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dc.contributor.authorHellema, Duco
dc.contributor.authorWiebes, Cees
dc.contributor.authorWitte, Toby
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-31 23:55:55
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-10 14:46:32
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-01T15:33:36Z
dc.date.available2020-04-01T15:33:36Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier340249
dc.identifierOCN: 302114881en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/35098
dc.description.abstractThe Netherlands played a remarkable role during the October War and the oil crisis of 1973. In secret, the Dutch government sent a substantial amount of ammunition and spare parts to Israel. The Dutch supported Israel also politically. Within the EC they vetoed a more pro-Arab policy. The Arab oil producing countries punished The Netherlands by imposing an oil embargo. The embargo against the Netherlands was intimidating. The Netherlands was dependent on Arab oil. The embargo seemed to threaten the Dutch position in the international oil sector. The government introduced several measures to reduce oil consumption. However, within two months it became clear that oil continued to arrive in Rotterdam. There was in fact no oil shortage in the Netherlands. The Netherlands even profited from the oil crisis. The energy situation in The Netherlands was much better than in other West European countries. The Dutch, therefore, rejected French plans for a more interventionist energy policy. Atlanticism and liberalism were the key words of the Dutch policy during the oil crisis. This book is the result of intensive research in all relevant Dutch archives. The authors had free access to all the files they wanted to see. They also used resources from other countries involved. Many politicians were interviewed. The result is a surprising analysis of the oil crisis of 1973, and of the Dutch role in particular.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and governmenten_US
dc.subject.otherpublic administration
dc.subject.otherbestuurskunde
dc.titleThe Netherlands and the Oil Crisis
dc.title.alternativeBusiness as Usual
dc.typebook
oapen.abstract.otherlanguageTijdens de Oktober-oorlog en de daarop volgende oliecrisis in 1973 speelde Nederland een opvallende rol. Al vóór Nixon een luchtbrug vormde naar Israël, had de Nederlandse regering in het geheim een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid wapentuig naar Israël gestuurd. Binnen de Europese Gemeenschap sprak Nederland een veto uit tegen een meer pro-Arabisch beleid. De Arabische olieproducerende landen straften Nederland met een olie-embargo. Maar binnen twee maanden bleek de olie nog steeds bij Rotterdam binnen te stromen. De Nederlanders wezen Franse plannen voor een meer interventionistisch energiebeleid van de EG daarom af. Atlanticisme en liberalisme waren de sleutelwoorden voor het Nederlandse beleid. Het was 'business as usual'. Dit boek is gebaseerd op intensief onderzoek in alle relevante Nederlandse archieven. De auteurs hadden toegang tot tot nu toe geheime regerings- en privédocumenten. Het resultaat is een verassende analyse van de Nederlandse rol in de oliecrisis in 1973.
oapen.identifier.doi10.5117/9789053564851
oapen.relation.isPublishedBydd3d1a33-0ac2-4cfe-a101-355ae1bd857a
oapen.relation.isbn9789053564851
oapen.pages320
oapen.identifier.ocn302114881


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