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dc.contributor.authorShepherd, Joshua
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-07T12:35:04Z
dc.date.available2021-06-07T12:35:04Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.urihttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/49427
dc.description.abstractDebates surrounding free will are notorious for their intractability. This is so in spite of the fact that, even at a fairly fine grain of analysis, competing views on the nature of free will are well understood. Why can’t philosophers find common ground? One line of thought that has emerged fairly recently draws on the psychology of concepts. The general idea is that an explanation for persistent disagreement about free will, and perhaps guidance toward resolution, might be found by exploring the psychological roots of “our concept” of free will—for example, those psychological factors that underlie our tendencies to say, of some bit of human behavior, that it was performed of an agent’s own free will, or not.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subject.classificationbic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophyen_US
dc.subject.otherfree will; psychologyen_US
dc.titleChapter 4 The Folk Psychological Roots of Free Willen_US
dc.typechapter
oapen.relation.isPublishedBy066d8288-86e4-4745-ad2c-4fa54a6b9b7ben_US
oapen.relation.isPartOfBook9421e6b5-b64b-4206-b467-8510b6ea497aen_US
oapen.relation.isFundedByd859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfden_US
oapen.collectionWellcomeen_US
oapen.pages14en_US
oapen.place.publicationLondonen_US


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