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dc.contributor.authorLinnebo, Øystein
dc.contributor.editorFrauchiger, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-19 23:55
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-07 16:47:06
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-01T09:26:28Z
dc.date.available2020-04-01T09:26:28Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier1006438
dc.identifierOCN: 1135847656en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/23706
dc.description.abstractIn this essay I first identify some desiderata for a theory of reference that appear in Føllesdal’s later work (Section 1). We will see that these desiderata are highly Fregean in character. Next I outline a Frege-inspired theory of (a certain core form of) reference that I have been developing in my own work (Section 2). Finally I argue that this theory (as far as it goes) satisfies Føllesdal’s desiderata (Section 3). In particular, I argue that, when the distinction between semantics proper and the theory of reference is carefully heeded, my Frege-inspired theory of reference can be seen to be fully compatible with Føllesdal’s “two-sorted semantics.” The Fregeanism that I advocate is thus highly selective: its only direct concern is the theory of reference, not semantics proper.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.subject.classificationbic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy::HPC History of Western philosophy::HPCF Western philosophy, from c 1900 -
dc.subject.otherAnalytic philosophy
dc.titleChapter Føllesdal and Frege on Reference
dc.typechapter
oapen.identifier.doi10.1515/9783110323542.259
oapen.relation.isPublishedBy2b386f62-fc18-4108-bcf1-ade3ed4cf2f3
oapen.relation.isPartOfBooka2b1e872-5a65-49f9-a932-cfd043ada292
oapen.relation.isFundedBy7292b17b-f01a-4016-94d3-d7fb5ef9fb79
oapen.relation.isbn9783110323016
oapen.collectionEuropean Research Council (ERC)
oapen.place.publicationBerlin/Boston
oapen.grant.number241098
oapen.grant.acronymPPP
oapen.identifier.ocn1135847656


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