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    Ethical Codes and Income Distribution

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    Author(s)
    Forges Davanzati, Guglielmo
    Language
    English
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    Abstract
    In contemporary non-mainstream economic debate, it is widely thought that the functioning of a market economy needs a set of rules (i.e. institutions) which bind agents in their behaviour, allowing efficient outcomes. This idea is contrary to the General Equilibrium Model (GEM) where markets are pictured as working in an institutional vacuum and where social and historical variables play no role. However, in more recent times, a large group of economists have begun to insert social and moral variables into standard models based on the rational choice paradigm, following the increasing interest – on the part of firms – in the possible positive effects of adopting ethical codes. In this key new text Guglielmo Davanzati studies this burgeoning view that ethics and economics can be compatible. Does ‘morality’ affect income distribution? And, if so, what are the effects of the widespread adoption of ethical codes on the functioning of the labour market? Central to Davanzati’s efforts is the thesis that the roots of these new developments can be traced back to the pioneering work of Thorstein Veblen and John Bates Clark. Utilizing their contrasting works, Davanzati’s text illuminates the propagation of ethical codes within the two opposing frameworks i.e. the neoclassical and the institutional. Davanzati’s important book will be an invaluable reference for readers interested in history of economic thought, economics and moral philosophy.
    URI
    http://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/24256
    Keywords
    john; bates; clark; thorstein; veblen; marginal; productivity; labour; market; bargaining
    DOI
    10.4324/9780203016794
    ISBN
    9780415365390;9780415494113;9781134215850;9781134215843;9781134215805
    OCN
    1135855012
    Publisher
    Taylor & Francis
    Publisher website
    https://taylorandfrancis.com/
    Publication date and place
    2006
    Series
    Routledge Studies in the History of Economics,
    Classification
    Ethics and moral philosophy
    Economics
    Political economy
    Business and Management
    Rights
    https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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    License

    • If not noted otherwise all contents are available under Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)

    Credits

    • logo EU
    • This project received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 683680, 810640, 871069 and 964352.

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