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dc.contributor.authorBarta, Zsófia
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-23T05:33:37Z
dc.date.available2021-09-23T05:33:37Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.urihttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/50673
dc.description.abstractWhy do rich countries flirt with fiscal disaster? Why did affluent countries – like Belgium, Greece, Italy or Japan – persistently accumulate so much debt between the 1970s and the 2000s, in times of peace and prosperity, that they became vulnerable and exposed themselves to the risk of default? In the past three decades, an extensive scholarly consensus emerged around the view that the answer is fiscal indiscipline, the lack of sufficient concern for budgetary constraints from policy makers as they try to please voters. Zsófia Barta argues that explaining why some countries accumulate substantial amounts of debt for decades hinges on understanding the conditions required to allow policy makers to successfully put into place painful adjustment measures.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPS International relationsen_US
dc.subject.otherPolitical Science
dc.subject.otherInternational Relations
dc.titleIn The Red
dc.title.alternativeThe Politics of Public Debt Accumulation in Developed Countries
dc.typebook
oapen.relation.isPublishedBye07ce9b5-7a46-4096-8f0c-bc1920e3d889
oapen.relation.isFundedByb818ba9d-2dd9-4fd7-a364-7f305aef7ee9
oapen.relation.isbn9780472900923
oapen.collectionKnowledge Unlatched (KU)
oapen.imprintUniversity of Michigan Press
oapen.identifierhttps://openresearchlibrary.org/viewer/d2621043-a6cc-40ac-ac89-e3d154dbb2e3
oapen.identifier.isbn9780472900923
grantor.number100858


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