin American delegates to oppose Spanish membership of the WHO prior to Assembly.

The Spanish exiles who participated in the work of international health organizations were certainly proud of the implicit challenge their roles posed to the Franco regime. The daughter of the exiled public health expert, Santiago Ruesta, recalled that her father had seen his involvement in the World Health Assembly representing the Venezuelan government as a challenge to Francoist isolation. 'Franco had managed,' she reported her father as saying, 'to push Spain to the margins of the international community and therefore absent from these assemblies, but he hadn't been able to prevent the participation of a Spanish doctor forced into exile.'[103] Through his ties with the Republican government-in-exile, Marcelino Pascua was involved with the lobbying campaign to exclude Spain from the UN in 1946, and may well have used his influence to try and prevent Spanish entry to the WHO.[104] The risk for the Franco regime was that the opposition of exiles would undermine the universalist and 'non-political' rhetoric it relied on to win support for WHO membership. In an age where so many international scientists and medical experts had first-hand experience of political exile, and within a community where personal relationships were highly valued, such opposition could carry serious weight.

But there is little evidence that the presence of Republican exiles had a significant impact on the Spanish membership debate, or on Francoist involvement with the WHO after 1951. If Pascua did meet with Latin American delegates on the eve of the 1951 vote, as Palanca claimed, then it clearly had no effect on the outcome. Although he may have lobbied against Spanish participation prior to that date, Spain's initial exclusion ultimately rested on the UN General Assembly resolution, and once that was rescinded in 1950 the momentum behind Spanish entry grew relatively quickly. The influence of exiled Republicans was strongest within Latin

[101] AGA, 82/09200, 'Información General sobre Agencias Especializadas de la O.N.U, 1949–53', Álvaro de Aguilar to MAE, 6 November 1950.

[102] Palanca, *Medio siglo*, 162.

[103] Quoted in Josep Bernabéu-Mestre, 'La contribución del exilio científico español al desarrollo de la salud pública venzolano: Santiago Ruesta Marco, 1938–1960', in Josep Lluís Barona (ed.), *Ciencia, salud pública y exilio: España, 1875–1939* (Valencia: Seminari d'estudis sobre la ciéncia, 2003), 223–56.

[104] Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid (AHN), Diversos Marcelino Pascua, Box 2, 14/9, *Report on the Work of The Friends of the Spanish Republic.*

America, where many had established influential roles within national health systems.[105] But the majority of Latin American states actively supported Spanish entry into the WHO from 1946, even in the case of Venezuela where Republican exiles held important roles within the public health system.

By 1945 the Franco regime seemed to have outlived its historical context. The European fascist milieu from which it had emerged had been replaced by a post-war system which incorporated divergent political models, but which appeared united in its anti-fascism. Francoism, many believed, lacked the external support to survive in this new environment. The idea of the Francoist 'social state' was particularly rooted in this discredited fascist past. It was inspired directly by the example of fascist social programmes in Italy and elsewhere. And in the post-war period it was still closely associated with the Falange and Falangist ministers who most vigorously promoted it. But it was this fascist-rooted concept which proved crucial in enabling the Franco regime to distance itself from its fascist past and to establish its legitimacy within the post-war international system. The Francoist social state was used to demonstrate Spain's alignment with the global post-war commitment to welfare, humanitarianism, and international development.

Health and welfare experts served as a vanguard for Spain's post-war integration into the UN system. The historical, personal, and professional ties between Francoist experts and their counterparts abroad helped to maintain the connections between Spain and the outside world during the most intense period of post-war diplomatic isolation. The commitment of many senior international experts to the idea of a universal and 'non-political' international health organization led them to support the integration of Franco's Spain, even in the cases of those liberal or left-wing proponents of interwar social medicine who had sympathized with the Republican cause during the Spanish Civil War. The Franco regime was able to exploit the language of international health as a 'technical' field to counter arguments against Spanish participation. This approach was even more effective in the case of health than in other areas of international technical cooperation such as communications or transport, because of the unique humanitarian and utopian rhetoric which surrounded the creation of the WHO. The regime's efforts were ably assisted by Spanish health experts, who were happy to decry the political opportunism of those seeking to exclude them.

In many ways, Spain's relationship with the WHO and other international health organizations fits our traditional understanding of the first two decades of the Franco regime as a period of international isolation, giving way to semi-integration following the start of the Cold War. In important respects, however, it also serves to complicate this picture. The involvement of Spanish health experts with liberal international health organizations both during and immediately after

[105] For more on the role of exiled Republican experts in Latin America and their relationship with Francoist experts, see Chapter 5.

the Second World War highlights the scale and significance of the international ties Franco's Spain retained outside of the Nazi New Order during the period. The Cold War clearly shaped the initial decision to exclude Spain from the WHO and to readmit it in 1951, particularly the support of the US and the later withdrawal of the USSR and its allies from the organization. But the debate in 1946 was not just a proxy conflict between the two superpowers, and Spain was not admitted to the organization in 1951 simply because of its anti-communism. The 1946 debate was shaped by questions over the universalism of international health, the independence of technical experts and expertise, and the relationship between nation states and specialized agencies, as well as by tensions between the USSR and the west. Spain's successful international reintegration stemmed partly from its ability to promote itself as a country committed to 'welfare work, humanitarianism and health on the international level', as Palanca described it.[106]

The fierce debate over Spanish membership also serves to illustrate the tensions inherent in post-war internationalism, particularly between the universalist rhetoric of the new UN system and the political realities of global conflict and political exclusion. During the post-war 'apogee of internationalism', many hoped the UN would be able to overcome the political divisions which had beset the League of Nations.[107] Functionalists argued that practical cases of international cooperation could help to build a new global society from the bottom up. Their goals were reflected in the language of the WHO's 'visionaries', and in the utopian preamble to the WHO Constitution which argued that 'the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and States'.[108] However, the UN, like the League before it, had emerged from a wartime coalition. The language of 'ex-enemy' states reflected the contradictions between its partisan origins and its post-war claims to universalism. The UN's structure ensured the dominance of the Great Powers and the ultimate control of specialized agencies by national governments. The emergence of the Cold War quickly transformed the UN system into a site for global political and ideological conflict. The work of its specialized agencies in the 1950s and 1960s was profoundly shaped by the strategic goals of the US on the one hand and by the opposition and withdrawal of the USSR and its allies on the other.

[106] *Offical Records of the World Health Organization, No. 35*, 123–4.
[107] Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, ch. 3.
[108] *Constitution of the World Health Organization* (1946).

3

'Generous, Selfless, Civilizing'

Health and Development in Francoist Africa

In February 1945 the head of the Spanish Institute of Colonial Medicine, Valentín Matilla Gómez, travelled to the west African colony of Spanish Guinea. Matilla was one of the leading figures in Spanish public health and tropical medicine throughout the early Franco era. During his early career he studied at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and the Hamburg Institute for Tropical Medicine. In 1939 he was appointed as Spain's first ever professor of microbiology and parasitology in Madrid, having spent the civil war working as a public health adviser to the notorious General Quiepo de Llano in Seville. In 1943 he was charged with coordinating health services in Morocco and Spanish Guinea, and in the same year founded the journal *La Medicina Colonial*.[1] Together with two colleagues, Matilla set out in 1945 to study the health problems faced by Spanish Guinea and the medical services available to address them, as well as carrying out research into the diseases and blood groups of the indigenous population.[2]

On his return, Matilla published an article in *La Medicina Colonial* describing the visit and setting out his views on the significance of colonial health in Franco's Spain. He claimed that the health services available to the indigenous population in Spanish Guinea were 'excellent', and were delivered in an 'agreeable and Christian' manner to a level perfectly attuned to the people's needs ('within, of course, the very limited appetite [for medical services] that those men feel for reasons of race and climate'[3]). For Matilla, this high level of care was not just significant for its intrinsic value to the colony's residents. Spanish Guinea, he argued, although 'extraordinarily miniscule', was of 'extraordinary symbolic value' for modern Spain. It tied the nation to its great colonizing history, and demonstrated that the Spanish 'deserved' their present-day imperial role because of 'the care and meticulousness with which we attend the needs of colonization'.[4] This

[1] *Anales de la Real Academia Nacional de Medicina*, 90, 4 (1988), 492–508; *Anales de la Real Academia Nacional de Medicina*, 101, 3 (1994), 507–16.

[2] Maria Aguilera Franco, 'El Profesor Don Justo Covaleda Ortega', *Anales de Medicina y Cirugía*, 46, 195, 211–18.

[3] Ibid., 313.

[4] Valentín Matilla Gómez, 'Una expedición científica a la Guinea', *La Medicina Colonial*, 6, 4–5 (November–December 1945), 302.

idea was reflected in the comparisons he drew with the other European imperial powers. The inhabitants of Spanish Guinea, he argued, could enjoy a level of health care which was the envy of those in neighbouring territories such as Nigeria and Cameroon, under the less civilized and attentive rule of Britain and France. Not only did Spain's colonial health services and experts help to justify Spanish imperial rule, but, as the end of the Second World War approached, they demonstrated to the world the value and the virtues of Franco's Spain. 'Those same Spaniards and experts,' argued Matilla, 'are those who go out of their way in the colony to demonstrate both to neighbouring colonies and to the whole world, that Spain continues to be the generous, selfless, civilizing and evangelizing nation it has always been.'[5]

Matilla's arguments reveal an important colonial dimension to the concept of the Francoist social state, and one which played a vital role in Spain's search for international legitimacy. Spain's African colonies were geographically tiny, but of huge symbolic value for the Franco regime. At least until the loss of Morocco in 1956, Francoist Spain saw the world through an imperial lens.[6] The relationship of the regime and its supporters to both the Axis and Allied powers during the Second World War, and to the post-war UN system, was coloured by their perception of Spain as an imperial power. The Franco regime failed to expand its African territories during the war, but aimed to consolidate them after 1945 and to exploit their resources to help revitalize the Spanish economy. Despite the brutality and neglect which characterized Spanish colonial rule, it sought to promote Francoist Spain as a responsible European colonial power committed to African development.

As Matilla's article illustrated, health and welfare experts were at the heart of this process. Their professional training and research in the fields of colonial health and tropical medicine brought them into contact with international networks of European and North American colleagues. Their work on the ground in Africa required them to participate in the inter-imperial networks of public health set up to prevent the spread of infectious diseases across the continent. For many inside and outside of the profession, colonial health symbolized both the virtues of the Francoist social state and Spain's claims to be a civilized and civilizing imperial power.

Whereas Chapters 1 and 2 explored the ways in which Spanish experts adapted to the changing world around them, this chapter, and Chapters 4 and 5, set out different ways in which they attempted to forge new international connections more aligned with Francoist ideology. All of these projects had their roots in the

[5] Ibid., 335.

[6] On the complex idea of empire during this period of Francoist rule, see Zira Box, 'Spanish Imperial Destiny: The Concept of Empire during Early Francoism', *Contributions to the History of Concepts*, 8, 1 (2013), 89–106.

pre-1945 era, but all persisted in some form after 1945. And they met with mixed success, no more so than in the case of colonial health and welfare in Africa. The reality of Spain's imperial power and influence fell far short of the grand visions of Francoist experts and officials. When Spain began to gain entry to post-war international health and humanitarian organizations, its status as an 'imperial power' seemed to promise Spanish experts a role within the regional structures set up to promote African health and development. But despite the rhetoric of the Franco regime, the limited size of Spain's colonies and obvious failings of Francoist colonial rule restricted Spanish colonial experts to a marginal role on the international stage. They were largely excluded from the more formal inter-imperial health networks established after 1945. This in turn limited their role in the regional work of international health and development organizations during the 1950s.

The international dimension of Francoist colonial medicine reflects the entangled histories of international and colonial health, and of imperialism and internationalism more generally.[7] The European imperial project, particularly during the period of 'high imperialism' in the late nineteenth century, involved extensive cooperation between the imperial powers, alongside the more familiar history of imperial rivalry and conflict.[8] Many of the forms of transnational society which developed from the nineteenth century emerged from networks and structures linked to European empires. The origins of the international sanitary conventions, for example, lay in the desire to protect European states from the infectious diseases which were often transmitted through imperial trade and transport routes.[9] The threat of infectious diseases to the European colonial project also underpinned the development of a transnational network of tropical medicine institutions and experts.[10] The League of Nations was in many ways an imperial club, reflecting and buttressing forms of colonial rule, and adopting the discourse of a world divided between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' states.[11] This inevitably affected the outlook and actions of the LNHO, which incorporated many officials and experts who had built their careers within colonial health systems and which did little to interfere with the health affairs of European colonies.

[7] Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro (eds), *Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Jessica Lynne Pearson, *The Colonial Politics of Global Health: France and the United Nations in Postwar Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).

[8] Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann (eds), *Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, c. 1880–1950* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

[9] João Rangel de Almeida, 'Epidemic Opportunities: Panic, Quarantines, and the 1851 International Sanitary Conference', in Robert Peckham (ed.), *Empire of Panic: Epidemics and Colonial Anxieties* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015), 57–86.

[10] Deborah J. Neill, *Networks in Tropical Medicine: Internationalism, Colonialism and the Rise of a Medical Speciality, 1890–1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).

[11] Pedersen, *The Guardians*.

After 1945, many of the founders of the UN also envisioned it as a system which would protect the interest of European empires.[12] However, the formal anti-colonialism of the US and the USSR, the influence of post-colonial states such as India, and the post-war reaffirmation of the principle of national sovereignty complicated the relationship between the UN and the European imperial powers. Again, this was reflected in the work and structure of the WHO. The foundation of the organization in 1946 witnessed a fierce debate about the status of colonial territories, many of which were important sites in the global fight against infectious diseases. Western experts working in south-east Asia ran up against the plans and priorities of newly decolonized states such as India.[13] And anti-colonial pressure within the UN system meant that the European imperial powers profoundly distrusted the projected work of organizations such as the WHO and UNICEF in Africa.[14]

This chapter explores the international and inter-imperial dimensions of Spanish colonial health. It begins with an overview of Franco's African empire, the *africanista* ideology which underpinned it, and the role of health and medicine within Francoist colonial thought. It then explores Spanish involvement in international networks of tropical medicine and colonial health. During the Second World War tropical medicine experts worked closely with their German counterparts, at a time when Spanish dreams of expanding their African empire with Nazi support were at their peak. These links were forged largely by experts based on the Spanish mainland. At the same time, experts based in Africa, particularly in Spanish Guinea, were working closely with their Allied neighbours within the inter-imperial health networks of the region. The chapter ends by showing how Spain's diplomatic isolation in the immediate aftermath of 1945 dashed hopes that Spanish experts would find a new role either in inter-imperial 'Eurafrican' networks, or within the regional offices of the WHO. It thus reveals the international ambitions and failures of Francoist colonial health. But it also shows how colonial powers and experts elsewhere in Europe continued to shape international health and development in Africa throughout the immediate post-war era.

Africanismo and Colonial Health

By the early twentieth century the Spanish empire had been reduced to a pale shadow of its former self. Following the Latin American wars of independence in the early nineteenth century, Spain's remaining American and Asian colonies were either granted independence or ceded to the US following the Spanish-American war of 1898, an event known in Spain simply as 'the Disaster',

[12] Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*. [13] Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health*.

[14] Jessica Pearson, 'Promoting Health, Protecting Empire: Inter-Colonial Medical Cooperation in Postwar Africa', *Monde(s)*, 7 (2015), 213–30.

which plunged the country into a political, social, and moral crisis. At a time when other European empires were reaching their zenith and the 'scramble for Africa' was rapidly expanding imperial power across the continent, Spain was left with a few historical enclaves on the Moroccan coast, a largely uninhabited desert region in the Sahara, and the tiny west African territory which would later become Equatorial Guinea.

Despite strident claims about its rights to wider territories across north Africa, years of Spanish negotiations with the other European powers only succeeded in gaining a strip of mountainous territory in northern Morocco. Lacking the natural and economic resources of the much larger French zone to the south, control of the Spanish protectorate of Morocco plunged Spain into a series of brutal and costly colonial conflicts between 1909 and 1927 in an attempt to pacify the local population, with severe consequences for the financial and political stability of the Spanish state.[15] These conflicts helped to form a generation of *africanista* officers and soldiers within the Spanish army, including Franco, for whom the brutal and brutalizing experiences of colonial conflict played a formative role in their political development. The army in Morocco would ultimately become the launch pad for the military rebellion which began the civil war in 1936, a conflict in which 70,000 Moroccans took part.[16]

Despite its extremely limited size, Spain's African empire was central to the Franco regime's foreign policy and international ambitions during its early years. The language of empire and imperialism had dominated the discourse of radical right-wing groups such as the Falange and *Acción Española* since before the civil war. Spain, these groups argued, was at heart an imperial power, and the only way to regain its former glory was to reconstruct in some form the empire that had been lost in 1898.[17] But the imperial vision of the Spanish right had been geographically flexible and had primarily focussed on the idea of Spain's 'spiritual' role in Latin America. Under the Franco regime these ideas merged with the Africanist focus of Franco and his fellow officers who had forged their careers in Morocco during the Rif wars, turning Francoist imperial policy firmly towards the idea of African expansion.[18] Imperialist policies reached their apogee in the early years of the Second World War when disruption to the international system made

[15] Susana Sueiro Seoane, 'Spanish Colonialism during Primo de Rivera's Dictatorship', in Raanan Rein (ed.), *Spain and the Mediterranean since 1898* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 48–64; María Rosa de Madariaga, *Marruecos, ese gran desconocido: breve historia del protectorado español* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2013).

[16] Sebastian Balfour, *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[17] On the role of Africa in twentieth-century Spanish nationalism, see Gonzalo Alvarez Chillida and Eloy Martín Corrales, 'Haciendo patria en Africa: España en Marruecos y en el Golfo de Guinea', in Xavier Moreno Juliá and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas (eds), *Ser españoles: imaginarios nacionalistas en el siglo XX* (Barcelona: RBA, 2013), 399–432.

[18] Gustau Nerín and Alfred Bosch, *El imperio que nunca existió: la aventura colonial discutida en Hendaya* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, 2001); Sergio Suárez Blanco, 'Las colonias españolas en

the idea of expanding the Spanish empire in Africa seem like a realistic possibility. During negotiations with Nazi Germany concerning possible Spanish entry into the Second World War in 1940, Franco unsuccessfully demanded the expansion of Spanish territories in north Africa, specifically the unification of the whole of Morocco under Spanish control at the expense of France.[19]

During the early 1940s, the future Spanish foreign minister, Fernando María Castiella, together with the Falangist politician José María de Areilza, published an exposition of Francoist imperial ideology in their work '*Reivindicaciones de España*'. Cataloguing the series of events by which Britain and France had apparently undermined Spain's legitimate imperial claims over the preceding two decades, they argued that the civil war had marked a turning point, and that a triumphant Spain 'with its Imperial will completely recovered [is now] ready to impose its desires in the vital sphere which it is justly entitled to'.[20] The idea of Spain's 'vital space' in north Africa, echoing the Nazi language of *Lebensraum* and *Grossraumwirtschaft*, reflected the economic priorities of the regime, which planned to revitalize the ruined post-civil war economy through a programme of economic autarky. Such a programme, many argued, would only be successful with access to expanded north African territories to provide the economy with both raw materials and markets for Spanish industry.[21] The National Institute of Industry (*Instituto Nacional de Industria*), the body set up by the regime to coordinate the development of the economy, was particularly interested in the development of mining, fishing, and telecommunications in the protectorate.[22]

Parallel to the development of these economic and diplomatic plans, the government established various institutional structures to develop and promote Africanist ideas. The creation of the General Franco Institute of Hispano-Arab Studies and Research (*Instituto General Franco de Estudios e Investigación Hispano-Arabe*) in 1938 highlighted the centrality of the idea of 'Hispano-Arab brotherhood' to Francoist Africanism.[23] Francoist propaganda and cultural policy in Morocco emphasized the historical relationship between Spanish and north African culture. Ignoring the violence of the *reconquista*, an event which was so central to its historical rhetoric in other fields, the regime held up the history of Al-Andalus as an example of fraternal union between the Hispanic and the Arabic

África durante el primer franquismo (1939–1959): algunas reflexiones', *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie V, Historia Contemporánea* (1997), 315–31.

[19] Norman J.W. Goda, 'Franco's Bid for Empire: Spain, Germany and the Western Mediterranean in World War II', in Raanan Rein (ed.), *Spain and the Mediterranean since 1898* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

[20] José María de Areilza and Fernando María Castiella, *Reivindicaciones de España* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1941), 49.

[21] Suárez Blanco, 'Las colonias españolas'.

[22] Ibid., 25.

[23] Irene González González, 'Educación, cultura y ejército: aliados de la política colonial en el norte de Marruecos', in Manuel Aragón Reyes (ed.), *El Protectorado español en Marruecos: la historia trascendida* (Bilbao: Edita Iberdrola, 2013), 341–62.

worlds, a shared past on which present relationships could be forged. This history was used to justify the idea of Spain's 'civilizing mission' in the region. As Moorish culture had helped to revitalize Spanish culture and free it from a period of stagnation in the Middle Ages, so now it was the turn of Spain to provide the same support to Morocco. Unlike the self-interested imperialism of the French, adherents of this vision argued, Spain's presence in the region was motivated by 'love' and by a deep understanding of the 'Moroccan soul'.[24]

The period of Francoist rule in Morocco was beset by contradictions between the humane, pro-Arab discourse of the regime and the reality of repression and neglect under the local administration. Droughts and bad harvests between 1940 and 1941 meant that the 'hunger years' proved even more deadly in the Spanish protectorate than they were on the mainland.[25] Food crises continued to erupt throughout the decade. Non-military spending was concentrated on grand government buildings in Tetuan, and on services for Spanish settlers and the pro-Spanish Moroccan elites, with basic services neglected. From the late 1940s this was combined with increasing brutal repression of Moroccan nationalist movements active in the Spanish zone, involving a vast network of informants run by the Department of Indigenous Affairs, which at its peak recruited one in six of the adult population.[26] Franco was ultimately forced to relinquish the Moroccan protectorate in April 1956 thanks to the increasing strength of Moroccan nationalism and France's decision to grant independence to its zone.[27] Spain's remaining north African possessions consisted of the enclave of Ifni, which was ceded to Morocco in 1969, and the larger desert region of the Spanish Sahara which it held until 1975.[28]

In addition to these north African possessions, Spain also controlled a colony in west Africa known as Spanish Guinea. Spain had laid claim to territories in equatorial Africa since the late 1700s, but did not establish full control over Spanish Guinea until the early twentieth century. It was made up of two distinct territories, the island of Fernando Po (now known as Bioko) plus a group of small nearby islands, and a strip of territory on the mainland between Gabon and Cameroon known as Rio Muni.[29] Fernando Po, the most economically and politically significant territory, was the seat of the Spanish administration and had

[24] De Areilza and Castiella, *Reivindicaciones de España*, 499.

[25] Mimoun Aziza, 'La sociedad marroquí bajo el Protectorado español (1912–1956)', in Manuel Aragón Reyes (ed.), *El Protectorado español en Marruecos: la historia trascendida* (Bilbao: Iberdrola, 2013), 127–48.

[26] De Madariaga, *Marruecos*, 375.

[27] Ibid., 458; Mike Elkin, 'Franco's Last Stand: An Analysis of Spanish Foreign Policy Regarding Moroccan Independence in 1956', *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, 17 (2004), 67–86.

[28] Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Western Sahara: Background to Conflict* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 460; Suárez Blanco, 'Las colonias españolas'. After this point, only the towns of Ceuta and Melilla remained under Spanish control.

[29] Alicia Campos Serrano, 'El régimen colonial franquista en el Golfo de Guinea', *Revista Jurídica Universidad Autónoma de Madrid*, 3 (2000), 79–108.

the most developed administrative and social services. The Rio Muni region was only fully occupied and brought under Spanish control in the 1920s, with Spanish influence spreading slowly, often through the work of Catholic missionaries. The majority of Africans in the colony were denied legal, property, and labour rights, although a small native elite known as *emancipados* theoretically enjoyed similar rights to white Europeans.[30]

Under Francoist rule in Spanish Guinea, a repressive military regime, backed up by the Church, exercised violent and coercive control over the lives of the majority of its African subjects, prioritizing the supply of cheap, pliant labour, while strictly limiting basic civic rights and neglecting social services.[31] One of the central objectives of the colonial administration was the supply and control of labour for the territory's timber and cacao plantations on which its relative post-war prosperity was based. African labour within Guinea was coordinated by agreements between the colonial government and large employers, and workers operated under semi-forced conditions, under which wages were not paid in full until the end of their contracts. Much of the labour force was made up of Nigerian migrant workers, particularly following an agreement signed with the British governor general in Lagos in 1942.[32] Although there was a partial liberalization and Africanization of the colonial administration from the 1950s under pressure from the UN, it was not enough to head off the increasing internal and external calls for self-determination, particularly after the neighbouring territories of Nigeria, Cameroon, and Gabon all gained independence in 1960. In 1968 the Spanish government agreed to call a constitutional conference under which, paradoxically for an authoritarian regime, it negotiated the implementation of full independence under a democratic constitution.[33]

The ideology underpinning Francoist rule in Spanish Guinea differed from the idea of 'Hispano-Arab brotherhood' in Morocco and the western Sahara. Rather than tying itself to the shared history of Spain and north Africa, colonialism in west Africa was identified firmly within the tradition of Spanish rule in Latin America, Spain's unique 'imperial gift' and its Catholic-inspired 'civilizing mission'. In the early years of the regime this manifested itself in a form of racist paternalism, in which the inferiority of African subjects was rationalized by medicalized theories of intelligence and formalized through their status as legal minors, and in which Spanish rule was justified by the need to civilize and develop

[30] Ibrahim K. Sundiata, *Equatorial Guinea: Colonialism, State Terror, and the Search for Stability* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 32–3.

[31] Much of this was aimed at the '*españolización*' of the colony. See Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida, 'Epígono de la Hispanidad. La españolización de la colonia de Guinea durante el primer franquismo', in Stéphane Michonneau and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas (eds), *Imaginarios y representaciones de España durante el franquismo* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2014), 103–26.

[32] Alicia Campos, 'The Decolonization of Equatorial Guinea: The Relevance of the International Factor', *Journal of African History*, 44 (2003), 95–116.

[33] Ibid.

African society.[34] In response to the increasing anti-colonialism Spain faced on the international stage from the mid-1950s, these attitudes developed into a theory which anthropologist Gustau Nerín has labelled 'hispanotropicalism'. This vision of Spanish colonialism retained the emphasis on the civilizing and missionary vocation of Spanish colonialism, stressed the primacy of spiritual concerns over economic exploitation, and argued that it was characterized by the absence of racist attitudes which, as had been the case with Latin America, encouraged the spread of *mestizaje*.[35]

Colonial health played a central role in Francoist imperial ideology. During the early years of the Second World War colonial medicine was presented as a vital part of Spain's expansionist ambitions. An article on colonial medicine published in the journal *Arriba* at the beginning of 1942 compared colonial doctors to the intrepid missionaries of Spain's imperial past who, through their care of the indigenous population and their fight against diseases such as malaria, would 'plant the deepest roots of our expansion' and become the 'firmest pillar of our future greatness'.[36] As the dream of African expansion receded, the emphasis shifted to the importance of colonial medicine for Spain's 'civilizing mission', with the metaphor of the colonial doctor as missionary again to the fore. Valentín Matilla argued that Spain's colonies were too small for 'lucrative exploitation and advantageous plunder', and that what remained was for Spain to 'humanize and improve the material life of the most backwards populations'.[37]

In part, Matilla argued, their work would serve to win indigenous support for Spanish rule through the policy of *attración*. Colonial doctors, like the Spanish missionaries of old, would help to convince the indigenous population of the benefits of western civilization and achieve the 'evangelizing and missionary task' of rescuing their souls from ignorance and leading them towards the path of eternal salvation.[38] Spanish doctors who formed close relations with the local population could exploit the 'tendency towards generalization' and 'spirit of observation and copying' which supposedly characterized African psychology in order to win support for the Spanish administration and thereby strengthen Spanish rule.[39] They would also help to demonstrate to a hostile world that Franco's Spain represented the benevolent and disinterested traditions of the nation's colonial past. This idea was most obviously present in the prominent attention paid to leprosy treatment in Spanish Africa.[40] The religious symbolism

[34] Enrique Sang Okenve-Martínez, *Equatorial Guinea, 1927–79: A New African Tradition* (PhD thesis: SOAS, 2007), 154.

[35] Gustau Nerín, *Guinea Ecuatorial, historia en blanco y negro: hombres blancos y mujeres negras en Guinea Ecuatorial, 1843–1968* (Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 1998).

[36] J. Ercilla, 'La medicina tropical: arma de penetración', *Si*, 5 (1 February 1942), 13.

[37] V. Matilla, 'Política sanitaria colonial', *La Medicina Colonial*, 2, 6 (December 1943), 383–4.

[38] Ibid., 387. [39] Ibid., 387.

