Logo Oapen
  • Join
    • Deposit
    • For Librarians
    • For Publishers
    • For Researchers
    • Funders
    • Resources
    • OAPEN
        View Item 
        •   OAPEN Home
        • View Item
        •   OAPEN Home
        • View Item
        JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

        Chapter Honour, social capital and alternative currencies: the “leisting” custom in the cities of the Late Medieval Low Countries and Rhineland

        Thumbnail
        Download PDF Viewer
        Web Shop
        Author(s)
        de Meulemeester, Jean-Luc
        Kusman, Pierre-David
        Language
        English
        Show full item record
        Abstract
        In this paper we analyse a specific legal clause inserted in debt contracts in the late Medieval Low Countries: the ‘leistinge’ custom. It implied personal sureties, i.e., vassals or councillors of the debtor (and sometimes himself) who had to go sojourning in an inn for an unspecified period, and there live, eat and drink conspicuously (“as good pledges should do”). This legal mechanism often implied high aristocratic debtors with, in a first stage, ecclesial creditors (as abbeys) and Italian financiers. We show how the innkeeper played an instrumental role in this framework. In Brussels, the technique fostered undoubtedly the use of alternative currencies by noble pledges to circumvent the lack of cash money or the intricacy of exchange rates. Later, this credit technique also spread among local merchants and well-off burghers as debtors and creditors, especially in Northern Low Countries as exemplified by our example of Kampen. In the latter city, this legal tool could well have been favoured by town authorities as an indirect regulation of the property market, avoiding therefore too much speculation on the urban plots during periods of expansion and works of public concern. The efficiency of this custom remains somewhat open to debate, the long-time span of its use suggesting a relative efficacy, whereas its sudden suppression (as in Kampen) hints at some abuses.
        URI
        https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/96421
        Keywords
        Hospitality economy; Debt-enforcement mechanisms; Conditional hostages; Moral economy and credit practices; Reputation based-mechanisms
        DOI
        10.36253/979-12-215-0347-0.16
        ISBN
        9791221503470, 9791221503470
        Publisher
        Firenze University Press
        Publisher website
        https://www.fupress.com/
        Publication date and place
        Florence, 2024
        Series
        Datini Studies in Economic History, 4
        Classification
        Economic history
        Pages
        34
        Rights
        https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
        • Imported or submitted locally

        Browse

        All of OAPENSubjectsPublishersLanguagesCollections

        My Account

        LoginRegister

        Export

        Repository metadata
        Logo Oapen
        • For Librarians
        • For Publishers
        • For Researchers
        • Funders
        • Resources
        • OAPEN

        Newsletter

        • Subscribe to our newsletter
        • view our news archive

        Follow us on

        License

        • If not noted otherwise all contents are available under Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)

        Credits

        • logo EU
        • This project received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 683680, 810640, 871069 and 964352.

        OAPEN is based in the Netherlands, with its registered office in the National Library in The Hague.

        Director: Niels Stern

        Address:
        OAPEN Foundation
        Prins Willem-Alexanderhof 5
        2595 BE The Hague
        Postal address:
        OAPEN Foundation
        P.O. Box 90407
        2509 LK The Hague

        Websites:
        OAPEN Home: www.oapen.org
        OAPEN Library: library.oapen.org
        DOAB: www.doabooks.org

         

         

        Export search results

        The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Differen formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

        A logged-in user can export up to 15000 items. If you're not logged in, you can export no more than 500 items.

        To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

        After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.