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dc.contributor.authorRichter, Michael
dc.contributor.authorRubinstein, Ariel
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-26T09:46:38Z
dc.date.available2024-04-26T09:46:38Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.identifier.urihttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/90034
dc.description.abstractWhile current economic theory focuses on prices and games, this book models economic settings where harmony is established through one of the following societal conventions: • A power relation according to which stronger agents are able to force weaker ones to do things against their will. • A norm that categorizes actions as permissible or forbidden. • A status relation over alternatives which limits each agent's choices. • Systematic biases in agents' preferences. These four conventions are analysed using simple and mathematically straightforward models, without any pretensions regarding direct applied usefulness. While we do not advocate for the adoption of any of these conventions specifically – we do advocate that when modelling an economic situation, alternative equilibrium notions should be considered, rather than automatically reaching for the familiar approaches of prices or games.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economicsen_US
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economics::KCA Economic theory and philosophyen_US
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economics::KCK Behavioural economicsen_US
dc.subject.otherEconomic Theory;Models;Prices;Games;Agents;Equilibriumen_US
dc.titleNo Prices No Games!en_US
dc.title.alternativeFour Economic Modelsen_US
dc.typebook
oapen.identifier.doi10.11647/OBP.0404en_US
oapen.relation.isPublishedBy23117811-c361-47b4-8b76-2c9b160c9a8ben_US
oapen.relation.isbn9781805113089en_US
oapen.relation.isbn9781805113096en_US
oapen.pages154en_US
oapen.place.publicationCambridgeen_US


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