Climate Games
External Review of Whole Manuscript
Experiments on How People Prevent Disaster
dc.contributor.author | Andrews, Talbot M. | |
dc.contributor.author | Delton, Andrew W. | |
dc.contributor.author | Kline, Reuben | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2025-01-31T13:28:34Z | |
dc.date.available | 2025-01-31T13:28:34Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024 | |
dc.identifier | ONIX_20250131_9780472904297_8 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/98129 | |
dc.description.abstract | Can humanity work together to mitigate the effects of climate change? Climate Games argues we can. This book brings together a decade and a half of experimentation, conducted by researchers around the world, which shows that people can and will work together to prevent disasters like climate change. These experiments, called economic games, put money on the line to create laboratory disasters. Participants must work together by spending a bit of money now to prevent themselves from losing even more money in the future. Will people sacrifice their own money to prevent disaster? Can people make wise decisions? And can people decide wisely on behalf of others? The answer is a resounding yes. Yet real climate change is a complex social dilemma involving the world’s nearly eight billion inhabitants. In the real world, the worst effects of climate change are likely to be felt by developing countries, while most of the decisions will be made by rich, industrialized countries. And while the world as a whole would be better off if all nations reduced their greenhouse gas emissions, any given nation could decide it would be even better off if it continued emitting and let other nations take care of the problem. These disaster experiments test how real people respond to climate change’s unique constellation of challenges and deliver a positive message: People will prevent disaster. | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.subject.classification | thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government | |
dc.subject.classification | thema EDItEUR::R Earth Sciences, Geography, Environment, Planning::RN The environment::RND Environmental policy and protocols | |
dc.subject.classification | thema EDItEUR::R Earth Sciences, Geography, Environment, Planning::RN The environment::RNP Pollution and threats to the environment::RNPG Climate change | |
dc.subject.classification | thema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economics::KCV Economics of specific sectors::KCVG Environmental economics | |
dc.subject.classification | thema EDItEUR::P Mathematics and Science::PB Mathematics::PBU Optimization::PBUD Game theory | |
dc.subject.other | Climate change, disaster, experiment, economic games, public goods, social dilemma, threshold public goods, geoengineering, climate change mitigation, cooperation, lab experiments, common pool resource, behavioral economics, intergenerational, political economy, emissions, environmental politics, environmental psychology, altruism, help, international, laboratory experiment, investing | |
dc.title | Climate Games | |
dc.title.alternative | Experiments on How People Prevent Disaster | |
dc.type | book | |
oapen.identifier.doi | 10.3998/mpub.12089759 | |
oapen.relation.isPublishedBy | e07ce9b5-7a46-4096-8f0c-bc1920e3d889 | |
oapen.relation.isbn | 9780472904297 | |
oapen.relation.isbn | 9780472076635 | |
oapen.relation.isbn | 9780472056637 | |
oapen.imprint | University of Michigan Press | |
oapen.pages | 216 | |
peerreview.anonymity | Double-anonymised | |
peerreview.id | d98bf225-990a-4ac4-acf4-fd7bf0dfb00c | |
peerreview.open.review | No | |
peerreview.publish.responsibility | Scientific or Editorial Board | |
peerreview.review.decision | Yes | |
peerreview.review.stage | Pre-publication | |
peerreview.review.type | Full text | |
peerreview.reviewer.type | External peer reviewer | |
peerreview.title | External Review of Whole Manuscript | |
oapen.review.comments | The proposal was selected by the acquisitions editor who invited a full manuscript. The full manuscript was reviewed by two external readers using a double-blind process. Based on the acquisitions editor recommendation, the external reviews, and their own analysis, the Executive Committee (Editorial Board) of U-M Press approved the project for publication. |