Chapter Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Relativism
Author(s)
Kusch, Martin
Contributor(s)
Rinofner-Kreidl, Sonja (editor)
Wiltsche, Harald A. (editor)
Collection
European Research Council (ERC)Language
EnglishAbstract
One important strand in the contemporary debate over epistemological relativism focuses on the question whether, and to what extent, Wittgenstein in “On Certainty” (1969) leaned towards this position. This paper is a contribution to this strand. My discussion has four parts. I shall begin by out lining my interpretation of Wittgensteinian certainties. Subsequently I shall briefly introduce some central arguments for and against attributing epistemic relativism to “On Certainty”. This will be followed by a sketch of the cluster of ideas that–on my analysis–define important versions of the doctrine in question. And finally I shall give my own interpretation of “On Certainty” in relation to epistemic relativism.
Keywords
Metaphilosophy; Analytic philosophy; continental philosophyDOI
10.1515/9783110450651-003ISBN
9783110448344; 9783110448870OCN
1135854731Publisher
De GruyterPublisher website
https://www.degruyter.com/Publication date and place
Berlin/Boston, 2016Grantor
Classification
Philosophical traditions and schools of thought
Western philosophy from c 1800
Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge