Dynamic Incentives for Optimal Control of Competitive Power Systems
| dc.contributor.author | Kölsch, Lukas | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-10-18T11:15:33Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-10-18T11:15:33Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/58901 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This work presents a real-time dynamic pricing framework for future electricity markets. Deduced by first-principles analysis of physical, economic, and communication constraints within the power system, the proposed feedback control mechanism ensures both closed-loop system stability and economic efficiency at any given time. The resulting price signals are able to incentivize competitive market participants to eliminate spatio-temporal shortages in power supply quickly and purposively. | en_US |
| dc.language | English | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Karlsruher Beiträge zur Regelungs- und Steuerungstechnik | en_US |
| dc.subject.classification | thema EDItEUR::T Technology, Engineering, Agriculture, Industrial processes::TH Energy technology and engineering::THR Electrical engineering | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | Strommarkt; Dynamische Optimierung; Spieltheorie; Nichtlinearer Reglerentwurf; Mathematische Modellbildung; Electricity Market; Dynamic Optimization; Game Theory; Nonlinear Control; Mathematical Modeling | en_US |
| dc.title | Dynamic Incentives for Optimal Control of Competitive Power Systems | en_US |
| dc.type | book | |
| oapen.identifier.doi | 10.5445/KSP/1000147941 | en_US |
| oapen.relation.isPublishedBy | 44e29711-8d53-496b-85cc-3d10c9469be9 | en_US |
| oapen.series.number | 17 | en_US |
| oapen.pages | 288 | en_US |
