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dc.contributor.authorPeels, Rik
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-02T15:02:16Z
dc.date.available2021-02-02T15:02:16Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifierONIX_20210202_9780429641794_chpt_40
dc.identifier.urihttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/46488
dc.description.abstractThere are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.relation.ispartofseriesRoutledge Studies in Epistemology
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophyen_US
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledgeen_US
dc.subject.otherAndrew Reisner
dc.subject.otherAnne Meylan
dc.subject.otherAnthony Robert Booth
dc.subject.otherbelief
dc.subject.otherClayton Littlejohn
dc.subject.otherdialogical foundationalism
dc.subject.otherdoxastic dilemma
dc.subject.otherdoxastic duties
dc.subject.otherEma Sullivan-Bissett
dc.subject.otherepistemic duties
dc.subject.otherepistemic normativity
dc.subject.otherepistemic obligation
dc.subject.otherepistemic tension
dc.subject.otherepistemology
dc.subject.otherevidence
dc.subject.otherfunctions
dc.subject.otherimplicit bias
dc.subject.otherJennifer Lackey
dc.subject.otherJonathan Matheson
dc.subject.otherKevin McCain
dc.subject.otherLindsay Rettler
dc.subject.otherLisa Bortolotti
dc.subject.otherLuis Oliveira
dc.subject.otherMark T. Nelson
dc.subject.otherMatthias Steup
dc.subject.otherMiriam Schleifer McCormick
dc.subject.otherobligation
dc.subject.otheropen-mindedness
dc.subject.otherought to believe
dc.subject.otherought to reflect
dc.titleChapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief
dc.typechapter
oapen.relation.isPublishedBy7b3c7b10-5b1e-40b3-860e-c6dd5197f0bb
oapen.relation.isPartOfBook08bb2f42-63ba-41e2-b1d3-2a6b5bc82182
oapen.relation.isPartOfBook08bb2f42-63ba-41e2-b1d3-2a6b5bc82182
oapen.imprintRoutledge
oapen.pages18


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