[40] David Brydan, 'Mikomeseng: Leprosy, Legitimacy and Francoist Repression in Spanish Guinea', *Social History of Medicine*, 31, 3 (2018), 627–47.

of the disease and its historical association with missionary work made it the perfect symbol for Francoist colonial medicine. For the Spanish judge and colonial administrator, Rafael Galbe Pueyo, leprosy services in the colony demonstrated 'the unprecedented generosity of a colonizing nation', working quietly and modestly to secure the healthy and prosperous future of its colonial subjects.[41] After his trip to Guinea in 1945 Matilla argued that the exceptional facilities for leprosy sufferers in the region were 'not only original, but also examples to the world'.[42]

Despite this lofty rhetoric, health services in Spanish Africa were focussed primarily on protecting the Spanish mainland and Spanish settlers from infectious diseases, rather than improving African health and well-being. Health services within the Moroccan protectorate were dominated by a series of top-down disease-specific campaigns, focussed on controlling both those infectious diseases which could spread to the mainland and those which posed a threat to Spanish soldiers and settlers, chiefly typhus, malaria, smallpox, and venereal diseases.[43] The civilian health administration prioritized care in urban areas, part of a plan to create 'health oases' in the major cities in which Spanish settlers would be protected from the diseases which beset the Moroccan population.[44] Beyond this, the overriding preoccupation for doctors and public health officials in the protectorate was to prevent diseases spreading to the Spanish peninsular. This policy had its roots in the recurrent outbreaks of bubonic plague which hit the region at various points between 1911 and 1926, and which spread to the peninsular on a number of occasions, including to Malaga and Barcelona between 1922 and 1926.[45] The control of infectious disease was a common concern of all of the European colonial powers in Africa. But Spain was unique in possessing an African territory almost on its doorstep, just a short boat journey away from some of its major metropolitan centres, and its health officials were therefore more closely attuned to the risks posed by infectious diseases.

In Spanish Guinea health services were primarily focussed, not on the risk of infectious diseases spreading to the peninsular, but on the protection of Spanish settlers and the African labour force on which the zone's economy relied.[46] This again translated into a focus on disease-specific health campaigns, combined with

[41] Rafael Galbe Pueyo, 'Mikomeseng', *Africa*, 165 (November 1955), 493.

[42] Valentín Matilla Gómez, 'Una expedición científica a la Guinea', *La Medicina Colonial*, 5–6 (November 1945), 330.

[43] Francisco Javier Martínez Antonio, 'En la enfermedad y en la salud: medicina y sanidad españolas en Marruecos (1906–1956)', in Manuel Gahete Jurado and Colabora Fatiha Benlabbah (eds), *El Protectorado español en Marruecos: la historia trascendida* (Bilbao: Iberdrola, 2013), 363–92.

[44] Rosa María Medina Domenech and Jorge Molero Mesa, 'La ley sanitaria colonial: marco legislativo para el análisis de la medicina colonial española en África', in Alejandro Diez Torre (ed.), *Ciencia y memoria de África: Actas de las III Jornadas sobre 'Expediciones científicas y africanismo español, 1898–1998'* (Alcalá de Henares: Ateneo de Madrid, 2002), 391–400.

[45] Martínez Antonio, 'En la enfermedad', 371; Medina Domenech and Molero Mesa, 'La ley sanitaria'.

[46] Medina Domenech and Molero Mesa, 'La ley sanitaria'.

an authoritarian sanitary regime designed to restrict the spread of key diseases across the territory through the use of restrictive health passports, strict limits on movement and travel, mandatory medical examination and reporting systems, and racially based intelligence testing.[47] Sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis), yellow fever, and leprosy were the three diseases which most preoccupied Spanish health officials.

The fight against sleeping sickness, spread by the tsetse fly which thrived in the forested regions of central and west Africa, was driven in part by the threat the disease posed to the labouring population, and was closely linked to the expansion of colonial power in Spanish Guinea. The use of mandatory health passports to control the disease mirrored similar schemes which had been introduced across colonial central Africa during the early twentieth century. As in the Spanish colonies, the treatment of sleeping sickness served both as a means of extending colonial control and as part of European 'civilizing mission' propaganda.[48] Yellow fever had represented one of the greatest threats to European settlement in west Africa since the eighteenth century, and the recurrent outbreaks that hit Spanish Guinea throughout the 1940s threatened both African labourers and Spanish settlers.[49] Leprosy was much more widespread in Guinea than it was in either Morocco or the Spanish mainland, with an estimated 4,000 sufferers in 1945.[50] As in other African colonies, the treatment of leprosy was used to justify colonial rule, and was particularly appealing to the religious congregations which controlled many of the territory's health services because of the disease's symbolic value and the opportunity to evangelize patients in long-term residential settings.[51]

Tropical Medicine: 'Weapon of Penetration'

The importance of empire to the international ambitions of the early Franco regime, together with the centrality of medicine and health to Francoist imperial ideology, meant that colonial health experts saw their discipline in international

[47] Rosa María Medina Domenech, 'Scientific Technologies of National Identity as Colonial Legacies: Extracting the Spanish Nation from Equatorial Guinea', *Social Studies of Science*, 39 (2009), 81–112; Benita Sampedro Vizcaya, 'La economía política de la sanidad colonial en Guinea Ecuatorial', *Endoxa: Series Filosóficas*, 37 (2016), 279–98.

[48] Enrique Lalinde del Rio, 'Organización sanitaria en los territorios españoles del Golfo de Guinea', *La Medicina Colonial*, 1 (January 1943), 59; Maryinez Lyons, *The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire, 1900–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[49] François Delaporte, *The History of Yellow Fever: An Essay on the Birth of Tropical Medicine* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).

[50] Valentín Matilla Gómez, 'Una expedición científica a la Guinea', *La Medicina Colonial*, 5–6 (November 1945), 330.

[51] Sundiata, *Equatorial Guinea*, 28; Kathleen Vongsathorn, 'Public Health or Public Good? Humanitarian Agendas and the Treatment of Leprosy in Uganda', in Bronwen Everill and Josiah Kaplan (eds), *The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in Africa* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 43–66.

terms. Their work in Africa and their membership of an international medical speciality provided opportunities to forge professional relationships and promote their work among colleagues from other European states. This was particularly evident in the field of tropical medicine, where links with German experts formed part of the wider ties between the German and Spanish medical professions during the Second World War, and where their relationship with Portuguese experts helped to ameliorate Spanish isolation in the immediate post-war period.

The development of tropical medicine was inextricably bound up with the history of European colonialism. Its origins lay in the need to combat diseases such as malaria and yellow fever which European colonists were so susceptible to in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Asian subcontinent. The formation of new colonies relied on the viability of populations of European soldiers and settlers, and the mass casualties these groups suffered posed a grave risk to colonial projects up until the nineteenth century.[52] From the 1890s a distinct field of tropical medicine began to emerge around newly established institutes in Liverpool, London, Paris, Hamburg, Lisbon, and New Orleans, using advances in microbiology and parasitology to develop treatments that would protect European populations, while relegating to the margins the health of native populations and the economic and social context in which they lived. Tropical medicine experts formed a transnational community whose missionary zeal helped to disseminate the young profession across the imperial powers, and contributed to the expansion of colonial practices and territories around the world.[53]

The apogee of tropical medicine immediately prior to the First World War coincided with the nadir of the Spanish empire, and as a result the discipline had remained relatively undeveloped in Spain compared to its European neighbours, including Portugal. It began to attract increasing interest and to develop professional structures during the interwar period, thanks partly to the work of Spanish parasitologists such as Gustavo Pittaluga and Sadí de Buen, but was weakened by the death and exile of a number of its leading practitioners during the civil war.[54] Nevertheless, the imperial ambitions of the Franco regime and its emphasis on Spain's colonial health services, particularly in Morocco, thrust the field back into the limelight. The Department of Morocco and Colonies began to construct a tropical medicine infrastructure to support the work of Spanish doctors in Africa towards the end of the Second World War. In 1943 it began to publish the journal *La Medicina Colonial*. And in 1944 it funded the creation of a new Spanish

[52] Philip D. Curtin, *Death by Migration: Europe's Encounter with the Tropical World in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Philip D. Curtin, *Disease and Empire: The Health of European Troops in the Conquest of Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[53] Neill, *Networks in Tropical Medicine*.

[54] C. Pérez Abadía and F. Sabaté Caselles, 'Revistas españolas de medicina tropical', in Ricardo Campos, Luis Montiel and Rafael Huertas (eds), *Medicina, ideología e historia en España, siglos XVI–XXI* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2007), 459–465.

Institute of Colonial Medicine within the *Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas* (CSIC), which combined microbiological and epidemiological research with anthropology 'to guide the study of the native in its multiple aspects and to produce rules for the medical specialists in Morocco and the Colonies'.[55]

The increasing prominence given to tropical medicine in Spain during the Second World War was linked to the expansionist goals of the regime's Africanists. In 1942 the Falangist newspaper *Arriba* published an article entitled 'Tropical Medicine: Weapon of Penetration'. The article linked the development of tropical medicine to the strength and vitality of the nation, arguing that: 'Only when a country finds itself at an ascendant moment in its history, in which the popular and collective ambition gives life to the [colonial] initiative, does the imperious need to address the problem of acquiring the difficult yet fruitful sanitary techniques of tropical countries arise.'[56] The clearest example of this phenomenon, the article argued, was Germany, which despite losing its colonial possessions in 1918 had chosen to strengthen and develop its understanding of tropical medicine through the work of the Hamburg Institute for Tropical Medicine. As a result of this preparation, its medical professionals were trained to treat those suffering from 'exotic diseases' and, more importantly, were ready to take control of any of the new colonial territories Germany gained during the Second World War. Spain, the article concluded, needed to prepare itself in a similar fashion if it was to make effective use of its current colonial possessions and expand them in the future.

In keeping with this admiration for the German example, tropical medicine played an important role in Spanish medical links with Nazi Germany during the early years of the Second World War. As was the case in other fields, many of the relationships between Spanish and German tropical medicine experts had been forged during the interwar period. The Hamburg Institute for Tropical Medicine had been promoting its work to the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America since the early 1920s with the publication of the Spanish-language journal *Revista Médica de Hamburgo*.[57] These efforts had been a response to Germany's scientific isolation following the end of the First World War, and had been supported by the German Foreign Office as part of Germany's wider cultural diplomacy towards the Spanish-speaking world. Researchers from Hamburg who had helped forge these interwar relationships with Spain and Latin America, including the institute's wartime leader Peter Mühlens, maintained links with Spanish experts during the Second World War. In June 1943 a group of German tropical medicine experts visited Spain at the invitation of the University of Madrid, giving a series of lectures to Spanish experts. Amongst them was the I.G. Farben researcher Walter

[55] *La Medicina Colonial*, 3, 6 (June 1944), 409–10.

[56] J. Ercilla, 'La medicina tropical: arma de penetración', *Si*, 5 (1 February 1942), 13.

[57] Magali Romero Sá and André Felipe Cândido da Silva, 'La Revista Médica de Hamburgo y la Revista Médica Germano-Ibero-Americana: diseminación de la medicina germánica en España y América Latina, 1920–1933', *Asclepio. Revista de Historia de la Medicina y de la Ciencia*, 62 (2010), 7–34.

Kikuth who had worked in Latin America during his time with the Hamburg institute in the 1920s, and the immunologist Hans Schmidt, who had volunteered with Francoist medical services during the Spanish Civil War.[58] Mühlens and Kikuth were also on the advisory board to the Spanish journal *La Medicina Colonial*.[59]

These links were part of the wider cultural relations between Spain and Germany during the Second World War. But they also provided practical and professional advantages for the experts and officials involved. For German experts, Spain’s African colonies provided sites to carry out research and to test new developments. In June 1939, for example, the Francoist government authorized the creation of a German medical mission in Spanish Guinea to study tropical diseases.[60] For Spanish authorities, Germany was one of the few sources of synthetic quinine and anti-malaria drugs during the war, when the worldwide shortage, Britain’s naval blockade, and Spain’s economic crisis made access to the drugs needed for both the Spanish metropole and its African colonies increasingly difficult.[61] Contact between Spanish and German experts largely dried up after 1944 and remained limited immediately after the war when links between the two countries were politically complicated on both sides. But they began to reappear on a more limited scale from the early 1950s, with figures such as Walter Kikuth reviving ties with the Spanish medical profession.[62]

In the immediate post-war era, the international isolation of Spanish health experts was partly ameliorated by their close ties to European tropical medicine, particularly in Portugal where relations were facilitated by the ideological affinities between the Franco and Salazar regimes. Spanish and Portuguese experts had begun to organize joint conferences in 1943, but it was after the war that cooperation between the two countries really began to flourish. On the Spanish side the relationship was facilitated by Luis Nájera Angulo, a leading epidemiologist and colonial health expert who had worked in Equatorial Guinea and collaborated with Gustavo Pittaluga prior to the war, before going on to work at the National Institute of Health in Madrid. In 1945 he visited Lisbon at the invitation of the Tropical Medicine Institute, where he met the Institute’s director, João Fraga de Azevedo, and the Portuguese minister for the colonies. Following the visit, Fraga de Azevedo asked the Spanish embassy in Lisbon for help in establishing more formal relations between the two countries, on the basis of their shared interests in diseases such as yellow fever and malaria, and the importance of tropical medicine to the colonial projects of both countries.[63] This led to increasing cooperation over the remainder of the decade, particularly in the fields

[58] *La Medicina Colonial*, 1, 6 (June 1943), 417–18.
[59] *La Medicina Colonial*, 1, 1 (January 1943), 1.
[60] Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Imperio de papel*, 99.
[61] AGA (15)18 81/08113. [62] *La Medicina Colonial*, 17, 6 (June 1951), 588–601.
[63] AGA, 10(73) 54/06664, Agregado Cultural, Lisbon to MAE, undated (1945).

of malaria and leprosy, facilitated by a series of grants awarded by the CSIC for Spanish researchers to study at the Lisbon Institute.[64]

As with Germany, Hispano-Portuguese medical cooperation conferred benefits to both sides. Spanish experts gained from the experience of the Portuguese tropical medicine profession which had been established and institutionalized for much longer than in Spain. The Lisbon School of Medicine had been founded in 1902 to help treat soldiers returning from the colonies, and was central to the efforts to develop Portugal's African colonies during the so-called Third Portuguese Empire. It acted as a centre for research and teaching, and for the despatch of scientific missions to develop the epidemic maps which were seen as vital to the eradication of tropical diseases. It specialized in the study of sleeping sickness, a disease which was endemic in Spanish Guinea, and its experts had a history of collaborating with European colleagues to a much greater extent than their Spanish counterparts.[65] For experts in both countries, bilateral links helped to maintain a degree of international cooperation at a time when access to international networks had been complicated by wartime disruption and political isolation. Their shared Catholicism and historical links with Latin America also facilitated cooperation, with both countries hosting Ibero-American and Catholic medical conferences during the 1940s.[66]

Portuguese tropical medicine experts were not alone in helping to ameliorate Spain's post-war isolation. The leading Italian malariologist, Alberto Missiroli, was vocal in his support for Spanish health experts in the immediate aftermath of the war. A veteran of international anti-malaria campaigns who had worked closely with the Rockefeller Foundation before the war and continued to work with the WHO after it, Missiroli was one of the few Italian experts to visit Spain in the late 1940s.[67] In 1949 he published an article in both the Italian and Spanish medical press which alleged that international health and well-being were being damaged by the WHO's exclusion of 'one of the most glorious nations of Europe'.[68] Missiroli's interwar career had brought him into contact with both Republican Spanish experts such as Pittaluga, and with those who would later go on to serve under the Franco regime. His commitment to the inclusion of Franco's Spain within post-war international health reflected the value of tropical medicine networks to the international standing of both Francoist experts and the Franco regime.

[64] *La Medicina Colonial*, 9, 5 (May 1947), 424, and 11, 2 (August 1950), 91–120.

[65] Isabel Amaral, 'The Emergence of Tropical Medicine in Portugal: The School of Tropical Medicine and the Colonial Hospital in Lisbon (1902–1935)', *Dynamis*, 28 (2008), 301–28.

[66] *La Medicina Colonial*, 9, 5 (May 1947), 424.

[67] Archivio dello Stato, Rome (AdS), Ministero della Sanitá, Istituto Superiore di Sanitá, 42/003, Busta 88.

[68] *Ser*, 49 (1949), 9.

Inter-Imperial Health during the Second World War

International cooperation in the field of tropical medicine primarily involved experts based within Spain, where the pattern of overseas relationships was closely influenced by the foreign policy of the Franco regime. For colonial health officials working on the ground in Africa, however, their distance from the metropole and the need to prevent the cross-border spread of infectious diseases meant that cooperation with colleagues in neighbouring colonies was both more extensive and less constrained by the regime's diplomatic relations. These forms of inter-imperial cooperation were particularly widespread during the Second World War, when disruption to communication and transport links with the mainland forced local officials to turn to their Allied neighbours, at the same time as health experts in the peninsular were promoting ties with the Axis states. After the war, inter-imperial health cooperation promised to provide a way for Spain to form closer ties with their fellow European imperial powers and to increase its influence on the international stage. But the political isolation of the Franco regime meant that Spain was ultimately excluded from the new inter-imperial structures that emerged.

The most striking example of Spanish participation in inter-imperial health was in the fight against yellow fever in Spanish Guinea during the Second World War. At the start of 1941 there was an outbreak of yellow fever in the town of Kogo on the Rio Muni estuary, which by April had killed six Europeans and an unspecified number of Africans, the first of a number of outbreaks which would hit the territory over the following years.[69] Despite the fact that it coincided with the period of Spain's closest alignment with the Axis powers, the outbreak provoked intensive cooperation between Spanish authorities in Guinea, their French and British counterparts in west Africa, and officials from the Rockefeller Foundation, which continued to varying degrees throughout the war. This cooperation stemmed in part from the failure of the Department of Morocco and Colonies and the Department of Health in Madrid to provide local authorities with adequate supplies of vaccines, despite repeated promises that they would do so, forcing health officials in Spanish Guinea to fall back on pre-existing inter-imperial networks in west Africa for support.[70]

During the early stages of the 1941 outbreak, initial support from Spain's colonial neighbours came from Libreville in neighbouring Free French-controlled Gabon. French officials arrived in Kogo in April to warn of an outbreak that had recently appeared in their territory, discussing control measures with local

[69] RAC, RF, record group 5, series 3–700, box 244, file 2952, Uganda—Yellow Fever Research Institute, 1st semi-annual report, 1941; AGA (15)18 81/08113, report by *Director de Sanidad de Guinea*, 23 April 1941.

[70] AGA (15)18 81/08113, *Gobernador general de Guinea* (GGG) to *Dirección general de Marruecos y Colonias* (DGMC), 3 July 1941.

Spanish officials and agreeing to help supply medication.[71] They then arranged for an expert from the Rockefeller Yellow Fever Research Institute in Uganda, Alexander Mahaffey, to visit Kogo with a supply of yellow fever vaccines the following month.[72] The Rockefeller vaccine had been developed in the early 1930s, and during the early years of the war the institute in Uganda was at the centre of efforts to control outbreaks of the disease across the so-called 'yellow fever belt' which ran across central Africa. Despite logistical problems caused by the need to keep the vaccines refrigerated, the institute carried out civilian vaccination campaigns in both Uganda and Eritrea in the early years of the war. The Rockefeller Foundation was also involved in the mass manufacture of vaccines in the US which were used to vaccinate Allied personnel serving in central and north Africa, primarily due to the fear that troops could spread the disease to hitherto unaffected areas such as India. In Rio Muni, Dr Mahaffey arranged to supply the territory with supplies to vaccinate 11,000 people, and also arranged for suspected blood samples to be sent to the Uganda institute for analysis.[73]

During the period in question Spain was still firmly aligned with the Axis states, and the Rockefeller Foundation had largely cut off ties with the Franco regime following US entry into the war.[74] Local colonial officials, however, demonstrated a remarkable degree of political flexibility when it came to the fight against yellow fever. When the governor general of Guinea wrote to Madrid in July 1941 to complain about the lack of vaccines being supplied to the territory, he urged them to request new supplies from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Wellcome Institute, and the German government.[75] When a new outbreak emerged in February 1943, vaccine supplies were rapidly sourced from the Rockefeller Foundation in the US, British officials in Nigeria, and the Free French administrations in Gabon and Cameroon.[76] The organization of these supplies involved not only colonial health officials, but also the direct and extensive intervention of civilian administrators, ambassadors, and central ministries in the various countries involved, to the extent that the British consul in Fernando Po agreed to personally fly in supplies of the vaccine from Cameroon in a thermos flask.[77] At the same time the German ambassador in Madrid was still involved in sourcing supplies from Berlin.[78] The fact that both Axis and Allied powers were vying to ensure the allegiance, or at least the benevolent neutrality, of the Spanish state, meant that support could be leveraged from both

[71] AGA (15)18 81/08113, *Subgobernador accidental* to GGG, 18 April 1941.

[72] RAC, RF, record group 5, series 3–700, box 244, file 2952, Uganda—Yellow Fever Research Institute, 1st semi-annual report, 1941; AGA (15)18 81/08113, telegram from GGG to DGMC, 30 May 1941.

[73] AGA (15)18 81/08113, *Director Interno de Sanidad* to GGG.

[74] See Chapter 2.

[75] AGA (15)18 81/08113, GGG to DGMC, 3 July 1941.

[76] AGA (15)18 81/08113, various correspondence, 1943.

[77] AGA (15)18 81/08113, British consulate Santa Isabel to GGG, 2 November 1944.

[78] AGA (15)18 81/08113, DGMC to GGG, 2 April 1943.

sides. While officials in Madrid could use the extensive ties between Spanish medicine and Nazi Germany to access German supplies, the military officers who dominated the colonial health administration were equally comfortable with requesting support from their British and French neighbours.

In addition to their cooperation in the fight against yellow fever, public health officials across British and Free French territories in west Africa continued to share epidemiological information with their counterparts in Spanish Guinea throughout the war. The risk posed by epidemic diseases was particularly acute in Spanish Guinea because of the regular movement of migrant workers into and out of the territory.[79] Fernando Po was home to thousands of labourers from Nigeria, with numbers increasing following the signing of the first formal labour agreement between the two territories in 1942.[80] Sanitary control measures were almost non-existent on the borders between Rio Muni and the neighbouring territories of Cameroon and Gabon, with local populations long accustomed to crossing the border freely. The exchange of epidemiological information was generally undertaken on the initiative of local health officials. Britain attempted to place it on a more formal footing on a number of occasions, first following an inter-imperial tsetse fly conference held in Lagos in July 1943 which promoted plans for a system of west African epidemiological exchange linked to similar systems in east Africa and Egypt, and again in the summer of 1944 when the Foreign Office attempted to revise a plan to re-create the epidemiological functions of the Axis-controlled OIHP from London.[81] On both occasions the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Department for Morocco and Colonies agreed to British proposals, although there is no evidence they were ever implemented.

These forms of inter-imperial cooperation seemed to set the stage for Spain to play an active role in post-war African health alongside its fellow European colonial powers. Luis Nájera Angulo gave voice to these hopes in a national radio broadcast in the summer of 1944.[82] The great geopolitical achievement of the post-war world, he predicted, would be the joint creation by Europe's imperial powers of a new Eurafrican union, something he saw in terms of a 'great biological block' centred on the Mediterranean, a 'biogeographical ideal'.[83] The idea of Eurafrica, the fusion of both European states and their African colonial possessions, had appeared under the guise of both the interwar pan-Europa movement

[79] AGA (15)18 81/18109, Enrique Lalinde to GGG, 2 February 1943.

[80] TNA CO 852/375/18, 'Trade Negotiations with Spanish Guinea', 4 July 1942; TNA HS 3/77, 'Final report on Fernando Po and Spanish Guinea (Mainland)', undated.

[81] AGA (15)18 81/08113, S.C. Larence to GGG, 21 December 1943; AGA 15(18) 81/11674, MAE to DGMC, 7 June 1944.

[82] Luis Nájera Angulo, 'La sanidad pública y la colonización africana', *Revista de Sanidad e Higiene Pública*, 18, 4 (July 1944), 298–304.

[83] Ibid.

and Nazi geopolitical thought. It emerged again among the western European imperial powers towards the end of the war and played a prominent role in plans for European integration during the late 1940s and early 1950s.[84] For Spanish imperialists, it held out the promise of both strengthening Spain's colonial claims and binding it into a unified Europe as one of the key imperial powers.[85]

For doctors and public health figures such as Nájera, the centrality of health and medicine to the colonial project meant that it would also offer a way for Spanish experts to contribute to wider African development, providing them with 'brilliant [professional] possibilities'.[86] Ever increasing travel and exchange between African colonies would mean that post-war African health would have to be managed by a new international organization. Nájera did not envisage these developments as an independent threat to the European powers, but as a 'united and coordinated labour of international character' involving European states in the development of colonial health across the continent. Such a project would be impossible without Spanish participation, both because of the technical skill of its experts and because of the fact that the Spanish and Portuguese peoples, for 'biogeographical reasons', could best adapt to the special climactic conditions faced in Africa.[87] The participation of Spanish experts in post-war inter-imperial health, in addition to the professional opportunities it would provide, would demonstrate 'the greatness and the prospects of the hispanic spirit in the united future of civilized peoples'.[88]

It seemed like these hopes might become a reality in January 1944 when the provisional Free French government, the French Committee of National Liberation, organized a conference in Brazzaville to discuss the future of France's colonial empire. From the conference emerged a plan to form an International Hygiene Office for Africa. French authorities hoped it would secure French control over a key area of African health administration, demonstrate the country's commitment to colonial development, and forestall attempts to bring African epidemiological services under international oversight.[89] Both French and British colonial authorities viewed the emergence of a post-war international health organization under the UN with suspicion, fearing it would interfere in what

[84] Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

[85] For a discussion of the idea in the Spanish academic press, see José María Cordero Torres, 'Crónica Internacional', *Cuadernos de Estudios Africanos*, 4 (October–December 1948), and Bartolomé Mostaza, 'Discurso sobre la continentalización de Euráfica', *Cuadernos de Estudios Africanos*, 13 (January–March 1951), 9–26.

[86] Luis Nájera Angulo, 'La sanidad pública y la colonización africana', *Revista de Sanidad e Higiene Pública*, 18, 4 (July 1944), 304.

[87] Ibid., 302. [88] Ibid., 304.

[89] Danielle Domergue-Cloarec, 'Les problèmes de santé à la Conférence de Brazzaville', in Institut Charles-de-Gaulle (ed.), *Brazzaville, Janvier-Février 1944: aux sources de la décolonisation* (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1988), 157–69.

they regarded as internal matters, and use health and development to mobilize international anti-colonial sentiment.[90]

In August 1944 the French provisional government requested that Spain join the proposed African hygiene office. Spanish authorities in Guinea and the Institute of Tropical Medicine in Madrid greeted the proposal with enthusiasm, seeing it as an opportunity to formalize pre-existing patterns of cooperation and strengthen scientific and social links with the other imperial powers.[91] The Spanish Foreign Office was also happy to agree to the proposals. The emergence of a new post-war international system posed an even greater threat to Spain's African colonies than it did for Britain and France given the difficult relationship it was clear Spain was going to have with the Allies after the end of the war. Increasing cooperation with the other European imperial powers would serve to strengthen Spain's imperial claims in the post-war era. And it would provide Spain with the opportunity to develop a wider international role in which its status as a progressive imperial power could be used to overcome the taint of its wartime alignment with the Axis powers.

Post-War Imperial Isolation

The planned African hygiene office, however, never got off the ground, and Spanish involvement with inter-imperial health declined sharply following the end of the Second World War. In Africa, the disruption to medical supplies and global communications which had forced colonial administrations to come together was quickly resolved after the war. Metropolitan governments were able to exert tighter control over the international activities of their colonial officials. The re-emergence of formal international health systems also reduced the need for the kind of ad hoc responses to disease outbreaks and epidemiological intelligence that had been developed during the war. At the same time, post-war controversies over the Franco regime and its role within the international system made the remaining European imperial powers reluctant to cooperate with Spain.

In west Africa, medical links between Spanish Guinea and its neighbours were restricted to cases of overriding practical importance. The antagonistic post-war relationship between Spain and the new French Republic severely curtailed links with Cameroon and Gabon. Relatively close relations were maintained only with Nigeria, due primarily to the ever increasing numbers of Nigerian migrant labourers working in Fernando Po and Rio Muni, and the ongoing controversies

[90] Pearson, 'Promoting Health'; Jessica Pearson, 'French Colonialism and the Battle against the WHO Regional Office for Africa', *Hygiea Internationalis*, 13, 2 (2016), 65–80.

[91] AGA (15)18 81/08113, DGMC to *Gobernador General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea*, 22 August 1945.

surrounding their transport and working conditions. British consular officials made regular visits to plantations in Spanish Guinea in order to inspect living conditions and medical services for Nigerian labourers, and public health figures in both regions maintained a degree of contact, particularly in the field of leprosy.[92] In the summer of 1948 the British governor in Lagos invited his Spanish counterpart in Fernando Po to tour the territory as part of a wider plan to promote inter-imperial cooperation between colonial administrations, including health services, across the west African region. The visit, however, was only reluctantly approved by the British Foreign Office because the practical need for cooperation concerning migrant labourers overrode the political disadvantages of being seen to cooperate with the Spanish.[93]

At the same time, the imminent creation of the UN and its specialized agencies was causing alarm amongst the European imperial states, who feared international interference in their territories driven by the USSR, India, and the other anti-colonial powers. Responsibility for international health on the continent was formally granted to the WHO in 1946, although its Regional Office for Africa would not be opened until 1951. In response, Britain and France came together in 1950 to create the Combined Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA), which aimed to formalize inter-imperial development cooperation along the lines envisaged by Nájera Angulo, thereby demonstrating that international 'interference' in the continent was unnecessary.[94]

To give the organization as much credibility as possible, the CCTA included all of the remaining European imperial powers, alongside South Africa. Crucially, however, Spain was excluded. Although the Franco regime shared the concerns of its European neighbours with regards to international interference, when Madrid applied for membership in 1952 it was rejected by Britain, which argued that admitting such a 'reactionary' power would only serve to undermine the prestige of the CCTA.[95] The image of Spain as a great, civilizing force in Africa expounded by Matilla, Nájera, and other Spanish colonial health experts was not shared by its fellow imperial powers.

