Logo Oapen
  • Search
  • Join
    • Deposit
    • For Librarians
    • For Publishers
    • For Researchers
    • Funders
    • Resources
    • OAPEN
    • For Librarians
    • For Publishers
    • For Researchers
    • Funders
    • Resources
    • OAPEN
    View Item 
    •   OAPEN Home
    • View Item
    •   OAPEN Home
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief

    Proposal review

    Thumbnail
    Download PDF Viewer
    Author(s)
    Peels, Rik
    Language
    English
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.
    Book
    Epistemic Duties; Epistemic Duties
    URI
    https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/46488
    Keywords
    Andrew Reisner; Anne Meylan; Anthony Robert Booth; belief; Clayton Littlejohn; dialogical foundationalism; doxastic dilemma; doxastic duties; Ema Sullivan-Bissett; epistemic duties; epistemic normativity; epistemic obligation; epistemic tension; epistemology; evidence; functions; implicit bias; Jennifer Lackey; Jonathan Matheson; Kevin McCain; Lindsay Rettler; Lisa Bortolotti; Luis Oliveira; Mark T. Nelson; Matthias Steup; Miriam Schleifer McCormick; obligation; open-mindedness; ought to believe; ought to reflect
    Publisher
    Taylor & Francis
    Publisher website
    https://taylorandfrancis.com/
    Publication date and place
    2020
    Imprint
    Routledge
    Series
    Routledge Studies in Epistemology,
    Classification
    Philosophy
    Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge
    Pages
    18
    Rights
    https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
    • Imported or submitted locally

    Browse

    All of OAPENSubjectsPublishersLanguagesCollections

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Export

    Repository metadata
    Logo Oapen
    • For Librarians
    • For Publishers
    • For Researchers
    • Funders
    • Resources
    • OAPEN

    Newsletter

    • Subscribe to our newsletter
    • view our news archive

    Follow us on

    License

    • If not noted otherwise all contents are available under Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)

    Credits

    • logo EU
    • This project received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 683680, 810640, 871069 and 964352.

    OAPEN is based in the Netherlands, with its registered office in the National Library in The Hague.

    Director: Niels Stern

    Address:
    OAPEN Foundation
    Prins Willem-Alexanderhof 5
    2595 BE The Hague
    Postal address:
    OAPEN Foundation
    P.O. Box 90407
    2509 LK The Hague

    Websites:
    OAPEN Home: www.oapen.org
    OAPEN Library: library.oapen.org
    DOAB: www.doabooks.org

     

     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Differen formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    A logged-in user can export up to 15000 items. If you're not logged in, you can export no more than 500 items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.