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dc.contributor.authorDouglas, Thomas
dc.contributor.authorForsberg, Lisa
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-14T14:07:31Z
dc.date.available2022-04-14T14:07:31Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.urihttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/54057
dc.description.abstractMany states recognize a legal right to bodily integrity, understood as a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s body. Recently, some have called for the recognition of an analogous legal right to mental integrity: a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s mind. In this chapter, we describe and distinguish three different rationales for recognizing such a right. The first appeals to case-based intuitions to establish a distinctive duty not to interfere with others’ minds; the second holds that, if we accept a legal right to bodily integrity, then we must, on pain of philosophical inconsistency, accept a case for an analogous right over the mind; and the third holds that recent technological developments create a need for a legal right to mental integrity.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::P Mathematics and Science::PS Biology, life sciences::PSA Life sciences: general issuesen_US
dc.subject.othermental integrity; legal righten_US
dc.titleChapter 8 Three Rationales for a Legal Right to Mental Integrityen_US
dc.typechapter
oapen.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-030-69277-3_8en_US
oapen.relation.isPublishedBy6c6992af-b843-4f46-859c-f6e9998e40d5en_US
oapen.relation.isPartOfBookad387141-94f3-455c-9cb3-3fb5645c7280en_US
oapen.relation.isFundedBy178e65b9-dd53-4922-b85c-0aaa74fce079en_US
oapen.relation.isbn9783030692766en_US
oapen.collectionEuropean Research Council (ERC)en_US
oapen.pages23en_US
oapen.grant.number819757
oapen.grant.programProtMind


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