Spain's absence from the post-war inter-imperial club had a direct impact on Spanish involvement in international health work and the country's influence within the WHO. Spain's entry into the WHO in 1951 came just at the moment when the new Regional Office for Africa was being established. Initially the regional committee only comprised the European imperial powers, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Liberia. Although Spain's territories were substantially smaller than the other European powers and it was excluded from the

[92] AGA (15)18 81/08109, British Vice Consul in Santa Isabel to GGG, 20 June 1945.
[93] TNA, FO 371/73364, 'Proposed visit of the Governor of Fernando Po to Nigeria', 4 June 1948.
[94] John Kent, *The Internationalization of Colonialism: Britain, France, and Black Africa, 1939–1956* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
[95] Ibid., 278–9.

inter-imperial CCTA, the new African regional structure seemed to provide its health officials with an opportunity to develop their influence and prestige within the organization. Initially, this appeared to be the intention of Spanish officials both in the colonies and the metropole. In June 1951 Madrid proposed to the WHO that the capital of Fernando Po, Santa Isabel, should host the headquarters of the African region, an offer which given the costs and labour involved would have represented a substantial commitment to the WHO at a time of severe financial shortages.[96] The offer was rejected due to the island's poor air links to the mainland, its lack of accommodation, and the need for the government to construct a purpose-built administrative building. Instead, the regional headquarters was established in Brazzaville in French Equatorial Africa, part of wider French efforts to control the new body.[97]

Following this initial burst of enthusiasm, Spain's absence from the CCTA severely limited its influence within the WHO Regional Office. During the early 1950s the CCTA focussed on retaining control of the UN's Technical Assistance programmes. It was heavily involved with the WHO's plans for malaria eradication in sub-Saharan Africa, co-convening a major WHO meeting in Kampala in 1950. Although attention was focussed on the equatorial region, Spain's absence from both the WHO and the CCTA meant that Spanish Guinea was not represented in discussions. After Spain was admitted to the WHO and Spanish delegates from the colonial administration began attending meetings of the new Regional Committee for Africa, its influence continued to be curtailed by its limited relationship with the other imperial powers. The CCTA states coordinated their approach towards the WHO Regional Office, using their majority on the committee to influence organizational developments and the Technical Assistance programme in the region.[98] Spain and Liberia were the only non-CCTA members on the committee until the late 1950s, and Liberia complained bitterly about the control which the imperial powers were able to exert through the numerical dominance of the CCTA members.[99]

Reflecting its curtailed influence, Spain only attended four of the nine annual meetings of the WHO Regional Committee during the 1950s, and on only one occasion sent public health officials as delegates, usually relying on diplomatic staff from local embassies and consulates who were unable to present papers or contribute to technical discussions.[100] In contrast, the other European powers

[96] *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 76. Executive Board, Nineteenth Session, Geneva, 15–30 January 1957* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1957), 46.

[97] *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 38: The Work of the WHO 1951* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1952), 73.

[98] TNA, CO 859/407, Watson to Rae, 19 January 1953.

[99] TNA, CO 859/407, 'CCTA: Second Session of the World Health Organisation Regional Committee for Africa', 10 September 1952.

[100] It was not until the twelfth meeting in 1962 when Spanish colonial health officials presented technical papers to the committee. See WHO IRIS, 'Regional Committee for Africa, Report on Twelfth

attended every committee meeting, usually with substantial delegations led by technical personnel. The results of this lack of engagement were reflected in the level of support Spanish territories received during the period. Experts in neighbouring countries in west and central Africa were receiving substantial support in the form of fellowships and financial contributions to specific programmes. But Spanish territories were not awarded any direct funding or fellowships until 1956, when a small number of officials began to receive grants to attend international conferences.[101] During this period, Spanish engagement was limited to the submission of occasional reports about disease control programmes and health services in Spanish territories.[102]

This lack of engagement reflected the profound ambivalence which the Franco regime felt towards the idea of international organizations working in its African territories. Once it had become clear that the field of African development was not going to help transform Spain's political reputation, and that its influence over the work of international health organizations would be extremely limited, the priority became protecting Spanish colonies from outside interference. When UNICEF mother and infant health programmes for Spanish colonies were proposed in 1954, the Spanish Foreign Ministry instructed local officials that, while they should maintain contact with the organization to ensure that they did not miss out on future funding opportunities, their priority should be to 'avoid all funding or influence from the officials of international organisations, harmful to the political and economic interests of Spain in those territories'.[103] In the WHO, Spanish officials fought to limit the organization's work in Africa to the traditional international tasks of 'fight[ing] diseases at their source' to prevent the spread of diseases such as trachoma and smallpox to Europe, rather than a broader remit of African health development.[104] Having failed in their ambition to establish Spain at the heart of international health and development in Africa, Francoist experts and officials drew back into their shells, concentrating on defending their colonial territories from outside interference.

This situation would only change from the early 1960s when Spain's remaining colonies, particularly Spanish Guinea, began to engage more widely with

Session', 26 November 1962, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/136440/1/EB31_13_eng.pdf (accessed 26 August 2015).

[101] *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 75. The Work of the WHO, 1956* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1957), 114; *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 98. The Work of the WHO, 1959* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1960), 124.

[102] See for example report by Enrique Lalinde submitted to 8th session of the Regional Committee, 3 June 1956, AGA, 15(5) 81/11527.

[103] AGA, 15(18) 81/08234, GGG to *Director General del Servicio de Sanidad Colonial*, 30 August 1954.

[104] WHO IRIS, 'Committee on Administration, Finance and Legal Matters: Provisional Minutes of the Sixth Meeting', 14 May 1952, 14, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/102166/1/WHA5_AFL-Min-6_eng.pdf (accessed 27 August 2015).

international health work in the region. In 1961 a group of officials from the WHO Regional Office for Africa visited Fernando Po and Rio Muni for the first time, drawing up a report on health conditions in the territory.[105] From 1963 the WHO began to help health officials in Guinea to prepare a malaria pre-eradication programme, part of wider pan-African efforts, and from 1967 the US helped to ensure that the territory was included, albeit belatedly, in the WHO's smallpox eradication programme.[106] This increased level of engagement coincided, however, with a new wave of African decolonization, which began to transform Spain's status as an imperial power from the potential source of international prestige and influence it had been in the early 1950s, to a further badge of international opprobrium. The WHO Regional Office increasingly became a vehicle for anti-colonial and anti-apartheid protests, and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked hard in regional forums to disassociate itself from the reviled Portuguese and South African regimes.[107] In order to do so they were forced to give African health officials an increasingly prominent role at regional health and development meetings. By 1967, African health officials made up the majority of the Spanish delegation at the Regional Committee for Africa, and were also sent to represent the territory at the newly formed (and African-led) Coordinating Organization for the Fight against Epidemics in Central Africa.[108] These changes, however, were largely cosmetic. Spain's increased engagement with international health in Africa during the 1960s did open some doors to African doctors and health officials in Spanish Guinea, and enabled local health services to benefit from international projects in the region. But the priority for Madrid was to do the minimum necessary to limit Spain's exposure to international criticism by demonstrating its apparent commitment to African development and administration.

The Spanish empire in Africa was central to the way in which the Franco regime saw the world and Spain's place within it, particularly prior to 1956. For Francoists, Spain's international power and prestige rested both on its glorious imperial past and on its present imperial status. These beliefs brought Spain into conflict with the other imperial powers, particularly with France in north Africa. But they also meant that Francoists saw international cooperation through an imperial lens, aspiring to participate in the numerous networks of inter-imperial

[105] AGA, 15(5) 81/11527, *Gobernador general de la Región Ecuatorial* to *Director general de Plazas y Provincias Africanas*, 28 August 1961.

[106] AGA, 15(5) 81/11527, various documents; *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 135: 17th World Health Assembly, Geneva, 2–30 Mar 1964* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1965).

[107] AGA, 15(5) 81/11527, 'Comisión Económica para África', February 1963; WHO IRIS, 'Report of the Director-General on the Thirteenth Session of the Regional Committee for Africa', 3 December 1963, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/136811/1/EB33_25_eng.pdf (accessed 27 August 2015).

[108] AGA, 15(5) 81/11527, Leopoldo Martinez de Campo to MAE, 31 January 1967; WHO IRIS, 'Regional Committee for Africa, Report on the Seventeenth Session', 7 December 1967, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/144320/1/EB41_9_eng.pdf (accessed 27 August 2015).

cooperation which existed during the period, and staking their claim to involvement with international organizations on Spain's status as an imperial power.

Health and welfare stood at the heart of these claims. The Franco regime and its supporters attempted to portray Spain as an advanced and uniquely civilized imperial power, bringing the full force of modern medicine and Francoist 'social justice' to bear on the health and welfare of its subjects. Spain's colonial health experts enthusiastically embraced the forms of inter-imperial health cooperation which formed around specific disciplines such as tropical medicine, and in particular regions such as west and central Africa. As such, they stood at the forefront of Francoist Spain's engagement with the outside world during the Second World War, and aspired to do so to an even greater extent after 1945. Ironically, however, it was in the field of inter-imperial cooperation that Spain's post-war diplomatic isolation had the greatest impact. Ultimately, empire was not a viable basis to re-establish Spain's post-war position on the world stage.

In many ways, the situation of Franco's Spain was similar to that of its European counterparts, an imperial state faced with the spectre of decolonization and anxious about its role in the post-imperial world. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the attitude of all of the European imperial powers towards the UN and its technical agencies was shaped by the interests of empire. This was particularly evident in sub-Saharan Africa, where the imperial powers sought to maintain and strengthen their rule as decolonization and anti-colonial movements spread across Asia. The raw materials, export markets, and labour of these colonies, many in Europe argued, would be vital to the continent's post-war reconstruction. The plans for pooling imperial territories and resources under the rubric of 'Eurafrica' were part of this process. All European powers were keen to strengthen inter-imperial cooperation in order to hinder the involvement of the UN in African affairs, fearful of the challenges to European rule it might pose. European states hoped to deflect international criticism and growing local anti-colonial movements by using the language of 'development' to demonstrate their commitment to social progress in Africa. Health and medicine were a vital part of the attempt to maintain post-war imperial rule across the continent.

African health and development, then, is another example of a field in which 1945 does not necessarily mark a key turning point in the history of internationalism. The histories of colonial and international health during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had been clearly intertwined. On the face of it, the rhetoric of international development and universal well-being which emerged around organizations like the WHO after the Second World War seemed to mark a new era of global health, one freed from the shackles of its imperial past and committed to a new era of cooperation and equality. But as we have seen, colonial health experts and colonial health services continued to dominate international health work in Africa after 1945. While international health in south Asia was being slowly 'decolonized', experts from the imperial powers banded together to

maintain control over the work of international organizations on the African continent.[109]

Rather than 1945, it was the late 1950s and early 1960s which marked a real turning point for international health work in Africa. The surge of decolonization across sub-Saharan Africa and the vastly increased influence of new post-colonial states within the UN and its technical agencies meant that international health organizations and development projects began to be freed from overt colonial control. Even then, however, the change should not be overstated. Many colonial experts would go on to find roles within the emerging field of international development, often transferring their services to NGOs or international health and humanitarian organizations after the colonies they worked in had achieved independence.[110] And in the context of the Cold War, African development would continue to be driven by the plans and priorities of non-African powers.

[109] Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health*.

[110] Joseph Morgan Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007).

4

Exporting Francoist Modernity

Health, Social Security, and *Hispanidad*

If colonial Africa was central to the Franco regime's international projection during the 1940s and 1950s, then Spain's former imperial role in Latin America was perhaps even more significant. This book opened with Franco's speech to an international social security conference in 1951. It was in fact an 'Ibero-American' conference, and was an important milestone in the international promotion of Franco's social state. Among the many Spanish and overseas ministers present was the Falangist minister of labour, José Antonio Girón de Velasco, who addressed the delegates and later published an extended version of his speech. Like Franco, he explained how Spain had been transformed from 'one of the most backwards countries in the world' in terms of its socio-political system, to 'one of the most advanced'. It was this advanced, modern social policy that made Spain once again 'a nation which deserves to be heard'. But he also wanted to emphasize that a successful modern social policy could only truly be carried out by 'a Christian state, like the Spanish state, which defines itself as Catholic and social'.[1] According to this argument Francoist social policy was defined by two characteristics: its modernity and its Christianity.

Other Spanish speakers at the conference echoed these themes, as did accounts published in specialist journals and the popular press. One journal claimed that the issue of social security was among the most urgent facing modern society. 'The man of our time,' its report argued, 'surrounded by the marvels of a flourishing civilization, is more helpless and less secure than the man of previous ages. Progress and technology have shrunk him.'[2] Another described how delegates used their 'Catholic fervour to create a social strength firm enough to confront and resist the attacks of the materialist world'. All Spanish reports argued that the conference provided an opportunity for countries of the Ibero-American region to learn from each other, discussing how Christian principles could help resolve the social problems which characterized the modern world. But they also emphasized

[1] José Antonio Girón de Velasco, *Quince años de política social dirigida por Franco* (Madrid: Ediciones OID: 1951), 109–19.

[2] 'Primer Congreso Iberoamericano de Seguridad Social', *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, 23 (September–October 1951), 246–7.

that Spain was at the vanguard of this process, and that the social systems of many Latin American countries had been 'informed' by the Spanish model.[3]

It was no coincidence that this vision of the Francoist social state was promoted most vigorously to Latin American countries. Latin America was seen by the Franco regime and its supporters as a space in which to project itself as a model of conservative Catholic modernity. Social policy and fields such as social security were central to this project, used to promote the idea of the Francoist social state as a spiritual 'third way' between the twin materialisms of communism and capitalism. During the Second World War this language was integrated into Falangist projects to promote the idea of a fascist New Order. But after 1945 it could be retooled by both Falangists and more conservative elements of the regime, who used the context of the emerging Cold War to emphasize social policy as a core part of Spain's modern, anti-communist credentials. Improving social conditions, Francoist experts and officials argued, was vital to counter the appeal of communism among populations increasingly alienated by modern industrial society. But the capitalist welfare model offered by countries such as the US was poorly suited to the countries of Iberia and Latin America because of its 'materialism', its narrow focus on material conditions at the expense of the spiritual and moral needs of workers. In contrast, Spain offered a model of Catholic anti-materialist modernity in which social policy was driven by spiritual values better suited to the traditions and cultures of the Christian west.

The idea of a post-imperial 'Ibero-American' community built around the ties of history, religion, language, and culture which united the two regions had first emerged during the nineteenth century, and appealed to Spanish elites across the political spectrum.[4] Originally it had been built around the language of *raza*, of a shared Hispanic race distinct from Anglo-Saxon or Slavic communities. It had played an important role in visions of Spanish national identity that developed during the turn of the century, particularly within the Spanish regenerationist movement which emerged after 1898 where the concept of *hispanidad* was used to articulate a new model of national identity for post-imperial Spain.[5] Forging a new Ibero-American community, Spanish intellectuals and elites hoped, would help both regions to strengthen their political, economic, and cultural position on the global stage, and to facilitate the moral regeneration and structural modernization which would help Spain reclaim its position as a world power.[6]

[3] 'Primer Congreso Iberoamericano de Seguridad Social', 246.

[4] David Marcilhacy, 'Las figuras de la "Raza": de la España Mayor a la Comunidad Iberoamericana, perspectivas (post)imperiales en el imaginario español', *Historia y Política*, 35 (2016), 145–74.

[5] Marcela García Sebastiani and David Marcilhacy, 'The Americas and the Celebration of 12 October', in Javier Moreno Luzón and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas (eds), *Metaphors of Spain: Representations of National Identity in the 20th Century* (London: Berghahn, 2016), 161–80.

[6] Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Diplomacia franquista y politica cultural hacia Iberoamérica, 1939–1953* (Madrid: CSIC, 1988), 18–28.

As the twentieth century progressed, the language of *hispanidad* was increasingly co-opted by the Spanish right. Conservative thinkers such as Ramiro de Maeztu developed a more nationalist and traditionalist vision of *hispanidad* based around Catholic values, the historical role of the Spanish empire in expanding global Catholicism (the 'empire of faith'), and the idea of Ibero-American identity as a counterpoint to liberal and secular forms of modernity.[7] His ideas helped to inform the foreign policy of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship during the 1920s, under which de Maeztu served as Spanish ambassador to Argentina. Latin America was also a focus for Spanish fascist thinkers prior to the civil war, and it formed an important part of the Falangist imperial imagination during the late 1930s and early 1940s.[8] These currents of thoughts were carried over into the Francoist era.[9] They underpinned the rhetorical emphasis on *hispanidad* in the regime's formulation and projection of Spanish national identity, and its attempts to establish Spain at the head of a new Ibero-American community of nations.[10]

The idea of *hispanidad* had a much more complicated reception in Latin America. Many in the region had long been supporters of the idea.[11] For many Spanish emigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the idea appealed to their patriotism and loyalty to the 'mother country'.[12] For sections of the Latin American elite, the idea of a strengthened Ibero-American community offered commercial, political, or personal opportunities. But it was opposed by others who resented the neo-imperialist undertones of Spanish projects. It also ran up against alternative models of transnational community which enjoyed support across the region. Other European countries laid claim to a special relationship with Latin America, whether Britain with its trading relationship in the nineteenth century, France or Italy with their vision of transnational Latin identities, or the Portuguese language of Luso-tropicalism.[13] These in turn competed with the influence of the US, and the hemispheric vision of Pan-Americanism. As Spanish economic and geopolitical power waned, so did its influence amongst the Latin

[7] Ramiro de Maeztu, *Defensa de la Hispanidad* (Madrid: Ediciones Fax, 1934).

[8] Nil Santiáñez, *Topographies of Fascism: Habitus, Space, and Writing in Twentieth-Century Spain* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 168–76.

[9] Eduardo González Calleja and Fredes Limón Nevado, *La hispanidad como instrumento de combate: raza e imperio en la prensa franquista durante la Guerra Civil Española* (Madrid: CSIC, 1988); Rosa María Pardo Sanz, *Con el franquismo hacia el imperio: la política exterior española en América Latina, 1939–1945* (Madrid: UNED, 1995); Johannes Großmann, '"Baroque Spain" as Metaphor: Hispanidad, Europeanism and Cold War Anti-Communism in Francoist Spain', *Bulletin of Spanish Studies*, 91 (2014), 755–71.

[10] David Marcilhacy, 'La Hispanidad bajo el franquismo: el americanismo al servicio de un proyecto nacionalista', in Xosé M. Núñez Seixas and Stéphane Michonneau (eds), *El imaginario nacionalista español en el franquismo* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2014), 73–102.

[11] Isidro Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria: Hispanoamericanismo y nacionalismo* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2005).

[12] Marcela García Sebastiani, *Patriotas entre naciones: elites emigrantes españolas en Argentina, 1870–1940* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 2011).

[13] Denis Rolland et al., *España, Francia y America Latina: políticas culturales, propaganda y relaciones internacionales, siglo XX* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001).

American republics. And as the Spanish vision of *hispanidad* became increasingly associated with the political right, so hostility among Latin American liberals and leftists grew.

The Francoist vision of *hispanidad* was in many ways backwards-looking and reactionary. It harked back to a lost imperial golden age, and emphasized a shared commitment to traditionalist Catholic values and social models. This chapter argues, however, that through its work in Latin America the Franco regime also sought to promote the image of Spain as a technically, economically, and socially advanced state. To do so it had to reconcile its traditionalist vision of *hispanidad* with elements of social and scientific modernization.[14] It was this which made social experts so important to Francoist cultural diplomacy in Latin America. According to Girón de Velasco they were the 'shock troops' of social justice, possessed of technical skills and knowledge which: '[when] applied to human misery, becomes no longer cold or mechanical, but instead becomes an extension of our spirit acting in a transcendental way and converting our spectacular and curious intelligence into what it should never cease to be: a blessed tool of the word of God'. Expertise, in this account, could be combined with the 'spirituality' of National Catholic Spain to project the values of the Francoist social state beyond its own borders. The religious and cultural identity Spain shared with Latin America meant that it was Latin American experts who would be most receptive to this vision of a modern, spiritually rooted social system.

Despite the significant resources dedicated to this task, the Francoist narrative faced significant opposition in Latin America. Left-wing governments and movements, particularly those which had supported the defeated Republic during the Spanish Civil War, were implacably hostile to any attempts by the Franco regime to promote its influence in the region. The many Spanish Republicans who had gone into exile in Latin America helped to coordinate and bolster anti-Francoist opposition. In particular, the large number of exiled Republican social experts provided a counterpoint to the work of their Francoist rivals in the region. Exile groups offered a more equal and collaborative model of Ibero-American cooperation, highlighting the neo-imperialist language and assumptions which continued to characterize Francoist efforts. Nevertheless, Latin America did provide a route through which Francoist social experts were able to engage with wider forms of international cooperation in certain instances. In areas such as social security and health insurance, cultural and historical ties with the region opened up opportunities to promote a vision of Francoist modernity to the outside world.

This chapter begins by setting out the importance of social experts and expertise within Francoist cultural diplomacy to Latin America, which sought to project Spain as a modern and modernizing power. Unlike the relationship between

[14] Antonio Cañellas Mas (ed.), *La tecnocracia hispánica: ideas y proyecto político en Europa y América* (Madrid: Trea, 2016).

Spanish social experts and Nazi Germany, or with French and British African colonies during the Second World War, expert involvement with Latin America was directed and promoted by the state as a coordinated aspect of its foreign policy. The second section examines the position of Republican exiles in the Latin American scientific community and their impact on the work of Francoist experts, using the example of international leprosy networks to demonstrate how Latin America provided a gateway through which Francoist experts could engage in wider forms of international activity despite the opposition they encountered. The final section shows how the fields of health insurance and social security were used by both the Franco regime and Spanish experts to promote their influence in the region from the 1950s, adopting the language of development and technical cooperation to position Spain as a model for those Latin American states looking to modernize their social security systems in response to the threat of communism.

Social Expertise, *Hispanidad*, and Cultural Diplomacy

At the end of the Second World War the Franco regime launched a new programme to attract Latin American students to study in Spanish universities. In numerical terms the policy was highly successful. By offering scholarships and promoting Spanish universities in the region, the government was able to increase the number of Latin American students arriving annually in Spain from just 25 in 1946 to 3,100 by 1953.[15] The policy reflected the importance of Latin America to the post-war Spanish government. *Hispanidad*, the idea that Spain stood at the head of a community of Ibero-American nations united by ties of history, culture, religion, and language, was central to the domestic discourse and the foreign policy of the Franco regime. Cultural diplomacy in Latin America was a key element of Francoist foreign policy, particularly during the late 1940s, and the regime hoped that educating the children of Latin American elites in Spain would buttress its influence in the region over the coming decades.

The very first beneficiaries of this new policy, a group of seventeen students and three professors from the University of Chile's medical faculty, arrived in Spain in February 1946.[16] Over the following five months the group visited some of the most important medical facilities and institutions across Spain, including the Royal Academy of Medicine and the Anti-Tuberculosis Trust in Madrid, and studied with renowned Spanish experts such as Gregorio Marañón and Carlos Jiménez Díaz. Six of the students were awarded additional scholarships to

[15] *El Instituto de Cultura Hispánica: al servicio de Iberoamerica* (Madrid: Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, 1953).

[16] AGA 10(18) 54/09379, 'Viaje a España estudiantes Esc. Medicina Universidad de Chile', undated.

continue their studies in Spain for a further year when their colleagues returned to Chile in May. The importance of the visit was reflected in the size of the scholarships granted at a time of severe financial shortages, and it was followed closely by Spanish diplomats and by the press in both countries. The Spanish ambassador in Chile lauded the significance of the tour in helping to counteract the 'adverse propaganda' in the region which painted the Francoist government as 'nazi-nipo-fascist-Falangists', particularly within the 'hostile redoubt' of the University of Chile.[17] Santiago's *El Diario Illustrado* reported in March that the students had been highly impressed by their experiences in Spain and the 'extraordinary' efforts of the regime in the social and educational sectors.[18] Pro-Francoist Spanish diaspora groups in Chile described it as a 'journey of Hispano-American brotherhood' which would help 'bring together the *Patria* and the countries of the New Continent'.[19]

Under the surface, however, the tour did not progress as smoothly as its sponsors had hoped. Shortly after the initial group had embarked on their return journey to Chile in May, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs received information that one of the students was affiliated to the Chilean communist party and had been in contact with 'extremist elements' while in Spain.[20] Although the purpose and extent of this contact was not clear, they suspected that he had been collecting material intended to begin a 'campaign of defamation' against the Franco regime on his return to Chile. The Spanish ambassador in Santiago warned his counterparts in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil about the student's imminent arrival, and with the collusion of Brazilian security services arranged for his belongings to be surreptitiously searched when the boat docked in Rio. No seditious material was found, but the Brazilian security services continued to follow the student around the city and reported that he had deposited a large amount of money in a local bank, before the trail went cold.[21]

Further problems soon emerged. In September, a Spanish resident of Santiago wrote to the Spanish ambassador to denounce Elsa Acuña, another of the students who had received the extended scholarships to stay on in Spain, whom she claimed was engaging in anti-Francoist 'propaganda'. In numerous letters home to family and friends, the informant alleged, Acuña had:

> rudely criticised the current regime . . . saying that leading figures in the government dedicate themselves to robbery and contraband . . . that there are no kinds of freedoms, that if anyone complains they are persecuted, and that all Spaniards

[17] AGA 10(18) 54/09379, Marqués de los Arcos to MAE, 6 January 1946.

[18] AGA 10(18) 54/09379, *El Diario Illustrado*, 24 March 1946.

[19] AGA 10(18) 54/09379, letters to the Spanish ambassador from the *Circulo Español*, the *Comité de Presidentes de Sociedades Españoles* and the *Unión Española*, 4–10 January 1946.

[20] AGA 10(18) 54/09379, MAE to Santiago Ambassador, 19 May 1946.

[21] AGA 10(18) 54/09379, various correspondence between the Ambassadors in Santiago, Rio, Montevideo, and Buenos Aires.

> are silenced and watched, that people are dying of hunger whilst those in the government lack for nothing.[22]

The ambassador passed the information on to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid, with a request that Acuña's funding be withdrawn. The Chilean newspaper *La Hora*, meanwhile, reported that the Federation of Chilean Students had denounced those students who had organized the tour and spoken positively about Franco's Spain as 'well-known fascists' seeking to undermine the solidarity between Chilean students and the Spanish people.[23] The diplomatic and propaganda aims the Franco regime had hoped to achieve through the tour had clearly not been entirely realized.

The tour illustrates the significance of health, science, and social policy to Francoist diplomacy in Latin America, the ambitions which underpinned it, and the factors which limited its success. In the absence of significant political, economic, or military influence in the region, Francoist attempts to enhance Spain's status in Latin America were focussed on cultural diplomacy. These efforts were led by the Institute of Hispanic Culture (*Instituto de Cultura Hispánica*; ICH) and its predecessors. The ICH aimed to win the allegiance of national elites and Spanish expatriates across Latin America, primarily by building educational, cultural, and professional ties with universities, businesses, and professional groups.[24] Although focussed on cultural activity, its work was not a marginal part of Francoist diplomacy. In 1946 close to 20 per cent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget was dedicated to cultural initiatives, the vast majority aimed at Latin America.[25]

During its peak in the 1940s and early 1950s, science, particularly the medical sciences, was central to Francoist cultural diplomacy in the region. This was partly explained by the fact that exchanges and visits involving experts and students could be promoted on 'technical' and scientific grounds, despite the often antagonistic relationships between Latin American republics and the Franco regime. Beyond that, however, lay the goal of using social and scientific experts to promote a modern, technologically advanced image of Franco's Spain, at a time when the exile of many of the country's leading scientists following the end of the civil war had severely weakened the regime's modern and modernizing credentials. In this sense, Francoist cultural diplomacy differed from the model of Cold War-era US cultural diplomacy which was aimed at winning a global ideological and cultural battle against the communist bloc.[26] Instead, it much more closely resembled the efforts of interwar states such as Weimar Germany or the USSR, which had been

[22] AGA 10(18) 54/09379, Carmen Sanchez y Suàrez to Daniel Castel, 13 September 1946.
[23] AGA 10(18) 54/09379, *La Hora*, 3 May 1946.
[24] María A. Escudero, *El Instituto de Cultura Hispánica* (Madrid: Ediciones Mapfre, 1994).
[25] Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Diplomacia franquista*, 119.
[26] Tony Shaw, 'The Politics of Cold War Culture', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3 (2001), 59–76.

marginalized within the international community, to use their artistic, technical, and scientific pedigree and traditions to build bilateral relations and to bolster their international status.[27]

The importance of science and medicine to Spanish cultural diplomacy in Latin America had its origins prior to the Spanish Civil War. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Spanish intellectuals had sought to strengthen ties with Latin America through organizations such as the *Unión Ibero-Americano*, often with the financial support of the Spanish state. In Latin America, political and economic elites, often recent Spanish emigrants, built similar organizations to promote educational and intellectual ties with the *madre patria*. These efforts were increasingly supported by the Spanish state. The JAE funded a growing number of scientific conferences and visits to Latin America in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly under the Primo de Rivera regime.[28]

The influence of Falangist leaders over Spanish foreign affairs in the immediate aftermath of the civil war meant that they were at the forefront of the Franco regime's initial attempts to build ties with Latin America. In November 1940, Serrano Suñer's Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Council of Hispanidad (*Consejo de Hispanidad*) to promote the interests of Spain and the cause of the totalitarian New Order in the region, and to counter the influence of the US and its allies. The council received some support from pro-Axis activists, businesses, and religious and military elites across Latin America. But its overtly imperialist tone meant that it was widely distrusted, and its practical attempts to improve cultural ties were hampered by disruptions to travel and communication caused by the war.[29]

The end of the Second World War provoked a shift in the Francoist approach to Latin America. Changes were driven by the appointment as foreign minister of the Catholic politician Alberto Martín Artajo, who was well known among the region's Catholic elites. Latin America remained central to Spanish foreign policy despite the fact that the majority of its states, barring Perón's Argentina, broke off diplomatic ties in 1946. Most, however, rejected calls for international intervention in Spanish affairs, and ultimately formed the bedrock of support for Spain's admission to the UN in 1955.[30] Martín Artajo's ministry shifted the language of

[27] Susan Gross Solomon (ed.), *Doing Medicine Together: Germany and Russia between the Wars* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); Jean-François Fayet, 'VOKS: The Third Dimension of Soviet Foreign Policy', in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfrield (eds), *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2010).

