US Nation-Building in Afghanistan
Proposal review
Abstract
Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush Administration. It rejects the ’rational actor’ model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.
Keywords
CIA Team; CIA Information; foreign; CIA's Role; policy; bureaucracy; CIA Operative; Combined Action Program; Marshal Plan; United States Central Command; Foreign Policy Bureaucracy; USAID Contractor; USAID Official; Common Language; Material Considerations; Tarin Kowt; Senior Defence Department Official; Senior State Department Official; Cord; Bureaucratic Politics Model; Model III; Afghanistan’s Legal System; Rational Actor Model; Bureaucratic Politics Approach; Quick Impact Projects; Counter-narcotics Strategy; AnaDOI
10.4324/9781315548623ISBN
9781317003199, 9781317003175, 9781472474841, 9781315548623, 9780815396260, 9781317003182, 9781317003199OCN
946106091Publisher
Taylor & FrancisPublisher website
https://taylorandfrancis.com/Publication date and place
Oxford, 2016Imprint
RoutledgeClassification
International relations
Armed conflict
Public administration