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dc.contributor.authorWashida, Hidekuni
dc.date.accessioned2023-12-12T09:58:43Z
dc.date.available2023-12-12T09:58:43Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.urihttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/86062
dc.description.abstractThis chapter explores how the BN had transformed the limited pool of mobilized votes into legislative dominance by tactical gerrymandering and malapportionment. Through the systematic analyses of an originally constructed GIS database of electoral boundaries, this chapter reveals that the optimal gerrymandering strategy under authoritarian party dominance deviates from the conventional wisdom of crack and pack. Specifically, the BN had cracked its supporting base and diffused opposition votes without packing. Moreover, the chapter also demonstrates that wide discretion over mapmaking enabled the leaders to selectively overrepresent their party’s supporting base. It also considers the unexpected negative consequences of redistricting.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subject.otherQuantitative; UMNO; Barisan Nasional; Mahathir; Najiben_US
dc.titleChapter 7 Manufacturing legislative dominanceen_US
dc.title.alternativeGerrymandering and malapportionmenten_US
dc.typechapter
oapen.identifier.doi10.4324/9781315206752-7en_US
oapen.relation.isPublishedBy7b3c7b10-5b1e-40b3-860e-c6dd5197f0bben_US
oapen.relation.isPartOfBook55a172a4-c9cc-435f-867f-b3366517a7been_US
oapen.relation.isbn9781138634510en_US
oapen.relation.isbn9780367585112en_US
oapen.imprintRoutledgeen_US
oapen.pages33en_US


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