[28] Rolland et al., *España, Francia y America Latina*, 97–164; Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria*, 337–408.

[29] Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Diplomacia franquista*, 63–77; Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Imperio de papel*, 267–75.

[30] Portero, *Franco aislado*, 125–7; Rein, *The Franco-Perón Alliance*. An important exception was Mexico (and to a lesser extent Guatemala), which provided active support to the Republican government in exile and continued to denounce the Franco regime long after other countries in the region had come to accept it.

hispanidad away from the idea of Spanish leadership of a political community to one which promoted the cultural, historical, and spiritual ties between Iberia and Latin America, with Spain presented as the unifying 'mother country' or as the 'bridge' between the two regions.[31] Although Spain's presence in Latin America implied a challenge to the US and to the Pan-American movement, this cultural vision of *hispanidad* aimed to position Spain as a positive regional partner. Some Francoist proponents of *hispanidad* presented Spain not as a rival to the US, but as a historical partner in the foundation of an 'Atlantic civilization' which united the Iberian and Anglo-Saxon worlds.[32]

In 1946, Martín Artajo re-established the Council of Hispanidad as the Institute of Hispanic Culture. The ICH coordinated scientific and medical links with Latin America, with the support of the Spanish National Research Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Committee of Cultural Relations.[33] A key strand of their work, particularly after 1946, involved encouraging Latin American students to study in Spanish universities through the provision of scholarships and student support services. The Chilean medical students visiting Spain in 1946 had been amongst the first beneficiaries of this programme, with the number of Latin American students in Spain rising rapidly thereafter.[34] The ICH coordinated a network of colleges and residences for Latin American students, providing scholarships, subsidized accommodation, and a range of cultural activities to support their studies. Medicine and medical students were given a prominent place in the organization's propaganda and publications, which emphasized the opportunities for students to study with internationally renowned experts such as Gregorio Marañón.[35] Encouraging student exchanges, the ICH hoped, would improve the contemporary image of Spain across the region through the positive reports of returning students. And it would help to cement Spain's long-term influence by ensuring that the next generation of Latin American elites gained direct experience of Spanish life.[36]

The ICH also supported the visits of Spanish scientists and social experts to Latin America. One of the earliest and most prominent examples was the visit of Carlos Jiménez Díaz to Argentina, Chile, and Peru at the end of 1943. The tour involved a series of conferences and lectures across the three countries, during which Jiménez Díaz was awarded various awards and honorary doctorates. It was

[31] Rosa Pardo Sanz, 'De puentes y comunidades: balance historiográfico sobre las relaciones con América Latina', in Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, and Rosa Pardo Sanz (eds), *La apertura internacional de España: entre el franquismo y la democracia, 1953–1986* (Madrid: Silex, 2016), 127–66.

[32] Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Diplomacia franquista*, 100–1.

[33] On the council's links with Latin America during the 1940s and 1950s, see Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, 'Dimensión internacional del CSIC', in Miguel Ángel Puig-Samper Mulero (ed.), *Tiempos de investigación: JAE-CSIC, cien años de ciencia en España* (Madrid: CSIC, 2007), 269–78.

[34] *El Instituto de Cultura Hispánica.* [35] Ibid., 21.

[36] Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Imperio de papel*, 161.

funded by the Council of Hispanidad, with considerable logistical and political support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Coming at the height of the Second World War when travel between Spain and Latin America was increasingly difficult, it provoked significant interest on both sides of the Atlantic. Jiménez Diaz's return made the front page of many Spanish newspapers, and led to a personal audience with Franco.[37] Accounts of his visit reflected the extent to which Jiménez Diaz was regarded as an ambassador for Francoist Spain through his ability to project a positive impression of the country's scientific and medical prestige. The newspaper *ABC* reported that his lectures had provided the Latin American scientific public with lessons about 'the progress of medical science, to which Spanish talents have always made such a great contribution', and had reawakened 'the oldest roots of pride' in Spanish science.[38] The Council of Public Health lauded his work in 'raising the prestige of Spain amongst the hispano-american nations'.[39]

The celebration of Jiménez Díaz's visit reflected a wider belief among the Francoist foreign policy establishment in the importance of science and medicine to Spanish diplomacy in the region. When a leading Spanish ophthalmologist attended an international congress in Uruguay in 1945, the Spanish ambassador called on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to encourage further visits from Spanish scientists, whom he described as 'magnificent expressions of the reality of Spain, so often misrepresented and poorly understood', and whose 'words and presence are the best and highest propaganda for our country'.[40] 'Science,' argued the foreign minister Martín Artajo in 1950, 'has strengthened our vigorous international presence, at the same time as it has attracted vast swathes of opinion among the world's most distinguished figures.'[41] The value of scientists and social experts for Spanish foreign policy lay in their ability to project an image of a positive, modern, and forward-looking Spanish state to Latin American elites. They were also seen as 'independent' experts whose views would carry more weight than those of diplomats and officials.

'We don't want Francoists here!'

The influence of Spanish scientists and social experts over Latin American elites was challenged, however, by the large number of Spanish exiles who had made their home in the region following the Spanish Civil War. Francoist diplomats

[37] Jiménez Casado, *Doctor Jiménez Díaz*, 344–5.
[38] 'Mañana, domingo, llegará a Madrid el profesor Jiménez Díaz', *ABC*, 12 February 1944, 8.
[39] Quoted in Jiménez Casado, *Doctor Jiménez Díaz*, 341.
[40] AGA (10)89 54/10090, Montevideo Ambassador to MAE, 5 December 1945.
[41] Alberto Martín Artajo, *La política internacional de España en 1945–1950* (Madrid: Oficina de Información Diplomática, 1950), 16.

encouraging the visits of Spanish experts to Latin America hoped to counter the negative image of the regime promoted by those exiles and their supporters on the left, but were unable to prevent the exile opposition from challenging their efforts. During his 1943 tour of the region, for example, a lecture delivered by Jiménez Díaz in Chile was met by shouts of 'Fascist! We don't want Francoists here!'[42] The problems experienced during the tour of Chilean medical students to Spain three years later highlighted the difficulties Francoist authorities faced in managing and countering these forms of opposition.

Spanish exiles in Latin America promoted an alternative model of Ibero-American cooperation in which Spain stood as an equal and collaborative partner rather than a spiritual and cultural leader. Their example risked throwing into stark relief the hierarchical and imperialistic undertones which endured within the Francoist discourse of *hispanidad*, even after the more overt neo-imperialism of the Falange had been jettisoned. Nevertheless, the prominent role of Spanish exiles in the Latin American medical community did not prevent Francoist experts from engaging with the region. As the strength of opposition began to die down from the end of the 1940s, they were even able to use Latin America as a springboard to reconstruct ties with international organizations and networks which had been damaged by Spain's post-war diplomatic isolation, particularly in the field of health.

The estimated half a million Spaniards who fled into exile during and immediately after the Spanish Civil War included a large proportion of the country's scientific, cultural, and intellectual elites. Most fled in the first instance to France, with many later building new lives in Mexico and, to a lesser degree, Argentina, Venezuela, Cuba, and the US. The field of medicine was particularly well represented among Spanish exiles, including internationally renowned researchers and experts such as Gustavo Pitalluga and Félix Martí Ibáñez, as well as hundreds of doctors and nurses.[43] In Mexico alone, 500 Spanish doctors were granted residence between 1939 and 1940, representing 10 per cent of the total number of doctors in the entire country.[44] Mexico welcomed a broad range of Spanish exiles and provided a base for the Republican government in exile, but was particularly keen to welcome Spanish intellectual immigration to help develop its university system. Spanish doctors, who struggled to gain accreditation in many countries

[42] Jiménez Casado, *Doctor Jiménez Díaz*, 334.

[43] Herman A Bogdan, 'Félix Martí-Ibáñez: Iberian Daedalus: The Man behind the Essays', *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine*, 86 (1993), 593–6; Esteban Rodríguez Ocaña and Iris Borowy, 'Gustavo Pittaluga (1876–1956): Science as a Weapon for Social Reform in a Time of Crisis', in Iris Borowy and Anne Hardy (eds), *Of Medicine and Men: Biographies and Ideas in European Social Medicine between the World Wars* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008), 173–97. Another medical exile of note was the former president of the Republic and leader of the Republican government-in-exile, Juan Negrín.

[44] Josep Lluís Barona and Joan Lloret Pastor, 'El exilio republicano como suceso histórico', in Josep Lluís Barona (ed.), *Ciencia, salud pública y exilio: Espana, 1875–1939* (Valencia: Seminari d'Estudis, 2003), 24; Bernabeu-Mestre, 'La contribución del exilio científico español al desarrollo de la salud pública venezolana'.

due to a lack of available documentation, were supported in Mexico via a special system of accreditation which allowed them to be examined verbally by a panel of Mexican and Spanish experts.[45] Spanish experts also played an important role in the development of public health, medical training, and nursing in Venezuela, and went on to establish successful medical careers elsewhere across Latin America.[46]

Spanish scientists in exile set up structures and institutions to help them re-establish their careers and integrate into the scientific communities of their adopted countries. The Union of Spanish University Professors Abroad (*Unión de Profesores Universitarios Españoles en el Extranjero*) was co-founded by the malariologist and public health expert Gustavo Pittaluga in Paris in 1939, later moving to Cuba and Mexico. The organization lobbied the Allied powers and the UN in favour of the Republican cause, and set up initiatives to support and promote the work of exiled scientists and academics.[47] Its most successful initiative was the exile-run journal *Ciencia* which began publication in Mexico in 1940 and continued for thirty-five years, and which reflected the prominent status which many Spanish exiles had attained within Latin American scientific communities.

In addition to the overt efforts of Spanish exiles to campaign against the Franco regime, their presence in the region represented an implied challenge to the Francoist conception of *hispanidad*, and the role of science and medicine within it. At its annual conference in Havana in September 1942, the Union of Spanish University Professors Abroad set out its view of the relationship between Spanish exiles and Latin America:

> The Spanish people, linked by blood, language and beliefs with the Republics which in other times made up the Spanish Empire, take pride in their achievements, harbour no imperial ambitions, and desire a fraternal collaboration to maintain and enrich our common heritage, whilst expressly adhering to the principle of interamerican solidarity and fervently desiring to contribute to the harmonious understanding between the racial and cultural elements which make up the western hemisphere.[48]

Like their Francoist counterparts, Spanish exiles emphasized the historical, linguistic, and cultural ties between Spain and Latin America. But they explicitly

[45] Francisco Giral, *Ciencia española en el exilio, 1939–1988* (Madrid: Aula de la Cultura Científica, 1989), 14–18. See also oral history interviews with exiled doctors and medical researchers who worked in Mexico held at the *Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica*, Salamanca (CDMH), 'Refugiados españoles en Méjico: Proyecto de Historia Oral', books 13, 75, 76, 80, 83, 100.

[46] Encarna Gascón Pérez, María Eugenia Galiana-Sánchez, and Josep Bernabeu-Mestre, 'La aportación de las enfermeras visitadoras sanitarias al desarrollo de la enfermaría venezolana', in Josep Lluis Barona (ed.), *Ciencia, salud pública y exilio: Espana, 1875–1939* (Valencia: Seminari d'Estudis sobre la Ciéncia, 2003), 99–130; Bernabeu-Mestre, 'La contribución'.

[47] Giral, *Ciencia española en el exilio, 1939–1988*, 12–13.

[48] 'La Reunión de la UPUEE, La Habana, septiembre de 1943', *Boletín Informativo de la Unión de Profesores Universitarios Españoles en el Extranjero*, 2–5 (September–December 1943), 9.

denounced the imperialist pretensions which, particularly during the early 1940s, had so clearly influenced the Falangist-inspired vision of *hispanidad*. Instead of the Spanish-led Ibero-American networks promoted by the ICH, Republican exiles explicitly called for equal and reciprocal forms of collaboration. The references to 'interamerican solidarity' and the 'western hemisphere' also situated their vision within, rather than against, pre-existing Pan-American networks and relations with the US.

In contrast to the inclusive and collaborative approach of Spanish exiles, many Francoist experts continued to couch scientific ties within imperialist and nationalist rhetoric, even beyond the end of the Second World War. A prime example was the involvement of the Spanish Catholic nursing association, *Salus Infirmorum*, with Catholic nursing groups in the region.[49] The leader of *Salus Infirmorum*, María de Madariaga, was involved in an ongoing battle with her French counterparts to ensure that Spain acted as the primary link between nurses in Latin America and the International Catholic Committee of Nurses and Medico-Social Assistants. Her cause was actively supported and funded by the ICH and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1949 the ICH's director, Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, wrote to the Spanish ambassador in Montevideo lauding Madariaga's efforts to assert Spain's 'rights' in the region by promoting the ties of *hispanidad* over French claims based on a broader Latin identity, and setting out the benefits of ensuring that Catholic nursing groups in Latin America were 'tied to Spain'.[50]

When Madariaga toured the region in 1954, the *Salus Infirmorum* journal drew enthusiastic parallels with the history of the *conquistadors* and Spain's imperial past: '[Madariaga] passes her days and nights inventing ways to conquer [*conquistar*] the whole world for Christ and for Spain. Poring indefatigably over the map she plans out the possible conquests [*conquistas*], not only within our borders but also outside of them.'[51] Although Madariaga was not aiming to subjugate or dominate Latin American nursing associations, these kinds of references to Spain's colonial past and the imperialist language which accompanied them clearly contrasted with the more inclusive rhetoric of Spanish exile groups. Thanks to these attitudes, and to the continued role of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in promoting cultural ties to Latin America, Spanish experts in the region continued to face suspicions that they were acting as a front for quasi-imperialist Spanish foreign policy ambitions.

Despite the importance of Spanish exiles within the Latin American scientific community, there is little evidence that they actively sought to prevent the engagement of Francoist experts with Latin America, or that they strengthened

[49] For more on *Salus Infirmorum* and its international links, see Chapter 5.
[50] AGA (10)89 54/10098, Joaquín Ruiz Giménez to Montevideo Ambassador, 9 August 1949.
[51] 'Maria de Madariaga visita varios países de la América Latina', *¡Firmes!*, 7 (October 1954), 7.

anti-Francoist sentiment among their Latin American colleagues. In fact, in a number of cases Latin America clearly acted as a springboard for Francoist experts to engage with wider international organizations and networks, sometimes even with the support of Spanish exiles. This was partly thanks to the shared language between the two regions, which meant that the Latin American scientific community provided a forum for the work of Francoist experts to gain exposure outside of Spain. The pharmacologist Benigno Lorenzo-Velázquez, for example, was one of the most internationally active experts in Franco's Spain during the 1950s, and attributed much of his international standing to the popularity of his work in Latin America. In particular, his invitation to join the WHO expert committee on narcotic drugs in 1952 was the result of a visit by the committee's chairman to Buenos Aires where he was introduced to Lorenzo-Velázquez's major work on pharmacology.[52] The personal, cultural, and linguistic ties between Spanish experts and their Latin American colleagues provided access to the professional networks so crucial to the field of international health, in which appointments and professional opportunities were often based on reputation and personal connections.

In other cases, Latin American experts provided more active support for Francoist medical authorities looking to establish connections with international health organizations and networks. The clearest example of this was the crucial role played by Latin American governments in supporting Spanish membership of the WHO between 1946 and 1951.[53] Below this level, Latin American experts supported the involvement of Franco's Spain in a wide range of international health networks, including specialist bodies such as the International Leprosy Association. The International Leprosy Congress held in Madrid in 1953, for example, was one of the first international medical congresses hosted by Franco's Spain, and was given an extraordinarily high profile by the regime as evidence of Spain's reintegration into the international scientific community.[54] The decision to host the event in Spain had been taken at the previous international conference held in Havana five years earlier. There, the Cuban organizers had agreed to invite a Spanish delegation at a time when Francoist experts were excluded from most other international conferences. Spanish delegates had then actively lobbied for Madrid to host the proceeding conference, and had succeeded in part due to the support of Latin American delegates. A report on the conference in a Spanish journal also alleged that the proposal had received support from unnamed Spanish exiles living in Mexico.[55]

[52] Benigno Lorenzo Velázquez, *Memorias: enseñanzas de una vida* (Madrid: Garsi, 1984), 58.

[53] See Chapter 2 for further details of the role of Latin American states in the WHO membership debate.

[54] Brydan, 'Mikomeseng', 644–6.

[55] 'Sanitaria Internacional: Congreso de Leprología en Cuba', *Ser*, 71 (1948), 25–58.

Francoist health authorities saw the field of leprosy as an ideal forum for promoting Francoist health care to the wider world, and particularly to Latin America. The symbolic value of the disease within Catholic culture meant that it could be used to link the idea of Spain as a modern, scientifically advanced power with its historical role as the defender and promoter of Catholic values. Speaking at the 1953 Madrid conference, the interior minister Blas Pérez González presented the care of leprosy sufferers as an integral part of Spanish history, highlighting the humanitarian efforts of historical figures from *El Cid* to the *Reyes Católicos*.[56] This proud history, he argued, was reflected in the expertise of contemporary Spanish leprosy experts and the advanced nature of leprosy treatment in Spain, following its neglect under the Second Republic. José Palanca told delegates that Spain had worked so hard to ensure the international conference came to Madrid because 'we wanted to show you our medical achievements and our campaign against leprosy which we in Spain carried out alone, without anyone's help and despite difficult economic conditions'.[57] The treatment of leprosy, he argued, was unique in combining 'a strict scientific character', with the 'humanitarian, altruistic and disinterested qualities' which characterized Spanish medicine.[58] The uniqueness of Spanish medicine, according to this argument, lay in its combination of advanced technical expertise with the social and humanitarian principles which underpinned the Francoist state.

The organizers of the conference, who included leading Spanish leprosy experts, the Interior Ministry, the Department of Health, and the ICH, saw it as an opportunity to promote the scientific and social credentials of the regime to the outside world. They organized extensive tours of medical facilities for the delegates, providing numerous examples of the supposed triumphs of Francoist public health.[59] Their efforts were targeted primarily at the Latin American experts who made up a majority of the foreign delegates. The historical role of Spanish missionaries in Latin American leprosy colonies and the religious symbolism of the disease were used to promote the idea of a distinctive Ibero-American approach to leprosy care. The success of these efforts was both reflected and reinforced by the newly founded Ibero-American College of Dermatology, which had first been established after the Havana conference and was developed further in Madrid. The work of the organization was supported and part-funded by the ICH, with Spanish leprosy experts holding key leadership positions over the following decade.[60]

The prominent role Spain was able to play in the field of leprosy both internationally and within the Ibero-American region reflected the extent to which,

[56] *Memoria del VI Congreso Internacional de Leprología* (Madrid: Gráficas González, 1954), 126–9.
[57] Ibid., 51. [58] Ibid., 50. [59] Ibid.
[60] Carlos F. Gatti and Dante A. Chinchilla, 'Reseña Histórica del CILAD', *Medicina Cutánea Ibero-Latino-Americana*, 33 (2005), 11–39.

despite the presence of Republican exiles, Latin America acted as a gateway for Francoist experts to gain access to wider forms of international health. Links with Latin America provided Francoist experts with the international exposure, networks, and contacts required to promote their involvement in international organizations, and in a number of cases to establish new Ibero-American patterns and networks of international cooperation.

Social Security and the 'Social Voice of Spain'

After 1945 the Francoist approach to *hispanidad* focussed increasingly on technical development and the idea of a shared Catholic, anti-communist modernity.[61] This was reflected in attempts to establish Spain as a model for the development of social security in Latin America, particularly in the field of health insurance. *Inter*-American cooperation in the field of social security had been taking place since the 1930s, promoted by the Inter-American Committee of Social Security (*Comité Interamericano de Seguridad Social*), which in 1942 had published the Santiago de Chile Declaration setting out the fundamental principles of social security for workers on the continent.[62] But the ICH, in collaboration with the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labour and the INP, actively supported attempts to form an alternative *Ibero*-American community of social security experts, beginning with the first Ibero-American Social Security Conference held in Madrid in 1951.

Spanish experts and officials used the social security system to promote an image of the Francoist state as both modern and socially advanced. These efforts reflected the post-war western consensus that welfare and technical development were vital to counter the global spread of communism. The US saw technical development as a means to secure the allegiance of Latin American, Asian, and African states to the western cause. But Francoist politicians and experts sought to promote the idea of an Ibero-American 'third way' between communism and the capitalist welfare state, based on the model of a Spanish social security system underpinned by a shared set of Catholic values.

Their goal was to promote the Francoist system as a model for the wider region, particularly in the case of health insurance. The centrepiece of early Francoist social legislation was the introduction of the compulsory sickness insurance scheme, the SOE, which was adopted in 1942 and implemented in 1944. Its launch coincided with renewed post-war efforts to promote the social credentials of

[61] Antonio Cañellas Mas, 'La técnica al servicio de la Hispanidad: un proyecto tradicionalista', in Antonio Cañellas Mas (ed.), *América y la Hispanidad: historia de un fenómeno cultural* (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2011), 181–208.

[62] Carlos Martí Bufill, *Presente y futuro del seguro social* (Madrid: Studium, 1947), 59.

Franco's Spain in Latin America. The first successful attempt to formalize Spain's regional status in the field was the Ibero-American Conference of Social Security held in Madrid in 1951. The conference was attended by delegations from sixteen Latin American states, the Philippines, and Portugal, with many states sending government ministers at the head of delegations of national experts. Observers also attended from Italy, Belgium, the ILO, and the International Association of Social Security, and the conference received statements of support from the Organization of American States (OAS).

The event provided the Franco regime with an international platform on which to promote its 'social' credentials. But it also agreed to establish a new Ibero-American Commission of Social Security, based in the ICH headquarters in Madrid, and led entirely by Spanish experts. The commission was intended to act as a clearing house for information about social security in the region, and to organize the provision of scholarships and training for experts in the field.[63] It was placed on a more permanent footing following the second conference held in Lima in 1954, when it was transformed into the Ibero-American Organization of Social Security (*Organización Ibero-Americana de Seguridad Social*, OISS), an organization still in existence today. Its formal role was to promote the coordination and exchange of expertise and the international collaboration of experts, with a focus on developing the distinct 'spiritual and ethical' character of social security in the region. Its headquarters remained at the ICH and its secretary general was confirmed as Carlos Martí Bufill, a Spanish lawyer and social security expert at the INP who had been one of the leading promoters of Ibero-American cooperation since the 1940s.[64]

For Martí the field of social security was inherently international, and represented an opportunity for Spain to promote its social credentials to the world in general, and to Latin America in particular. In his major 1947 work, *The Present and Future of Social Security*, Martí set out his views on the 'internationality' of social security, arguing that because the social problems faced by modern nation states had causes and effects which crossed borders, those states needed to cooperate in trying to craft solutions.[65] This kind of pragmatic international collaboration, he argued, would prove even more effective when carried out among nations united by a 'brotherhood of the spirit', as in the case of the Ibero-American states.[66] In particular, he argued that the Catholic faith shared by Spain and the Latin American states would ensure they avoided the kind of policies adopted elsewhere which ran against Christian values, such as the

[63] Margarita Vilar Rodríguez and Jerònia Pons-Pons, 'La extensión del seguro de salud en Iberoamerica: una estrategia de política exterior del franquismo en la inmediata posguerra, 1942–1950', *Asclepio: Revista de Historia de la Medicina y de la Ciencia*, 67 (2015), 1–14.

[64] AGA, MAE, 82/9402, 'Organización Ibero-Americana de Seguridad Social (Lima, 12–27 October 1954)'.

[65] Martí Bufill, *Presente y futuro*.

[66] Ibid., 10.

promotion of birth control or the recognition of civil unions and divorce. Martí presented the Spanish social security system as one of the most modern in the world, inspired by the Franco regime's 'desire for social justice' and providing the perfect opportunity for Spain to promote to the international community both its technical expertise and its social commitment.[67] 'The social voice of Spain,' he argued, 'can and should be an important factor on the world stage.' And social security cooperation between the Ibero-American community of nations would represent 'a lively and eager expression of the most perfect brotherhood'.[68]

Alongside experts such as Martí, much of the impetus and funding for the creation of an Ibero-American social security organization came from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ICH. The ministry identified social security and welfare as key internal issues for Latin American states in the immediate post-war era.[69] They attributed this universal interest in welfare to the threat of communism across the continent, and to the realization among Latin American governments that the only way to counter the communist threat was to establish welfare systems which would ensure social peace and harmony. The Francoist rhetoric of social justice and anti-communism, they felt, meant that Latin American governments would naturally regard Spain as a model to copy. Spanish social security, argued the ministry, was particularly attractive to those governments looking to create their own systems financed by workers and employers without direct state funding. Spain represented an impeccably anti-communist model for Latin American governments looking to establish social security systems on the cheap.[70]

The threat of communism was key both to Spanish diplomacy in Latin America and to its approach to Cold War-era international relations more generally. When the OAS issued a denunciation of communism in 1954, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that it provided an opportunity for Spain to improve its ties with Latin America in general, and with the OAS in particular. According to the ministry's director of foreign policy:

> The radically critical attitude towards the subversive activities of international communism coincides in essence with the historical mission of the current Spanish state . . . Precisely because of the internationalist character of the political offensive of communism, Spain finds itself in a favourable situation to initiate contacts and gestures of rapprochement towards the American Republics.[71]

In the Cold War era the international threat of communism gave Franco's Spain, which its adherents saw as the original anti-communist power, the opportunity to

[67] Ibid., 12. [68] Ibid., 10.

[69] AGA, MAE, 82/15970, 'Unión Panamericana, Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA), X Conferencia Interamericana (Caracas, marzo 1954)'.

[70] Ibid.

[71] AGA, MAE, 82/15970, Dirección General de Política Exterior, 'X Conferencia interamericana de Caracas, Organismos Internacionales, 15 Mar 1954'.

position itself as a leading player within the western international community. And Latin America was at the heart of this project. The same Foreign Ministry report argued that Latin American states would be keen to cooperate more closely with Spain, the 'standard-bearer of international anticommunism', because communist subversion 'overruns all types of political and geographical borders'.[72]

But Francoist authorities also saw social security as a field in which Spain could counter US influence in the region. The US, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would be reluctant to enter into any kind of formal agreement with its Latin American neighbours in the field of social security for fear of inviting outside interference in its internal policies. In the absence of US influence, Spain could present its social security model as a Catholic-inspired 'third way' between communist and capitalist welfare systems.

This idea particularly appealed to the Falangists who continued to dominate much of the Spanish social security system in the 1950s, and who were keen to promote their vision of welfare as an alternative to the ineffective liberal capitalist states of western Europe and the US. But they were also looking for ways to maintain their influence over Ibero-American relations which distanced themselves from their previous advocacy for the fascist New Order in Latin America. In his address to the first Ibero-American Conference of Social Security in 1951, Girón de Velasco contrasted Francoist social legislation to welfare systems elsewhere in the liberal capitalist west, which he alleged were built on 'petulant formulas' inspired by Adam Smith on a naïve 'patriarchal' approach which entrusted social justice to the good will of businessmen.[73] Spanish conceptions of social justice, he argued, were defined by the Catholic principles which underpinned them, a form of Francoist 'humanism'. Rather than promoting material well-being as an end in itself, as the capitalist countries did, the Francoist state saw man as the 'carrier of eternal values', to be supported in his relation to God, to eternal glory, and to his *patria*.[74] While *Inter*-American cooperation would expose Latin American states to the materialistic influences of US capitalism, *Ibero*-American cooperation would allow them to develop a more holistic form of social security based on these shared Catholic values.[75]

The idea of Ibero-American cooperation in the field of social security was not just rhetorical, and Spain enjoyed limited success in promoting its social model among certain Latin American states. The importance of the OISS to Spanish cultural diplomacy was reflected in the decision to house the organization's secretariat in the ICH.[76] Spanish experts, led by Martí, dominated its leadership positions until the 1960s. Latin American delegations to the regular

[72] Ibid. [73] Girón de Velasco, *Quince años de política social*, 12–13. [74] Ibid., 34.

[75] Vilar Rodríguez and Pons-Pons, 'La extensión del seguro de salud'.

[76] AGA, MAE, 82/9402, 'Organización Ibero-Americana de Seguridad Social (Lima, 12–27 October 1954)'.

