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dc.contributor.authorBrown, Deborah
dc.contributor.authorKey, Brian
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-27T17:12:27Z
dc.date.available2023-11-27T17:12:27Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifierONIX_20231127_9791221501698_5
dc.identifier.urihttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/85595
dc.description.abstractIn arguing against the likelihood of consciousness in non-human animals, Descartes advances a slippery slope argument that if thought were attributed to any one animal, it would have to be attributed to all, which is absurd. This paper examines the foundations of Thomas Willis’ comparative neuroanatomy against the background of Descartes’ slippery slope argument against animal consciousness. Inspired by Gassendi’s ideas about the corporeal soul, Thomas Willis distinguished between neural circuitry responsible for reflex behaviour and that responsible for cognitively or consciously mediated behaviour. This afforded Willis a non-arbitrary basis for distinguishing between animals with thought and consciousness and those without, a methodology which retains currency for neuroscience today.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.relation.ispartofseriesKnowledge and its Histories
dc.subject.otherRené Descartes
dc.subject.otherThomas Willis
dc.subject.otherconsciousness
dc.subject.otheranimal soul
dc.subject.otherstructure-determines-function principle
dc.subject.otherimmortality
dc.titleChapter Foundations of Human and Animal Sensory Awareness: Descartes and Willis
dc.typechapter
oapen.identifier.doi10.36253/979-12-215-0169-8.06
oapen.relation.isPublishedBybf65d21a-78e5-4ba2-983a-dbfa90962870
oapen.relation.isbn9791221501698
oapen.series.number1
oapen.pages19
oapen.place.publicationFlorence


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