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dc.contributor.editorMcCain, Kevin
dc.contributor.editorStapleford, Scott
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-02T14:44:48Z
dc.date.available2021-02-02T14:44:48Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifierONIX_20210202_9780429641794_47
dc.identifier.urihttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/46439
dc.description.abstractThere are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.relation.ispartofseriesRoutledge Studies in Epistemology
dc.subject.classificationbic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy
dc.subject.classificationbic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy::HPK Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge
dc.subject.otherAndrew Reisner
dc.subject.otherAnne Meylan
dc.subject.otherAnthony Robert Booth
dc.subject.otherbelief
dc.subject.otherClayton Littlejohn
dc.subject.otherdialogical foundationalism
dc.subject.otherdoxastic dilemma
dc.subject.otherdoxastic duties
dc.subject.otherEma Sullivan-Bissett
dc.subject.otherepistemic duties
dc.subject.otherepistemic normativity
dc.subject.otherepistemic obligation
dc.subject.otherepistemic tension
dc.subject.otherepistemology
dc.subject.otherevidence
dc.subject.otherfunctions
dc.subject.otherimplicit bias
dc.subject.otherJennifer Lackey
dc.subject.otherJonathan Matheson
dc.subject.otherKevin McCain
dc.subject.otherLindsay Rettler
dc.subject.otherLisa Bortolotti
dc.subject.otherLuis Oliveira
dc.subject.otherMark T. Nelson
dc.subject.otherMatthias Steup
dc.subject.otherMiriam Schleifer McCormick
dc.subject.otherobligation
dc.subject.otheropen-mindedness
dc.subject.otherought to believe
dc.subject.otherought to reflect
dc.titleEpistemic Duties
dc.title.alternativeNew Arguments, New Angles
dc.typebook
oapen.identifier.doi10.4324/9780429030215
oapen.relation.isPublishedBy7b3c7b10-5b1e-40b3-860e-c6dd5197f0bb
oapen.relation.hasChapter69ed54ce-ccfb-41d0-9433-e8aa0da37ae8
oapen.relation.hasChapter69ed54ce-ccfb-41d0-9433-e8aa0da37ae8
oapen.relation.isbn9780429030215
oapen.imprintRoutledge
oapen.pages314


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