OISS conferences were generally headed by labour or social security ministers, providing Spain with the opportunity to promote its social model to influential Latin American audiences. The ICH, for example, ensured that every Ibero-American social security conference during the 1950s included an exhibition featuring scale models of the SOE's new hospitals and health clinics, despite the difficulties and expense involved in shipping them to Latin America.[77]

The OISS also organized training courses in Madrid for Latin American experts to study the Spanish social security system, drawing attendees from across the continent.[78] Although countries such as Chile and Uruguay had established successful social security systems well before the Second World War and had little to learn from the Spanish model, other Latin American states with relatively underdeveloped systems seemed more open to Spanish support. The clearest cases of Spanish influence were Bolivia, Ecuador, and El Salvador, which all received 'technical assistance' from the OISS during the 1950s. This assistance consisted of teams of Spanish experts providing support in drafting legislation and designing systems and processes to inform national social security reforms.[79] Through the OISS, Spain was also able to develop ties with other international organizations such as the OAS and the ILO, which both sent observers to OISS conferences and dispatched delegations to Spain during the 1950s.[80]

The success of these efforts should not be exaggerated. The Franco regime's overtly politicized use of the OISS to promote its interests and image in Latin America limited its effectiveness as a genuine forum for the multidirectional exchange of expertise and ideas. Although certain Latin American states and experts were willing to engage with Spanish social security as a model, the reverse was not the case. There is little evidence of Spanish experts adopting ideas or practices from their Latin American counterparts, or of the OISS in its early history acting as the primary forum of exchange between those Latin American states which had already had well-developed social security systems. *Inter*-American exchange could more easily be carried out on a bilateral basis or through organizations such as the OAS or the ILO. Although Spain was successful in promoting the OISS as one among a number of overlapping regional social security bodies, it did not succeed in establishing it as *the* primary form of cross-border cooperation in the region.

Its efforts were also hampered by the fact that the reality of Spanish social security fell a long way short of the regime's rhetoric. The Francoist social security

[77] Ibid.

[78] *II Congreso Iberoamericano de Seguridad Social: actas y trabajos, tomo I* (Lima: Torres Aguirre, 1954), 6–7.

[79] Revista Ibero-Americana de Seguridad Social, 1 (1952), 51–92; *IV Congreso Iberoamericano de Seguridad Social: actas y trabajos del congreso y de la comisión directiva de la OISS* (Madrid: OISS, 1964), 38–40.

[80] Vilar Rodríguez and Pons-Pons, 'La extensión del seguro de salud', 5.

system was piecemeal, fragmented, underfunded, and largely ineffective. Despite the grand propaganda claims attached to the SOE, in reality it amounted to a modest scheme which provided limited coverage to approximately 8 million urban Spanish workers and their families, but which offered no support for the rural labourers who made up over half of the workforce. It was entirely funded by mandatory contributions from workers and employers, with no funding from general taxation. Its administration was divided between an array of mutuals, insurance providers, and political bodies (syndicates and organizations linked to the *Movimiento*), and its rushed implementation meant that from the start it faced widespread financial and logistical difficulties.[81] Unlike other welfare schemes being introduced in post-war Europe, the Francoist health and social security system was neither universal nor redistributive.

The 'Ibero-American' existed alongside the 'Inter-American' and the 'international' as a nexus for cooperation and exchange. If social security and health insurance represented one of the most successful concrete manifestations of Francoist *hispanidad*, that success consisted in establishing Spain as part of the overlapping web of international networks with which Latin American experts were able to engage. In the context of Spain's post-war isolation, this represented a significant diplomatic achievement. It did not, however, come close to matching the grandiose ambitions or expansive rhetoric which characterized the Francoist vision of a historically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously united community.

The idea of *hispanidad* encompassed a range of diverse and competing visions of Spain's relationship with Latin America. For the traditional Spanish right it was a resolutely conservative concept, resting on the historical ties of Spain's imperial 'Golden Age' and a shared Catholic identity. In the 1930s and early 1940s, Falangists saw Spain as the link between Latin American and the totalitarian states of the 'New Europe', the vanguard of a new global force extending its influence to the region, shaping and translating fascism for a Latin American audience. Republican exiles challenged both of these visions, promoting in their place a relationship of equals based on genuine collaboration, and open to the influence of the US.

The role of social experts, however, points towards a different side to the Francoist vision of *hispanidad*, one which was present throughout the early years of the regime but which came to the fore after 1945. Their involvement with the region was part of the regime's attempt to promote Spain as a model of post-war modernity, more closely aligned with the history and culture of Latin America than those offered by the liberal capitalism of the US on the one hand, or by global communism on the other. In the 1940s, scientific and social experts were used to project the Franco regime as a technologically and socially advanced power. The emphasis on social security from the 1950s exploited the language of technical development to portray the Francoist 'social state' as an advanced and

[81] Vilar Rodríguez and Pons-Pons, 'La extensión del seguro de salud'; Vilar-Rodríguez and Pons-Pons, 'The Introduction of Sickness Insurance in Spain in the First Decades of the Franco Dictatorship'.

comprehensive model for emerging Latin American social services, but one which was underpinned by shared Catholic values.

For Spanish experts, involvement in these Ibero-American organizations and networks was politically, professionally, and personally rewarding. Taking part in the cultural diplomacy driven by the ICH and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs helped to cement the status of experts within the Francoist system. Carlos Jiménez Díaz, for example, had been regarded with suspicion by many within the Franco regime in the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War on account of his perceived liberal sympathies. But his feted tour of Latin America in 1943 and his subsequent audience with Franco helped to secure his standing and reputation, paving the way for his rise to prominence as one of the most high-profile and well-supported medical researchers working in Spain over the coming decades. Others, such as Martí Bufill, genuinely saw the shared culture, history, and religion of the Ibero-American region as the basis for a distinct approach to his field of social security. Even for those who placed less store by such shared values, the fact that Spain was tied to Latin America through a common language made it a natural focus for overseas exchange and collaboration. Ibero-American expert networks thus combined the shared scientific beliefs and values of epistemic communities with the goals of Francoist diplomacy, the self-interest of individual experts, and the shared ties of culture and language between the two regions.

Despite its relatively limited success, the Francoist vision of *hispanidad* was not completely out of step with wider post-war developments. The attempt to establish modern international networks on the foundations of past imperial glories echoed British and French efforts to maintain their international influence through the Commonwealth and French Union, both of which leant heavily on the language of development and technical assistance in the 1940s and 1950s. The aim of integrating Spain within a distinct Ibero-American region reflected the importance of regional bodies and regional cooperation within the post-war international order, in which Spain's estrangement from its western European neighbours left it without the regional forms of economic or political support enjoyed by other states. The idea of uniting states around the vision of a 'third way' between the increasingly polarized capitalist and communist blocs was one that was widely shared during the early decades of the Cold War, from European social democrats to the governments involved in the Bandung Conference and the non-aligned movement during the 1950s and 1960s.

The post-war international system, to a greater degree than its interwar predecessor, was made up of numerous interlocking and overlapping regional, linguistic, religious, political, and cultural units, with individual states positioning themselves at the intersection of a range of different international groups and networks. The post-war promotion of *hispanidad* represented part of the Franco regime's attempt to achieve the same goal by constructing a new Ibero-American community through which its influence could be projected beyond Spanish borders.

5
Spain's Catholic Internationalists

In the summer of 1958, dozens of Spanish social experts, medical professionals, and welfare workers visited the Universal Exposition in Brussels, the first such event held since the Second World War. The Spanish visitors were primarily drawn by the Vatican pavilion and the events organized around it by a group of Catholic NGOs, known at the time as international Catholic organizations (ICOs). Spanish doctors, nurses, and pharmacists took part in the first Catholic World Health Conference, debating the role of Catholics and Catholic values in modern medicine.[1] Leaders of the Spanish welfare organization, Caritas, attended the annual meeting of *Caritas Internationalis*, where they discussed the Pope's call to strengthen Catholic development work in Africa and to spread their activities beyond national borders.[2] The Universal Exposition provided Catholics, both from Spain and abroad, with the chance to share their Christian-inspired visions of the future and to debate the role of Catholics in the modern world. Their activities formed part of an influential, although often overlooked feature of the post-war international landscape: the organizations and networks pursuing a distinct model of Catholic internationalism.

As we saw in Chapter 4, the Francoist social state was conceived and presented as a project defined by Catholic values. In a pseudonymously authored article published in 1947, for example, Franco made the link between the social state and Catholic faith explicit. 'In opposition to social anarchy,' he wrote, 'Spain offers a true social State . . . [s]ocial laws inspired by the strictest Catholic orthodoxy are building up social security under a doctrine which nourishes and animates all parts of the State.'[3] The link between Catholicism and the social state reflected the National-Catholic ideology which lay at the core of the Francoist system, and the centrality of an arch-conservative Catholic faith to all sectors of the Francoist coalition, including the Falange.[4] It was also a function of the prominent role which Catholic organizations played within the Francoist health and welfare system, and the traditional dominance of the Church over social and charitable

[1] 'El gran Congreso', *¡Firmes!*, 20 (May 1958), 12–13.
[2] 'Editorial, La Caridad en Bruselas 1958', *Cáritas* (July–October 1958), 1–2.
[3] Hispanicus, 'Huelga, Justicia y Libertad', *Arriba*, 11 December 1947.
[4] Stanley G. Payne, *Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 171–205; Botti, *Cielo y dinero*; Julián Casanova, *La Iglesia de Franco* (Madrid: Temas de hoy, 2001), 282–93.

work in Spain. But as had been evident through their work in Africa and Latin America, the involvement of Spanish social experts in the Catholic events surrounding the Universal Exposition demonstrated that the idea of a Catholic-inspired Francoist social system also had an important international dimension, particularly in the context of the early Cold War.

Isolated diplomatically after 1945 and under pressure over his wartime ties with the Axis powers, Franco had boosted the role of Catholics within his cabinet, largely at the expense of the Falange. In order to sell these changes to the outside world, Franco appointed Alberto Martín Artajo as foreign minister. The head of the lay activist group Catholic Action, Martín Artajo, had been active in Catholic politics both inside and outside of Spain for decades. At a time when western European politics was dominated by Christian democratic parties, many of whose leaders were also Catholic Action members, he was able to use his international ties and reputation as a relative moderate to present Spain as a responsible, Christian member of the international community, particularly to Catholic-majority states in Europe and the Americas.[5] As the Cold War developed the regime sought to portray Franco's Spain as the 'spiritual reserve of the west', its global status resting on a combination of its anti-communist credentials and its unique adherence to Christian (Catholic) values. It was an image which aligned with contemporary ideas about the 'Abendland' or Christian west which were popular among conservative Catholic politicians elsewhere in western Europe, and which defined the Cold War west as a Christian community united by its shared history, faith and culture, and by its opposition to communism.[6] Within this context, ICOs and networks like those meeting around the Universal Exposition in 1958 provided an ideal forum for lay Spanish Catholics to promote a positive image of Franco's Spain to the global Catholic community.

Although it drew on theological ideas about the unity of mankind under God and on the supranational traditions of the Church, post-war Catholic internationalism was not a purely religious phenomenon. Rather, it represented a specific response to developments in the post-war world, building on over a century of Catholic engagement with the secular international order.[7] Since the early nineteenth century, both lay and religious Catholics had worked together in transnational networks beyond the formal structures of the Church, mobilized by

[5] Javier Tusell, *Franco y los católicos: la política interior española entre 1945 y 1957* (Madrid: Alianza, 1984); Antonio Moreno Juste, 'La política europea de los católicos españoles en los años 40 y 50', in Glicerio Sánchez Recio (ed.), *La Internacional Católica: Pax Romana en la política europea de posguerra* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2005), 175–212.

[6] Forlenza, 'The Politics of *Abendland*'. On the interwar origins of some of these ideas, see Giuliana Chamedes, 'The Vatican, Nazi-Fascism, and the Making of Transnational Anti-Communism in the 1930s', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 51, 2 (2016), 261–90.

[7] On the history of religious internationalism, including Catholic internationalism, see Viaene, 'International History, Religious History, Catholic History'; Green and Viaene, *Religious Internationals in the Modern World*; Michael G. Thompson, *For God and Globe: Christian Internationalism in the United States between the Great War and the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

political campaigns in defence of Catholic interests, or by social and humanitarian causes. The international networks of Catholic voluntary organizations which emerged during this period expanded rapidly during the 1940s and 1950s. An increasing number of international Catholic lay organizations brought together intellectuals, students, politicians, scientists, and professional groups to formulate a Catholic response to the issues facing modern society, particularly in the fields of social work and humanitarianism.[8] During the same period, Catholics played an active role in global debates around human rights and economic development, as well as the emergence of secular international organizations such as the UN and the European Communities.[9]

Many Catholics were enthusiastic advocates of post-war internationalism. But others saw secular international institutions as a threat to global Catholicism, worrying about their 'material' values, the growing emphasis on technical development, and the promotion of population and birth-control policies by organizations such as the WHO.[10] In response, they established, reinvigorated, or expanded a wide range of ICOs through which they aimed to cement Christian values at the heart of the international system. Through these organizations, they hoped to mobilize the world's Catholics against the global threat of materialism, and to strengthen Catholic influence within secular international organizations. 'Catholics also have their message to transmit to the world,' argued one Spanish visitor to the Universal Exposition. 'One must not try only to improve it, but to save it, providing the means necessary to achieve eternal happiness . . . Man today has more need of a solid moral base than of machines and technology.'[11]

Engaging with Catholic internationalism was one of the primary ways through which Franco's Spain interacted with the outside world during the immediate post-war period. Spanish intellectuals and experts were warmly welcomed within these Catholic international structures, unlike in many of their secular equivalents. The historical prestige of Spanish Catholicism, and the global Catholic mobilization in support of Francoist forces during the civil war, ensured a broad sympathy for the Franco regime amongst the global Catholic community after 1945. Although international Catholic support for the Franco regime was far from universal, it was strengthened by the emergence of the Cold War, which helped to legitimize the Francoist emphasis on Spain's Catholic and anti-communist identity. This favourable political context, combined with the intellectual and theological underpinnings of Catholic internationalism—the universality of

[8] *Los católicos en la vida internacional* (Madrid: Vicentius Tena, 1960).

[9] Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*; Giuliana Chamedes, 'The Catholic Origins of Economic Development after World War II', *French Politics, Culture and Society*, 33 (2015), 54–75; Moyn, *Christian Human Rights*.

[10] Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2008).

[11] A. Maté, 'Cáritas presente en el día de "Civitas Dei"', *Cáritas* (July–October 1958), 6–7.

mankind under God, the supranational authority of the Church, and the idea of solidarity among the global Catholic community—allowed Spanish Catholics to stake a claim for their inclusion within ICOs.

This did not mean, however, that Spanish engagement with Catholic internationalism was a purely top-down phenomenon or a mere extension of Francoist cultural diplomacy. Despite their ambiguous attitude towards the post-war international system, many Spanish Catholics were genuinely engaged with international debates. Spanish Catholic elites used international networks and events to discuss key developments in the post-war world, from human rights and the welfare state, to the process of European integration. By acting internationally they hoped both to demonstrate the unity and strength of the global Catholic community, and to maximize Catholic influence within international organizations in order to counter what they saw as the malign influence of atheists, Protestants, and communists. But they also aimed to strengthen Catholic influence within Spain itself. Lay groups such as the mass-membership Catholic Action and the elite National Catholic Association of Propagandists (*Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas*; ACNP) were anxious to maintain an autonomous 'Catholic space' within the Francoist state, despite the ideological dominance of National Catholicism.[12] They were particularly concerned with neutralizing the influence of the Falange by ensuring the dominance of Catholic institutions in key areas of social and economic life. This engagement with international affairs was dominated by members of the lay Catholic elite. But it also spread beyond those traditional groups to mass-membership professional and lay organizations, including nursing and women's groups.

This chapter examines Spanish involvement in post-war Catholic internationalism and its impact on Spanish political and social organizations. It begins by exploring the political context of Catholic internationalism in Spain through the work of the ACNP. Senior figures in the ACNP used their positions within a wide range of ICOs, from the student group Pax Romana to the peace organization Pax Christi, to promote the reputation and influence of the Franco regime among Catholics abroad. The second section uses the case study of the Spanish nursing association, Salus Infirmorum, to show how Catholic organizations helped to promote Spanish involvement in both religious and secular forms of international health. The Church's focus on social work meant that professionals in these fields were prominent in Spanish involvement with post-war Catholic internationalism. This was particularly the case in the nursing profession, where Catholics around the world were united in their often critical engagement with the work of organizations such as the WHO. The section also

[12] Francisco Sevillano Calero, 'La delimitación del "espacio católico": reflexiones y proyectos en el "Nuevo Estado" franquista, 1936–46', in Glicerio Sánchez Recio (ed.), *La Internacional Católica: Pax Romana en la política europea de posguerra* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2005), 51–74.

argues that Catholic forms of international cooperation provided Spanish women with one of the few opportunities to develop influential public roles on the world stage. Spanish nurses actively engaged in international debates about health, birth control, and the nursing profession, despite Francoist efforts to limit Spanish women to the domestic sphere. Their work highlights the ways in which Spain influenced ICOs and movements, but also how Catholic internationalism affected life in Spain.

The final section explores Spanish involvement in post-war Catholic humanitarianism. The thousands of Spanish missionaries serving around the world, many of them women working in the fields of health and education, came under increasing pressure from both the Spanish state and the Church after 1945 to professionalize their work and respond to the global interest in 'international development'. Lay welfare organizations such as Caritas formed part of international networks of Catholic organizations, providing support for victims of natural disasters and Christian refugees abroad. Their humanitarian work, however, reflected the interests and ideology of the Franco regime. International aid programmes were focussed on Catholics who were perceived to be victims of communism, and Caritas was used by the Spanish state to channel US social aid following the Pact of Madrid in 1953. Their work highlights the ambiguous position of Spain's Catholic internationalists, genuinely engaged with debates and developments in the post-war world, but firmly tied to the interests and outlook of the Franco regime.

Catholic Internationalism and the ACNP

Much of the Spanish participation in post-war Catholic internationalism revolved around the leadership of the elite Catholic group, the ACNP.[13] Their efforts were closely aligned with Francoist foreign policy. In the immediate post-war era, Spanish involvement in the Catholic student organization, Pax Romana, was used by Francoist diplomats to underline Spain's international credibility during the debates about the Franco regime at the UN. The regular series of International Catholic Conversations (*Conversaciones Católicos Internacionales*), held in San Sebastian from the late 1940s, helped to build ties between Francoist Catholic elites and their European counterparts, as well as promoting an open and

[13] On the history of the ACNP, see José Manuel Ordovas and Mercedes Montero, *Historia de la ACN de P: de la Dictadura a la Segunda República, 1923–1936* (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1993); José Manuel Ordovas and Mercedes Montero, *Historia de la ACN de P: la construcción del estado confesional, 1936–1945* (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1993); Mónica Moreno Seco, 'Los dirigentes de la ACNP entre lo religioso y lo político: Fernando Martín-Sánchez Juliá', in Glicerio Sánchez Recio (ed.), *La Internacional Católica: Pax Romana en la política europea de posguerra* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2005), 75–119; Cristina Barreiro Gordillo, *Historia de la Asociación Católica de Propagandistas: la presidencia de Fernando Martin-Sánchez Julia, 1935–1953* (Madrid: CEU Ediciones, 2010).

outward-facing image of Franco's Spain to the outside world. Following the regime's alliance with the US and entry into the UN in the mid-1950s, its increasing focus on European integration was reflected in Spanish involvement with European Catholic organizations aiming to forge a more right-wing, anti-communist alternative to the liberal Europeanism emerging from Brussels and Strasburg. Although a number of the ACNP members involved in these groups would later move towards the internal anti-Francoist opposition, during the 1940s and 1950s their international engagement did not necessarily reflect any disagreement with the regime.[14] Rather, they were driven by a Catholic-inspired commitment to international collaboration, combined with a desire to promote the interests and image of Franco's Spain on the world stage.

Formed in 1909, the ACNP brought together leading Catholic intellectuals and lay elites dedicated to the 're-Christianization' of society through the work of a select minority of lay Catholics working in the fields of politics, business, law, education, and the media. The organization played a leading role in Catholic politics and the press during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, the Second Republic, and the civil war, particularly through its control of the newspaper *El Debate*. Although a number of ACNP members were included in the first Francoist cabinets, their role was constrained during the Second World War by the power of the Falange. But the ACNP's influence was greatly enhanced after the end of the war, not least in the field of foreign policy where one of its leading members, Martín Artajo, was appointed foreign minister.[15]

At the centre of the ACNP's international engagement was Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, president of the ICO Pax Romana. Ruiz-Giménez was a senior figure within the Franco regime during the immediate post-war period, acting as one of the key conduits between the regime and the international Catholic community. During the 1930s he had been active in Catholic student politics, and after the civil war had held a senior position within the Francoist student organization, the *Sindicato Español Universitario*. He was the first director of the ICH and was appointed as ambassador to the Vatican in 1948, initiating the negotiations which would eventually result in the Concordat. In 1951 he was appointed as minister of education before being dismissed during the student protests of 1956, gradually moving towards the internal Christian democratic opposition and establishing the influential journal *Cuadernos para el Diálogo* in the 1960s.[16]

[14] Mary Vincent, 'Spain', in Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (eds), *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 97–129.

[15] Santos Juliá, 'Intelectuales católicos a la reconquista del Estado', *Ayer*, 40 (2000), 79–104.

[16] Javier Muñoz Soro, 'Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez o el católico total (apúntes para una biografía política e intelectual hasta 1964)', *Pasado y Memoria: Revista de Historia Contemporánea*, 5 (2006), 259–88.

Pax Romana had originally been founded as an international Catholic students' association in 1921, later branching into two distinct sections for students and intellectuals.[17] Although based in Freiburg, Switzerland, Spanish Catholics had always played an important role in the organization. Ruiz-Giménez had begun his involvement with the group during the 1930s. In September 1939 he attended the Pax Romana annual congress in Washington alongside Martín Artajo, where it was agreed that Zaragoza would host the subsequent conference in 1940, and where Ruiz-Giménez was appointed president.[18] The 1940 conference was postponed as a result of the war, but Ruiz-Giménez maintained contact with Catholic groups abroad throughout the conflict, attending a Catholic students' congress in Montpellier in 1942 involving students from France, Spain, and Switzerland. In 1943 he visited Rome alongside his fellow ACNP member, Alfredo Sánchez Bello, where he discussed the future of Pax Romana with Pope Pius XII, emphasizing the important role it could play in re-establishing international ties between Catholic students and intellectuals after the war.[19]

The organization was quickly reactivated after the end of the conflict. Ruiz-Giménez attended Pax Romana meetings in both Freiburg and London during 1945, reaffirming Spain's claim to host the next international conference. His efforts were successful, and the conference took place in Salamanca and El Escorial during the summer of 1946. Its scale involved considerable cost, much of it borne by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But at the height of Spain's diplomatic isolation it succeeded in drawing over 225 foreign students and intellectuals from thirty-three countries, as well as leading representatives of the Spanish Church and lay Catholic organizations.[20]

The themes of the conference were designed to emphasize the historical commitment of Spanish Catholics to international cooperation. The official topic of debate was the legacy of the Spanish Dominican scholar, Francisco de Vitoria, whose work in sixteenth-century Salamanca focussed on the nature of international society and cooperation among nations.[21] Along with figures such as Hugo Grotius, he is often cited as one of the founders of international law.[22] As such he was a well-known figure among twentieth-century internationalists and international organizations, with one of the main council chambers in Geneva's *Palais des Nations* named in his honour. As well as drawing links between secular

[17] Glicerio Sánchez Recio (ed.), *La Internacional Católica: Pax Romana en la política europea de posguerra* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2005).

[18] Barreiro Gordillo, *Historia de la Asociación Católica de Propagandistas*, 82–4.

[19] Ibid., 153–90.

[20] *XIX Congreso Mundial de Pax Romana, junio-julio 1946* (Madrid: Gráficas Reunidas, 1946).

[21] American Catholic History Research Center and University Archives (ACUA), US Conference of Catholic Bishops Office of the General Secretary, Box 156, Folder 49, 'XIX Congreso Mundial de Pax Romana'.

[22] O.P. Ramón Hernández, 'The Internationalization of Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto', *Fordham International Law Journal*, 15 (1991), 1031–59.

internationalism and the history of Catholic philosophy, the conference also discussed ways to strengthen cooperation between Catholics worldwide. In particular, it raised the plight of Catholic students from eastern Europe who had been forced to flee Soviet occupation. In Spain these calls prompted the creation of new groups and institutions to support such students, which by 1960 were funding the university studies of over 600 eastern European students in Madrid.[23]

For the Franco regime, Spain's prominent role in Pax Romana was key to its post-war foreign policy. The Martín Artajo-era Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided both practical and financial support for Spain's involvement with Pax Romana from 1945. The 1946 conference, taking place at the height of Franco's diplomatic isolation and the UN crisis, was eagerly seized upon by Spanish diplomats as evidence of Spain's international respectability. Writing to its ambassadors in June 1946 encouraging them to make use of the conference in their discussions on the UN, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that it provided a 'magnificent example of the potential of Catholic culture, and demonstrates to illustrious foreign visitors the development and energy which these studies and these principles have in our country today'.[24] Ruiz-Giménez was intimately aware of the diplomatic importance of Spain's leadership of Pax Romana. Writing to a Spanish ambassador in Latin America, he argued that the success of the 1946 congress was important 'as much from a national as a Catholic point of view, beset [as we are] in recent months by the continuous libels launched against our nation'.[25]

It was far from clear, however, that Spanish involvement in Pax Romana served to boost the prestige of the Franco regime among Catholics abroad. Even before the 1946 conference, there had been those outside of Spain who were critical of the organization's accommodation with the Franco regime. At the 1945 London meeting attended by Ruiz-Giménez, the plan to host the next conference in Spain was criticized both by French Catholics and by Spanish Basques in exile in Britain. At the 1949 Pax Romana conference in Mexico, Spanish attendees reported that leading Pax Romana figures openly criticized the regime and its isolationism.[26] These attitudes soon began to erode the support of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which as the post-war diplomatic crisis receded, was less willing to allocate scare resources to the organization. By the early 1950s, Spain's improved bilateral ties and its agreement with the US meant that Spanish diplomats were no longer as reliant on Catholic intellectuals to do their work for

[23] Matilde Eiroa San Francisco, '*Pax Romana* y los estudiantes católicos del este de Europa: solidaridad y perspectivas de futuro', in Glicerio Sánchez Recio (ed.), *La Internacional Católica: Pax Romana en la política europea de posguerra* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2005), 257–301.

[24] AGA (10)91 54/11850, Caracas Embassy, MAE circular, 26 June 1946.

[25] AGA (10)89 54/10099, Ruiz-Giménez to Montevideo Ambassador, 3 April 46.

[26] Glicerio Sánchez Recio, 'Pax Romana como vehículo de las relaciones exteriores del gobierno español, 1945–1952', in Glicerio Sánchez Recio (ed.), *La Internacional Católica: Pax Romana en la política europea de posguerra* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2005), 213–55.

them, and their interest in Pax Romana as a foreign policy tool rapidly diminished.[27] Spanish Catholics continued to play a role in Pax Romana. But 1946 represented the high point of Spanish intellectual and political engagement with the organization.

Aside from Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, the other key figure in the ACNP's international work was Carlos Santamaría. Born in the Basque Country in 1909, Santamaría trained as a mathematician and meteorologist, and prior to the civil war was active in the Basque scientific and educational communities.[28] In 1935 he was involved in the short-lived 'International Catholic Courses' held in San Sebastian, which brought together Catholic students and intellectuals from Spain and abroad to promote, among other things, debate about the nature and form of 'Catholic internationalism'.[29] In 1946 he helped to revive these courses as the International Catholic Conversations, which ran until 1959 and acted as one of the chief meeting points between Catholics from Spain and their international colleagues during the immediate post-war era. Santamaría was also closely involved with other ICOs such as the peace movement Pax Christi, and in 1950 was appointed as head of the ACNP's new Secretariat for International Relations.[30]

The International Catholic Conversations in San Sebastian aimed to bring together European Catholics to discuss the challenges posed by the post-war world.[31] The events took place every year and lasted for a week, with themes changing annually. During the late 1940s and early 1950s the Conversations focussed on the relationship of Catholics to both national states and to the newly developing international institutions, with discussions on European unity, the rights and responsibilities of individuals to the modern state, human rights, and internationalism. Attracting Catholics from over thirty countries, the majority of foreign participants in the Conversations came from France, Italy, and Belgium. A number of representatives from Latin America attended with the financial support of Ruiz-Giménez's ICH, alongside eastern European Catholics who had fled into exile in Spain following Soviet occupation. Broadly speaking, the participants were drawn from the European Catholic right. Some participants, such as the French intellectual Achille Dauphin-Meunier, had been involved with the Vichy regime or with other European collaborationist governments during the war. Others, however, belonged more clearly to the liberal, Christian democratic mainstream within post-war European Catholicism, including the Belgian theologian Jacques Leclercq and the British editor of *The Tablet*, Douglas Woodruff.[32]

[27] Ibid. [28] Archive of the ACNP, Madrid (AACNP), expediente Carlos Santamaría.

[29] Santiago Casas, 'Los Cursos Internacionales Católicos de San Sebastian, 1935', *Sancho el Sabio: Revista de Cultura e Investigación Vasca*, 35 (2012), 143–63.

[30] Juste, 'La política europea de los católicos españoles en los años 40 y 50'.

[31] Pablo López-Chaves, *Los intelectuales católicos en el franquismo. Las conversaciones católicas de San Sebastián (1947–1959)* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2016).

