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dc.contributor.authorLevy, Neil
dc.date.accessioned2021-05-31T11:58:06Z
dc.date.available2021-05-31T11:58:06Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.urihttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/48872
dc.description.abstractThere is a near universal consensus that the bearers of moral responsibility are the individuals we identify with proper names. I suggest that if we take the exercise of agency as a guide to the identification of agents, we may find that agents sometimes extend into the world: they may be constituted by several individuals and/or by institutions. These extended agents may be responsible for morally significant outcomes. I argue that institutions or extended agents may also be responsible for the failure of individuals to satisfy the epistemic conditions on moral responsibility. Individuals may believe virtuously but falsely, due to the way in which cues to reliability are socially distributed. I conclude by suggesting that a focus on individual responsibility may have distracted us from the urgent task of reforming the institutional actors responsible for widespread ignorance about morally significant facts.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subject.classificationbic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophyen_US
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophyen_US
dc.subject.othermoral responsibility; socializing responsibilityen_US
dc.titleChapter 7 Socializing Responsibilityen_US
dc.typechapter
oapen.relation.isPublishedByb9501915-cdee-4f2a-8030-9c0b187854b2en_US
oapen.relation.isPartOfBook21946293-b4d2-46b2-98a7-43c9ab1bc486en_US
oapen.relation.isFundedByd859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfden_US
oapen.collectionWellcomeen_US
oapen.pages20en_US
oapen.place.publicationOxforden_US


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