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    Bad Beliefs

    Why They Happen to Good People

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    Author(s)
    Levy, Neil
    Collection
    Wellcome
    Language
    English
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    Abstract
    Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This book presents an alternative account. It argues that bad beliefs arise from genuinely rational processes. We’ve missed the rationality of bad beliefs because we’ve failed to recognize the ubiquity of the higher-order evidence that shapes beliefs, and the rationality of being guided by this evidence. The book argues that attention to higher-order evidence should lead us to rethink both how minds are best changed and the ethics of changing them: we should come to see that nudging—at least usually—changes belief (and behavior) by presenting rational agents with genuine evidence, and is therefore fully respectful of intellectual agency. We needn’t rethink Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy and rationality, but we should reshape them to take account of our deeply social epistemic agency.
    URI
    https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/52638
    Keywords
    belief, evidence, rationality, autonomy, nudging
    DOI
    10.1093/oso/9780192895325.001.0001
    ISBN
    9780192895325
    Publisher
    Oxford University Press
    Publisher website
    https://global.oup.com/
    Publication date and place
    Oxford, 2021
    Grantor
    • Wellcome Trust - WT104848/Z14/Z
    • Macquarie University
    Classification
    Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge
    Ethics and moral philosophy
    Social and political philosophy
    Pages
    224
    Rights
    https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
    • Imported or submitted locally

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    License

    • If not noted otherwise all contents are available under Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)

    Credits

    • logo EU
    • This project received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 683680, 810640, 871069 and 964352.

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