[32] AACNP, Box 156, 6.13, 'Conclusiones de las Conversaciones Católicas Internacionales de San Sebastián, 5–8 Sept 1947'.

The events were underpinned by a specific concept of Catholic internationalism set out by Santamaría in the official journal of the Conversations in 1949.[33] Humanity, he argued, is indivisible under Christ, and it was the duty of Catholics to ensure that unity was reflected in the temporal realm. In the modern era, nations had created 'artificial dominions of thought' which had increasingly divided the peoples of the world, including Catholics, from each other.[34] The contemporary growth of international organizations and events reflected an admirable attempt to overcome such divisions, and although it was not an easy task, it was the world's Catholics, thanks to their sense of citizenship and their consciousness of the universality of mankind, who were 'best prepared for international collaboration'.[35] For Santamaría, this collaboration needed to take the form both of international cooperation between Catholics, and active Catholic participation in secular international institutions. Embracing these forms of internationalism should not mean undermining the diversity among nations or imposing a kind of 'Catholic Kominform', but required Catholics to recognize the primacy of the 'essential' sentiment of humanity over the 'accidental' sentiment of nationality.[36] Catholic internationalism would therefore be able to forge a path between 'Marxist monism' on the one hand, which sought to destroy all natural and spiritual relations between society and the state, and 'closed nationalisms' on the other, which shut the door on 'political fraternity'.[37]

It is tempting to read into the Conversations a form of early Catholic opposition to the Franco regime, particularly as many of those involved later went on to become influential centre-right opposition figures in the 1960s and early 1970s. Perhaps inevitably, the events brought Spanish Catholics into contact with foreigners critical of the Franco regime, and with very different views about the role of the modern state from those commonly advocated in Spain. Discussions of human rights and the relationship of the individual to the state clearly risked inviting opinions critical of the Franco regime. Many of the foreign participants promoted the idea of a secular state in which the Church should play a non-political role, in direct contrast to the avowed clericalism of the Francoist state.[38] Some leading Spanish Catholics refused to attend the Conversations on account of the distrustful and reproachful atmosphere caused by political and religious disagreements between French and Spanish Catholics.[39] Articles critical of the Franco regime linked with some of the high-profile participants at San Sebastian appeared in foreign Catholic periodicals.[40] Some French participants complained directly to the organizers of the Conversations in 1947 when the Spanish

[33] Carlos Santamaría, 'Notas para un dialogo', *Documentos: Conversaciones Católicas Internacionales*, 3 (1949), 87–101.

[34] Ibid., 90–1. [35] Ibid. [36] Ibid., 97–8. [37] Ibid., 100.

[38] J.B. Manyá, 'Presencia de la Iglesia en la Europa Nueva: le *problème théologique*', *Documentos: Conversaciones Católicas Internacionales*, 3 (1949), 105–10.

[39] AACNP, Box 156, 6.13, Conversaciones Católicos Internacionales de San Sebastián, Enrique Calabia to Fernando Martin-Sanchez, 22 February 1948.

[40] AACNP, Box 156, 6.13, Carlos Santamaría to Fernando Martin Sanches, 24 April 1948.

government censored a regional Catholic Action publication which had published an article in the Basque language.[41]

The idea of the Conversations as a site of opposition should not, however, be overstated. The events were heavily funded and promoted by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministries of Education and Propaganda, and the ICH, all of which saw them as a way of promoting Spain's international reputation during the height of Franco's diplomatic isolation. In promoting their cause to government officials, the organizers of the Conversations presented them as a means to build Catholic unity in the face of 'the threat of international materialism'.[42] The organizers made efforts to predict where discussions would prove politically sensitive, and to arrange sufficient representation of conservative Spanish intellectuals and theologians to ensure that the National-Catholic view was sufficiently represented.[43] The format of the events also meant that a greater than usual range of opinion could be tolerated. Restricted to a relatively small number of Spanish and foreign intellectuals, public communication of the debates could be closely controlled by the organizers to effectively guide public opinion. Abroad, demonstrating a degree of tolerance for open discussion would help to counter allegations about the 'supposed intransigence' of the Franco regime.[44]

Indeed, the Spanish organizers and participants in the Conversations were keen to emphasize that their vision of internationalism was compatible with the National-Catholic principles of the Francoist state. Writing in 1949, for example, Carlos Santamaría framed the question of international cooperation around a Christian notion of 'humanity':

> This meaning of humanity which we defend, in no way stands in opposition to the just and authentic sense of nationality, only to that which is unjust and narrow. The motives of nationality can neither supersede those of humanity, nor be an obstacle to social and friendly coexistence with the other countries of the world. And a political ideology which doesn't attend to the absolute principles of the spirit can in no way be the cause of distance between peoples, whose social, cultural and religious communication precedes any particular political forms.[45]

For Santamaría, 'unjust' forms of nationalism risked undermining the natural unity of mankind and international cooperation between people of different countries. But far from being a criticism of Francoism or the Franco regime, his argument suggested that the spiritual and religious basis of Spanish nationalism, or at least the version promoted by Spanish Catholics, placed it firmly within the family of 'just' and 'authentic' national sentiment. This echoed the arguments used by the Franco regime in support of its membership of the UN and its place within

[41] AACNP, Box 156, 6.13, unsigned letter to Carlos Santamaría, 27 September 1948.
[42] AACNP, Box 156, 6.13, José Ángel Lizasoain to Director General de Propaganda, 18 May 1948.
[43] AACNP, Box 156, 6.13, 'Informes', 1948. [44] Ibid.
[45] 'Notas para el diálogo', *Documentos: Conversaciones Católicas Internacionales*, 3 (1949), 98.

the post-war international community. Franco's Spain, its propagandists argued, was a fundamentally Christian country governed by a political system based firmly on Catholic values and a commitment to social justice. Those who denounced it as a fascist-inspired opponent of the post-war international community were wrong. Spain was not governed by a closed and narrow form of nationalism, but by an open and outward-looking patriotism rooted in spiritual principles, and committed to international cooperation and coexistence.

The Conversations were far from the only international activity Carlos Santamaría was involved in. Over the course of the 1940s and 1950s he was an official observer at various UNESCO conferences and took part in numerous associations, events, and initiatives bringing together European Catholics.[46] Most notably, he served as the International Secretary of the Catholic peace organization, Pax Christi, which emerged under the tutelage of French and German bishops in 1950 as a forum to discuss Catholic responses to the emerging Cold War and ways to promote peace, while maintaining a firmly anti-communist stance. His involvement in these organizations and his trips abroad were partly funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for whom his wide-ranging contacts among European Catholics, his access to the key debates and decisions within that community, and his ability to act as a 'moderate' advocate of the Spanish cause proved diplomatically useful. He was appointed as the ACNP's first secretary of international affairs in 1949, and from 1950 was utilized by Martín Artajo as Spain's informal representative within international Catholic congresses and organizations.[47]

From the mid-1950s, the ACNP's international activities moved away from international organizations towards new forms of anti-communist Europeanism, reflecting the increasing European focus of Spanish foreign policy following the normalization of relations with the UN in 1955. Leading members of Catholic Action and the ACNP gained prominent roles in organizations aiming to use anti-communism, either to forge cooperation between European Catholics, or to promote a specific vision of European integration to the right of those emerging from Strasburg and Brussels. One of the first manifestations of this trend was the anti-communist organization, the Committee for the Defence of Christian Civilisation. The committee had been established by a group of former Vichy sympathizers around the French Catholic intellectual Paul Lesourd in 1947, and although its vision of Europe was substantially to the right of the Christian democratic mainstream, it attracted high-profile support from Catholic political leaders in West Germany and elsewhere, including the Belgian foreign minister Paul van Zeeland.[48] The Spanish committee formed one of the most active

[46] AACNP, Carlos Santamaría folder.
[47] AACNP, Relaciones Internacionales box, Sánchez Julia to Santamaría, 30 June 1950.
[48] AACNP, Relaciones Internacionales box, 'Comité de Defensa de la Civilización Cristiana'.

branches of the organization, led initially by Joaquin Ruiz-Giménez and his fellow propagandist Alfredo Sánchez Bella.[49] Despite its prominent circle of members and supporters, the committee was never able to develop a substantial diplomatic role other than providing a forum for informal policy discussion, and ultimately came to focus on producing and disseminating anti-communist propaganda.[50]

Alfredo Sánchez Bella also played an important role in a similar organization of more lasting significance to Francoist Europeanism, the European Centre for Documentation and Information (*Centro Europeo de Documentación e Información*; CEDI). Originally founded in Munich under the leadership of Otto von Habsburg, the organization opened a Spanish branch and moved its General Secretariat to Madrid after 1953, funded by the ICH and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[51] Like the Committee for the Defence of Christian Civilisation, it aimed to become a hub for Catholic cooperation within Europe, and to promote its vision of a conservative, 'spiritual' European community in opposition to the liberal model of economic integration offered by the EEC. Anti-communism was at the heart of its programme, with early debates focussing on how western Europe should manage relations with the USSR and its European satellites.[52] The CEDI provided an important forum for the Catholic elites around Martín Artajo's ministry to discuss European affairs with their counterparts abroad, particularly in Germany, where the CEDI attracted influential members of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union.[53] From the 1960s it also increasingly attracted French Gaullists, and remained a useful Francoist counterweight to the European activities of the anti-Francoist opposition abroad.

The centrality of ACNP elites to the Franco regime's engagement with post-war Catholic internationalism shows the extent to which Spanish Catholic internationalism was aligned with the interests of Francoist foreign policy. Although ICOs and networks often discussed ideas and deployed language alien to Francoism and National Catholicism, the involvement of Spanish Catholics did not imply or encourage opposition to the regime. However, Spanish participants trod a fine line between pursuing their religious-inspired commitment to international cooperation and trying to develop alternative networks of Catholic

[49] AACNP, Carlos Santamaría folder, 'Comité Español de Defensa de la Civilización Cristiana'.

[50] Johannes Großmann, 'The *Comité international de défense de la civilisation chrétienne* and the Transnationalization of Anti-Communist Propaganda in Western Europe after the Second World War', in Luc van Dongen, Stéphanie Roulin, and Giles Scott-Smith (eds), *Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 251–62.

[51] Petra-Maria Weber, 'El CEDI: promotor del occidente cristiano y de las relaciones hispano-alemanes de los años cincuenta', *Hispania*, 188 (1994), 1077–103; Cavallaro, *Los orígenes de la integración de España en Europa*; Zaratiegui, *Una Europa para dos Españas*, 158–60.

[52] TNA, FO 371/117864, 'Report on the fourth annual CEDI seminar', 14 June 1955.

[53] German attendees at early CEDI conferences included the Bundestag president Eugen Gerstenmaier, and his vice-president and future justice minister Richard Jaeger, who would later serve as CEDI president. See Ibid.

internationalism to the right of the Christian Democratic European mainstream which were more compatible with Francoist worldviews. Their difficulties in doing so reflected the extent to which, despite the rhetoric of Spain as the 'spiritual reserve of the west', Franco's Spain was semi-detached from the realities of post-war international Catholicism.

Salus Infirmorum and International Nursing

Spanish Catholic internationalism, was not, however, confined to political elites. It also had an important social dimension, with Spanish experts engaging particularly enthusiastically with emerging forms of Catholic international health. Their involvement spanned the range of medical disciplines, from doctors and psychologists to medical researchers and students. It was most pronounced, however, in the field of nursing. At the forefront of this international engagement was María de Madariaga, the founder and president of Spain's Catholic nursing association, Salus Infirmorum. For Madariaga and her colleagues, the need to act internationally was an unavoidable response to the increasingly globalized post-war world. This did not mean that they viewed the international arena in a positive light. Indeed, they regarded post-war international institutions, particularly the UN and the WHO, as threatening tools of anti-Catholic materialism, devoid of spiritual values, and bent on spreading dangerous and damaging practices across the globe. Catholics, they believed, needed to respond to this threat by uniting both within and across national boundaries to ensure their voices were heard, and to fight for representation within secular international bodies in order to promote Catholic values from the inside.

Salus Infirmorum's leaders shared these goals with the international Catholic nursing body, CICIAMS (International Catholic Committee of Nurses and Medico-Social Assistants; *Comité International Catholique des Infirmières et Assistantes Médico-Sociales*), in which they played a leading role in the immediate post-war era. Their work was supported by the Franco regime and by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Spanish nurses on the international stage saw themselves as representatives both of the Francoist state and of the Spanish nation. Acting internationally, however, also provided these nurses with the opportunity to promote the position of the Church, and their own status as professional women, within Spain. Their high profile and much publicized work on the world stage helped to raise the profile of Catholic medical associations at the expense of their rivals, primarily the Women's Section of the Falange, and provided a rare opportunity to develop high-profile, autonomous careers within a society where women's professional freedom was severely restricted. As time went on, it also increasingly provided a platform for nurses to criticize, even if only obliquely, the policies of the Franco regime.

Madariaga had first set up a nurses' movement within the female youth wing of Catholic Action in 1935. During the war she had worked as inspector of hospitals in the rebel zone.[54] In 1941 she was asked by the archbishop of Madrid to establish a new Catholic nursing organization, and founded Salus Infirmorum the following year, bringing together representatives of nurses working within the military health corps, the Red Cross, the Falangist welfare organization *18 de julio*, and the Spanish rail operator RENFE. The organization ran its own network of urban health clinics (*dispensarios*) and provided nursing training courses. During the 1940s and early 1950s it established over thirty clinics in parishes across Madrid, primarily in the poorer working-class suburbs where state health services were almost entirely absent. Its first nursing school was established in Madrid in 1942 under the leadership of Gregorio Marañón, with additional schools set up in Cadiz in 1952 and Tangier in 1953, later spreading across Spain in the 1960s.[55] In addition to technical training and work placements, SI schools emphasized the religious and moral education of nurses, and insisted that recruits provide evidence of their religious faith and education, their good standing within the Church, and their ongoing behaviour and deportment.[56] The organization aimed to recruit nurses from across the Spanish health system, and by the early 1950s was widely represented within all branches of the fragmented Spanish nursing profession.[57]

Despite the partial international isolation of the Spanish government and Spanish health profession, Madariaga and Salus Infirmorum were deeply involved in international Catholic nursing after 1945. Madariaga had personal experience with Catholic lay internationalism through her pre-war involvement with the International Union of Catholic Women's Leagues and the International Council of Catholic Action.[58] Salus Infirmorum's international work was channelled through CICIAMS, which had originally been established in Lourdes in 1933.[59] Salus Infirmorum was incorporated into the organization at the first post-war conference held in 1947, and Madariaga was appointed vice-president of the 1950

[54] Francisco Glicerio Conde Mora, *Dª María de Madariaga y Alonso (1908–2001): Fundadora de Salus Infirmorum* (Cadiz: Salus Infirmorum, 2008), 44–8.

[55] Ibid., 52–60. [56] Ibid., 54–5.

[57] SI was, however, conceived as an association of *lay* Catholic nurses and as such did not aim to incorporate the many religious sisters involved in Spanish nursing associated with religious orders such as the *Siervas de María* and the *Hijas de Caridad*. Religious nurses were represented by the *Asociación de Religiosas Auxiliares Sanitarias* and the *Federación Española de Religiosas Sanitarias*. Despite this, there were a number of religious sisters within the SI leadership, and many religious nurses trained at SI schools. See Francisco Glicerio Conde Mora, Alonso Núñez Núñez, and Mercedes Almagro Villar, '"In Omnibus Caritas": la sanidad al servicio de la caridad en Salus Infirmorum', *Un siglo cuidando a la sociedad: centenario del reconocimiento oficial de la enfermería en España* (Santander: Colegio Oficial de Enfermería de Cantabria, 2015), 341–3.

[58] Inmaculada Blasco, *Paradojas de la ortodoxia: política de masas y militancia católica femenina en España, 1919–1939* (Zaragoza: Prensa Universitaria Zaragoza, 2003), 257–8.

[59] *CICIAMS News: Bulletin of the International Catholic Committee for Nurses and Medico-Social Assistants*, 2 (1983), 7.

conference in Rome.[60] In 1958 she was elected as head of the CICIAMS permanent commission on professional ethics and played a prominent role in the 1962 conference, leading the committee's work on professional ethics and domiciliary care. Her involvement with the organization stretched well into the 1970s, alongside that of her colleagues within the Salus Infirmorum leadership and that of its sister organization, the *Federación Española de Religiosas Sanitarias*. In addition to these formal roles, Madariaga developed a wide range of international experience, touring Latin America and studying in the US during the late 1940s.[61]

But the engagement of Salus Infirmorum with international Catholic nursing, and with Catholic internationalism more generally, extended well beyond the personal efforts of Madariaga. The group set up a dedicated foreign affairs service in the late 1940s to coordinate its relationship with international and foreign nursing associations, and to disseminate knowledge of these links throughout their ranks.[62] Large groups of Salus Infirmorum nurses regularly attended international nursing conferences and worked with international health and nursing organizations, both Catholic groups such as CICIAMS and secular ones such as the International Council of Nurses (ICN) and the WHO. Its quarterly journal contained regular reports on international developments and the involvement of Spanish nurses in international conferences and organizations. Both the *Salus Infirmorum* journal and the SI leadership actively encouraged its nurses to study and work abroad, promoting scholarship opportunities to foreign institutions and providing information and support for nurses travelling to work as lay missionaries in Latin America and Africa.[63] Latin America was central to the organization's international activity, with Madariaga's role as international vice-president linked to the specific goal of promoting the work of CICIAMS and supporting Catholic nursing associations across the continent. In 1950, Salus Infirmorum established a dedicated Hispano-American Committee to pursue this goal, which became the coordinating body for CICIAMS activity in Latin America and which successfully encouraged the foundation and affiliation of Catholic nursing associations in a number of states.[64]

The degree to which Salus Infirmorum nurses actively engaged with international health went far beyond that of other Spanish medical organizations prior to the mid-1950s. Their willingness to transcend Spain's cultural and scientific isolation reflected their awareness of the extent to which the post-war

[60] M.T. Miralles Sangro, E. Garre Murúa, M.F. Casas Martínez, T. Ruiz Ureña, and P. González Villanueva, 'Historia de la Escuela de Enfermeras "Salus Infirmorum" de Madrid', *Cultura de Cuidados*, 1 (1997), 15–20.

[61] Conde Mora, *Dª María de Madariaga y Alonso*, 56–62.

[62] *Cuarta Asamblea de la Hermandad de Enfermeras y Asistencia Médico-Social 'Salus Infirmorum'* (Madrid: Publicaciones 'Al Servicio de España y del Niño Español', 1950), 26–30.

[63] See for example Carmen García Victoria, 'Organizaciones Internacionales', *¡Firmes!* (12 October 1955), 6–10.

[64] *Cuarta Asamblea*, 29–30.

world was being shaped by new forms of secular international cooperation. In 1951 the Salus Infirmorum foreign secretary, María Rosa Cardenal, published an article in the organization's journal introducing and comparing the work of CICIAMS and the secular ICN, part of an attempt, as she described it, to give all of Spain's nurses 'a clear idea of the importance that the international world [sic] has'. 'At the present time,' she argued, 'everything is related to the international level [*todas las cosas se tratan sobre el plano internacional*], and our profession is no exception to this worldwide law.'[65] Cardenal's deputy, Mari-Trini Gutiérrez, told Salus Infirmorum nurses at their 1950 conference that 'the fact of the immense importance of international agreements brings with it the necessity for Catholics to be present within international associations'.[66] Acting internationally was, in this view, not necessarily something intrinsically positive, but was a necessary response to the modern world shaped so obviously by the forces of globalization and secular internationalism.

Indeed, the specifically Catholic forms of international associationism practised by Salus Infirmorum and its nurses were at least in part a response to the perceived *threat* of post-war internationalism. The desire to unite with Catholic nurses abroad was underpinned, or at least justified, by traditional ideas of the universality of the Catholic faith, the unity of mankind under God, and the apostolic duty to spread the word of God to all corners of the world. These ideas, however, were combined with a sense that modern societies, and particularly the international organizations and networks which played an increasingly prominent role in them, were dominated by ideas and values inimical to the Catholic faith. For many leading Salus Infirmorum nurses, these impressions drew on the history and rhetoric of the Spanish Civil War, and on fears about the supposed global threat of atheism, communism, and materialism. In her report on the annual CICIAMS conference in Amsterdam in 1949, María Rosa Cardenal warned of 'the danger of freemasonry which dominates the world' and the increasing global influence of Protestantism.[67] A report on the 1951 CICIAMS conference in Rome published in the *Salus Infirmorum* journal described the need for Catholics of the world to unite 'in the face of the wave of materialism which threatens to engulf everything'.[68]

Global anti-Catholic forces, according to this view, were gaining power and influence through their domination of the international organizations. At the fourth Salus Infirmorum assembly in Madrid in 1950, the Chilean nurse Veronica de la Fuente described to her Spanish colleagues the plight of Catholics in Latin America, increasingly surrounded by 'freemasonry, Protestantism . . . materialism,

[65] María Rosa Cardenal, 'CICIAMS y la ICN', *Salus Infirmorum*, 16 (1951), 16.
[66] *Cuarta Asamblea*, 27.
[67] María Rosa Cardenal, 'Impresiones del Congreso Internacional de Enfermeras y Asistentas médico-sociales en Amsterdam', *Salus Infirmorum*, 9 (1949), 23.
[68] *Salus Infirmorum*, 15 (1951), 29.

American modernism and, to finish with the "isms", atheistic Communism'.[69] These ideologies, she argued, gained force from the willingness of their adherents to unite on both national and global scales. 'We are in the century of the "Popular Fronts", of the Trade Unions, Cooperativism, Leagues, Federations, etc. The whole world and all of mankind looks to unite to defend its rights and achieve financial and political benefits.'[70] In response to the growth of these forms of anti-religious internationalism, she argued, it was the duty of Catholics to come together in the same way and to unify in the fight to defend their faith and their values.

This political hostility towards modern forms of internationalism was combined with specific fears about developments in international health and medicine. Catholics, both in Spain and elsewhere, felt that the post-war focus on *technical* solutions to international problems ran counter to Christian approaches which prioritized the individual, and which focussed on spiritual as well as material development. In 1955 the national secretary of Salus Infirmorum, Carmen García Victoria, reiterating the need for her members to stay informed about international developments in their profession given that 'life today takes place more and more . . . on the international level', lamented that in many cases international problems related to welfare, health, children, and education were 'studied from the economic and scientific point of view, but not from the moral or religious'. These concerns reflected wider fears that, even within Spain itself, the trend towards collective and state-led forms of medicine were undermining the focus on the spiritual and material well-being of the individual and the relationship between individual patient and care giver.[71] On the international stage, where Catholic principles held less sway, Salus Infirmorum nurses and other Catholic medical bodies feared that health and welfare programmes were focussing exclusively on materialistic and technical solutions anathema to religious, and particularly Catholic, values.[72]

Both for Salus Infirmorum nurses and for much of the global Catholic community, these concerns crystallized around specific fears regarding the activities and attitude of the newly formed WHO. In part these were general fears based on the relative weakness of Catholic states within the organization and the lack of specific Catholic representation within its affiliated bodies. The result of this absence, according to the Salus Infirmorum vice-secretary of foreign relations, Mari-Trini Gutierrez Santiago, was that the WHO was pursuing its goals in a 'negative antireligious way'.[73] For the CICIAMS leadership, the WHO's

[69] *Cuarta Asamblea*, 34–5. [70] Ibid., 35–6.

[71] 'Resumen de la Conferencia pronunciada por el profesor Beniamino de María en el "Angelicum" del día 7 de septiembre: orientaciones de la medicina social con respeto a la persona humana', *Salus Infirmorum*, 14 (1950), 16–18.

[72] See for example María Rosa Cardenal, 'Impresiones del Congreso Internacional de Enfermeras y Asistentas médico-sociales en Amsterdam', *Salus Infirmorum*, 9 (1949), 19–27.

[73] *Cuarta Asamblea*, 26.

conception of nursing was 'too materialist', and it needed to be reminded that 'man is composed of body and soul, and only by attending to both can the nurse fulfil her mission'.[74]

On a more concrete level, their concerns focussed on the advocacy of birth control as a means to limit population size. Leading figures within the WHO, including the organization's director general Brock Chisholm, advocated birth control to deal with what they perceived to be a global population crisis. During the early 1950s, a fierce debate raged between those who wanted to develop WHO birth-control programmes in countries such as India which were worried about population size, and the Catholic Church and Catholic-majority states which opposed the promotion of birth-control measures.[75] Salus Infirmorum nurses denounced the proposed WHO measures as 'eugenics' and 'euthanasia', and argued that they stemmed from an organization in which scientific and technical solutions to social problems were pursued without sufficient concern for moral and religious principles.[76]

Rather than turn their back on 'antireligious' forms of international health, however, the response of Catholics both in Spain and abroad was to actively seek ways of influencing their policies from within. Leading ICOs in the US, Europe, and Latin America led a concerted campaign to secure WHO recognition for CICIAMS during the late 1940s and early 1950s, to the extent that the issue became a proxy for the wider struggle between the WHO and the global Catholic community.[77] The rules governing the affiliation of NGOs were not clarified until the early 1950s. When CICIAMS lobbied for admission after 1946 they were rejected on the grounds that there should only be one affiliated group for each medical profession, and that nurses were represented by the 'neutral' ICN.[78] Although CICIAMS was an active member of the ICN executive board, its relationship with its secular counterpart was complicated, with CICIAMS members consistently lobbying the organization to adopt a more spiritual and religious approach to nursing, particularly in relation to the issue of birth control. In response to the WHO's rejection, CICIAMS argued that 'neutral' organizations such as the ICN only concerned themselves with professional and technical questions, and were therefore unable to represent the moral and humanitarian principles of the Catholic nursing community.[79] In private the CICIAMS

[74] 'CICIAMS', *!Firmes!*, 15 (July 1956), 19.

[75] Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 146–53. On the WHO's post-war approach to birth control and to 'technical' solutions in India and south-east Asia, see Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health*.

[76] Carmen García Victoria, 'El Congreso Mundial del Apostolado Seglar, en Roma', *Salus Infirmorum*, 19 (December 1951), 20–1; 'Representativas de quince Gobiernos católicos se oponen al control de la natalidad en la V Asamblea de la Salud', *Salus Infirmorum*, 21 (June 1952), 21.

[77] ACUA, US Conference of Catholic Bishops Office of the General Secretary, Series 1, Box 56, Folders 19 and 20.

[78] María Rosa Cardenal, 'Impresiones del Congreso Internacional de Enfermeras y Asistentas médico-sociales en Amsterdam, *Salus Infirmorum*, 9 (1949), 22–3.

[79] Ibid.

leadership suspected a specifically anti-Catholic bias, with the organization's president arguing that the WHO 'feared too much Catholic influence'.[80] Eventually the WHO changed its rules, accepting the plurality of representation for each sector, and admitted CICIAMS as an affiliate in January 1954, after which its officials were able to attend World Health Assemblies and take part in expert committees.

These efforts to establish Catholic influence and values at the heart of international health mirrored the domestic priorities of Spain's Catholic nurses. Nurses were expected to contribute, with the full support of the Church, to the Francoist mission to 're-Christianize' the Spanish medical profession.[81] They were also central to the regime's pro-natalist policies through their involvement in mother and infant health programmes. Through their roles as visiting nurses and their work in rural areas or poor urban suburbs they were able to influence the private and family lives of large sections of the population.[82] New legislation concerning the training of nurses mandated a greater focus on religious and moral instruction. Reflecting these priorities, Salus Infirmorum promoted a religiously informed model of nursing training, and worked to ensure that new entrants to the profession demonstrated a sufficient commitment to the Catholic faith and the life of the Church.[83] The organization was able to pursue similar goals on the international stage. Salus Infirmorum leaders, for example, lobbied the WHO and the ICN to reject birth-control policies through their involvement with CICIAMS. Madariaga's role as chair of the CICIAMS professional ethics committee enabled her to draw up new international codes of conduct for Catholic nurses informed by her organization's work in Spain and the ideas of Spanish theologians.[84] Within international Catholic medical associations, Spanish nurses were able to pursue the same aims as they were domestically, promoting their conception of Catholic nursing beyond Spain's borders.

Efforts to promote Spanish models of nursing abroad reflected the extent to which Salus Infirmorum nurses saw their work on the world stage in national and patriotic terms, a way to promote the reputation of the Spanish nation and the Francoist state to the outside world. Calls from the Salus Infirmorum leadership for nurses to participate in international activities were combined with reminders about Spain's identity as a uniquely Catholic state, indeed as 'the Catholic country *par excellence*', both in terms of the faith of its people and of the

[80] Ibid.

[81] Josep Bernabeu Mestre and Encarna Gascón Pérez, *Historia de la enfermería de salud pública en España, 1860–1977* (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1999), 103–4.

[82] María Eugenia Galiana-Sánchez, Josep Bernabeu-Mestre, and María Pilar García-Paramio, 'Nurses for a New Fatherland: Gender and Ideology in the Health Policies of the Early Franco Regime in Spain (1938–1942)', *Women's History Magazine*, 68 (2012), 33–41; Nash, 'Pronatalism and Motherhood in Franco's Spain'.

[83] Miralles Sangro et al., 'Historia de la Escuela de Enfermeras "Salus Infirmorum" de Madrid'.

