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dc.contributor.authorPugh, Jonathan
dc.contributor.authorKahane, Guy
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-17T09:44:08Z
dc.date.available2021-06-17T09:44:08Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.urihttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/49607
dc.description.abstractWe consider a strategy for justifying bio-conservative opposition to enhancement according to which we should resist radical departures from human nature, not because human nature possesses any intrinsic value, but because it is our nature. The idea is that we can be partial to humanity in the same way that common sense morality allows us to be partial to self, family, lovers, friends or our country. Whilst a similar idea was suggested by Bernard Williams and Jerry Cohen, it was not fully developed, and their arguments fail to mount a serious challenge to many forms of enhancement. We explore a better approach, drawing on recent literature about the nature and grounds of partiality, and attempt to elucidate what partiality for humanity might plausibly involve. We argue, however, that even if such partiality for humanity is defensible, it can at most only set limits on enhancement.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subject.classificationbic Book Industry Communication::P Mathematics & science::PS Biology, life sciences::PSB Biochemistryen_US
dc.subject.otherhuman enhancement; bioconservativesen_US
dc.titleChapter 12 Partiality for Humanity and Enhancementen_US
dc.typechapter
oapen.relation.isPublishedByb9501915-cdee-4f2a-8030-9c0b187854b2en_US
oapen.relation.isPartOfBook4df2449a-506a-4796-b39b-00c16041ac29en_US
oapen.relation.isFundedByd859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfden_US
oapen.collectionWellcomeen_US
oapen.pages11en_US
oapen.place.publicationOxforden_US


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