[84] Conde Mora, *Dª María de Madariaga y Alonso*, 62.

self-proclaimed Catholic identity of its government.[85] Spanish nurses on the world stage embodied Franco's discourse of Cold War-era Spain as the 'spiritual reserve of the west'. Whereas foreign Catholic nursing associations often represented only a small part of their national nursing communities, excluding their Protestant or secular colleagues, the Spanish nursing community was, at least in the eyes of the Salus Infirmorum leadership, 100 per cent Catholic and uniquely committed to practising its profession in accordance with its faith. As a result, descriptions of international congresses, meetings, and organizations were interspersed with patriotic exhortations to ensure that Spain was not left isolated on the international stage, and to demonstrate the faith and glory of the Spanish nation through the commitment and dedication of its nursing profession.[86]

This patriotic self-assertion on the part of the Salus Infirmorum leadership was actively supported by the Spanish state as part of its attempts to ameliorate Spain's post-war isolation. Madariaga had a close personal relationship with the foreign minister Martín Artajo, with whom she shared a background in Catholic Action.[87] The role of Salus Infirmorum in international nursing was of particular interest to those groups working to improve Spain's ties with Latin America. Madariaga's various trips to the region were supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ICH. The director of the ICH, Joaquin Ruiz-Giménez, closely followed Madariaga's successful struggle to position herself as the conduit for CICIAMS expansion to Latin America, in which Spain's claim to a special relationship with the region based on ties of *hispanidad* was challenged by French arguments that a shared *Latin* history and identity gave them a greater claim to the role than Spain. Writing to the Spanish ambassador in Uruguay prior to Madariaga's visit in 1949, he lauded the benefits of a new network of Latin American Catholic nursing associations under Spanish tutelage to Spain's diplomatic work in the region.[88] For the Franco regime, international Catholic nursing represented another useful tool of post-war cultural diplomacy.

But as well as promoting the interests and reputation of the Franco regime abroad, international nursing also provided Spain's Catholic nurses with the opportunity to buttress their domestic position vis-à-vis rival Falangist and state-led nursing associations. María de Madariaga was particularly keen to ensure that Spain's overwhelmingly Catholic nursing community was represented by Salus Infirmorum rather than rival groups such as the Women's Section of the Falange. In this she was supported by the Pope and the Vatican hierarchy, which made continuous calls during the 1940s and 1950s for Catholic medical

[85] 'CICIAMS', *¡Firmes!*, 15 (1956), 19.
[86] See for example 'El gran Congreso', *¡Firmes!*, 20 (May 1958), 12–13.
[87] Conde Mora, *Dª María de Madariaga y Alonso*, 82.
[88] AGA (10)89 54/10098, Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez to Montevideo ambassador, 9 August 1949.

professionals to join Catholic, rather than secular, professional groups.[89] For Madariaga, Spain's identity as an overtly Catholic state did nothing to diminish the relevance of this message. Addressing the issue in 1956, she argued that:

> The existence of state organisations is not enough, however authentically Catholic the nation. In our case, with professional sanitary organisations, even when all the members are Catholics and even when these professional state organisations have, as in many cases, sections dedicated to defending religious and moral rights. It's not enough, we insist. The Pope promotes, insists and urges the organisation and vigorous existence of professional associations of the Church.[90]

Despite the overtly Catholic identity and values of secular Spanish nursing groups such as the Red Cross and the Falange's Women's Section, Madariaga and the Salus Infirmorum leadership saw their organization as the only *true* representative of Catholic nursing. The active participation of all Catholic nurses in both national and international associations was, Salus Infirmorum leaders argued, vital to ensure that they were strong enough to resist the materialist forces which beset modern society.

As well as helping to promote their interests as Catholics, international nursing also provided an opportunity for Salus Infirmorum members to develop the kind of autonomous, high-profile public roles generally denied to women in Franco's Spain. One of the priorities of Francoist social policy was to reverse the reforms of the Second Republic which had granted women greater freedoms in family, educational, and professional life, and which had seen women developing an increasingly public role. For the regime, the primary role of women was child birth and child rearing, and while young unmarried women could pursue careers relatively freely, it was expected, at least for 'respectable' middle-class women, that professional ambitions would be subordinated to their duties as wives and mothers.[91] Nurses played an important part in enforcing these expectations through their work in the field of infant and maternal health and their roles as visiting nurses. Paradoxically, however, nursing was one of the few professions in which women were able to forge prominent and influential careers. In many cases, senior figures within professional bodies such as Salus Infirmorum were able to develop influential roles precisely because they remained unmarried, acting in direct contravention of the principles their organizations espoused, but using the freedom this granted them to pursue successful careers. Leading nurses such as María de Madariaga, much like the powerful leader of the Falange's Women's

[89] See for example the call from Dutch bishops urging Catholics not to join the Rotary Club in 1930. 'Orbis Terrarum', *The Tablet*, 16 August 1930, 23.

[90] María de Madariaga, 'La Gran Consignia', *¡Firmes!*, 15 (1956), 5.

[91] Blasco, *Paradojas de la ortodoxia*, 312–22.

Section, Pilar Primo de Rivera, used the freedom available to them as unmarried women to develop highly political and public roles.[92]

Engaging with international nursing and international health provided further opportunities for Salus Infirmorum leaders to develop their careers and engage in the kind of high-profile work which would have been impossible in other areas of public life. Catholic nurses taking part in international congresses and organizations described their activities in quasi-diplomatic terms, emphasizing the unusual level of responsibility they carried on such occasions. 'Representing Spain at an international conference,' wrote one Salus Infirmorum nurse attending the International Congress on the Protection of Infancy in Stockholm in 1948, 'is a delicate mission for a woman . . . [but] my fear of impotency in the face of my mission disappeared in the atmosphere of understanding and consideration towards my country.'[93] Accounts of Spanish nurses on the international stage often deployed the language of militarized, masculine heroism to describe their exploits. When María de Madariaga undertook a tour of Latin America in 1954 to encourage the formation of Catholic nursing associations across the region, the *Salus Infirmorum* journal described her role in the language of the *conquistadors*, 'passing her days and her nights pondering the way to conquer the entire world for Christ and for Spain'.[94] By taking part in these international activities, Spanish nurses were engaging in work that was both politically and professionally prestigious, and were able to use female forms of associationism as a route into the male-dominated arena of international health.

The paradox of these autonomous and influential female roles lay in their implied defiance of Francoist restrictions on public activity for Spanish women. International engagement, however, also provided Spanish nurses with opportunities for more explicit criticisms of government policy. In the immediate post-war period such criticism was limited, subsumed within the general patriotic fervour surrounding any Spanish involvement in international activity during the height of the regime's diplomatic isolation. Even during this period, however, accounts of international congresses and organizations provided an opportunity to express ideas which ran counter to approved Francoist policy. Reporting on a debate about housing policy at an international conference on infancy in 1948, for example, the Salus Infirmorum nurses Milagros Cespedes set out the advantages of collective over individual housing for mothers, partly on the grounds that the more convenient location of shops and services allowed them more time to

[92] On the public role of the Sección Femenina during the period, see María Teresa Gallego Méndez, *Mujer, falange y franquismo* (Madrid: Taurus, 1983); Kathleen Richmond, *Women and Spanish Fascism: The Women's Section of the Falange, 1934–1959* (London: Routledge, 2003).

[93] Milagros Cespedes, 'España en el Congreso Internacional de Protección a la Infancia', *Salus Infirmorum*, 7 (1948), 27–8.

[94] 'María de Madariaga visita varios países de la América Latina', *¡Firmes!*, 7 (1954), 7.

undertake paid work outside of the home.[95] Whilst such salaried work was extremely common for mothers in the poor urban suburbs in which Salus Infirmorum nurses operated, it ran entirely counter to Francoist social policy and discourse around motherhood, and it was rare to find its benefits explicitly outlined in such a way during the period. In this case the policy could be openly expressed as an apparently neutral report on the proceedings of an international conference, legitimized by the prestige which Spanish participation in such forums enjoyed. In this way, international developments in the fields of health and social policy could be disseminated within Spain despite their incompatibility with Francoist ideology.

Like the international work of ANCP members, however, the involvement in Spanish health professionals in post-war Catholic internationalism should not be seen as a form of pseudo-opposition, nor the embrace of the 'international' as a rejection of an inward-looking national regime. Although more overt forms of opposition began to appear in international forums from the mid-1960s, during the 1940s and 1950s Spain's nurses harnessed the idea of a global community of Catholics to oppose the apparently threatening, anti-Christian developments within secular international health organizations. The struggle to 're-Christianize' Spanish medicine, promote the family, and develop a form of modern health care based on Catholic values could be transposed almost wholesale onto the world stage, and pursued within an environment free from the criticism and hostility Spanish experts faced within non-Catholic international organizations.

Catholic Humanitarianism

Alongside these forms of Catholic international health, the immediate post-war era also witnessed the rapid development of new forms of Catholic humanitarianism. In response to the increasing global interest in the language and ideas of 'international development', Catholics around the world began to discuss what economic and social development meant from a Catholic perspective, particularly in relation to the 'Third World'.[96] French Catholic intellectuals, for example, promoted their own models of economic development for colonial and postcolonial African states.[97] Catholic missionaries struggled to reconcile traditional, charitable conceptions of missionary work with the ideas of those who saw the 'mission countries' as sites to promote new, modern models of Catholic

[95] Milagros Cespedes, 'España en el Congreso Internacional de Protección a la Infancia', *Salus Infirmorum*, 7 (1948), 27–8.

[96] On the history of international development during the early Cold War, see Amy L.S. Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food And Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Have Changed the World, 1945–1965* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006).

[97] Chamedes, 'The Catholic Origins of Economic Development after World War II'.

development, presented as another 'third way' between communist and capitalist materialism.[98] Much of this debate was driven by the expanding ranks of lay Catholic organizations, known at the time as ICOs, operating in the fields of health, welfare, and humanitarianism.[99]

These developments were both driven by, and reflected within, the Vatican and the Church hierarchy. Even before the Second Vatican Council emphasized the global social mission of the Church and of lay Catholics in the early 1960s, the Vatican had been attempting to grapple with the challenges posed by post-war internationalism, the Cold War, and decolonization.[100] Pope Pius XII had regularly addressed the issues of Catholic participation in international organizations and international development from the end of the Second World War. In 1957 the Papal encyclical *Fidei Donum* called on the global Catholic community to focus its attention on Africa, and to support the work of both religious and lay missionaries in promoting spiritual and material development across the continent.[101] The encyclical was prompted both by increasing levels of nationalist agitation in the colonial African states and by Cold War fears about the spread of communism within the continent. It became one of the main discussion points for Catholics meeting at the Universal Exposition in Brussels the following year, including those from Spain.[102]

Spanish Catholics were intensively involved in these debates and were heavily influenced by trends within the international Catholic community. The thousands of Spanish missionaries serving around the world were becoming increasingly professionalized, encouraged to develop the technical skills necessary to shape the social conditions of the countries they lived in, and thus moving beyond their traditional evangelizing roles. Missionary work was also expanding beyond religious communities to include lay Catholics volunteering to serve abroad for limited periods of time, often bringing with them professional skills and experience in the fields of health and education. Catholic welfare organizations such as Caritas were inspired and shaped by the work of similar groups abroad, and formed part of wider ICOs and networks. At the same time, however, Spanish involvement in these forms of Catholic humanitarianism was unique in many respects, shaped by the direct influence of the Franco regime and by the context of Spain's position in the post-war world. Spanish missionaries were appropriated as

[98] Charlotte Walker-Said, 'Science and Charity: Rival Catholic Visions for Humanitarian Practice at the End of French Rule in Cameroon', *French Politics, Culture and Society*, 33 (2015), 33–54.

[99] *Los católicos en la vida internacional.*

[100] 'Degree on the Apostolate of the Laity, *Apostolicam Actuositatem*, Solemnly Promulgated by His Holiness Pope Paul VI on November 18, 1965', http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19651118_apostolicam-actuositatem_en.html (accessed 11 January 2016).

[101] '*Fidei Donum*: On the Present Condition of the Catholic Missions, Especially In Africa', 21 April 1957, http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_21041957_fidei-donum.html (accessed 11 January 2016).

[102] A. Maté, 'Cáritas presente en el día de "Civitas Dei"', *Cáritas* (July–October 1958), 5–11.

a tool of Francoist foreign policy, used to bolster Spain's international reputation and to pursue its cultural diplomacy, while Spanish Catholic welfare organizations focussed on forms of anti-communist humanitarianism which were closely aligned with the policies and discourse of the regime.

For Spanish Catholics, the modern, secular language of humanitarianism and development was inseparable from the history and practice of Spanish missionaries who had been engaged in health and educational work across the globe since the fifteenth century. Precise figures are hard to come by, but missionaries were by far the largest group of Spaniards involved in any kind of international welfare and humanitarianism during the immediate post-war period. In 1962 the Spanish government estimated that there were more than 26,000 Spanish missionaries working around the world, of whom nearly 16,000 were women.[103] Over 17,000 Spanish missionaries were based in Latin America, but large numbers also worked in Africa and Asia. Not all these missionaries were involved in providing social and welfare services. Of those that were, the majority worked in the field of education, running missionary schools and colleges. But a significant number were involved in the running of missionary medical services, particularly female missionaries working as nurses. Spanish missionaries ran hospitals, clinics, and maternity units in Bolivia, Brazil, the Philippines, and India, as well as in the African colonies of Spanish Morocco and Spanish Guinea.[104]

From the late 1940s, both secular and religious organizations in Spain became increasingly interested in professionalizing missionary work. This was particularly the case in the field of health, where missionary nurses were often required to carry out a broad range of medical tasks without the professional training required to meet the technical demands of modern medical practice. From 1949 the Spanish Council of Missions (*Consejo de Misiones*) began to fund medical training for missionaries, first at the University of Salamanca and later at the newly formed Spanish School of Medicine for Missionaries in Madrid. Their courses provided both theoretical and practical training for prospective missionaries, 90 per cent of whom were women, who would be responsible for both diagnostics and treatment in missionary facilities which lacked qualified doctors. These efforts were combined with similar schemes organized by the Church, the Order of Malta in Barcelona, and by Salus Infirmorum, and represented a concerted effort to improve the professionalism and quality of missionary health care.[105] The effects should not be exaggerated, however. By 1956 only ninety missionaries had graduated from the school in Madrid, and the total number of missionaries

[103] *España misionera: catálogo de las misiones y de los misioneros españoles* (Madrid: Ediciones España Misionera, 1962), 3.

[104] Ibid., 167–214.

[105] Ibid., 405–10; Enrique Pelach, 'La Medicina en el Apostolado Misionero', *Misiones Extranjeros*, 2, 7 (January–June, 1951), 36–44; Mercedes de Porras–Isla 'Cursillo de Formación Misionera', *Salus Infirmorum*, 1, 17 (June 1951), 4.

attending these courses represented only a small fraction of those providing medical services abroad.[106]

These processes of professionalization were also driven by Spanish lay missionaries who were increasingly volunteering to spend periods of time working in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Many of these lay volunteers were nurses whose professional skills were much in demand among overseas missions. The work of lay missionaries was actively promoted by both Salus Infirmorum and by the Church. Salus Infirmorum established a dedicated missionaries' department in the early 1950s, which coordinated the organization's missionary training work and requests from foreign missions for volunteer nurses.[107] During the 1950s its nurses volunteered as lay missionaries in Rhodesia, Indonesia, and various Latin American countries. In 1957 the Church hierarchy also established a body to encourage lay Spanish volunteers to work in Latin America, with placements coordinated by local bishops. Volunteers, the vast majority of whom were women, underwent three months of initial training and were recruited in part for their existing professional skills. Although many worked in education, a large proportion of volunteers were nurses, medical assistants, and doctors.[108] These developments were both inspired and actively encouraged by the Vatican. During the 1950s the Pope explicitly promoted the role of lay missionaries, particularly female assistants working in the fields of health and education, in fostering economic, social, and spiritual development around the world. It was his address to the Second World Congress of the Lay Apostolate in October 1957, for example, which prompted Spanish bishops to encourage lay missionary volunteers to Latin America.[109]

The professionalization and expansion of missionary work was also encouraged by the Franco regime, which saw missionaries as a tool of foreign policy. The relationship between Spanish missionaries and the Spanish state underwent significant changes after the civil war. The Franco regime increasingly attempted to coordinate and control missionary activity, and to co-opt it as a semi-official form of cultural diplomacy. The Council of Missions, which was instrumental in introducing professional training programmes for Spanish missionaries, had been established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1940. Its role was to coordinate state support and monitoring of missionaries abroad.

The ministerial order announcing the council's foundation was clear as to the political importance of missionary activity:

[106] *España Misionera*, 9, 51 (July–September 1956), 263.

[107] Mercedes de Porras–Isla 'Cursillo de Formación Misionera', *Salus Infirmorum*, 1, 17 (June 1951), 4. See also the various articles on missionaries and tropical medicine in *Salus Infirmorum*, 1951–6.

[108] 'Obra de Cooperación Apostólico Seglar Hispano-Americano (OCASHA)', *Cáritas*, 59 (July–August 1954), 10–11.

[109] *Salus Infirmorum*, 2, 6 (June 1954), 27; Pius XII, *Guiding Principles of the Lay Apostolate: Address of His Holiness Pope Pius XII to the Second World Congress of the Lay Apostolate, October 5, 1957* (Washington, DC: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1957).

> The civilizing action which Spanish missionaries carried out in other eras was not only of historical importance and retrospective value, but continues to play a role in multiple countries today. The current number of our missions and missionaries and their incontrovertible and valuable contribution to the maintenance of the sense of *hispanidad* amongst the nations which constitute the Spanish Empire attest to this fact. Spanish religious missions and missionaries are spokesmen for the fundamental principles of the tradition salvaged by our holy Crusade [the Spanish Civil War] and of Spanish cultural values.[110]

The figure of the Spanish missionary chimed with the regime's identification with the history and values of the Spanish Empire's 'Golden Age', and represented the spiritual and humanitarian counterpart to the martial 'crusade' of the civil war. In his 1948 New Year message, Franco described Spanish missionaries as 'the most beautiful manifestation of the Catholic spirit of the Old Spain', lauding their work in maintaining 'the love of the Motherland and demonstrating to the world our Christian spirit of peace and our desire to fight for the eternal values of Humanity'.[111] At a time when the Franco regime was regularly accused of fascism, repression, and violence by its foreign critics, the thousands of Spanish missionaries serving abroad could play a valuable role in projecting a peaceful, Christian, and humanitarian image of Spain to the outside world. The Council of Missions aimed to integrate the work of missionaries with Spanish diplomatic services, 'the interpenetration of civil and religious powers to achieve a common goal', in the words of one of its senior officials.[112] Its training courses and educational initiatives were designed to ensure that these Spanish missionaries-cum-diplomats had the expertise necessary to portray a positive image of Spain to the outside world.

The influence of the regime was also evident in the work of Caritas, the most influential Catholic welfare organization in post-war Spain. Spanish Caritas had its origins in the charitable campaigns and institutional structures established by Catholic Action following the end of the civil war.[113] Its initial goal was to coordinate and strengthen the Church's welfare activities, seen as vital to its efforts to win back the Spanish working classes and to 're-Christianize' Spain in the aftermath of the conflict. Its secretariat brought together representatives from the diocese and the ecclesiastical hierarchies, alongside the various Catholic orders most closely associated with health, social, and charitable work, including the medical confraternity of St Cosme and St Damian. In 1947 Caritas was formally

[110] Orden del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 5 March 1940, reproduced in *España misionera: catálogo de las misiones y de los misioneros españoles*, 17.

[111] Mensaje de fin de año, 31 December 1947.

[112] Manuel Rodríguez, 'Actividades del Consejo Superior de Misiones', *España Misionera*, 1, 1 (January–March, 1944), 26–36.

[113] José Sánchez Jiménez, *Cáritas española, 1942–1997: acción social y compromiso cristiano* (Cáritas Española Editores, 1998), 37–41.

established as an independent lay organization, although one still affiliated with Catholic Action.[114]

Spanish Caritas also formed part of an international network of Caritas organizations, and from the very beginning its work was influenced by its counterparts abroad. This influence began even before the end of the Second World War, when Spanish church officials with ties to Germany began to bring back information about the welfare initiatives the Church had managed to maintain in the major German cities throughout the conflict.[115] In 1946 the director of Spanish Caritas, Jesús García Valcárcel, undertook a tour of the various European countries where Caritas branches had already been established, primarily Germany, France, and Italy, to inform the development of Caritas in Spain.[116] Spanish representatives were involved in the initial discussions around the foundation of an international Caritas organization which took place in Paris in 1947, and in 1951 Spanish Caritas was elected to the executive committee of the newly established *Caritas Internationalis*. García Valcárcel, who was also a member of the ACNP, was Spain's chief representative within the organization and would go on to play an important role in its early development.[117]

On a practical level, however, the international work of Spanish Caritas was shaped, not just by a commitment to Catholic internationalism, but by the fervent anti-communism which characterized Spanish Catholicism under the early Franco regime. Aside from relatively small amounts of funding to support victims of natural disasters abroad, the largest and most high-profile international campaigns of Spanish Caritas were dedicated to helping foreign victims of communism.[118] Its first major initiative came in 1949 in the form of support for orphaned refugee children from central and eastern European countries which had fallen under communist control. 20,000 of these refugee children were invited to visit Spain for summer holidays from their new homes in Austria and Germany, and on a few occasions were adopted by Spanish families.[119] The pattern was repeated following the Hungarian uprising in 1956. In cooperation with the Spanish government, Caritas coordinated a 'Help for Hungary' programme, raising 5 million pesetas to fund supplies of food and clothing for refugees in Austria and Germany, university scholarships for Hungarian students, and employment programmes for Hungarian refugees in Spain.[120] Three years later a similar programme was established for Cuban refugees fleeing the communist revolution on the island. Between 1959 and 1966, Caritas claimed to have supported almost 10,000 Cuban refugees who had moved to Spain, providing health, housing, and

[114] Ibid., 78–81. [115] Ibid., 43–4. [116] Ibid., 57. [117] Ibid., 72–4.

[118] Spending on disaster relief only amounted to 2 per cent of Caritas' annual budget by 1969. *Actividades de Caritas Española* (1969), 84.

[119] Sánchez Jiménez, *Cáritas española, 1942–1997: acción social y compromiso cristiano*, 71–2.

[120] ANCWC, OGS Records, Box 197, Folder 63; AANCP, Jesús García Valcárcel file.

educational services with the help of grants from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.[121] During the whole period there was not a single large-scale campaign to support refugees who were not perceived to be victims of communism. International Catholic solidarity appeared to be limited to those cases which were aligned with the political outlook of the Cold War-era Franco regime.

Caritas' most important international relationship was with the US. Between the mid-1950s and the end of the 1960s, Caritas came to play a vital role in US–Spanish relations. In order to comply with the requirement for US aid to be supplied to 'non-political' organizations, the vast amounts of US social aid provided to Spain through the *Ayuda Social Americana* (ASA) programme after the signing of the Pact of Madrid was channelled through the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) in the US, and distributed by Caritas in Spain.[122] The NCWC was the organization representing Catholic bishops in the US, and its overseas humanitarian arm, Catholic Relief Services, was affiliated with *Caritas Internationalis*. The ASA, and by extension Caritas itself, came to play a vital role in Francoist welfare provision from the early 1950s until it was wound up in 1969. It consisted of surplus food supplies donated by the US government, primarily powdered milk and other foodstuffs, including cheese, butter, and powdered egg, as well as other domestic supplies such as blankets. Caritas was appointed by the Spanish government to transport and distribute supplies, which were provided to children through the schools service, to poor families through organizations such as the Women's Section of the Falange and *Auxilio Social*, and to the sick and disabled through the SOE and Department of Health.[123] Over the lifetime of the programme the ASA supplied goods worth over 11,000 million pesetas, reaching an estimated 4.6 million Spaniards.[124] The sheer size of the programme dwarfed Caritas' other activities, contributing over 60 per cent of its total budget by 1965.[125]

For Caritas and for Spanish Catholics, the ASA helped to establish the Church's position within local communities and to secure access to working-class neighbourhoods where its influence was weakest. In the context of the Cold War and of the Church's mission to 're-Christianize' Spain, it was a weapon with which to eradicate the legacies of republicanism and communism, and to win new adherents to the faith. In May 1958, the *Cáritas* journal reproduced a letter from a

[121] 'Primera Conferencia Católica Internacional Pro Refugiados', *Cáritas*, 43 (March 1964), 8–9; 'Algunos Servicios de Cáritas en favor de los necesitados', *Cáritas*, 56–7 (April–May 1965), 10–11; 'Cáritas en el Comité Ejecutivo de la Alta Comisaría de Refugiados de la ONU', *Cáritas*, 62 (December 1965–January 1967), 7.

[122] Antonio Gutiérrez Resa, *Cáritas Española en la sociedad de bienestar, 1942–1990* (Barcelona: Editorial Hacer, 1993), 229.

[123] 'Ayuda Social Americana', *Cáritas* (January–February 1958), 8.

[124] AACNP, Jesús García Valcárcel file, 'La Caritas de Jesús García Valcárcel y sus Relaciones con la A.C.N. de P. y el Centro de Fundaciones', 4.

[125] 'De donde procede el dinero que distribuye Cáritas?', *Cáritas*, 56–7 (April–May 1965), 8–9.

parish priest in the Catalan town of Gerona which encapsulated Catholic attitudes towards the ASA. In his parish, the priest wrote, lived an old man who, like most of his neighbours, was completely distanced from the Church, and who 'under the Republic hung the Communist flag from the balcony of his house whenever the occasion permitted'. When he fell ill with cancer, however, the priest had begun to provide him with ASA aid, and this support had gradually encouraged the man to look upon the parish 'with more benevolence and friendliness'. When his health suddenly deteriorated, the priest visited his home and found that he had constructed a small cross from two toothpicks. Visiting again the next day, the old man insisted on receiving the sacraments, and just a day later he died. The priest was clear about the role that the ASA had played in winning this particular convert from communism to Christianity. 'God bless the American Aid,' he wrote, 'which wins souls for the Lord!'[126]

Caritas and the NCWC played an important role in the developing relationship between Franco's Spain and the US over the course of the 1950s. The NCWC's relationship with Franco's Spain had its roots in the civil war, when it had denounced anti-clerical violence in the Republican zone and helped raise funds for humanitarian relief in the rebel zone.[127] The NCWC began providing aid to Caritas in Spain in 1950, a process initially brokered with the help of *Caritas Internationalis* and the Vatican.[128] In addition to the ASA, it also provided Caritas with regular donations in response to particular emergencies or natural disasters.[129]

The relationship between the two organizations provided useful to their respective governments. The ASA programme bolstered the image of the US amongst the Spanish population—'the only way the Spanish poor receive a concrete demonstration of US aid which they can understand,' as one US embassy official argued in 1955.[130] It also helped to head off any criticism of the favourable treaties which the US had negotiated with the Spanish government. For the Franco regime, the ASA demonstrated to the Spanish people that their country had gained international acceptance and was benefitting from American support in a similar way to Marshall Plan recipients in the rest of Europe. It also provided both countries with a 'non-political' way to channel funds they wanted to remain hidden from public scrutiny. In 1957, for example, the USSR repatriated hundreds of Spaniards who had fled to the country after the Spanish Civil War. The Spanish government allowed the US Central Intelligence Agency, whose European office

[126] Reproduced in *Cáritas* (May–June 1958), 17.

[127] ACUA, US Conference of Catholic Bishops Office of the General Secretary, Series 1, Box 50, Folders 13–23.

[128] Gutiérrez Resa, *Cáritas Española*, 225–7.

[129] NARA, Record Group 59, Department of State, 1955–1959 Central Decimal File, Series 852, Box 4622.

[130] Ibid., telegram from Madrid Embassy to State Department, 11 March 1955.

was in Madrid, to interrogate the returnees about the military, political, and social situation in the USSR. In return the Central Intelligence Agency agreed to pay 20 million pesetas towards the costs of their reintegration into Spanish society, payments which were channelled secretly through the NCWC and Caritas.[131]

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s Spanish forms of Catholic humanitarianism were fundamentally aligned with the diplomatic priorities and ideological outlook of the Franco regime. The Second Vatican Council, however, had a profound impact on the patterns of Spanish Catholic humanitarianism. In important ways it helped to break the link between Spanish Catholics and the Francoist state, adding impetus to the increasing Catholic opposition against the regime within Spain. Although the Church hierarchy and much of the Catholic elite remained loyal to Franco, the international humanitarian work of Catholic organizations was no longer so intimately tied to the interests and policies of the regime. From the 1960s, groups such as Caritas increasingly began to criticize the poverty and social exclusion which accompanied Spain's economic modernization. Their understanding of international development and the Catholic role in the 'Third World' was influenced by debates in the Second Vatican Council, and by the work of Catholic organizations elsewhere in Europe such as the German welfare organization MISEREOR.[132] At the same time, Catholics began to establish independent NGOs working in the fields of development, humanitarian, and international health, the kind of civil society organizations which had failed to emerge under the early Franco regime but which would form the basis of the vibrant NGO sector which emerged after the transition to democracy.[133]

Post-war international history is often written in strikingly secular terms. Whereas religious ideas and groups had played an important part in the birth of the modern global community during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, histories of the post-war world emphasize the Cold War battle of economic systems, living standards, and materialist ideologies, and the emerging secular language of human rights. Recent research has begun to reaffirm the influence of Christianity, and Catholicism in particular, on European and international history, but it has tended to focus on the work of the Vatican hierarchy, Catholic politicians, and a few high-profile Catholic intellectuals. The international activities of Spanish Catholics serves to highlight the role of ICOs, and the wider group of lay Catholic elites who dominated them, within the post-war global system. It suggests that a distinct model of Catholic internationalism helped to ensure that religious interests and values retained a dominant role within secular international

[131] AGA, 16/71.607, 'Documentación sobre repatriados de Rusia, 1957–58', 7 March 1957.

[132] Rueda de prensa sobre el plan C.C.B', *Cáritas*, 61 (October–November 1965), 5–10'; 'El Plan Social Baza, promovido por Caritás Nacional, está transformando esa población granadina', *ABC* (22 June 1970), 36.

[133] One such organization was the international health NGO, *Medicus Mundi*, which is discussed further in the Conclusion.

institutions across a wide range of fields, including the work of humanitarian and social organizations.

But Catholic internationalism was never a politically homogeneous phenomenon. Many of its most influential participants identified with the forms of Christian democracy that dominated post-war western European politics. But not all Catholics had suddenly been converted into liberal proponents of Christian democracy at the end of the Second World War. As the example of Spain highlights, there existed both within and beyond Europe a large proportion of the Catholic population still wedded to pre-war visions of political Catholicism and to the traditions of nineteenth-century Catholic integralism.[134] In some cases they participated within the same ICOs and networks as their co-religionists, but in other cases they formed their own, more politically and theologically congenial organizations which adopted a more belligerent approach to the post-war secular order. Indeed, if any single factor united these diverse movements, it was anti-communism. As the Cold War developed, all could agree that the USSR and its allies represented the ultimate enemy of the Christian faith and its values, whether they positioned themselves at the heart of the Cold War west, or as a third way between the twin materialisms of Soviet communism and US capitalism.

The relationship between Spanish Catholics and their counterparts abroad was never straightforward. Much of the global Catholic community had been happy to support rebel forces during the Spanish Civil War as the defenders of Christian Spain against the menace of Bolshevism. But the post-war anti-fascist consensus complicated relations with the Francoist state. The fundamental incompatibility between National-Catholic visions of an authoritarian, clerical Spanish state on the one hand, and mainstream Christian democracy on the other, meant that Spanish influence was limited to the right wing of post-war European Catholicism, symbolized by the former Vichy sympathizers and eastern European exiles who attended the Catholic conferences held in Spain. 'Moderate' Spanish Catholic elites, who shared many of the same theological and social assumptions as their European counterparts, remained isolated from mainstream European Christian democracy by their inability to reconcile their vision of the Spanish state with liberal democracy. Those in Spain who did embrace Christian democracy from the late 1950s did so by moving towards forms of internal opposition.[135] During the immediate post-war period, Catholic internationalism represented one of the primary means through which Franco's Spain was able to engage with the outside

[134] Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (eds), *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

[135] Natalia Urigüen, 'De reuniones de amigos a partidos políticos: la democracia cristiana española y el apoyo europeo durante el franquismo', in Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, Ricardo Martín De la Guardia, and Rosa Pardo Sanz (eds), *La apertura internacional de España: entre el franquismo y la democracia, 1953–1986* (Madrid: Silex, 2016), 337–60.

world. But the country remained semi-detached from the global Catholic mainstream.

From the 1960s, in contrast, the Church increasingly became a source of both international and domestic opposition to the regime. Many of the Spanish Catholics who had been most exposed to international debates and trends during the 1940s and 1950s began to move towards the internal opposition. Traditional Catholic groups such as the ANCP were superseded by the technocrats of Opus Dei. But despite their commitment to economic modernization and their ties with European business elites, this new generation remained opposed to the political and social liberalization increasingly advocated by Catholics abroad.[136] Catholic health and welfare organizations in Spain, meanwhile, increasingly began to criticize the poverty and hardship which accompanied economic modernization. The influence of the Second Vatican Council helped to inspire a new generation of Catholic opponents to the Franco regime inside of Spain. Although Catholicism retained its place in the ideology, identity, and discourse of the Franco regime until the dictator's death in 1975, its ability to lend the regime international legitimacy became a thing of the past.

[136] Juan Estruch, *Saints and Schemers: Opus Dei and Its Paradoxes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Epilogue and Conclusion

Epilogue: 1959–75

How did the international activities of Spanish social experts change after 1959? As discussed in the Introduction, the year did not mark a clean break between two entirely distinct periods. Nevertheless, the period of 'late Francoism' from 1959 until the dictator's death in 1975 differed in many ways from the early years of the regime in the 1940s and early 1950s.[1] A series of economic reforms were instigated by a new generation of economic technocrats linked to the Catholic group Opus Dei, who aspired to open up the Spanish economy to international markets while maintaining the political and social conservatism of the Franco regime. The Stabilization Plan of 1959 cast aside two decades of autarky by liberalizing trade, encouraging foreign investment, and opening up the Spanish economy to the influence of the western European 'economic miracle'.[2] Despite the immediate pain caused by the process of readjustment, this change paved the way for the economic boom of the 1960s which unleashed almost three decades of suppressed economic potential and saw Spain achieve some of the highest levels of growth in the world economy. In the process it transformed the country from a primarily rural, agricultural society to a urban one based around exports, services, and tourism.

The social and cultural changes these processes unleashed, combined with increasingly stark inequalities, high levels of poverty, and political repression, helped to fuel a new wave of opposition to the regime. Much of this opposition came from within the Catholic Church, up until then one of its strongest pillars of support.[3] A new generation of 'worker priests' and activists within Catholic workers' organizations (primarily the *Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica*) became increasingly critical of the regime from 1960 onwards, later influenced by the liberalizing trends within the global Church and the Second Vatican Council. They were joined by the communist-influenced workers' commissions which had emerged within the official syndicalist structure, sparking a wave of

[1] Townson (ed.), *Spain Transformed*.

[2] Carlos Barciela (ed.), *La España de Franco (1939–1975): economía* (Madrid: Síntesis, 2001).

[3] Tusell, *Franco y los católicos*; Payne, *Spanish Catholicism*; William J. Callahan, *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1998* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000).

strikes and protests which lasted sporadically from the mid-1960s until the end of the regime. The threat posed by these groups, as well as by the increasingly violent nationalist movement emerging from the Basque country, prompted a renewed wave of state violence and repression. The regime was increasingly split between those who envisioned some shift towards liberalization and democracy after the death of Franco, and loyalists such as Blas Piñar who formed the 'bunker' which hoped to maintain the fundamental features of the Francoist system after the dictator's death.[4]

Such social and political changes inevitably affected the way Spanish experts engaged with the outside world during the 1960s and early 1970s. This was different in two key respects from the preceding decades. Firstly, the extent and pattern of international cooperation evolved. Spanish experts became much more closely integrated into international organizations and networks. The alternative networks which they had been involved in during the previous decades were becoming increasingly less important. Instead, Spanish experts worked much more closely within mainstream international organizations such as the WHO and UNICEF, and with states such as the US and West Germany. These changes reflected the altered international status of Franco's Spain during the period. It was no longer an outlier casting round for an international role, but a semi-integrated member of the Cold War west.

Secondly, the nature of Spanish involvement in international health and welfare changed. The new generation of social experts enjoyed a much wider range of international professional opportunities. Crucially, these experts did not see their international work through the prism of Spanish power and prestige in the same way as their immediate predecessors had done. In turn, the Franco regime relied less heavily on social experts to promote its image abroad now that its status within the international system had been broadly established. As a result, Spanish experts began to engage with international organizations in more independent ways, working outside of state structures and state-backed organizations. As the period wore on and internal opposition to the regime grew, international organizations and networks increasingly provided opportunities for Spanish experts to criticize social policies and social conditions within Spain. These changing patterns helped to lay the groundwork for Spain's significantly increased involvement in all forms of international health, welfare, and humanitarianism following the transition to democracy.

By the late 1950s the legacy of Spain's post-war exclusion from international social organizations had almost completely disappeared. Major Spanish health and social programmes were increasingly influenced by European and

[4] Juan Pablo Fusi, 'La reaparición de la conflictividad en la España de los sesenta', in Josep Fontana (ed.), *España bajo el franquismo* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1986), 160–9; Paul Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (London: Routledge, 1986).

international organizations. The WHO and UNICEF, for example, provided information and advice to Spanish experts about the design of the mass vaccination campaign against polio which began in 1958, as well as training and funding for rehabilitation services designed to support polio victims.[5]

Spanish experts also played an increasingly prominent role within these organizations. The infant health specialist Juan Bosch Marín served as vice-president of the European Association against Polio from 1955 to 1961, while the virologist Florencio Pérez Gallardo was appointed to the WHO's Regional Office for Europe. During the 1940s and early 1950s the only Spanish expert to hold a senior position within the WHO had been the exiled Republican Marcelino Pascua. But from the late 1950s, the taint of the Franco regime no longer represented an impediment to the advancement of Spanish experts within the organization. In 1959, for example, the dermatologist José Gay Prieto was appointed as the first chief of the WHO Leprosy Unit, organizing a global leprosy campaign that emphasized early diagnosis and rehabilitation.[6] This more receptive professional environment was mirrored by a more open attitude from leading Spanish officials. José Palanca had retained an antagonistic attitude towards the WHO even after Spain had joined the organization in 1951. But his successor as director general of health, Jesús García Orcoyen, served on the organization's executive board during the 1960s and as president of the European Regional Committee in 1971.[7] Francoist experts were no longer restricted to the margins of international organizations.

The centrality of the Cold War to Spain's international reintegration was reflected in the increasing importance of the US for Spanish social experts. Again, 1959 did not mark the beginning of this process. The Spanish National Research Council had been providing scholarships for Spanish scientists and researchers to study in the US from as early as 1946, re-establishing ties formed by the JAE and the Rockefeller Foundation during the interwar period.[8] The Pact of Madrid in 1953 gave a boost to these initiatives, quickly confirming the US as Spain's most important overseas ally and putting an end to the last vestiges of Spain's post-war diplomatic isolation. Much of the US support to Spain after 1953 was focussed on modernization and technical development programmes, allowing US officials to maintain good relations with both the Franco regime and the democratic opposition.[9] US officials saw education and research as vital to Spain's economic and social modernization, something that was reflected in the series of

[5] Juan Bosch Marin, *Los niños del mundo en los XXV años del UNICEF* (Madrid: Asociación de Amigos de UNICEF, 1971); Porras et al., *El drama de la polio*.

[6] 'Obituary: Dr. José Gay Prieto, 1905–1979', *International Journal of Leprosy*, 48, 2 (1980), 206–7.

[7] WHO IRIS, 'Comité regional de l'Europe: Rapport sur la vingt et uniéme session', http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/153017/1/EB49_9_fre.pdf (accessed 12 June 2016).

[8] Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Viento de poniente: el Programa Fulbright en España* (Madrid: LID Editorial, 2009), 32.

[9] Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, 'Modernizadores y tecnócratas: Estados Unidos ante la política educativa y científica de la España del desarrollo', *Historia y Política*, 34 (2015), 113–46.

technical and educational exchange programmes extended to Spain after 1953. The most important of these was the Fulbright Program, launched in Spain in 1958, which provided scholarships for students and researchers to work in the US. Over half of these scholarships were in the fields of technology, science, and medicine. Cooperation in the fields of medical education and research continued to play an important role in Spain's cultural relations with the US for the remainder of the Franco era.[10] Similar exchange programmes and research agreements were developed with other western European states, particularly West Germany which once again began to attract a large number of Spanish students and researchers from the late 1950s.[11]

Alongside this changing political context, Spanish experts no longer faced the economic constraints to international mobility and exchange which had hampered them during the 1940s and 1950s. The dire state of the Francoist economy in the decade following the civil war had meant that access to foreign currency was extremely limited. This scarcity had had a serious impact on Spanish access to medicines and medical supplies, particularly during the Second World War, and had continued to impose financial constraints on international exchange after it. Throughout the 1940s, Spanish experts needed government approval to release foreign currency for trips abroad. Underfunded government departments and research institutions could only provide a limited number of scholarships and grants to support international exchange. Membership of institutions such as the WHO was valued in part because it provided Spanish experts with access to international funding, at the same time as the Franco regime resented the financial contributions Spain was required to make. These economic constraints continued well into the 1950s. Returning from exile in Mexico in 1953, the doctor José Barón struggled to get access to foreign medical journals that required subscriptions to be paid in foreign currencies, and argued that the lack of foreign journals had hindered progress in all fields of Spanish science and culture.[12] The rapid economic growth of the 1960s, however, largely put paid to these problems, particularly those stemming from restrictions on foreign currency. Organizations such as the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, which Spain joined in 1959, helped liberalize trade restrictions and provided the Franco regime with access to funding for the import of medical supplies and equipment.[13]

Spain's reintegration into international networks of education and research meant that the new generation of experts emerging from the late 1950s enjoyed a

[10] 'Texto íntegro del Acuerdo de Amistad y Cooperación entre España y Estados Unidos', *ABC* (9 August 1970), 16–19; Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Viento de poniente*, 62.

[11] Carlos Sanz Díaz, 'El papel de la política cultural exterior en las relaciones hispano-alemanas, 1949–1966', *Ayer*, 69 (2008), 155–85.

[12] CDMH, Refugiados Españoles en Méjico—Proyecto de Historia Oral, Libro 13, entrevista con José Barón.

[13] Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence, OEEC-316, 'Association of Spain with the work of the Organisation', 16 February 1959.

similar range of international opportunities to those that had previously existed during the 1920s and 1930s. Most of the leading experts from the previous generation had spent time studying or working abroad on JAE or Rockefeller Foundation scholarships, most commonly in the US, the UK, or Germany. For the new generation, scholarships from the Fulbright Foundation, the Spanish National Research Council, the WHO, the Humboldt Foundation, and individual universities provided similar international opportunities, and the US and West Germany remained favoured destinations. At the same time, an increasing number of young doctors and medical researchers chose to emigrate in order to seek out better professional, academic, and economic opportunities.

In many cases the generational shift was a literal one, with patterns of international mobility replicated across generations within individual families. The Spanish cancer specialist, Juan Manuel Ortiz Picón, who had studied in Germany on a JAE grant during the 1930s, was able to help his son secure a scholarship to study ophthalmology in Dusseldorf in 1961.[14] His colleague, Julián Sanz Ibáñez, who had been funded by the JAE to study in Vienna in 1932 and who had worked with the Rockefeller Foundation in Madrid, had a son who received a WHO scholarship to study in Bonn in 1964.[15] This younger generation had not been shaped by the civil war in the same way as their predecessors and had no direct experience of the reduced levels of international mobility and professional opportunities which had followed it. Those growing up in a period of partial liberalization and increasing internal opposition to the regime regarded international mobility and cooperation as a normal part of professional life, rather than as an opportunity to promote the status and influence of Franco's Spain.

Growing internal opposition to the Franco regime during the 1960s and early 1970s was increasingly reflected in the field of international health. Many of those who had willingly represented Franco's Spain on the international stage during the 1940s and early 1950s moved towards open forms of monarchical or Christian democratic opposition thereafter, from medical experts such as Primitivo de la Quintana, to former Falangists such as Pedro Laín Entralgo and Catholics such as Carlos Santamaría. Anti-Francoist opposition among the post-war generation, particularly Catholics linked to organizations such as the *Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica*, was reflected in Spanish social experts using international events to attack the regime. By the early 1970s, for example, Spanish nurses regularly used international forums to criticize Francoist policy. In 1972 the regional CICIAMS meeting for Europe held in Madrid was dominated by Spanish nurses and their concerns. Its sessions included explicit demands for the government to

[14] J.M. Ortiz Picón, *Una vida y su entorno (1903–1978): memorias de un médico con vocación de biólogo* (Madrid: CSIC, 1978), 308.

[15] *Académicos numerarios del Instituto de España, 1938–2004* (Madrid: Instituto de España, 2005), 405.

reform the Spanish health system, with widespread calls for the creation of a single Ministry of Health to help overcome the fragmentation and inefficiency of the current system. Participants at the conference also criticized the subordinate role of Spanish nurses in their work with doctors, and called for stronger representation and organization of the nursing profession.[16] The international context of these debates helped to lend legitimacy to the nurses' demands, and provided cover to encourage their dissemination and reporting. The transformation of international organizations and events into opportunities to criticize the regime reflected the growth of anti-Francoist feeling among previously loyal groups.

Even where Spanish involvement in international health and welfare didn't involve active opposition, Spanish experts were increasingly acting outside of state structures and the institutions of the regime. In 1963 a group of Catalan doctors founded the organization Medicus Mundi, bringing together doctors, pharmacists, nurses, and medical assistants interested in promoting health in the developing world.[17] The new organization reflected the gradual emergence of Spanish civil society groups from the early 1960s. Unlike Caritas, Medicus Mundi had no formal links to Catholic Action or to the Church hierarchy. Working alongside Spanish missionaries, it began by providing funding and equipment to support medical missionary services in Cameroon. Although operating on a small scale the organization spread rapidly across Spain, and by the mid-1960s had begun programmes to train and fund medical volunteers to work in sites across Africa and Latin America. It also developed links with Catholic charities abroad, joining the Medicus Mundi International Federation which had its origins in German, French, Belgian, and Dutch groups founded in the interwar period to support and promote medical missions.[18] The previous generation of Francoist experts had pursued their interest in international health and humanitarianism through government departments, universities, missionary networks, or state-backed Catholic groups such as Caritas and Salus Infirmorum. But the post-war generation was able to work internationally outside of the structures of the regime.

These developments did not mean that the international work of Spanish social experts had become depoliticized, or that Franco's Spain had suddenly shifted from being a repressive, 'closed' society to a liberal 'open' one. But they did reflect the fact that the domestic and international political context had changed. Spain's partial integration into the Cold War west had stabilized its relationship with the western democracies and with the international organizations it had been

[16] 'V Congreso Regional Europeo de Enfermeras Católicas', *Caridad, Ciencia y Arte*, 2, 1 (June 1972), 7–11.

[17] On the emergence of civil society in Franco's Spain, see Pamela Beth Radcliff, *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960–1978* (Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

[18] Information supplied to the author by Medicus Mundi. See also *La Vanguardia*, 29 April 1964, 27; 2 April 1967, 57; 2 September 67, 15; 23 May 1971, 27; 3 February 1972, 25; 5 August 1973, 23.

admitted to. At the same time, political ties between the Franco regime and parts of the Spanish elite had begun to fray with the growth of the internal opposition and the emergence of the post-civil war generation. Spanish social experts were thus even more internationally active, but they were no longer necessarily 'Franco's internationalists'.

Nationalists in the Age of Internationalism

Integrating the history of Franco's Spain into the history of twentieth-century internationalism for the first time, the preceding chapters have sought to shed new light on both subjects. They have shown how the idea of the 'social state' was used as part of the Franco regime's search for international legitimacy. They have shown how social experts were at the forefront of efforts to promote Spain to the outside world, exploiting the internationalist ideas and practices of their profession to project an image of Franco's Spain as a modern, scientifically advanced, and socially just state. By exploring what it meant for Francoist elites to think and act internationally, they have also demonstrated the influence of international organizations and networks on the way Francoists saw the world and Spain's place within it. Rather than isolating themselves or turning inwards, these elites were involved in a constant struggle to establish Spanish prestige and influence on the global stage, attempting to embed Spain into the international structures emerging around them, and to construct new patterns of international cooperation aligned with Spanish interests and ideology. Their story illustrates how far mid-century authoritarian regimes and their supporters had embraced, even if only reluctantly, the development of international organizations, international ideas, and international society over previous decades. They were nationalists in an age of internationalism.

The importance of international cooperation for Francoist elites reflects the extent to which Spanish nationalism during the early Franco era was framed and shaped by the history of internationalism. Central to the Francoist narrative was the idea of the rising or resurgence of the 'New Spain' brought about by the rebel victory in the Spanish Civil War. This idea implied that Spain was emerging from the setbacks it had suffered during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was now ready to recapture some of the power and prestige of the 'Golden Age' of imperial expansion in Latin America, and of its lost economic, military, and cultural influence both in Europe and in the wider world.

But by the time this New Spain began to emerge, the world it was 'rising' within had been shaped by more than a century of expanding international systems, networks, and organizations, from the Congress of Vienna to the League of Nations. Francoists still thought of Spain's new dawn in military and imperial terms, most obviously in the plans to expand its imperial territories in north

Africa. More importantly, however, the 'rising' or 'resurgence' of Spain meant gaining increasing power and influence within the international system and international organizations that existed at the time. Those Spaniards drawn to Nazi Germany during the Second World War envisaged Spain re-establishing its power and prestige within the Nazi-dominated New Order, a radical reimagination of the pre-war international system. The idea of *hispanidad* rested, not on plans to re-establish Spain's formal empire in Latin America, but on providing leadership within a voluntary association of Ibero-American states. It was a vision which thus drew on the language and practices of internationalism, and on the history of similar quasi-imperial and associative movements, from the British Commonwealth to Pan-Americanism. One of the reasons Francoists were so exercised by the question of UN membership was the conviction that the dawning of the 'New Spain' should be reflected in a prominent and respected status for the country within the post-war international system. Strengthening the nation in Franco's Spain thus meant embracing contemporary models of international organization and international cooperation in whatever forms they took.

This does not mean that Francoist elites were enthusiastic internationalists in the traditional sense of the term. The Francoist coalition was a broad one, united by the experience and memory of the civil war, but divided on many fundamental political and ideological issues. Some, most notably lay Catholic elites, explicitly attempted to reconcile Francoism with the reality of contemporary liberal internationalism. For others, acting internationally was necessary to counter the threat posed by international communism. This argument was used both during the Second World War in support of Spain's involvement in the Nazi New Order, and after the emergence of the Cold War when the Franco regime's anti-communist credentials were mobilized behind its claims to international respectability. From this perspective, international cooperation was a necessity rather than a choice, required to guard against international political threats in the same way that cooperation in the field of health was necessary to prevent the spread of disease.

The majority of Francoist officials and experts shared this functional view of international cooperation, and thus pursued a kind of belligerent engagement with the outside world. They accepted that Spain existed within an international system made up of a diverse and changing constellation of international organizations and networks, most of which did not share the values of Franco's Spain. Nevertheless, they felt strongly that the Spanish nation deserved a prominent and influential position within these organizations. When they suspected that Spain was not receiving the respect it deserved, whether in the context of the Nazi New Order or in the post-war UN system, they reacted angrily, emphasizing Spain's historical status and its commitment to international cooperation, and denouncing its opponents as politically motivated enemies of the Spanish people. In response to real or perceived attempts to marginalize or exclude them, they sought

out new, more congenial forms of international cooperation within which Spain could claim the status and influence it deserved.

The work of these Francoist experts provides a new perspective on the modern history of internationalism. Exploring this history through the lens of Franco's Spain helps us develop a fuller picture of the character and chronology of international cooperation. The forms of international exchange Francoist elites engaged in stretched beyond the liberal international organizations and networks which have dominated much of the historiography. Examining the perspective of experts from an authoritarian nationalist regime serves to broaden and deepen our understanding of the 'dark side' of internationalism, the forms of cross-border cooperation which brought together fascist, right-wing, and conservative forces to shape alternatives to liberal and socialist models of international society. International exchange within the Nazi New Order united adherents of fascist and radical right-wing movements from across Europe. Their efforts were fraught with tension between the aspiration towards international cooperation and the realities of nationalist ideology, but existed within a much wider history of right-wing collaboration across borders. Francoist attempts to foster inter-imperial forms of cooperation in Africa and quasi-imperial regional identities in Latin America reflected the extent to which, even after the Second World War, European states saw international organizations and networks as a tool to consolidate their empires and strengthen their imperial status. The broad spectrum of post-war Catholic internationalism certainly encompassed the liberal proponents of European Christian democracy. But it was in many ways a reaction against the liberal international order, reflecting the authoritarian impulses of the Church and the continuing influence of anti-liberal forms of political Catholicism in countries like Spain.

Focussing on these 'alternative' patterns of international cooperation shows the limitations of accounts which paint internationalism as a unified, homogenous phenomenon, rising and falling in influence and popularity over the course of the twentieth century. In particular, it challenges familiar chronologies of the subject. The late 1930s may have represented the nadir of liberal internationalism. But many Francoists saw the period from 1939 to 1943 as the peak of a new, modern international system led by the 'totalitarian' states, a system which had been slowly developing since the end of the First World War in response to the perceived failures of parliamentary democracy and the threat of global communism. After 1945, liberal internationalism again seemed to be triumphant. But the new international system was shaped by many of the same anti-liberal principles which had characterized its interwar predecessors, from conservative political Catholicism and anti-communism, to the imperialism which continued to underpin the work of the UN. Particularly in the 'technical' fields of international cooperation, there was a significant degree of overlap between those involved in pre-1945 fascist international projects, transwar inter-imperial networks, and

post-war liberal internationalism. These continuities facilitated Spain's integration into the supposedly 'liberal' post-war world order.

The international work of Spanish social experts also sheds light on the entangled nature of the multiple internationalisms which characterized the middle of the twentieth century. The idea of *internationalisms* in the plural has begun to receive more attention from historians in recent years. But by breaking the history of internationalism down into its different components we run the risk of neatly separating each sub-division into its own hermetically sealed box, suggesting for example that religious internationalism was entirely different from fascist internationalism, which was in turn distinct from liberal or imperial internationalism, and so on. In reality, the international actors of the era were much more flexible than such rigid categorizations would suggest. For many, the desire to act internationally subsumed questions of the most politically appropriate forms of international cooperation. This was again particularly the case for experts working in 'technical' fields, where the practical and professional benefits of international action pushed individuals into multiple, overlapping, and often competing international structures. By following the trajectories of Spanish experts, we can see how the boundaries between these various internationalisms were blurred, how individuals were able to think about and engage with the outside world in different ways, and how they adapted to the changing international environment around them.

The case of Spain also highlights the importance of hierarchies and 'outsiders' to the history of internationalism. Much of this history has been written from the perspective of those states, primarily in North America and western Europe, which held dominant positions within international organizations and networks. The idealistic rhetoric of equality and inclusion which characterized internationalist projects in these countries served to occlude the continued importance of power discrepancies or exclusionary practices within international organizations.

Francoists, however, were painfully aware of Spain's status and position on the world stage, and their attitudes to international organizations and networks were shaped by Spain's peripheral or outsider status, whether real or perceived. In many ways Spain enjoyed an exalted status within the wartime New Order, but Spaniards in Nazi Germany were still keenly aware of their subordinate position in relation to their German allies. The UN, like the League of Nations before it, emerged as a victors' club of wartime allies, and the status of 'ex-enemy' countries like Spain highlights the limits to the universal rhetoric of post-war internationalism. Spanish attempts to forge alternative forms of international cooperation were motivated by a desire to establish Spain as a leading rather than a peripheral power on the world stage. The case of Franco's Spain thus brings to the fore the tensions between equality and hierarchy, between universalism and exclusion, which played such a profound role in the history of twentieth-century internationalisms. From the controversy surrounding the international isolation of

Germany and Russia after the First World War to the debates about decolonization at the UN during the 1950s and 1960s, international organizations and patterns of international cooperation have been shaped by tensions between powerful states and international outsiders.

Experts and expertise played a crucial role in these conflicts, particularly in the fields of health and welfare. Health, medicine, and social policy had been central to the development of transnational society during the nineteenth century. The practical need to prevent the spread of disease, the idea of health and social policy as 'technical' fields standing above political concerns, and the idealism of many social experts meant that agreements such as the International Sanitary Conventions could prefigure wider forms of international political cooperation. The same factors helped to ensure that, during the middle of the twentieth century, these fields continued to shape the wider history of internationalism. The idea of international health as a 'technical' undertaking could be used to bind it to diverse political forms of international cooperation, from the Nazi New Order to the UN. The global debate about different political models of welfare and social provision ensured that social experts played a prominent role in liberal, socialist, fascist, and religious internationalisms during the period. The commitment to health and welfare as a 'universal' field meant that the membership of international social organizations often outstripped that of political bodies, and could be used by international outsiders, from Franco's Spain to colonial states in Asia and Africa, as a gateway into the wider international system. Social experts, then, helped to fuel the development of competing, alternative internationalisms. But they also stood at the epicentre of post-war international tensions between the UN system's theoretical and rhetorical commitment to universalism on the one hand, and the visible persistence of international hierarchies and outsiders on the other.

Ultimately, by approaching international cooperation and exchange from the perspective of an authoritarian nationalist regime this book seeks to undermine normative accounts of the history of internationalism. In their place, it argues that international cooperation was a feature of twentieth-century society which could be yoked to a politically diverse range of professional, religious, national, or imperial interests and beliefs. Twentieth-century internationalism was not the antithesis of nationalism or imperialism. Rather, the histories of nationalism and the nation state, imperialism, and internationalism were fundamentally entangled, and can only be understood in relation to each other. From the nineteenth century until the post-Second World War era, European imperial powers played a dominant role in shaping international organizations and networks. These same organizations and networks were also used to pursue national agendas and national interests, institutionalizing the influence of the Great Powers while helping to legitimize and give voice to emerging and peripheral states.

Liberal forms of internationalism were not somehow more legitimate, coherent, or 'real' than illiberal, hierarchical, or right-wing forms of internationalism.

Socialist, religious, fascist, liberal, linguistic, and scientific internationalisms all developed alongside and in response to each other. All were hierarchical in some form beneath their rhetoric of universalism, equality, and cooperation, and struggled to manage tensions between local, national, regional, and international interests and identities. All represented attempts to respond to the challenges posed by technological and economic globalization, and to a sense that the world was becoming ever more interconnected. Europe's twentieth century cannot be understood without taking account of these competing and overlapping forms of internationalism, and their influence on national and imperial histories.

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